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Abstract 
 
This essay traces the reception of Augustine in the 20th and 21st century 
phenomenological tradition.  It gives special attention to recent monographs 
on Augustine by Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Louis Chrétien, but 
contextualises these both fore (by examining the earlier work of Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, as well as earlier and less determinative 
Augustinian engagements by Marion and Chrétien) and aft (by critically 
considering the philosophical, philological and theological implications of 
phenomenology for the study of Augustine).  The cross-fertilization of its 
study of Augustine himself and its study of the various phenomenological 
appropriations of Augustine sheds new light on the Augustinian questions of 
Platonism, ontology, and the role of Scripture in philosophy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
´Mentitur qui te totam legisse facteturµ,VLGRUHRI6HYLOOH famously says to an 
imagined Augustine:  The one who confesses that he has read all of you, lies.1  
The difficulty of approaching Augustine is first a function of the sheer 
amount of words he wrote and said, and secondly a matter of the swath of 
genres in which he wrote and said them, and thirdly a matter of the variance 
of styles, intellectual positions, and temperaments which he adopted.  Even 
if, in a mundane thought experiment, we can imagine a reader having 
brushed her eyes across all of these words, it is difficult to imagine her being 
able to make systematic sense of them all.  We always approach Augustine in 
some sort of medias res, and our understanding of him is always provisional.  
We could translate Isidore more loosely:  The best reader of Augustine is the 
one who does not deceive himself into thinking that he is reading Augustine 
entirely, or reading entirely Augustine.  Perhaps the Reformation would have 
taken a much different shape if all of his 16th century adherents would 
acknowledge this fact.  Perhaps we could make a similar case for the current 
ecumenical scene. 
 But disputes on Augustinian turf are not limited to theological and 
HFFOHVLDOFULVHV,ILQOLVWLQJ$XJXVWLQH·VH[SOLFLWDQGVHOI-conscious 
descendents, theological figures come to mind first, they are nonetheless 
followed by similarly explicit and self-consciously Augustinian philosophers:  
                                                          
1 Isidore of Seville, De natura rerum (Migne PL 83.1109).  
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'HVFDUWHV0DOHEUDQFKH:LWWJHQVWHLQ«$Q\QXPEHURIWKHRORJLFDODQG
philosophical figures can function as an introduction to Augustine, and more 
than an introduction, a lens.  The present essay takes it as axiomatic that no 
reader approaches Augustine without such a lens, without a guide, without 
some sort of prioritization of intellectual concerns, without a canon of 
supposed greater and lesser works, without presuppositions of which 
questions are worth asking, which answers are worth entertaining, and in 
many cases which genres are worth ignoring altogether. 
 This thesis intends to introduce the phenomenological tradition as a 
lens onto the Augustinian terrain which has been emerging from continental 
Europe for the past century, and which has been especially prominent and 
coherent in the past decade.   In it I will give a sense of the contours of this 
tradition:  its intentions, its contexts, the textual ground on which it plays, its 
methodologies, and its limitations.  I will make the case that the 
phenomenological readers of Augustine have all used Augustine for 
rhetorical ends, and more decisively for philosophical ends.  I will draw 
attention to this interesting phenomenon in some of the earliest texts of the 
tradition, from Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and I will sustain this 
sort of attention into a more extended reading of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-
Louis Chrétien.  With regard to these latter thinkers, I will argue that their 
accounts of Augustine are bound at once to a theoretical fidelity to 
$XJXVWLQH·VRZQWKRXJKW² that is, they attempt to unpack what Augustine 
himself tries to communicate, independently of their own theological and 
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philosophical agenda ² and to some extent to a theoretical fidelity to their 
phenomenological forebears.  It will be the burden of much of this thesis to 
describe the specific fissures that this dual loyalty causes for their work, and 
to evaluate the success of their attempts to navigate such fissures.  In making 
this assessment, I want to make my own loyalty clear:  it lies with Augustine, 
and not with phenomenology.  I will suggest throughout this work that there 
is significant overlap between the two, and I will make a case for why this is 
so.  This work has already, in large part, been done for me by Marion and 
Chrétien themselves ² Marion in particular takes many pains to elaborate a 
´SURWR-SKHQRPHQRORJ\µSUHVHQWLQAugustine, and I find his account to 
point satisfactorily to several passages in Augustine which agree with, and 
even anticipate, certain phenomenological theses and methods.  But 
ultimately, there are points of departure from Augustine in the dogmatic 
foundational texts of phenomenology ² indeed, how could there not be, 
given the millennium-and-a-half of philosophical developments and 
departures between them? ² DQG,LQWHQGWRFDOOWKHUHDGHU·VDWWHQWLRQWR
places where I have found phenomenological shibboleths intruding on 
Augustinian shibboleths.  Even more frequently, I will argue that while a 
particular conclusion of Marion or Chrétien is correct, it only captures a part 
of the picture, and by ignoring other related conceptual or textual material, 
they risk oversimplifying Augustine.  The principle examples of this pattern 
DUH$XJXVWLQH·VmetaphysicsDQG$XJXVWLQH·VUHODWLRQVKLS to the Neo-
Platonic tradition.  Since Marion in particular fights hard against the rather 
uncontroversial nature of the latter, and the very existence of the former, I 
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am relatively forceful in my critiques of his expositions of Augustine with 
regard to both.  I have not done so with malice, but with the sincere belief 
that Marion wants to learn from Augustine, and that he closes himself off 
from such an education due to a surprisingly over-developed sense of loyalty 
to dogmatic phenomenology.  The same is true, to a lesser extent, for my 
response to Chrétien·s monograph on Augustine ² although Chrétien has 
himself outlined similar critical comments in his other works. 
This is a work on Augustine, and on his philosophical reception in 
the 20th century and beyond.  One easy way of beginning ² actually a 
surprisingly popular one ² would be to point to etymology, and say that for 
Augustine, philosophy is the love of wisdom, and then discuss what 
Augustine says about love or about wisdom.  Typically this is an excuse to 
talk a lot, sometimes without much rigor, and it tends to wind up being 
dismissive of, or wringing our hands about, what goes on in philosophy 
departments these days, lamenting that current institutional philosophy is not 
just a code for sophiology, or that philosophers do not talk enough about 
love.  Although love will certainly become a theme for this work, because it is 
DWKHPHIRU$XJXVWLQH·VSKHQRPHQRORJLFal interlocutors, I hope in my 
discussion of their work to avoid this hand-wringing.  But even the wringing 
of hands is not entirely bereft of salutary motivation:  it is not unrelated to 
one of the facets of Augustine that has been most attractive to moderns, 
namely that he wrote at least one of his major works in the first person, and 
therefore cast his philosophy into a very personal realm.  The Confessions will 
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often mention, even on the same page, both the attractions and 
shortcomings of a particular pKLORVRSKLFDOVFKRRODQG$XJXVWLQH·VVWUXJJOHV
with toothache.  There is a real sense that Augustine makes philosophy a 
SUDFWLFHSUDFWLFHGE\DFWXDOSHRSOHDQGWKDWWKH¶ORYHRIZLVGRP·DVDGHHSO\
personal quest, comparable to the love of another person for example, is 
more accessible or more exciting than the systematic acquisition, appreciation 
or rejection of various philosophical doctrines.  One of the most 
characteristic and winsome trajectories of the phenomenological tradition 
which will emerge in the present essay is the real attempt to capture this 
´livedµ nature of Augustine·s philosophy.  But the phenomenologists ² 
especially Heidegger ² overcompensate for a real or perceived overemphasis 
on Augustine·s historical and intellectual context.  This personal dimension is 
not easily separable from the more historical dimension, that which deals 
with these doctrines or schools.   
$XJXVWLQH·VELRJUDSKHr Possidius is among the first to suggest the 
approach that the phenomenologists have, in recent days, taken.  He closes 
his Vita by telling us that, whatever benefit we might get from reading 
$XJXVWLQH·VZRUNVZRXOGEHH[FHHGLQJE\VHHLQJDQGKHDULQJKLPpreach, or 
better, by having a conversation with him.2  This is not simply about 
                                                          
2 ´)URPKLVZULWLQJDVVXUHGO\LWLVPDQLIHVWWKDWWKLVSULHVWEHORYHGDQGDFFHSWDEOH
to God, lived uprightly and soberly in the faith, hope and love of the Catholic 
Church insofar as he was permitted to see it by the light of truth, and those who 
read his works on divine subjects profit thereby.  But I believe that they were able to 
derive greater good from him who heard and saw him as he spoke in person in the 
church, and especially those who knew well his manner of life among men (inter 
homines conversationemPRUHOLWHUDOO\WKRVHZKRKDGFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKKLPµ
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rhetorical charisma, sensory stimulation, or the privileging of the spoken over 
the written word,3 but about exchange and (especially) dialogue (in both 
preaching and 'intimate conversation').  Obviously this is impossible for us, 
since Augustine has been dead for some time now, but I should like to 
suggest, by way of closing this introductory chapter, that it points us to two 
sort of next best things:  on the one hand, as Marion and Chrétien have 
begun to do, to give, within our internal canon, a special place of authority to 
WKHVHUPRQVDQGELEOLFDOFRPPHQWDULHVDQGRWKHUWUDQVFULSWVRI$XJXVWLQH·V
actual speeches, and to a lesser extent the dialogues, at the relative expense of 
the more composed philosophical treatises.  And on the other hand, a way 
forward that is absent from the phenomenologists, which is that in some 
prominent passages4 Augustine suggests that certain ritual aspects of his 
philosophy (especially the sacraments) are at the heart of the question of its 
continuity or break with Platonism.  This is the question of the liturgical 
mysteries, which are formally sympathetic with certain practices in Platonism, 
but, Augustine argues, superior in what they accomplish; part of the work in 
the last chapter of this essay will be to argue that these mysteries, viewed as 
themselves philosophical, could easily find a place in continuity with the 
                                                                                                                                                
Possidius, The Life of Saint Augustine, trans. Herbert Weiskotten. New York: 
Evolution Press, 2008, 31. 
3 As is obvious from the fact that he gives us sight and conversation as relevant modes. 
4 Augustine, Contra academicos 3.42-3; cf. also De civitate dei VIII.  This book (and 
indeed the entirety of De civitate dei) is wrongly neglected in many discussions of 
$XJXVWLQH·V3ODWRQLVPLQIDYRXURIWKHRQHIDPRXVOLQHIURPConfessions and also 
the comparatively scanty treatment in De vera religione.  To rectify this neglect is a 
very peripheral interest of Chapter 5 of the present essay. 
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descriptions of Augustine that are present in the phenomenological tradition, 
particularly in the last ten years.   
In order both to critique and to advance these sorts of questions, a 
fuller account of Augustine and his relationship to the philosophies of his 
time requires the delicate balancing of Augustine·s personal life and the 
historical and philosophical contexts in which he works; the final chapter of 
this thesis attempts to sketch some of the directions that a dialogue between 
the lively phenomenologists and the sober historians might take.   In any 
event, there is a broad consensus in Anglo-American scholarship at least that, 
to whatever extent the Confessions DUHD¶VSLULWXDODXWRELRJUDSK\·WKH\DUHDW
least as much also an appreciation and a critique of ancient philosophies, cast 
in narrative form, where Mani and Cicero and Plotinus become dramatic 
heroes.  This introduction, and indeed the whole of this thesis, takes this for 
granted, although in its telling, it will emerge that the fact that the last two 
books of the Confessions are an extended exegesis of Genesis is also a part of 
that trajectory, resulting in a reading of the Confessions wherein the Bible is 
something like a philosophical text, or maybe even the philosophical text par 
excellence.  This insight is not entirely foreign to 20th century Anglo-
American readings of Augustine, but it does tend to remain implicit, and thus 
under-conceptualized.  It will be the onus of the last chapter of this work to 
FRQFHSWXDOL]HLWDQGWRORFDWHFHUWDLQHOHPHQWVRI$XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJVRI
Scripture, particularly of Genesis, as the center of his philosophy.  Such a 
ORFDWLRQDQGHYHQDYDORUL]DWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VSKLORVRSKy as scriptural, is at 
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OHDVWLPSOLFLWLQSDVVDJHVRI0DULRQ·VDQG&KUpWLHQ·VUHFHQWERRNVRQ
Augustine; I begin to pull on and to follow some of these strands in the two 
chapters of this thesis devoted to these books.  It is an impulse that I find 
winsome and persuasive in these recent phenomenological readings of 
Augustine, and it is only one among many impulses which I believe to have 
at least some merit.  But unless there is some literature devoted to this 
question that I have entirely missed, these readings have been almost entirely 
ignored by the Anglo-American guild of Augustinian scholarship.  A 
secondary part of my intention in this thesis, then, is to make a case to this 
guild that the Augustines of Husserl, Heidegger, Marion and Chrétien are 
worth their time, even, perhaps, a necessary supplement or corrective to the 
work that they do.   A central disclaimer applies here.  Certainly some readers 
of Augustine ² those very conservative scholars5 who continue to ignore the 
burgeoning field of scholarship emphasizing the distance between Augustine 
and Descartes ² will be more scandalized by the phenomenological 
Augustine than the increasingly mainstream scholars, in America, Europe, 
and the United Kingdom, who insist that Augustine does not present a 
simple interiorist philosophy.6  The long-standing stereotype, that Augustine 
                                                          
5 I think primarily of Philip Cary, who has published a trilogy of popularizing books 
($XJXVWLQH·V,QYHQWLRQRIWKH,QQHU6HOI7KH/HJDF\RID&KULVWLDQ3ODWRQLVW. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, and Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, and Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of 
([WHUQDO7KLQJVLQ$XJXVWLQH·V7KRXJKW. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) which have gained a certain amount of traction in American religious 
studies departments, although the broader world of Augustinian scholarship has 
ignored or refuted him. 
6 Cf. Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010; John Milbank, ´Sacred Triads: Augustine and the IndoǦEuropean Soul.µ 
Modern 
  
 
 
13 
 
is an uncomplicated figure in a straightforward trajectory of interiorist 
philosophers from Plotinus to Descartes, all of whom reject the material 
world in favor of a privileged immaterial soul, has been solidly rejected by 
Augustinian scholarship.  But this has not entirely convinced the historians 
of philosophy who scarcely have the time for a cursory reading of 
Augustine·s most prominent and obviously ´philosophicalµ texts, let alone a 
serious engagement with philosophical themes in his ´theologicalµ texts, or 
certainly his sermons and interpretations of Scripture.  The recent  
phenomenological engagements with Augustine, both in their openness to 
these more historically obscure texts, and in their ideological commitment to 
a cross-fertilization of topics traditionally separated by disciplinary 
boundaries of philosophy and theology, can serve as an ally to the Anglo-
American and the continental scholars of Augustine.  Both camps share an 
understanding of Augustine as a socially situated thinker, whose philosophy 
emerges in service not only to God, but to a community:  the 
phenomenologists view this community first in terms of the created universe, 
where the scholars will tend to prioritize the Church, but both contexts 
eschew an individualist or interiorist reading of Augustine.  To this extent, I 
am claiming that serious readers of Augustine will benefit from seriously 
                                                                                                                                                
Theology 13 (1997): 451Ǧ474; Rowan Williams, ´´6DSLHQWLDDQGWKH7ULQLW\
5HIOHFWLRQVRQ'H7ULQLWDWHµ,Q&ROOHFWDQHD$XJXVWLQLDQDHG%HUQDUG Bruning, J. 
van Houtem and Mathijs Lamberigts, 317Ǧ332.  Louvain: Leuven Press, 1990; 
Michael Hanby,  Augustine and Modernity. New York: Routledge, 2003.  Lest the 
reader note that I pull four titles from four ideologically and institutionally related 
readers of Augustine, I·d like to assert that the entirely separate, very sober and 
historically-minded, and extremely well-regarded book by Stephen Menn comes to 
precisely the same conclusions as most of the above thinkers:  see his Descartes and 
Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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reading the phenomenological treatments of Augustine; they might not find 
any paradigm-shifting insights in this thesis, but they will certainly find small 
bits of creative and persuasive philology herein, and perhaps some paths to 
surprising allies. 
Are Marion and Chrétien essential to this non-interiorist project?  Is 
there something in their methodology or their concern that entirely escapes 
this project?  Or are they merely interesting, provocative, and at best able to 
overlap with the best Anglo-American readings?   There is, from my 
perspective, no question that Marion and Chrétien have some good insights 
into Augustine.  But to what extent are these insights essentially 
phenomenological, and to what extent only accidentally so, or at least only 
indirectly bound to the practical and methodological constrictions of 
phenomenology?   Put even more bluntly, is phenomenology itself of any 
value in the reading of Augustine? 
TKHDQVZHURIP\DUJXPHQWLV¶QR·RUDWOHDVWRQO\¶\HVZLWK
VLJQLILFDQWUHVHUYDWLRQV·,WZLOOEHP\DUJXPHQWWKDWIURP+eidegger on, 
phenomenology has a side-effect of hermeneutical carefulness, an 
inauguration of hermeneutics as at once a serious and an imaginative, even 
playful, enterprise, and that it is this care, rather than any dogmatic assertions 
about metaphysics, for example, that marks phenomenological readings of 
Augustine both as distinctively phenomenological, and as worthy of 
consideration within non-phenomenological circles.  So the first substantial 
chapter, in arguing that Husserl and Heidegger have never been given 
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sufficient credit for their restoration of temporality to a central place in their 
readings of Augustine, will not hesitate to distance itself from a more rigidly 
doctrinaire reading of these figures as philosophically interesting in their own 
right.  This will no doubt be unpopular among phenomenologists, and to 
them I offer an apology.  Likewise, my reading of Marion on Augustine will 
often suggest that an overly pre-GHWHUPLQHGDOOHUJ\WR¶RQWR-WKHRORJ\·FDQDW
times derail his otherwise solid interpretation of Augustine, and further, that 
this allergy is almost entirely accidental to what Marion really would like to 
VD\DERXW$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRIWKHVHOI,KHVLWDWHWRTXDQWLI\EXWLI,ZHUH
forced to, I would estimate that fully 95% of MariRQ·VSURMHFWGRHVQRW
depend at all on his allegedly determinative decision to substitute 
¶SKHQRPHQRORJ\·IRU¶PHWDSK\VLFV·DVWKHSULVPWKURXJKZKLFKZHUHDG
Augustine, and that the remaining 5% (for which Marion will no doubt be 
most sharply criticized from Anglo-American quarters) is indeed hard to find 
H[HJHWLFDOVXSSRUWIRULQ$XJXVWLQH·VZULWLQJVWKHPVHOYHV7KLVLVZK\,JLYH
Chrétien the more valorized place in my considerations, notwithstanding his 
SODFHPHQWLQWKH´WUDGLWLRQµIRU&KUpWLHQLVQRW nearly so bound to the 
Heideggerean project of denying some sort of speculative or metaphysical 
GLPHQVLRQWR$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDQGVRKLVHTXDOO\LQVLJKWIXOKHUPHQHXWLFDO
approach to Augustine is not nearly so often derailed by a prior 
methodological (even ideological) commitment.  The final chapter of this 
essay is in keeping with this trajectory, which allows phenomenology an 
important instrumental role in the interpretation of Augustine, but denies it 
the power to set an ideological agenda for Augustine before he is even, so to 
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say, allowed to speak.  It will, as I have already intimated, tend more to the 
speculative and less to the hermeneutical, and will gesture towards directions 
in Augustinian scholarship which are congenial, I should think, both to the 
Anglo-$PHULFDQ¶QRQ-LQWHULRUL]LQJ·WUDGLWLRQRIUHDGLQJ$XJXVWLQHDQGWRWKH
phenomenological camp, but which neither of them have conceptualized 
sufficiently. 
In other words, my argument is more centrally directed at the 
phenomenologists themselves.   I will argue that the general contour of their 
approach to Augustine is impressively monomaniacal:  the entire tradition 
insists on reading Augustine primarily through the prism of the relationship 
between the self and the world, and reading subjects and objects as co-
constitutive poles of manifestation.  The sheer quantity of Augustinian text 
that they are able to shoehorn into this framework, and with a generally 
persuasive output, proves that their approach is intriguing and 
underdeveloped.  But the degree to which they have had to shift 
phenomenological dogma in the direction of Augustinian exploration proves 
that more work is still to be done.  Phenomenology can bring, indeed has 
brought, some significant if accidental light to Augustine·s life and text; but 
in the end, this thesis suggests that more surprisingly and more centrally, 
Augustine is currently in the process of converting and transfiguring 
phenomenology itself.  
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II. Husserl and Heidegger on Augustine  
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I examine two competing early phenomenological readings of 
Augustine.  I argue that the primary point of contention between Husserl and 
Heidegger on exegetical grounds functions as an emblem of the larger 
GLYLVLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRWKLQNHUV·SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOV\VWHPV+XVVHUO·V
reading of Augustine and the interior homo maintains a fundamentally subject-
oriented phenomenology under the guise of the epochéZKLOVW+HLGHJJHU·V
more sustained reading of Confessions X elaborates a symbiotic relationship 
between subject and object.  But the similarities between their accounts are 
ultimately more important for the current project.  Both thinkers rightly 
establish temporality as a determinative question for how one reads 
Augustine, and for how one practices phenomenology; both arbitrarily 
exclude theology and Greek metaphysics from their considerations, in an 
attempt to preserve a supposedly pure arena for phenomena to assert 
themselves.  In the end, since Heidegger has been more decisive in the 
tradition of phenomenological encounters with Augustine, and since his 
reading of Augustine is more superficially coherent, I begin here to argue for 
WKHQHFHVVLW\RIDPRUHULJRURXVHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$XJXVWLQH·VWKHRORJLFDO
metaphysics. 
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Husserl makes prominent but elliptical use of Augustine 
 
First, a disclaimer:  this section of this chapter might be frustrating 
for some readers.  Unlike the section on Heidegger which follows it, and 
unlike the subsequent chapters on Marion and on Chrétien, I have here a 
scarcity of material.  So far as I have been able to determine, Augustine 
appears with some significance only twice in the Husserlian canon:  very 
famously as the closing quotation of the Cartesian Meditations, and less 
famously as the introductory quotation of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness.  Some words of self-justification are thus in order, if only to 
clarify the use I make of Husserl and his importance to this project.  In part 
this use and this importance are limited to methodological foils; only in the 
dim light of +XVVHUO·VRII-hand (if not to say sloppy) references to Augustine 
can the brilliance of the latter thinkers and their close attention to what 
Augustine says and how he says it shine.  But lest it seem disingenuous or 
radically uncharitable to castigate Husserl for not providing me with an 
extended reading of a fourth-century bishop ² how could he have known 
that the tradition he inaugurated in the face of his cultural and academic 
climate precisely to cast off tradition and concern for figures in the history of 
philosophy would have then fought so rigorously to claim certain historical 
figures as their own? ² I have seen it preferable to assume the most about 
+XVVHUO·VXVHVRI$XJXVWLQH0RUHSUHFLVHO\,KDYHLQPLQGWKHIROORZLQJ
hermeneutic rule:  if Husserl restricts himself to only a few citations of only a 
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few historical figures, we ought to read those citations as particularly 
important to Husserl, and to read them in their context as though they are 
intended to disclose something essential of the early phenomenological 
project.  That my quasi-chronological approach has placed these relatively 
scant passages at the outset of my project puts the whole of the project, as 
any rhetorician knows, at risk; therefore I ask the reader for some measure of 
charity.  If it seems to a particular reader that I make Husserl to say more 
WKDQKHVD\VRUZRUVHWKDW,DPJXLOW\RIPDNLQJ+XVVHUO·VOLPLWHG
engagement with Augustine a straw-man through whom the entire 
phenomenological tradition can be attacked, let me say first that such is far 
from my intent, and second that such a reader will likely be happier skipping 
ahead to the less putative dealings with Heidegger, Marion and Chrétien. All 
disclaimers aside:  the relatively scarce Husserlian references to Augustine 
show, if not a decisive preoccupation with Augustine or Augustinianism, at 
WKHOHDVWDQDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIDQRYHUODSLQFRQFHUQVEHWZHHQ$XJXVWLQH·V
early attempts to outline and defend a certain conception of subjectivity 
within a broader determining context of temporality.  Further, as the 
following exegetical account will suggest, the fact that these references are 
made specifically to Augustine, while Husserl could have accomplished a 
similar task with reference instead to Plato or to Plotinus, indicates a degree 
of openness to a dialogue with theology, or even a qualified concession that 
phenomenology is in some part theological in its very constitution.  
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 Of the two references to Augustine in the Husserlian canon which 
are significant to the present project, one is more famous than the other:  the 
closing line of the Cartesian Meditations.  Although the other reference (the 
opening of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness) is more directly 
relevant to this thesis, more substantial, and more predictive of the use of 
Augustine which his heirs will make, I here begin with the more famous 
quotation, if for no other reason than that Husserl himself seems to have 
viewed this as more important ² he has, after all, quoted it (which is itself 
significant), in Latin (this may only be a pretension, but Husserl is not prone 
WRHSLJUDSKVVRWKHVW\OHPLJKWEHWUD\VRPHWKLQJRIWKHVXEVWDQFH·V
importance to him), and has done so at the end of a series of lectures 
LQWHQGHGDV¶$Q,QWURGXFWLRQWR3KHQRPHQRORJ\·7 
 
The epoché is a revision of an Augustinian, not a Cartesian, concept 
 To begin, then, at the end:  the closing lines of these lectures. 
´7KH'HOSKLFPRWWR¶.QRZWK\VHOI·KDVJDLQHGDQHZ
VLJQLILFDWLRQ«,PXVWORVHWKHZRUOGE\HSRFKpLQRUGHUWR
regain it by a universal self-H[DPLQDWLRQ´Noli foras ire,µVD\V
$XJXVWLQH´in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.µ8  
 
6RPHZKDWIUXVWUDWLQJO\+XVVHUOJLYHVQRH[SODQDWLRQRIZKDWLV¶QHZ·LQKLV
UHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH'HOSKLFRUDFOH·VH[KRUWDWLon into Augustinian 
terminology.  He merely quotes Augustine and gnomically leaves it to his 
                                                          
7 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. 
Dorion Cairns.  The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. 
 
8 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 157 (citing De vera religione 39.72). 
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readers to understand or to interpret the significance of this signification.  To 
unravel this mystery, we may follow two avenues.  First, the decision to refer 
to Augustine, rather than Descartes, suggests something linguistically unique 
about the Augustinian quotation: surely Husserl would not struggle to find a 
Cartesian formulation of the Delphic motto.  This leads us to the second 
avenue:  the departure from Delphi is not found in the first part of the 
TXRWDWLRQ´GRQRWZLVKWRJRRXWVLGHJRLQVLGH\RXUVHOIµEXWLQWKHVHFRQG
SDUW´WUXWKPDNHVLWVKRPHLQWKHLQWHULRUSHUVRQµ,QRWKHUZRUGVWR
assert that truth can be found, or that it exists, in the interior, is not in the 
least a unique occurrence to Augustine; what is peculiarly Augustinian is the 
claim that truth lives, makes a habitat, there.  The introduction of truth as 
something that lives, is active, and actively dwells in people:  one need not 
(and indeed Husserl certainly does not) read this as fully Christian ² since 
veritas is for Augustine incarnate, and so obviously has to find a home 
somewhere ² to find in it a somewhat bolder claim than the Delphic, 
Platonic or Cartesian insistence that truth is stably located in the self. 
 In the context of the whole of the Cartesian Meditations, which is 
VWUXFWXUHGDVD´UDGLFDOµIRUPDODSSURSULDWLRQRI'HVFDUWHVZKLFKREOLJHV
+XVVHUO´WRUHMHFWQHDUO\DOOWKHZHOO-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian 
SKLORVRSK\µ9 this closing quotation leaps off the page.  Since Husserl has 
announced that his phenomenology retains the formal Cartesian 
FRQILJXUDWLRQRIUHMHFWLQJWKH´EHLQJRIWKHZRUOGµDVPHGLDWHGWKURXJKWKH
senses and through experience, in order to gain it back through the 
                                                          
9 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 1. 
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cogitations of the self, we must take special care to note that Husserl does 
not naively repeat what he perceives as the Cartesian error:  namely, to 
replace a brutely immanent objectivism with an equally immanent 
subjectivism.10  Herein lies the difference between a Cartesian dubito and a 
phenomenological epoché, and the heart of what Husserl means to elaborate 
LQSODFHRI'HVFDUWHV·VHOI-guaranteeing self.   He describes it as 
´WUDQVFHQGHQWDOVXEMHFWLYLVPµZKLFKGRHVQRWVLPSO\ reverse the hierarchy 
of pre-Cartesian experientialism and so preserve its terms (with the subject 
determining objects, rather than objects determining the subject), but instead 
inscribes the subject and the object each with a certain power to delimit, 
inIOXHQFHDQGHYHQFRQVWLWXWHWKHRWKHURQH7KLVLVDWOHDVW+XVVHUO·V
theoretical commitment, although as we shall see he struggles to maintain its 
integrity when he practices the epoché, at least in The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness.  
 Some support for my reading of habitat as the decisive word in 
+XVVHUO·VTXRWDWLRQRIDe vera religione can be found in these opening remarks 
of the Meditations.  Husserl draws attention, in his introductory exposition of 
Descartes, to the activity of the ego:   
Anything belonging to the world, any spatio-temporal being, 
exists for me -- that is to say, is accepted by me -- in that I 
experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, 
judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like.  Descartes, as we 
know, indicated all that by the name cogito.11    
 
                                                          
10 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 4. 
11 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 20-1. 
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The epoché which brings to light all of these activities is highly attuned to 
cogito as a verb.  When the self thinks (in the richness of the term which 
Husserl, rightly or not, ascribes to Descartes) the world, both the self and the 
world flow through the res cogitans, and one relies on the other.  No world 
without the self:  this much Descartes shows.  But the genius in his 
formulation, according to Husserl, which remains hidden even to himself, is 
that WKHUHLVDOVRQRVHOIZLWKRXWZRUOGERWKDUHH[SUHVVHGLQ´WKH
grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito «>ZKLFK@H[SUHVVHVWKHHJR·V
OLYLQJSUHVHQWµ+XVVHUO·VJUDPPDWLFDOO\WUDLQHGHDUFDQQRWKHOSEXWQRWLFH
that Descartes could easily have chosen to express his most famous 
IRUPXODWLRQLQWKHSHUIHFWWHQVHEXWKHGLGQRWPXFKOLNH$XJXVWLQH·V
veritas, if it exists at all, it exists as living in time, and more specifically in the 
present time.  Interior homo is less emphasized than habitat, and ego less than 
cogito:  the truth that lives in the inner man is one that is verb-al, alive, 
unpredictable, and only partially and mediately grasped by the also verb-al, 
alive and unpredictable ego cogito.   This includes all modes of human thought:  
perception of the present is of course the paradigmatic example, but 
recollection and imagination also exist only in this unpredictable and 
mediated way.  The phenomenological structuring of the self is emphatically 
not limited to actuality, even if it is always performed in the present tense.12  
Quite the contrary:  even in the present, the phenomenological self is 
primarily constituted by an entirely formal intuition of all of its possibilities, 
empty of all actual content.  Moreover, since all particular forms of the world 
                                                          
12 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 28-9. 
  
 
 
24 
 
² those constituted in the past, the present and the future ² are constituted 
´LQDFHUWDLQQRHWLF-noematic formal structure of flowing modes RIJLYHQQHVVµ
+XVVHUOIHHOVHPEROGHQHGWRODEHOWKLVIORZLQJRIPRPHQWVDVWKH´XQLYHUVDO
form of all «HJRORJLFDOJHQHVLVµ13  Or again, in a passage which 
approximates or anticipates the Heideggerean Dasein:   
Only by virtue of this new attitude do I see that all the world, 
and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for me only as 
accepted by me, with the sense that it has for me at the time -
- that it exists for me only as cogitatum of my changing and, 
while changing, interconnected FRJLWDWLRQV«The fundamental 
form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other 
syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing 
consciousness of internal time.14   
 
 
3KHQRPHQRORJ\SXUSRUWVLWVFRQFHSWRI´WLPHµWREH$XJXVWLQLDQ 
Since Descartes does not wrestle with time as a philosophical 
problem, and Augustine famously does, it will not surprise us to find that it is 
DTXRWDWLRQIURP$XJXVWLQHZKLFKRSHQV+XVVHUO·VZRUNRQWKHVDPH
subject.  He begins The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness15 thus:   
The analysis of time consciousness is an age-old crux of 
descriptive psychology and theory of knowledge.  The first 
thinker to be deeply sensitive to the immense difficulties to 
be found here was Augustine, who labored almost to despair 
over this problem.  Chapters 13-18 of Book XI of the 
Confessions must even today be thoroughly studied by 
eveU\RQHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHSUREOHPRIWLPH«2QHPD\
still say with Augustine:  si nemo a me quaerat, scio, si quaerenti 
explicare velim, nescio.16    
                                                          
13 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 28-9. 
14 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 37. 
15 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. James 
Churchill. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1964. 
16 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 37. 
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One is left to assume, at least on a cursory reading, that this quotation is the 
only portion of the Confessions which is relevant to his enquiry; he never 
SUHVHQWVEXWPHUHO\VXSSRVHVVXFKD´WKRURXJKVWXG\µRIConf. XI.  Husserl 
sets up this problematic nescio as  
the attempt to account for time-consciousness, to put 
Objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the 
right relations and thus gain an understanding of how 
temporal Objectivity -- therefore, individual Objectivity in 
general -- can be constituted in subjective time-consciousness 
-- indeed, as soon as we even make the attempt to undertake 
an analysis of pure subjective time-consciousness -- the 
phenomenological content of lived experiences of time -- we 
are involved in the most extraordinary difficulties, 
contradictions and entanglements.17 
 
 7KLVH[FOXGHV´2EMHFWLYHWLPHµDVDQLPSURSHUdatum for phenomenology:  
WRFRQVLGHUWKLVZRXOGEH´ZRUOG-time, real time, the time of nature in the 
sense of natural VFLHQFHLQFOXGLQJSV\FKRORJ\«µ.18  Instead his lectures 
H[SRVLW´WKHWHPSRUDOFKDUDFWHURIREMHFWVRISHUFHSWLRQ, memory and 
anticipation.µ19  While the language here is obviously Augustinian in its 
provenance, no further reference is made to Augustine. 
In explicitly authorizing use of Conf. XI.13-18, Husserl raises several 
questions.  The first is whether these six chapters, as he leads us to believe,  
present a discrete contemplation and explication of the Augustinian 
meditation on time-consciousness, quite apart from the larger question of 
whether it is legitimate to consider them outside of or apart from the whole 
                                                          
17 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 21-2. 
18 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 23. 
19 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 23. 
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of the Confessions, let alone the rest of the Augustinian corpus.  A cursory 
reading, content to rest with the only explicit citation Husserl gives (si nemo a 
me quaeret«;,PLJKWFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHLQIOXHQFHKHUHLVRQO\
superficial and banal -- the pithy and even catchy formulation of the paradox 
which is applicable across the board to any facet of the schema of the 
transcendental epoché interrupting the natural attitude.20  In keeping with my 
commitment to assume the most, however, I here feel justified in taking a 
small detour to rehearse the most salient aspects of the chapters Husserl 
refers to, familiar as these are likely to be to many readers; we cannot rest 
FRQWHQWDW+XVVHUO·VSHUKDSVK\SHUEROLFSUDLVHRI$XJXVWLQHDV´WKLVJUHDW
WKLQNHUµZKRLQ´VWUXJJOLQJVRHDUQHVWO\µKDV´PDGHPRUHPDVWHUIXO>DQG@
VLJQLILFDQWSURJUHVVLQWKHVHPDWWHUVµWKDQDQ\RQH´LQWKLVNQRZOedge-proud 
PRGHUQJHQHUDWLRQµ21   This tactic of referring readers to Augustine and 
praising him obscures the precise way in which Husserl uses Augustine, and 
allows one to forget other potential (and potentially more fruitful) purposes 
in service to which one could employ him, and so a brief recapitulation of 
Confessions XI is in order. 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Indeed there is no shortage of phenomenologists who, in treating time or other 
subjects, make just such a use of this quotation:  cf. e.g.. Adolf Reinach, 
´&RQFHUQLQJ3KHQRPHQRORJ\µWUDQV'DOODV:LOODUGThe Personalist 50 (1969), p. 
195.  Wittgenstein has perhaps the most famous such citation of this phrase.  See 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.  Oxford:  
Basil Blackwell, 1963. § 89. 
21 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 21. 
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Time for Augustine is inseparable from a theology of creation 
AugusWLQH·VDQDO\VLVRIWLPHHPHUJHVRXWRIWKHSUREOHP-- quickly 
shown to be a false problem -- RI*RG·VVHHPLQJLQDFWLYLW\¶EHIRUH·*RG
created the heaven and the earth.  He notes that the question raised by this 
problem are due at once to a failure of the imagination and to a lack of pious 
ULJRURQWKHRQHKDQGWKH\DVVXPHWKDW*RG·VFUHDWLYLW\SUHVXSSRVHVDQG
follows the logic of time, rather than authorizing and governing it, and on the 
other hand they fall short of understanding time as fully equatable with 
heaven and earth themselves, and thus still subordinate to God.  In 
phenomenological terms, we could thus label time as the transcendental a 
priori of all created phenomena, which yet requires these phenomena in 
order to exist.22  The implication is that eternity, rather than being foreign to 
time -- even to the present time -- is more fully and more truly said to be 
¶SUHVHQW·WKDQWKHSUHVHQWWLPHDQGWKXVWKH¶SUHVHQFH·RIDQ\SDUWLFXODU
WLPH)RUWKLVUHDVRQ*RGLVVDLGWREH´LQWKHVXEOLPLW\RI an eternity 
ZKLFKLVDOZD\VLQWKHSUHVHQWµ7KLVOHDGVWRDQDSRUHWLFIRUPXODWLRQRI
EHLQJDQGWLPH´WKH\HDUVZKLFKDUHRXUVZLOOQRWDOOEHXQWLl all years have 
FHDVHGWREHµ;23 time only exists in and by means of ceasing to exist.  
Augustine radicalL]HVWKLVDSRULD´,IWKHQLQRUGHUWREHWLPHDWDOOWKH
present is so made [fit¶VREHFRPHV·@LQVXFKDZD\WKDWLWSDVVHVLQWRWKHSDVW
KRZFDQZHVD\WKDWWKLVSUHVHQWDOVR¶LV·"7KHFDXVHRILWVEHLQg is that it will 
                                                          
22 Augustine, Conf. XI.13.15. 
23 Augustine, Conf. XI.13.16. 
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cease to be.µ24  The customary translation of fieri KHUHDV¶LVPDGH·LVQRW
inaccurate, particularly given the context of a discussion of creation and 
Genesis, but it does risk obscuring the ontological principle here, that all 
becoming begins in an inability or a refusal fully to be.  It is important to 
note here (against a certain Heideggerean impulse) that this aporia is not at all 
contingent on a theology of the fall, but is the logic of creation itself.  This 
fundamental aporia distracts Augustine into outlining others:  for example, 
although we commonly speak of time as being long or short in duration, it is 
strictly impossible to predicate such length to any time except the present, 
since it can only be long or short if it is as we speak of it, like a tree can only 
be tall, or short, or alive, if it is -- but on the other hand, time can only be 
experienced as being in the present moment, as being present-ed in the nunc, 
which is always slipping away as soon as it is named.  Though Augustine 
clearly has read his Plotinus on the matter25 his argument does not rely on 
philosophical authority but solely on the methodology of reflecting on 
quotidian experience.  There is then a radical sense in which the oft-quoted si 
nemo a me quaeret is true:  the very act of asking, in the present tense, what 
time is (or even what time it is) renders a correct answer impossible, in the 
first case because time strictly speaking is not, but only becomes, and in the 
second because by the time I have checked my watch and formulated the 
ZRUGV´,WLVµ that time has elapsed, disappeared, and ceased to be.  The 
                                                          
24 Augustine, Conf. XI.14.17. 
25 Cf. A.H. Armstrong, ed. Plotinus:͓Enneads͓(with͓English͓translation). Loeb 
Classical Library.  Cambridge,͓MA:͓Harvard͓University͓Press,͓1966-1988. 3.7. 
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world itself is FRPSRVHGRI´IXJLWLYHPRPHQWV.µ26  And nevertheless we do 
know what time is, or rather becomes:  life is not utterly crippled by our 
inability to grasp it, formulate it or fix it in a pretended frozen (which is to 
say timeless) schema.27  $XJXVWLQH·VSRLQWLQHODERUDWLQJWKHVHDSRULDVLV
neither speculation for its own sake, nor a sort of mocking scepticism in 
service of the discouragement of philosophical hubris, but a serious quest to 
demonstrate all time as contingent existence, and thus all speculation (here 
functioning as a paradigm of any enterprise within time) as partial, in the final 
analysis neither authoritative nor meaningless.  For this reason all thought, all 
speech and all act falls into the same category as memory or prophecy (the 
two examples by which Augustine is most perplexed):  they all exist for us 
RQO\LQ´LPDJHVµ28  which need not be illusory, but by the same token are by 
definition never exhaustive.29  Memory, anticipation and perception -- three 
fundamental modes of time-consciousness -- are thus all modes of mediate 
´GLVFHUQLQJcernuntur) as present.µ30  $XJXVWLQH·VILQDOH[DPSOH-- that of the 
rising of the sun -- possesses a certain double appropriateness.  In the first 
place, in the most banal sense, the prediction of a full sunrise based on the 
first breaking of the dawn illustrates our dependence on presented facts to 
foretell future realities, and the future as a horizon for interpreting the 
present, and in the second, more radically, the mediate relationship of light to 
anything we see presents time as the metaphorical horizon in which the rest 
                                                          
26 Augustine, Conf.  XI.15.20. 
27 Augustine, Conf. XI.16.21 
28 Augustine, Conf. XI.18.23. 
29 Cf. Ch. 5 of the present study. 
30 Augustine, Conf. XI.18.24. 
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RIFUHDWLRQDSSHDUVIRUXV7LPHLVWKXVWKHILUVW¶WKLQJ·FUHDWHGDQGRXU
internal consciousness of time grounds our consciousness of all things. 
 Before considering the extent to which Husserl makes use of 
$XJXVWLQH·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVOHWXVSDXVHDQGFRQVLGHUFHUWDLQTXHVWLRQVUDLVHG
by his methodology.  From the standpoint of Augustinian scholarship, it is 
objectionable that Husserl excludes the immediate context of Conf. X-XI, 
including the lengthy discussion of memoria, or the aporias of creation and 
eternity.  From a less theologically motivated perspective, even the most 
sympathetic phenomenological interpreter of Husserl would struggle to 
articulate his reasons for excluding the discussion of being from the backdrop 
of this book.  On both fronts, it is tempting to suggest that Husserl has not 
read as closely as he recommends, nor as broadly as he ought. 
 
AugustLQH·Vepoché LVPRUHUDGLFDOWKDQ+XVVHUO·VLQWZRZD\VRQH
because it includes the self; two, because it is ontological 
The presentation of Conf. XI.13-18 as the playing grounds for his 
analysis has excluded too much; nevertheless, it is not surprising that these 
chapters provide some fertile ground for his phenomenology to till.  The 
Augustinian limitation of time to the mediate and contingent, but no less 
determining, horizon of phenomenology in the strict sense also motivates 
+XVVHUO·VDQDO\VLVRQH can speculate regarding, or even assume, a totalizing 
´2EMHFWLYHµWLPHFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHHWHUQDOSUHVHQWRI$XJXVWLQH·V
theological argument.  Indeed, such an assumption is nearly impossible to 
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escape in daily working within the natural attitude, but ´RQHFDQQRWGLVFRYHU
WKHOHDVWWUDFHµRIVXFKDQREMHFWLYHWLPH´WKURXJKSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
analysis.µ31  7KHDSRULDRIWKH´RULJLQRIWLPHµDQVZHUHGIRU$XJXVWLQHRQO\
in certain spiritual exercises, remains for Husserl an epistemological riddle, 
since for Husserl (as not for Augustine) the mediate nature of time restricts 
its disclosive power to the purely formal realm.  
The opening gambit of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 
PLUURUV$XJXVWLQH·VLQIRUPEHJLQQLQJZLWKWKHGHVWDELOL]LQJLQVLghts that 
the sensing or thinking subject depends entirely on the horizon of the 
present time to sense or to think,32 +XVVHUOUDLVHVWKH´TXHVWLRQRIWKHRULJLQ
of time.µ33  He even goes as far as to borrow ² although he attributes the 
example and the insight to Brentano, in an unpublished lecture ² $XJXVWLQH·V
IDPRXVGHVFULSWLRQRIDPHORG\LQWKLVFDVH$PEURVH·VHYHQLQJK\PQZKLFK
occurs in Conf. XI.27.35, a portion which falls considerably outside the 
chapters which Husserl has referred to and authorized as relevant. Husserl 
WHOOLQJO\WDNHVIURPWKHH[DPSOHRIDVRQJRQO\RQHRI$XJXVWLQH·VWZR
central lessons:  he acknowledges that the flux of time and of forgetting is so 
powerful that, without the power of memory intervening, we could not make 
sense of a sequence of tones, that is, some portion of subjective 
consciousness is required for the very constitution of a melody.34  But he 
                                                          
31 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 24. 
32 Augustine, Conf. XI.11.13; cf. Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 
21-6. 
33 Augustine, Conf. XI.12.14-13.15; cf. Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness, 27-9. 
34 Cf. Augustine, Conf. XI.27.35 
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misses or ignores a corollary doctrine which limits this first insight, namely 
that this melody does not leave the memory which helps to constitute its very 
existence intact; by ignoring this reciprocality, as though either the self which 
sings a hymn or the self that hears it and reassembles it were a neutral and 
omnipotent instrument of some higher, undefined power, Husserl loses 
almost entirely the import of this Augustinian insight.  If, as Marion has 
seen,35 $XJXVWLQH·VIDPRXVGHILQLWLRQRIWLPHDVDdistentio animi should be 
understood grammatically as comprising both a subjective and an objective 
genitive, Husserl has grasped only one half of the description, a fact which 
corrupts his understanding even of this half:  he sees how the mind, through 
WKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWLPHVWUHWFKHVRU¶LQWHQGV·WKHWKLQJLWSHUFHLYHVEXW
fails to see how this intention also stretches the mind, as Augustine will put 
it, or, to cast the same concept into more familiarly phenomenological 
WHUPLQRORJ\FDOOVWKHVHOILWVHOILQWRTXHVWLRQ7KLVRPLVVLRQRQ+XVVHUO·V
part ² which, on an exegetical level, goes unnoted and thus un-argued for ² is 
illustrative of the entire argument of the Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness.  Even in this late stage of his career, when Husserl is 
increasingly giving privileged place to an account of time and of temporality 
within his transcendental reductions,36 his dedication to plunging all 
phenomena under the light of temporality apparently stops just short of 
plunging the self into this light.  In terms of the logic and the limits of 
phenomenology, it is worthwhile to note that this shortcoming has been seen 
                                                          
35  Marion, Au Lieu De Soi pp. 289-295, and cf. Chapter 3 below 
36  7KLVSDYHVWKHZD\IRUPXFKRI+HLGHJJHU·VHDUO\DQGPRVWLQIOXHQWLDOZRUNDQG
this is no doubt one reason that Heidegger edited these lectures to begin with. 
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by Derrida37 and more radically by Marion.38  I want at this juncture only to 
make a methodological note: whether or not this unwillingness to consider 
the self as a radically temporal phenomenon corrupts Husserlian 
phenomenology, it is diagnosable as a failure to keep reading the Confessions.  
This is true even in the more sensitive and more careful treatment Husserl 
gives to melody as an essential image of how memory functions somewhat 
later in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness:39  although by this 
consideration Husserl introduces important nuances to his description of 
PHPRU\VXFKDVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDPHPRU\¶JHQHUDWLQJLWVHOI·
transcendentally, still there is no sense in which the melody, in its role as an 
example of memory as the essentially temporalizing structure of reality, can 
also constitute, alter, call into question or have any reciprocal relation 
whatsoever with the conscious subject, who is still able to wield memory as 
an instrument.  The subject-object relation is still ² DJDLQVW+XVVHUO·VRZQ
commitments, elaborated in Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere ² trapped on 
a fundamentally and irreversibly one-way street.  No matter how much 
+XVVHUOZLOOXVHWKHODQJXDJHRIREMHFWV¶LPSUHVVLQJ·WKHPVHOYHVRQWKH
VXEMHFW·VFRQVFiousness, the entire logical structure he constructs, elaborates 
and defends exists to maintain the subject as the powerful entity in the 
subject-object relation:  the subject retains the active role, and the object (and 
perhaps even time itself) is defined first by its passivity. 
                                                          
37  Jacques Derrida, 7KH3UREOHPRI*HQHVLVLQ+XVVHUO·V3KLORsophy, trans. Marian 
Hobson.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
38  Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. 
Kosky.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, 27-33. 
39 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 57ff. 
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 Husserl seems to be aware of at least one weakness within this 
structure.  The sensation of this weakness is precisely what motivates 
Augustine to be so emphatic within the confines of his philosophical thought 
that the self is not an entirely active entity ² WRZLWWKHVXEMHFW·VLQFDSDFLW\WR
grasp the present moment directly.40  Husserl betrays his awareness of this 
ZHDNQHVVE\ORFDWLQJWKHDSH[RIWKHVXEMHFW·VDFWLYHSRZHUQRWRQO\WRJUDVS
but to call forth and indeed to create a moment exclusively in the past,41 for 
only in my intuition of the past can my act of intuiting and that which I intuit 
entirely overlap.  Both Husserl and Augustine are aware that the subject can 
only present to itself that which is already past, and this is why memory plays 
such an important role in their portraits not only of time, but of the self.  But 
Augustine ² perhaps at least partially because he writes in the first person, 
and also because he writes in narrative form ² is aware, as Husserl shows no 
awareness, that memory, narration, re-narration and indeed consciousness 
itself can only constitute an object by elaborating it, refracting it, even 
distorting it.  Every point raised by theorists of hermeneutics, for example 
about the reader constituting a textual meaning but also in part being 
constituted, qua reader, by the event of that same textual meaning, applies in 
an Augustinian perspective also or even primarily in an ontological key:  since 
we live in a world that was created verbally, all existence follows this same 
form of co-constitutive or reciprocal textual events.  How then could 
+XVVHUO·VDWWHPSWVWRUHFDVWWKLVLQVLJKWLQWRDVROHO\HSLVWHPRORJLFDONH\IDLO
                                                          
40 Augustine, Conf. XI.31.41. 
41 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 63-4. 
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WRDSSHDUDVDUDWKHUZHDNVKDGRZRI$XJXVWLQH·VSRZHUIXODQGGLVRULHQWLQJ
insLVWHQFHWKDWDWUDQVFHQGHQWSRZHURIPHPRU\LVQRWRQO\WKHSUHVHQW·V
mode of relating to the past, but also the only way that the self can relate 
even to the present in the moment as it is presented (albeit in an infinitely 
oblique way, since it must somehow accomplish the impossible traversal of 
the nunc by the eternal)?   Further, in this shadow, can it be a surprise that 
Husserl is unable to discern any difference between the structure of 
LQWHQGLQJVRPHWKLQJZKROO\LPDJLQDU\DQGWKDWRILQWHQGLQJDQ¶HQduring 
EHLQJ·ZKLFKKDValways been and will always be?42  And yet the problem with 
this equivalence is not at all, from an Augustinian perspective (as it might be 
from, say, a Thomist perspective) that the difference between possible and 
actual has been erased.  The problem is rather that this erasure has been 
performed insufficiently, that is, only epistemologically, and not 
ontologically:  the mind or self which exercises perception by means of 
memory floats above this temporalizing mechanism, as somehow, without 
explanation or phenomenological justification, existing stably as an entity 
independent of the time via which it intends the world.  The crucial 
difference here marks out a trap which Heidegger and his most literal 
followers go perhaps too far to avoid.  While both Husserl and Augustine 
SRVLWVRPHVWDEOHHQWLW\ERWK¶HYHUDQFLHQWDQGHYHUQHZ·43 as necessary to 
ground both tradition and novelty, and thus to make sense even of the 
present moment, Augustine very intentionally avoids making, as Husserl 
                                                          
42 Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 84-5. 
43 Augustine, Conf. X.27.38. 
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rather naively makes, this structure so easily accessible to himself, or indeed 
equivalent with the self.  Such, for him, would not only be a moral failure, 
but a gravely intellectual nonsense.  That is to say, a critique of this self-
sufficiently stable structure of consciousness ² of time or of anything which 
HPHUJHVDJDLQVWWLPH·VKRUL]RQ² need not be an excessively pious cry of 
hubris, nor even necessarily theological in form, but can take place on 
exclusively phenomenological grounds.  Had Husserl not quoted Augustine 
at the beginning of the work, he might have more persuasively hidden his 
commitment to the freedom of the determining subject; by opening with 
Augustine, he quietly draws attention to the perdurant idealism of his 
transcendental subjectivity, albeit an idealism which is sharply limited to the 
IRUPDOVWUXFWXUHVRIWKHLQWXLWLQJVHOI,QWKHODVWDQDO\VLV+XVVHUO·V
phenomenology aims not merely to describe temporality and finitude, but to 
conquer it; this indicates at least some of the phenomenological catalyst for 
+HLGHJJHU·VVXEVHTXHQWUHDGLQJRIConfessions X. 
$V,QRWHGDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKLVFKDSWHU+XVVHUO·VUHIHUHQFHVWR
Augustine are both few and casual; only the completist of the 
phenomenological tradition (which I neither pretend nor aspire to be) could 
benefit by much more engagement than I have here offered.  The major 
UHDVRQKRZHYHUIRUGHDOLQJZLWK+XVVHUODWDOOLQWKLV¶ERWFKHGJHQHDORJ\·
where only a very weak sense of tradition binds a later thinker to an earlier 
one, is to set up a foil to the Heideggerean strand of reading Augustine.  In 
other words, the foregoing analysis aims only to show the phenomenological 
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reading of Augustine that never was ² for even the hints that Husserl 
provides point toward an Augustine who will recognizable neither to the 
Augustinian guild nor to the tradition which Heidegger will inaugurate.  For 
the remainder of this chapter, then, I shall consider two Heideggerean texts; 
the first, the translated notes of a lecture course which Heidegger gave on a 
book of the Confessions, and the second, albeit in a more speculative key, the 
much more decisive Being and Time.   
 
+HLGHJJHUDWWHPSWVWRUHPHGLDWH+XVVHUO·VGHILFLHQFLHV 
Had the present essay been written even ten years ago, it would be at 
WKHVHYHUHGLVDGYDQWDJHRIODFNLQJDQ(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQRI+HLGHJJHU·V
lecture notes from his 1920-VHPLQDURQ´7KH3KHQRPHQRORJ\RIWKH
5HOLJLRXV/LIHµ44  Had it been written twenty years ago, it would lack even 
access to the German text of these notes.  Were this the case, my account 
would have to have been at once more speculative, in that I would have had 
WRWULDQJXODWHDQDFFRXQWRI+HLGHJJHU·V$XJXVWLQLDQLVPIURPDIHZ
references in Being and Time and elsewhere, and more contentiously 
argumentative, in that I would have had to demonstrate a more subterranean 
$XJXVWLQLDQLVPIURP+HLGHJJHU·VRZQGHYHORSPHQWRIDQRQWRORJLFDO
SKHQRPHQRORJ\URXJKO\DNLQWR$XJXVWLQH·VRZQRUIURPFHUWDLQKLVWRULFDO
facts (such as the fact that Heidegger encouraged his closest disciples to read 
                                                          
44 0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-PlDWRQLVPµLQThe Phenomenology of Religious 
Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencci.  Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2004. 
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Augustine carefully).45  In this regard, the state of scholarship on Heidegger 
with regard to Augustine would have looked much like the current state of 
scholarship on Husserl:  that is, nearly non-existent, and justifiably so.  As it 
stands, the publication and subsequent translation of these lecture notes has 
received considerable attention from both scholars of Heidegger and thinkers 
attuned to the religious background of phenomenological thought more 
generally.46   Indeed the amount of recent interest in these lecture notes (and 
other assorted related interest) may hint toward an emerging verdict on the 
charges of Janicaud, issued not so long ago:47  WKDWQRWRQO\LVWKH¶WKHRORJLFDO
WXUQ·LQ)UHQFKSKHQRPHQRORJ\QRWQHFHVVDULO\Ds methodologically 
SUREOHPDWLFDV-DQLFDXGDOOHJHGEXWWKDWLWLVQRWHYHQUHDOO\D¶WXUQ·VRPXFK
as a return.  In any event, much of the debate and discussion surrounding 
these lecture notes have tried to determine their role in the Heideggerean 
canon, attempting especially to demonstrate or disprove that certain 
doctrines of Being and Time emerged earlier, or perhaps even first of all, in an 
engagement with Augustine -- whether, for example, Sorge is a mere 
translation of the Augustinian cura, or whetheUWKH´ZLOO-not-to-ZLOOµILQGV
                                                          
45   The most famous of these is Hannah Arendt, whose dissertation has been 
published in English as Love and Saint Augustine, trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and 
Judith Stark. Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
46   An important, if eclectic, collection of essays on this subject was published in 
2006:  Craig J.N. de Paulo, ed. The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of 
an Augustinian Phenomenology.  Lewiston, NY:  The Edwin Mellen Press, 2006.  I 
VKRXOGDOVRJLYHVRPHPHQWLRQRI6HDQ0F*UDWK·VLPSRUWDQWZRUNRQWKHHDUO\
Heidegger, although the importance of Augustine in these pages is somewhat 
RYHUVKDGRZHGE\0F*UDWK·VDWWHQWLRQWR%RQDYHQWXUH$TXLQDV6FRWXVDQGHYHQ
Luther:  see his The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the 
Godforsaken.  Washington, D.C.:  The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. 
47 Dominique Janicaud, ed. 3KHQRPHQRORJ\DQGWKH´7KHRORJLFDO7XUQµ7KH)UHQFK'HEDWH.  
New York: Fordham University Press, 2000. 
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some kind of ultimate historical rooting in the distinction between uti and 
frui.  I leave much of this important work to one side, since my concern in 
WKLVFKDSWHULVQRWWKHVKDSHRI+HLGHJJHU·VWKRXJKWJHQHUDOO\DEODFNKole of 
a task from which many scholars find themselves happily unable to escape), 
but the more modest attempt to find in these notes an alternate 
Augustinianism within the phenomenological tradition, another, in some 
ways opposing, instinct which shapes the dialectic through which Marion and 
Chrétien will navigate their own readings of Augustine.  I will deal with Being 
and Time, then, only to the limited extent to which it sheds light on the 
insights and shortcomings of Marion and Chrétien.  
 To that opening disclaimer I will add two other observations, both of 
ZKLFKGHPDUFDWHZD\VLQZKLFK+HLGHJJHU·VXVHRI$XJXVWLQHGLIIHUVIURP
that of Husserl, and set the stage for especially my consideration of Marion 
(and of Chrétien, albeit to a lesser extent).  First and most obviously, the 
DWWHQWLRQDQGVHQVLWLYLW\WRGHWDLOZKLFKHPHUJHVLQ+HLGHJJHU·VOHFWXUHVZLOO
be apparent in my exposition of them. This should be no surprise, since 
+HLGHJJHULVQRWKLQJLIQRWDJRRG´FORVHUHDGHUµRIWH[WVDQGKLVUROHLQWKe 
formation of the discipline of hermeneutics in the 20th century is not 
irrelevant to his method, even when he is not discussing hermeneutics 
explicitly.  To refer his auditors to a passage, as does Husserl, without 
interpreting that passage with care, would be foreign to Heidegger, and 
would cost him the opportunity to make his points by making inventive and 
sometimes wild glosses on the Latin text.  Heidegger works, as it were, within 
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the margins of the Confessions, and his account of phenomenology in 
Augustine is shaped less like a system and more like marginalia.  The second 
consideration, probably more determinative, is the choice of pages on which 
KHVFUDZOVWKHVHPDUJLQDOLD+HLGHJJHU·VFDUHHU-long focus on time might 
prepare us to expect his lecturHVRQ$XJXVWLQHWRFHQWHUOLNH+XVVHUO·VRQ
Conf. XI; instead they take as their subject the more elusive Conf. X, 
$XJXVWLQH·VFRQIHVVLRQRIZKDWKHLVLQWKHnunc, the present moment (that is, 
as he writes).  In the introduction to the lecture, Heidegger suggests certain 
reasons for this choice, which I will examine momentarily.  For now, I simply 
want to point out that the foundations of the phenomenological tradition of 
UHDGLQJ$XJXVWLQHFDUHOLWWOHIRUWKHILUVWQLQH´DXWRELRJUDSKLFDOµERRNVRI
the Confessions, and still less for the last two books.  This tradition, then, is 
set in motion in a rather simple tension between the Augustine of Conf. X 
and the Augustine of Conf. XI, a tension which Marion and Chrétien will 
subtly acknowledge and also try to complicate, if not escape. 
 
+HLGHJJHUWULHVWRFRQVLGHU$XJXVWLQHRQ$XJXVWLQH·VRZQWHUPV
XQGHUWKHDHJLVRI´IDFWLFDOOLIHµ 
Heidegger begins his lecture by noting what his approach will not do, 
although this negative demarcation of the interpretation is itself limited to a 
few representations of Augustinian philosophical scholarship in the decades 
immediately preceding his course.  Specifically he briefly considers and 
criticizes the work of Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack and Wilhelm 
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Dilthey.48  It is worth noting immediately what the introduction could well 
KDYHFRQVLGHUHGJLYHQ+HLGHJJHU·VFRQFHUQVEXWGRHVQRW+HLGHJJHUGRHV
not display any overt interest in the relationship of Augustine to Descartes, 
Pascal or Luther, who among other figures in the history of Augustinianism 
could have set up, either by way of appropriation (in the case of Luther) or 
FRQWUDVW'HVFDUWHVRU3DVFDO+HLGHJJHU·VRZQUHDGLQJ(YHQPRUH
surprisingly absent from his attempt to show some proto-phenomenological 
concerns in Augustine is Husserl himself.  With this omission, Heidegger 
neglects to give explicit shape to the question of how his reading of 
Augustine situates him in the phenomenological tradition; perhaps in these 
early stages he wished more simply to view himself as the founder of 
phenomenological interest in Augustine.  For Heidegger, the three readings 
of Augustine which best serve as a counter-reading to his own are alike in 
their concern with evaluating Augustine as a particular instance of some 
general historical problem -- in the case of Troeltsch, the question is how 
(Christian) religion arises from and relates to (pagan) culture; in the case of 
Harnack, it is the translation of metaphysical dogma into personal piety; in 
the case of Dilthey, the emergence of internal consciousness and internal 
H[SHULHQFHDVDQDEVROXWHPHWDSK\VLFDOUHDOLW\,QDOOWKUHHRIWKHVH´REMHFW-
KLVWRULFDOµDSSURDFKHVWR$XJXVWLQH-- VXPPDUL]HGDV´WKHKLVWRU\RIFXOWXUHµ
WKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPDQWLTXHWRPHGLHYDOFXOWXUH´WKH KLVWRU\RIGRJPDµWKH
WUDQVLWLRQIURPDEVWUDFWWHDFKLQJVWRFRQFUHWHSHUVRQDOHWKLFVDQG´WKH
KLVWRU\RIVFLHQFHµWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPDQDQFLHQWWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ3ODWRQLF
                                                          
48 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ-3. 
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transcendence and skeptical refusal thereof to an internal, proto-Cartesian 
subjective transcendentalism), Augustine functions as a hinge, a transitional 
figure who achieved or at least attempted a seismic and objectively 
PHDVXUDEOHVKLIWLQVRPHKLVWRULFDOQDUUDWLYHIRU+HLGHJJHU·VSXUSRVHVLW
hardly matters which narrative is chosen.  Readers familiar with the more 
IDPRXVOHFWXUHFRXUVHRQ´7KH,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH3KHQRPHQRORJ\RI
5HOLJLRQµRULQGHHGZLWKWKHVKDSHRI+HLGHJJHU·VDSSURDFKWR$ULVWRWOHRU
any other historical philosophical figure) will be able to anticipate the 
contRXUVRI+HLGHJJHU·VREMHFWLRQWRWKHIRUPRIWKHVHWKUHHDSSURDFKHV
namely, that Augustine is a philosopher, not a scientist, and that philosophy 
´GRHVQRWKDYHDWLWVGLVSRVDODQREMHFWLYHO\DQGWKRURXJKO\IRUPHGPDWHULDO
context into which concepts can be integrated in order to receive their 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQµ49  From this perspective, the study of Augustine (as of any 
historical figure) as one particular object within this or that general narrative, 
however crucial his role in that narrative might be, still entirely misses the 
force of Augustinian thought as an experience of life which occurs within the 
context not of the history of culture, dogma or science, but in an embodied 
and sensory existence.  Heidegger rather politely declines to point out the 
sometimes ham-handed way in which these object-historical readings find 
Augustine congenial or even subservient to their ideological aims, whether 
Protestant, Catholic, Cartesian or the like, and restricts himself to the 
argument that in any event these studies are in their very constitution 
                                                          
49   0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU´,QWURGXFWLRQWR3KHQRPHQRORJ\RI5HOLJLRQµ,n The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life. Trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-
Ferencei. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 3. 
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SUHWHQGLQJWRHVFDSHKLVWRU\LQYLHZLQJWKHLU¶REMHFW·DVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQD
historical limitation from which they themselves are exempt, and on which 
they may pass this or that judgment.  For this reason, though Heidegger 
might well have noted that the three figures he discusses have apparently 
only a very limited familiarity with the texts of Augustine, or at least only a 
very limited interest in exegesis, this critique would only reach an accidental 
characteristic of these historical studies.  What is essential is that they 
stubbornly resist a view of Augustine which on the one hand allows him the 
dignity of sharing the same variegated life which the interpreter experiences 
and on the other hand acknowledges the limitations of the same on the 
interpreter.  Heidegger puts the point, which has as much to do with the 
methodology of this mostly exegetical study as with the phenomenological 
approach to philosophy most generally, into an epigrammatic utterance:  
´+LVWRU\KLWVusDQGZHDUHKLVWRU\LWVHOIµ50  The fact that Heidegger has 
WLWOHGWKLVOHFWXUHFRXUVH´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµFDQQRWKHOSEXW
mislead us:  his is decidedly not the concern of much contemporary 
American readers of Augustine on this question, and Plotinus (for example) 
LVHQWLUHO\DEVHQWIURPWKHVXEVHTXHQWSDJHVDVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·V
relationship to Platonism (or any such question which attempts to provide an 
over-DUFKLQJIUDPHZRUNWKDWFDQDFFRXQWIRU$XJXVWLQH·V´OLIHDQGZRUNVµ
would be a betrayal of this central dictum.  At the end of this introduction 
Heidegger gives somewhat more positive content to what the lecture course 
will instead do:   
                                                          
50 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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In the objective form of Greek metaphysics and cosmology 
lies the problem of the meaning of object-theoretical, material 
science; and the question of the inner experience and the 
essence of the factical connection harbors a much more 
radical phenomenon -- merely the defining title here:  
´IDFWLFDOOLIHµ>«@7KLVPDQQHURISRVLQJWKHSUREOHPOHDGV
us, in the treatment of Augustine, to draw on the theological, 
just as much as on the philosophical, very concretely and 
determinately, and not, for instance, to extract a philosophy 
which we then use as a basis.  The boundaries between the 
theological and the philosophical are not to be blurred (no 
SKLORVRSKLFDOEOXUULQJRIWKHRORJ\QR¶LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ·RI
philosophy pretending to be religious).  Rather, precisely 
going back behind both exemplary foundations of factical life 
ought to (1) indicate in princiSOHKRZDQGZKDWOLHV¶EHKLQG·
both, and (2) how a genuine problematic results from this; all 
this not extra-temporally and for the construction of an 
approaching or not approaching culture, but itself in historical 
enactment.51 
 
This explains at once the fRUPRI+HLGHJJHU·VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$XJXVWLQHD
close reading, or better, an extended gloss) and its content (a focus on Conf. 
;WKHVWXG\DVVXPHVDQGGRHVQRWWU\WRDUJXHIRU$XJXVWLQH·VFRQIHVVLRQ
RIKLVFXUUHQWUHODWLRQVKLSWR´IDFWLFDOOLIHµLQWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQWDV´already 
somehow compelling,µ52 as possessing a grip on our attention independent 
from its role in (1) the history of philosophy, or (2)  the broader corpus of 
$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDQGOLIH.HHSLQJWKHVHWZRSDUDOOHOFRQWHQWLRQVLQ
miQGLVFHQWUDOWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ+HLGHJJHU·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQHDQG
although I will argue below that (2) is especially problematic, I will for the 
moment accept them both provisionally in order to frame my discussion of 
+HLGHJJHU·VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH$XJustinian thought on experience and 
perception.  One final note:  while my presentation of this interpretation will 
                                                          
51 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ-5. 
52 HeideggHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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here and there gesture towards an eventual critique -- both the implied 
critiques of Marion and Chrétien and a more intentional critique of my own -
- it is important first to present the object of the critique as fairly as possible, 
and for this reason I will be as judicious as the text allows, restricting myself 
IRUWKHPRVWSDUWWRUHSRUWLQJWKHFRQVLGHUDEOHPHULWVRI+HLGHJJHU·VFORVH
reading, which is both a fragmentary portrait of the 20th FHQWXU\·VPRVW
influential philosopher and a fascinating meditation on Augustine himself. 
 
´)DFWLFDOOLIHµPHDQVDQH[DPLQDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VORYHV 
$OUHDG\LQWKHEHJLQQLQJRIKLV´H[SOLFDWLRQµRIConfessions X, 
Heidegger displays the two major modes in which this explication will take 
their shape:  careful, if selective, attention to the text in its very literal self-
presentation, and brazen gloss on that text.  The first of these is at issue in 
HeideggeU·V´VWDUWLQJSRLQWµKLVH[SODQDWLRQIRUZK\KHKDVWDNHQConfessions 
X as his central text:   
$VDVWDUWLQJSRLQWZHKDYHDQRULHQWDWLRQDERXW´ZKDWDWDOO
LVDFWXDOO\VWDWHGWKHUHµ´ZKDWLWLVDOODERXWµ,QWKLVUHVSHFW
Book X can be easily demarcated from the other [sc. 
previous] books, as Augustine here no longer relates his past, 
EXWUDWKHUWHOOVZKDWKHLVQRZ´>,@QLSVRWHPSRUH
FRQIHVVLRQXPPHDUXPµquod sim >ZKDW,DP´LQWKHYHU\WLPH
RIWKHPDNLQJRIP\FRQIHVVLRQVµ@53   
 
The central phrase here, which Heidegger is careful to emphasize, is quod sim:  
$XJXVWLQH·VVHOI-portrait is existential, confessing not just what he thinks or 
perceives or senses as he makes his confession, but what he is, and the mode 
                                                          
53 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµFLWLQJ$XJXVWLQHConf. X.3.4. 
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in which his confession articulates, alters or even constitutes his being.  This 
LVFRUUHFWEXW+HLGHJJHU·VVHOHFWLYLW\DOUHDG\EHJLQVWRH[FOXGHWKHWKHRORJLFDO
DQGHFFOHVLRORJLFDOFRQWH[WRI$XJXVWLQH·VH[LVWHQWLDOFRQIHVVLRQDV;LV
mostly concerned with the relationship of this confession to his audience; 
$XJXVWLQH·VRZQHPSKDVLVOLHVRQWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDSUXULHQWUHDGHU
RUDXGLWRUZKRZLVKHVWR´SHQHWUDWHµ$XJXVWLQH·VVHOILQWKHPRGHRI
´FHUWDLQNQRZOHGJHµDQLPSRVVLELOLW\RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGDFKDULWDEOH
reader or audiWRUZKRZLOOKDYHDFFHVVWR$XJXVWLQH·VVHOILQWKHPRGHRI
FDULWDVRQWKHRWKHUKDQG´7KHORYHLQWKHPEHOLHYHVPHµ7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQ´FHUWDLQNQRZOHGJHµDQGORYHRXJKWWRKDYHEHHQZLQVRPHWR
+HLGHJJHUJLYHQKLVUHVLVWDQFHWR´REMHFW-historicDOµUHDGLQJVZKLFKPLJKW
well bear a similar diagnosis to that offered here by Augustine, but it is here 
ignored by him.54   7KLVRPLVVLRQLVLQFRQWLQXLW\ZLWK+HLGHJJHU·VGHVLUHWR
locate Confessions X as determinatively different from Confessions I-IX, but his 
(one assumes deliberate) silence on how it relates to the books of the 
Confessions which follow it.   
 With regard to the second mode, bound to be more controversial, 
EXWQROHVVGLVFORVLYHRIWKHQDWXUHRI+HLGHJJHU·VLQWHUHVWLQ$XJXVWLQHZH
have +HLGHJJHU·VWUDQVODWLRQVDQGJORVVHVIRUH[DPSOHWKDWRIWKHTXRWDWLRQ
of the passage of the Retractiones which opens the main part of his lecture.  
With no textual warrant, but arguably considerable philosophical reason, 
+HLGHJJHUUHQGHUV$XJXVWLQH·V/Dtin as follows: 
                                                          
54   This is an omission which Marion will spend many pages rectifying:  cf. Au Lieu 
De Soi passim, esp. Ch 4. 
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The thirteen books of my Confessions praise God as just and 
good for my bad and my good actions [de malis et de bonis meis] 
(in my good and my bad being, life, having-been), and they excite 
the human intellect and affect.55 
 
The opportunity WRLQVHUW´EHLQJOLIHKDYLQJ-EHHQµZKHUHWUDQVODWRUVZRXOG
PRUHRIWHQJLYH´GHHGVµRUVRPHVXFKLVRQHVHQVHVWKHSULPDU\UHDVRQ
Heidegger has opened the Retractiones in the first place.  The reader interested 
in textual commentary in a more traditional philological key is being warned 
DWWKHRXWVHWWKDWVXFKLVQRWWKHQDWXUHRI+HLGHJJHU·VOHFWXUHPRUH
interesting, leaving aside the question of method, is exactly where he wishes 
WRWDNHWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKH´EHLQJOLIHDQGKDYLQJ-EHHQµZKLFK$XJXVWine 
takes up in Confessions ;7KLVEHJLQVLQHDUQHVWZLWK+HLGHJJHU·VFRUUHFW
insistence that, among the many things Augustine confesses that he does not 
know (nescio) and thus cannot confess about himself, under the great shadow 
of the quaestio that Augustine is to himself,56 ´RQHWKLQJLVFHUWDLQIor him:  
that he loves God.µ57  7KHTXHVWLRQIRU$XJXVWLQHLV´ZKDWGR,ORYHZKHQ,
love my God, quid autem amo cum te amo"µDQG+HLGHJJHULQVLVWVWKDWZHUHDG
this question as literally as possible, arguing against a more facile reading 
ZKLFKVHHVWKLVTXHVWLRQDVDVNLQJ´ZKDWLVWKLV*RGZKRP,ORYHµIRUD
VWURQJO\SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOIRUFHZLWKLQWKH´cumµRI´cum te amoµ 
Augustine attempts to find an answer to this question by 
investigating what there is which is worthy of love, and by 
asking whether there is something among them which God 
                                                          
55 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQd Neo-3ODWRQLVPµ 
56   In Chapter 5 below, I will argue that the verb in this formulation carries more 
weight than Heidegger (and Marion, for that matter) have seen it bear:  they both 
UHDGWKLVTXHVWLRQDVDVLPSO\LQHUWJLYHQZKHUHWKH¶IDFWXVVXP·indicates on the 
contrary a participation in the ontological dynamic of creation. 
57 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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KLPVHOILVRUZKDWJLYHVD´IXOILOOLQJLQWXLWLRQµLIKHOLYHVLQ
the love of God, what suffices for, or saturates, that which, in 
WKHORYHRI*RGKHLQWHQGV´Cum te amoµDOUHDG\LQGLFDWHV
an existential stage here -- the stage which has experienced 
mercy and, in this mercy, has been pulled out of deafness, the 
VWDJHZKLFKFDQ´KHDUµDQGVHHWKDWLVWKHVWDJHLQZKLFK
love, in such loving, is opened up for something definite; and 
RQO\IURPKHUHRQLQWKH´cumµGRcaelum et terra announce 
*RG·VSUDLVH-- not, however, when my attitude is that of 
natural-scientific research.58   
 
The difference emerges:  reading cum as forcefully temporal undermines a 
dualistic spiritualizing reading of the following sentence, wherein Augustine 
denies and then affirms that his love of God is in some sense sensory:  
Confessions ;LVQRWDQDUJXPHQWIRU´ILYHVSLULWXDOVHQVHVµLQDQ2ULJHQLVW
mode, which rejects physical light, voice, fragrance and the rest in favor of a 
merely analogous spiritual light, voice, and fragrance, but argues within the 
H[LVWHQWLDOVSKHUHLQDXJXUDWHGLQWKH´ZKHQ,ORYH\RXµIRUDGLIIHUHQWPRGH
of loving the same objects.  The resultant question, then, is noW´ZKHUHLVWKLV
God located -- in physical nature, in my memory, in a purely intellectual 
VSKHUHHWFµEXW´LQZKDWPRGHRUPDQQHUFDQ*RGEHIRXQGLQDOORI
WKHVH"µ7KHDQVZHUWRWKLVTXHVWLRQDSKHQRPHQRORJ\RIZKDWZHORYHDQG
how we love it, more aptly ties together the rest of Confessions X (as 
Heidegger has seen) and indeed the whole of the Confessions (as Heidegger has 
neglected to see) than does the popular reading of Conf. X as an interior quest 
for the objective knowledge of God.  Within the context of the 
phenomenological tradition, moreover, this close attention to Conf. X.6.8 
complicates in what will be a decisive way for Marion and Chrétien the 
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TXHVWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWDQGLWVUHODWLRQWRREMHFWVVXFKLV+HLGHJJHU·V
reading of the inarguably proto-phenomenological narrative in which 
$XJXVWLQHLQTXLUHVE\ZD\RIKLV´intentioµWKDWHDFKSDUWRIFUHDWLRQWHOOKLP
´VRPHWKLQJµDERXWWKH*RGZKRPKHORYHVDQGWKH\UHVSRQGE\ZD\RI
their beauty,59 ´ipse fecit nos.µ60   Heidegger seizes on a less famous detail from 
this narrative, that the divine light, voice, scent, touch and taste present in all 
of the created phenomena which Augustine describes cannot be sensed by 
WKRVH´VXEMHFWVµsubditi, PRUHOLWHUDOO\´WKHVXEMHFWHGRQHVµZKRVHPRGHRI
subjectivity is one of love intended too directly to the objective phenomena.   
$XJXVWLQHVLWXDWHVKLVFLWDWLRQRI5RPDQV´WKHLQYLVLEOHWKLQJVRI*RG
DUHXQGHUVWRRGDQGVHHQWKURXJKWKHWKLQJVZKLFKDUHPDGHµZLWKLQWKH
question of why not everybody can perceive God in creation in this way, and 
LQDQVZHULQJLWZLWKH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRWKH´VXEMHFWµLQLWVHW\PRORJLFDO
VHQVHLQYLWHV+HLGHJJHU·VUHMHFWLRQRIDQ\VLPSOLVWLF+XVVHUOLDQGLYLGH
between intending subjects and intended objects.  To love things when we 
love God, at the same time and without contradiction, it is first necessary to 
recognize an ontological equivalence between things and our selves, both 
EHLQJFRQVWLWXWHGDQGDQLPDWHGLQWKHLUYHU\EHLQJE\*RG´Deus autem tuus 
etiam tibi vita vitae est<RXU*RGLVIRU\RX\RXUOLIH·VOLIH.µ61 Within this more 
transitory (because it is living) phenomenological account of the love of God, 
LQUHODWLRQWRWKHORYHRIEHDXW\+HLGHJJHUEHJLQVWRGHYHORS$XJXVWLQH·V
itinerarium through the soul, itself understood as in tension between loving 
                                                          
59  ´Speciesµ-- UHDOO\EHWWHUWUDQVODWHGDVIRUPDV,·OODUJXHEHORZ&K 
60 Augustine, Conf.  X.6.9. 
61 Augustine, Conf. X.6.10. 
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REMHFWVDQGWKXVEHLQJ´VXEMHFWHGµWRWKHPLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKH\REVFXUH
WKHLUOLIH·VOLIHDQGORYLQJWKH*RGKHGRHVQRW\HWNQRZDQGWKXVHQWHULQJ
into a reciprocal relationship of caritas with created objects, now understood 
as ontologically parallel to the self).   
 
+HLGHJJHU·VH[FOXVLRQRI´PHWDSK\VLFVµXQGHUPLQHVKLVFRPPLWPHQW
to reading Augustine as a living thinker 
From this thorny set of inter-UHODWHGTXHVWLRQVDULVHV+HLGHJJHU·V
guiding principOHIRUQDUUDWLQJWKHUHVWRI$XJXVWLQH·VSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI
God and of things:   
+HUHZHDOUHDG\KDYHWKH´GLVSODFHPHQWµRIWKHTXHVWLRQ² 
cf. 10.20 ² under pressure from the phenomena:  the question 
is no longer whether this or that is God, but whether I can 
ILQG*RG´WKHUHLQµ ´WKHUHE\µ² ´OLYLQJWKHUHLQµ7KLV
happens by comparison with other living beings ² objectively 
² which are in possession RIWKHVDPHSRZHU>«@&ILQWKH
following,  the back-and-forth of the considerations regarding 
experience as the means objectively present-at-hand, and as 
interpretations regarding enactment!  The wavering itself is an 
expression of what?  The starting point for the existential 
breakthrough of the order and object-relation³psychology, 
or interpretation and grasping of the problem from factical 
life concretely historical-existentially.62   
 
This guiding principle, here offered in characteristically difficult prose, is 
WKDQNIXOO\FODULILHGLQDIRRWQRWHVRFUXFLDOWR+HLGHJJHU·VLGLRV\QFUDWLF
reading that one wonders why it is a mere footnote:   
The motivation of progredi [progressing, rising above] also in 
memoria7KHPHDQLQJRI´JRLQJWKURXJKµ"7KHSDWKDQGWKH
ZD\VWDWLRQVRIWKH´JRLQJWKURXJKµDUHSUHGHOLQHDWHG
                                                          
62 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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through obsolete traditional psychological classifications.  
How to break through and render a different sense?63   
$QG+HLGHJJHU·VSXUVXLWRIDQRQ-obsolete framework in which to articulate 
an Augustinian phenomenology asserts itself still more clearly in the 
following two sections, on memoria and the beata vita, but here he begins to 
equivocate so strongly that one is left unsure how much of his interpretation 
KHUHFRJQL]HVDVKLVRZQDQGKRZPXFKKHEHOLHYHVLVJHQXLQHO\$XJXVWLQH·V
RZQLQWHQW)RURQHSURPLQHQWH[DPSOHWKHEHJLQQLQJRI+HLGHJJHU·V 
explication of memoria (which he wisely and studiously leaves untranslated):  
´:KDWSKHQRPHQD$XJXVWLQHEULQJVIRUWKUHJDUGLQJWKHFRQWHQW>RImemoria] 
only, and above all, how he explicates the phenomena and in what basic 
FRQWH[WVDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQV>«@ shatters the framework and the structure of 
WKHXVXDOFRQFHSWµ64  WKLVODWWHU´XVXDOFRQFHSWµQHYHUTXLWHEHLQJEURXJKW
into focus clearly enough to be attacked with integrity (but often linked to a 
VLPLODUO\XQGHUGHYHORSHG´*UHHN-PHWDSK\VLFDOµGHWHUPLQDWion of memoria).  
In memoria Heidegger rightly detects the Augustinian locus of the present:  
´$QGZKHQ,DPGZHOOLQJLQmemoria,GHPDQGDWZLOOWKDW>«@WKLVRUthat 
EHFRPHVSUHVHQWWRPHµ and rightly diagnoses this presentation as disarming 
DQG´DVWRQLVKLQJµ to the self.65  Further, and more impressively, Heidegger 
allows that for Augustine the sifting between various objects or phenomena 
(sensuous objects, mathematical or theoretical objects, even the 
consciousness of the self) is not merely a cognitive or epistemological 
functioning, but puts ontology into play.  This is evidently at play in his 
                                                          
63 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµQ 
64 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
65 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ-4. 
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VWURQJWUDQVODWLRQRI´et ideo valde suntµ´WKH\>YL]LQWHOOHFWXDOREMHFWVKHUH
FDVWPLVOHDGLQJO\DV´QRQ-OLQJXLVWLFµ@SRVVHVVEHLQJLQDKLJKGHJUHH.µ66  
Nevertheless, Heidegger makes two connected choices which undermine the 
strength of this reading.  In the first place, while he locates the acts of 
memoria (to gather and give some form of hierarchical order to these various 
phenomena) within a larger framework of ontological gathering,67 he does 
not extend this (as Augustine clearly does in X.29.39, which without 
H[SODQDWLRQIDOOVRXWVLGHRI+HLGHJJHU·VSXUYLHZWRWKHVWUXFWXUHRIexitus 
and reditus which structures the Confessions as a whole.  In memoria, the self is 
able to gather and give order to phenomena only because it is itself in the 
process of being gathered in caritatem:  this omission is surprising, given 
+HLGHJJHU·VSUHYLRXVO\GLVFXVVHGVHQVLWLYLW\WRORYHDVDWOHDVWD
hermeneutically decisive consideration for approaching the Confessions, and 
VKRZVVRPHILVVXUHVLQKLVWKHRUHWLFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRUHVSHFWLQJ$XJXVWLQH·V
´IDFWLFLW\µ7KHVHFRQGDQGDWILUVWJODQFHOHVVLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQRFFXUVLQ
his discussion of the ontological category of the image, which Heidegger 
briefly raises68 DVDQH[DPSOHRI$XJXVWLQH·VXVHRIDSRULDDVDUKHWRULFDO
device:  images are at once present in memoria, but in their very being as 
images are not truly present, only quasi praesentia.  I will argue below that the 
UROHRILPDJHVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VSURWR-phenomenology is crucial, and that it is 
crucial that this be read in a larger context of Augustinian thought which 
does not exclude his meditations on the imago dei in Genesis; for now I 
                                                          
66 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ&I$XJXVWLQHConf. X.12.19. 
67 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
68 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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restrict myself to pointing out that Heidegger hardly skirts near this decisive 
FDWHJRU\%RWKRIWKHVHRPLVVLRQVSRLQWWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQRI+HLGHJJHU·V
reading of memoria+LVDWWHPSWDWIUHHLQJ$XJXVWLQHIURPWKH´REVROHWHµ
psychological articulation of memoria, in its clumsy circumnavigation of the 
exitus and reditus structure and of the role of images and the imagination, 
UHDOO\WULHVWRDLPGLUHFWO\DWWKHVHOIZKLFKKHUDGLFDOL]HVEH\RQG$XJXVWLQH·V
own text:  the self is no longer only the subject of an exitus and a reditus, but 
the very movement of exitus and reditus itself:   
I am not only the one from whose place the search proceeds 
and who moves toward some place, or the one in whom the 
search takes place; but the enactment of the search itself is 
something of the self.  What GRHVLWPHDQWKDW,´DPµ"69  
 
 
+HLGHJJHU·VIHWLVKL]LQJRI´DXWKHQWLFLW\µKDVVRPHMXVWLILFDWLRQLQ
Augustine, but ignores the ontology of images which grounds it 
We have come far away from the Husserlian stable, if entirely formal, 
subject:  not only is HeLGHJJHU·V$XJXVWLQLDQVHOIXQVWDEOHWRDOLPLWHGGHJUHH
it is entirely constituted by its movement and its search.  But its search for 
what, its movement towards what?  Viewed within the context of the entire 
Confessions, it is difficult to avoid reading this theologically; Conf. I.1.1 
DQQRXQFHVHFKRLQJ*HQHVLVWKDWWKHVHOILVPDGH´ad teµLQPRYHPHQW
toward God.  But by restricting his reading to Confessions X, Heidegger is able 
to put a characteristically impersonal gloss on the answer to this central 
question:   
                                                          
69 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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At what am I directing my effort, and what escapes me?  (In 
anticipation:  God as vita vitae [the life of life].  But this does 
not have to have the formed-out, concrete, traditional sense, 
but really has an existential sense of movement.70  
 
+HLGHJJHUILQGVDPSOHJURXQGRQZKLFKWRHODERUDWHWKLV´H[LVWHQWLDOVHQVH
RIPRYHPHQWµLQWKHPDUJLQVRI$XJXVWLQH·VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHbeata vita.71  
As with memoria, Heidegger reads Augustine on the beata vita sensitively but 
incompletely, and begins to express some disappointment with what he finds, 
and so to display a critical orientation which elsewhere lies more or less 
dormant in his exposition.  The sensitivity, even the sympathy, of 
+HLGHJJHU·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQHUHVLGHVSULPDULO\LQKLVUH-articulation of 
´beata vitaµDV´DXWKHQWLFH[LVWHQFHµ 
What the happy life is in accordance with the established 
mode of access and mode of having is to be established at the 
same time, and by way of, the explication of the How of 
having.  The primacy of the relational sense, or of the sense 
of enactment, is remarkable.  ² What it is:  this question leads 
to the How of having it.  The situation of enactment, authentic 
existence.  ² $SSURSULDWHWKH´KDYLQJµVXFKWKDWWKH having 
EHFRPHVD´EHLQJµ72 
 
The beata vita is defined, by Augustine and by an impressed Heidegger, as 
essentially different from material things and intelligible things alike, in that it 
is never simply presented to the self but must be desired and sought actively.  
This is the meaning of tKH¶UHODWLRQDOVHQVH·RU¶VHQVHRIHQDFWPHQW·LQ
+HLGHJJHU·VJORVV+HILQGVWKLVVRQRWDEOHDQGVRSHUFHSWLYHWKDWKHOHDYHV
                                                          
70 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQd Neo-3ODWRQLVPµ-1. 
71 Augustine, Conf.  X.20.29-27.38.  Heidegger oddly treats X.20.29-23.24 as the 
entirety of the relevant pericope, thus stopping short of the way in which Augustine 
himself answers the problems of the beata vita, namely by way of hXPLOLW\´<RXU
best servant is the person who does not attend so much to hearing what he himself 
ZDQWVDVWRZLOOLQJZKDWKHKDVKHDUGIURP\RXµConf. X.27.37. 
72 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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to one side the more obvious issue of how these passages situate Augustine 
within the eudaimonistic ethical tradition, for what is at play is not, like 
YLUWXHLQWHUSHUVRQDO$XJXVWLQH·VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHbeata vita, Heidegger tells 
XVLQLWVYHU\FRQVWLWXWLRQDV$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDQGQRWRXURZQ´RQO\
tells us that and how we experience a determinate What in which we take 
delight.  But the being-delighted itself?  Radical reference to the self, 
authentic facticity. ² Something which cannot be taken over from others at 
all.µ73  ,QWRWKLVSDUDOOHOUHJLVWHURID´UDGLFDOIDFWLFLW\µ+HLGHJJHUFDVWV
$XJXVWLQH·VFULWLTXHRI´WKRVHZKRthink that the happy life is found 
HOVHZKHUHµWKDQLQ*RG.74 For Augustine, these people (assuredly including 
himself, through most of the Confessions) pose the problem of why, though 
everybody wishes to life happily, not all live in such a way as to attain this; 
the solution Augustine offers, and Heidegger ignores or rejects, is to filter the 
eudaimonism which Augustine never questions through an ontology of 
images.75  7KLVPRYHLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK$XJXVWLQH·VGLVFXVVLRQRIHYLODV
privatio boni, and the humaQZLOO·VDWWDFKPHQWWRUHODWLYHO\OHVVHUJRRGVDVD
weakness or an illness rather than a radical and inexplicable attachment to 
HYLO%XW+HLGHJJHUVKRZVQRDZDUHQHVVRI$XJXVWLQH·VODUJHUHWKLFDODQG
ontological project, which leads his close reading of Conf. X.20.29-23.24 into 
two related errors:  an artificial isolation of the self from any communal 
context into a bizarre individual subjectivism, and a de-personalization of the 
                                                          
73 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ43-4. 
74 Augustine, Conf. X.22.32ff. 
75  Cf. Conf. ;´1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHLUZLOOUHPDLQVGUDZQWRZDUGVVRPHLPDJHRI
WKHWUXHMR\µ 
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beata vita as veritasZKLFKGLYRUFHV$XJXVWLQH·VWH[WIURPWKHREYLRXVO\
Christological and Trinitarian context in which in appears in Conf. X.  The 
first of these is perhaps somewhat more surprising within the context of 
+HLGHJJHU·VHDUO\WKRXJKWDQGVRGHVHUYHVDUHODWLYHO\ORQJTXRWDWLRQ 
Formally indicated, the beata vita as such, and in relation to 
the how of its existence, is one.  It really concerns the 
individual, how he appropriates it.  There is one true one, and 
HVSHFLDOO\WKLVLQWXUQLVIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDO>«@>7KRVHZKR
do not strive for the beata vita authenticaOO\@´non tantum volunt, 
quantum sat est ut valeantµ>WKH\GRQRWZLOOVRPXFKDVLV
sufficient to give them the strength], -- they do not project 
this from out of themselves toward themselves as 
´SRVVLELOLW\µLQVXFKDZD\WKDWLWZRXOGVXIILFHWRWDNH
possession of themselves in the first place.  The concern for 
it is lacking to such an extent that it is not really present, 
precisely because it becomes at object in its genuine manner 
only in such concern.76 
 
This sense of possibility or projection of the self from itself beyond itself is 
indeed Augustinian, although Heidegger neglects to mention that he has 
replaced the term which this movement defines for Augustine ² namely 
worship ² ZLWKWKHQHRORJLVWLF¶DXWKHQWLFLW\·:LWKWKLVPRYH+HLGHJJHUKLQWV
toward fetishizing the Augustinian description of movement by revising or 
removing the terminus towards which the self moves:  
In factical life, human beings somehow intimate something 
right, live in it and for it as something significant.  Inasmuch 
DVWKLV´OLYLQJµDQGH[SHULHQFLQJLVDOUHDG\DQDEVRUSWLRQLQ
factical life, an abandoning oneself over to it, it is, and will 
become, at the same time that which fulfills the effort toward 
WUXWK´Hoc quod amant velint esse veritatemµ>ZKDWWKH\ORYHWKH\
want to be the truth] ² what is loved at the moment, a loving 
into which one grows, through tradition, fashion, 
convenience, the anxiety of disquiet, the anxiety of suddenly 
VWDQGLQJLQYDFXLW\SUHFLVHO\WKLVEHFRPHVWKH´WUXWKµLWVHOI
                                                          
76 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ-6. 
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in and with this falling enactment..  The truth and its meaning 
are taken even into this modification ² that is, one does not 
only retreat from the vacuity, but even more, and primarily, 
IURPWKH´PRYHPHQWµWRZDUGLW77 
 
Those who are content with their image of joy (though it must be again 
emphasized that Heidegger does not make use of the language of images) are 
to be castigated primarily, for the Heideggerean Augustine, for their false 
sense of stability, and for their desire to stand still, refusing the sort of gleeful 
movement from one thing to another which characterizes authentic facticity.  
7KHUHLVWH[WXDOZDUUDQWIRUPXFKRIWKLVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VGHILQLWLRQRIWKH
beata vita as gaudium.  But it is extremely telling that Heidegger accepts this 
definition only by half:   
He who loves the veritas sola ² ´SHUTXDPYHUDVXQWRPQLDµ
[by which all things else are true] ² sine interpellante molestia 
[without any discomfort interfering], without any burden, 
without that which pulls him back, without an inauthentic, 
convenient, self-concealing willfulness ² will probably have 
the authentic beata vita.  Beata vita is gaudium, more closely, 
gaudium de veritate [joy in the truth], understood as existentially 
related to the vita beata.  (By way of veritas, however, we have, at 
the same time, the invasion of Greek philosophy).78 
 
Leave aside for a moment the arbitrariness of this assertion that gaudium is 
existentially acceptable but veritas is Greek and metaphysical:  what is more 
interesting in this claim, and what sets the stage more decisivHO\IRU0DULRQ·V
DQG&KUpWLHQ·VUHDGLQJVLVWKHRXWULJKWUHIXVDORI$XJXVWLQH·V&KULVWRORJLFDO
and Trinitarian resolution to the existential problems of the self, which arises 
LQIXOOIRUFHZLWK+HLGHJJHU·VOHQJWK\H[DPLQDWLRQRIcura, molestia and tentatio, 
                                                          
77 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
78 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLne and Neo-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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the remainder of his lectures.  Heidegger chooses to treat these entirely under 
the shadow of the deformed self,79 ZKLFK´SOXQJHVKHDGORQJµLQWRWKH
´EHDXWLIXOO\IRUPHGµformosa) things of the world.  He argues that the whole 
of Conf. X hinges on this, its most famous chapter.   
 
,QH[FOXGLQJWKHRORJ\+HLGHJJHUVXEYHUWV$XJXVWLQH·VRQWRORJ\ 
In a move which Marion will repeat, Heidegger discusses the long and 
LPSRUWDQWTXRWDWLRQ´sero te amavi«µIURPWKLVFKDSWHUZLWKSULPDU\
reference to the self, secondary reference to the act of loving, and only a 
passing glance at God. 
Thus everything depends upon the authentic hearing, upon 
the How of the questioning posture, of the wanting-to-hear 
«7KHTXHVWLRQRIwhere I find God has turned into a 
discussion of the conditions of experiencing God, and that 
comes to a head in the problem of what I am myself.80   
 
His explicit gloss on this phrase -- ´ODWHGLG,JHWWRWKHOHYHORIIDFWLFDOOLIH
ZKHUH,SXWP\VHOILQWKHSRVLWLRQWRORYH\RXµ-- quietly brushes aside the 
sense, entirely obvious to even a careless reader of X.27.38, in which this love 
is a response to the sensuous beauty of Christ,81 placing the emphasis instead 
RQWKHVHOI·VDWWHPSWVWRNHHSLWVHOIPRELOHDQGRSHQWRWKHJUHDWHVWH[WHQW
possible unformed by external objects. The gloss on the remainder of 
X.27.38 which forms the closing lines of a long preamble to a longer set of 
                                                          
79 Cf. Augustine, Conf. X.27.38. 
80 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
81 ,WLVSHUKDSV0DULRQ·VFHQWUDOWDVNWRFRUUHFWWKLVE\UHDGLQJQRWRQO\WKLVORYHEXW
also the self which loves as such a response, under a rubric of a determining and 
primordial givenness. 
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expositions (of cura, tentatio and molestia), are demonstrative of this almost 
obsessive fixation on the self, and of the hermeneutical distance he must 
traverse in order to arrive at it: 
I plunged headlong into the world and things as formosa, 
beautifully formed, impressive and announcing something 
significant, so that they captured me; and my desire to know 
made an effort at it ² but deformis inruebam, I myself was not in 
the form, I did not have the Being, which is the genuine 
%HLQJRIDVHOI´Tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuamµ><RX
touched me, and I am burning for Your peace].82 
 
The transition here from Heideggerean gloss to Augustinian quotation is 
abrupt and jarring, at least when one reads it,83 and it raises the question of 
why Heidegger bothers to quote this sentence at all.  Both the second person 
agency (tetigisti) and the emphasis on peace (pacem tuam) would have 
HPSKDWLFDOO\XQGHUFXW+HLGHJJHU·VFRQFHUQVLIKHKDGUXPLQDWHGRQWKHP
even briefly, and only the sense of ardor or burning (exarsi) occupies his 
interests in the following pages. 
       Though the aforementioned expositions run their course for 
several pages -- nearly half of the entire lecture course is devoted to 
unpacking molestia DVWKH¶EDVLFFKDUDFWHURIIDFWLFDOOLIH·-- I will forego a 
similarly extended attention to these pages, as they follow rather 
uncontroversially from the premises which Heidegger has set up in the 
portions of the lecture to which I have been attending thus far.  This is not 
to deny their intrigue and their value; several reflections on discrete moments 
                                                          
82 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
83 2QHDVVXPHVWKDW+HLGHJJHU·VDXGLWRUVZHUHQRWDOHUWHGWRDQ\GLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQ$XJXVWLQH·VDQG+HLGHJJHU·VWKRXJKWV 
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RI$XJXVWLQH·VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHYDULRXVtentationes of the senses and of 
interpersonal life are perceptive, if not terribly relevant to the rest of his 
reading. Aside from these brief attentions to particularities of the Augustinian 
text, the last half of the lecture course is insistent, almost repetitive, in its 
drive towards describing Augustinianism as fundamentally a play of historical 
curaeLQDQRULJLQDO´IDOOLQJµPRWLRQIURPDQXQGHU-theorized) unity to a 
dissolute, scattered manifold (multumDQGLQD´FRXQWHU-PRYHPHQWµRI
authenticity which attempts to contain itself (an interesting twist on the Latin 
continentiaLQDQH[LVWHQWLDOO\KRQHVWGLUHFWLRQ+HLGHJJHU·VIL[DWLRQRQWKH
chapters of Conf. X which describe the various obstacles to this authenticity84 
prevents him from elaborating on the object of this direction.  His numerous 
LQYRFDWLRQVRIDEUHDNEHWZHHQ´SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOµFRQFHUQZLWKWKH
´KRZ"µOLIHLVGLUHFWHGDQGWKHLOOHJLWLPDWH´WKHRORJLFDOµFRQFHUQZLWKWKH
TXHVWLRQ´WRZKDW"µOLIHLVGLUHFWHG85 make a certain amount of sense, once 
we have forgiven Heidegger for his eccentrically selective reading.  But this 
forgiveness ought not to come without rigorous objection:  from an 
Augustinian perspective, it is simply impermissible to ignore an ontological 
context to the phenomenological project.  This failing, as I have noted above, 
is most obvious in the omission of the rest of the Confessions from 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQLWLVPRUHVXEWO\SUHVHQWLQ+HLGHJJHU·V
refusal to consider even the whole of the tenth book of the Confessions -- he 
stops just before Augustine begins to reflect on humility, on Christ as 
                                                          
84 Augustine, Conf. X.28.39-X.39.64. 
85 HeLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµDQG 
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mediator, on the incarnation and on the sacraments, with a culminating nod 
towards the Eucharist86 ZKLFKZRXOGLQFRQFHUQZLWK$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW
RQFUHDWLRQKDYHOHIW+HLGHJJHU·VGHVFULSWLRn of life as molestia radically 
untenable: 
«D+RZRIH[SHULHQFLQJDEXUGHQWRDQGDQHQGDQJHULQJ
of, having-of-oneself -- in full facticity.  This having-of-
oneself is, as factical, such that it enacts this endangering itself 
and forms it. In the concrete and genuine enactment of 
experience, it gives itself the possibility of falling, but in its 
ownmost radical self-concern, it gives itself at the same time 
WKHIXOOFRQFUHWHIDFWLFDO´RSSRUWXQLW\µWRDUULYHDWWKHEHLQJ
of its ownmost life.87   
 
 
HeideggHU·VVXEYHUVLRQRI$XJXVWLQLDQWKHRORJ\REVFXUHV$XJXVWLQLDQ
phenomenology, and ultimately returns to the stability of the subject 
 
It will be the project of Marion, of Chrétien and of my final chapter 
to try to correct these omissions, and suggest appropriate reconfigurations of 
the themes which Heidegger has rendered as central to the 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOWUDGLWLRQ·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQHEHLQJOLIHWKHVHOILQWKH
light of the most relevant theological data.  For now, I wish only to note a 
moment of quiet LURQ\ZKLFKGLVFORVHVDFHQWUDOSUREOHPLQ+HLGHJJHU·V
presentation of Augustine.  In rendering continentia, that which Heidegger 
rightly sees as serving as a buffer against the tentationes and as reinforcing a 
partially positive dynamic of cura, as something which God commands, but 
not something which God also grants (the famous prayer, da quod iubes et iube 
quod visLVVXUSULVLQJO\PLVVLQJIURP+HLGHJJHU·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVKHQRWRQO\
                                                          
86 Augustine, Conf. X.43.70, 
87 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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runs a considerable risk of Pelagianism; he also restores, at the last minute 
and as through the back door, a sort of reversed Husserlian subjective 
stability, where the self ultimately grounds and assures its own selfhood, 
albeit only in its willingness to endanger its own being.  Extracting 
phenomenology from Augustine, and casting aside the theology which 
surrounds it and pervades it, is not only a process which self-consciously 
betrays both the Augustinian text and the Augustinian spirit; it also ends in a 
VWUDQJHO\FRQVHUYDWLYHPRWLRQWRZDUGV´DOLIHZKRVHEHLQJLVJURXnded in a 
radical having-of-oneself.µ88  Perhaps it is not too crude to draw a direct line 
IURP+HLGHJJHU·VUHIXVDOWRUHDGConf. X in the broader context of the rest of 
$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDQGOLIHWRWKLVODVW-moment retreat into idealist 
subjectivity, even if this subjectivity begins to strain in its tragic outlook 
towards an impersonal ontology.   
 
The subject of Conf. XI overlaps significantly with Dasein 
On, then, to Being and Time,89 and here we must tread carefully.  As 
intimated above, Being and Time refers to Augustine explicitly only four times.  
Augustine appears, then, with considerably less frequency than Descartes or 
Aristotle, but with considerably more frequency than Aquinas or other 
scholastic figures. It would therefore be foolhardy (if still tempting) to try to 
read the whole of this opus as a gloss on the Confessions (although the 
                                                          
88 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
89 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1962). 
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temptation to point out that the reverse holds true is too great to resist:  four 
references to Augustine, and very little scholarly discourse; two references to 
Aquinas, and a whole industry of debates about the extent to which 
Heidegger is a scholastic!).   
 7KHOLQHIURPWKH´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµOHFWXUHWRBeing 
and Time could obviously be drawn too sharply, but does this mean that it 
does not exist?  Put another way, the question is:  to what extent does the 
account of subject-object co-FRQVWLWXWLYLW\IRXQGLQ´7KH3KHQRPHQRORJ\RI
5HOLJLRXV/LIHµDQWLFLSDWHWKDWIRXQGLQBeing and Time?  To that end, I here 
present a brief report of the major thematics of Being and Time as they strike 
an ear trained more by Augustine than by other obvious influences on 
+HLGHJJHU.DQW+XVVHUO1LHW]VFKH.LHUNHJDDUG'LOWKH\«$JDLQWKH
point is not to establish that Being and Time is a crypto-Augustinian text, put 
into a German code to hide the obvious influence, nor even to set up a 
watertight genealogy from Heidegger to Marion and Chrétien (or for that 
matter to Sartre or to Derrida) by way of Augustine.  I aim solely to alert 
those readers unfamiliar with Heidegger, and to remind those much more 
familiar than I, of some of the key dynamics of Being and Time, and to put 
forth the rather uncontroversial assertion that, if the 21st century 
phenomenological game is played at least in part on Augustinian turf, this is 
not a wholly new or wholly arbitrary phenomenon.90 
                                                          
90 7KHPRVWWKRURXJKDQGEDODQFHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHTXHVWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VSODFH
in the pre-history of Being and Time is that of Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of 
+HLGHJJHU·V%HLQJDQG7LPH(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 69-115, 
SDUWLFXODUO\IIVHHDOVRKLVH[WHQVLYHVXPPDU\RI´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-
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 We may start with what Heidegger himself ² in a rare and awkward 
autobiographical remark ² WHOOVXVDERXW$XJXVWLQH·VUROHLQBeing and Time, 
specifically with regard to the prominent phenomenon of care and its 
linguistic and conceptual history:   
Even as early as the Stoics, ƬƥƱƩƬƭƧ was a firmly established 
term, and it recurs in the New Testament, becoming sollicitudo 
LQWKH9XOJDWH7KHZD\LQZKLFK¶FDUH·LVYLHZHGLQWKH
foregoing existential analytic of Dasein, is one which has 
grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to 
Interpret the Augustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) 
anthropology with regard to the foundational principles 
reached in the ontology of Aristotle.91  
 
7KHWUDMHFWRU\LQ+HLGHJJHU·VZULWLQJIURPGHDOLQJZLWK$XJXVWLQHLQThe 
Phenomenology of Religious Life) to dealing with Aristotle (in Being and Time and 
certainly elsewhere) is well-known, and I do not wish to dispute that in many 
ways Being and Time·V$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPLVPRUHGHHSO\LPSULQWHGWKDQLWV
Augustinianism.  This is true both in its language of choice (Greek) and in 
parts of its very structure (e.g. its opening quotation, or the governing 
preoccupation of delineating Being rather than beings).  Nevertheless, the 
´+HOOHQR-&KULVWLDQDQWKURSRORJ\µLPSRUWHGDOPRVWHQWLUHO\LQWDFWIURPThe 
Phenomenology of Religious Life, when run through the machines of Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                                                
3ODWRQLVPµLELG-.LVLHOFRQFOXGHVWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VLPSRUWDQFHIRUBeing 
and Time LVSULPDULO\VWUXFWXUDO´2GGO\LWLVWKHVRPHZKDWPRUH¶JHQHULF·DQGVR
impoverished Augustinian schema which begins to anticipate the structure of BT..  
7KHFRUHLQILQLWLYH«FDULQJFXUDUHRQWKHRQHHQGRIWKHGLDJUDPLVWULHGE\WKH
opposing tendencies of falling into disperson in the many or rising toward an 
integrated and unified self.  On the other end, it is ontologically oriented toward 
thigs of use versus things to be enjoyed for their own sake.  Especially the latter 
distinction, amplified by Nicomachean Ethics 6, points to the two extant Divisions of 
%7µ 
91 Heidegger, Being and Time, 492 n.7. 
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ontology, is the animating force of Being and Time.  No doubt the 
anthropology is more complicated than Augustine, even than a Heideggerean 
limitation of Augustine.  Also no doubt that anthropology, Christian or 
RWKHUZLVHLVHPSKDWLFDOO\QRW+HLGHJJHU·VVWDWHGDLP 
Thus, by our ontological Interpretation of Dasein, we have 
been brought to the existential conception RIFDUHIURP'DVHLQ·V
pre-ontological interpretation of itselIDV¶FDUH·<HWWKH
analytic of Dasein is not aimed at laying an ontological basis 
for anthropology; its purpose is one of fundamental ontology. 
92 
 
Nevertheless the opposite remains true:  that Heidegger allows a certain 
Stoicized Augustinian anthropology ² and it is quite important that 
+HLGHJJHU·V$XJXVWLQHLVDOZD\VDQGHYHU\ZKHUH6WRLFL]HGDQGQHYHULQDQ\
sense Platonic -- to give shape to his inquiry, both selecting the phenomena 
which will be laid bare for his analysis and more fundamentally limiting the 
horizon against which they appear.  These phenomena, and their linkings to 
the Confessions, are plentiful.  Foremost there is the question of cura, translated 
or revised into Sorge.  Less prominently, we could note the distinction 
between timor castus and timor servilis93  and a quick nod of the head to 
Augustine (alongside Pascal) for their work in elaborating that we come to 
things first in the affective order and only later in the epistemic order.94  
Finally, in this list of lesser Augustinianisms, we ought to note the lengthiest 
engagement with an Augustinian text to appear in Being and Time, namely the 
discussion of curiositas as a particularly sharp quotidian way of relating to 
                                                          
92 Heidegger, Being and Time, 244. 
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, 492 n.4 
94 Heidegger, Being and Time, 178 and 492 n.5. 
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beings.  Here it is possible to trace a departure from the analysis of 
´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ+HLGHJJHULVLQBeing and Time much more 
FDUHIXOQRWWRUHFRPPHQGZKDWKHKDVGLDJQRVHGDV'DVHLQ·VSHUVLVWHQWQHHG
for nRYHOW\IRUQRYHOW\·VVDNH.95  These themes are, however much they 
illuminate small corners of the Heideggerean universe, admittedly rather 
minor, particularly when compared to the sheer number of citations of 
$ULVWRWOHPDUVKDOOHGDQGGLVFXVVHGDWOHQJWKZLWKUHJDUGWR+HLGHJJHU·V
REMHFWRILQTXLU\%HLQJ,QGHHG$XJXVWLQH·VRQWRORJ\LVFRQVSLFXRXVLQBeing 
and Time for its absence ² the Heideggerean scholar who would guess that 
Augustine never worried himself with ontological questions will be easily 
forgiven for this mis-estimation. 
 
Being : Aristotle :: Time : Augustine 
 I would like, though, to hazard a more provocative thesis, which 
confessedly finds little in the way of obvious textual support.  To wit:  if 
$ULVWRWOHLVWKHSULPDU\FDWDO\VWIRU+HLGHJJHU·VWKRXJKWRIBeing, Augustine is 
the primary, if utterly unacknowledged, catalyst for his thought of Time. 
 7KHRUHWLFLDQVRIWLPHDUHZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQYLOODLQVLQ+HLGHJJHU·V
DFFRXQWRQPRUHWKDQRQHRFFDVLRQKHUHIHUVWRWKH´WUDGLWLRQDOµ
conception of time, a tradition which begins with Aristotle and ends with 
Bergson.  In this conception, time is WKH´RQWLFDOFULWHULRQIRUQDLYHO\
                                                          
95 Heidegger, Being and Time, 215-7. 
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discriminatiQJYDULRXVUHDOPVRIHQWLWLHVµ96  It is the unsophisticated and 
under-DQDO\]HGIORZRIIDFLOHO\GHILQHG´QRZVµWKHEDQDOWLFNLQJVRIWKH
FORFNWKH´FRXUVHRIWLPHµZKHUHLQPRPHQWVDUH3UHVHQW-to-hand, and no 
discussion of time ² from Aristotle to Bergson, running through Descartes 
and Kant ² assumes this basic meaning.97  Against this ² indeed, to destroy this 
² ontic conception of time, Heidegger proposes an ontological definition of 
time as that which primordially determines Being, and not merely that which 
accidentally provides a setting and a context for any given being: 
7KHIDFWWKDWLQHYHU\´QRZµQRPDWWHUKRZPRPHQWDU\LWLV
in each case already now, must be conceived in terms of 
VRPHWKLQJZKLFKLV¶HDUOLHU·still DQGIURPZKLFKHYHU\´QRZµ
stems:  that is to say, it must be conceived in terms of the 
ecstatical stretching-along of that temporality which is alien to 
any Continuity of something present-at-hand but which, for 
its part, presents the condition for the possibility of access to 
anything continuous that is present-at-hand.98  
 
This ecstasy and this stretching, presented at a climactic portion of 
+HLGHJJHU·VDUJXPHQWDVWKHRQWRORJLFDOKRUL]RQIRUWKHDSSHDUDQFHRI
Being, cannot help but remind us of the Augustinian distentio animi.  Indeed, 
that Dasein is constituted by its futurity, by its openness and directedness to 
potential, rather than by its presence and its actuality,99 has upset Thomist 
readers of Heidegger, but it is formally nearly identical to the inquietum cor of 
Confessions I.  More to the point, Augustine has also discussed and rejected, in 
                                                          
96 Heidegger, Being and Time, 39. 
97 Heidegger, Being and Time, 41ff. 
98 Heidegger, Being and Time, 476. 
99 &I´%\WKHWHUP¶IXWXUDOZHGRQRWKHUHKDYHLQYLHZD´QRZµZKLFKKDVnot 
yet EHFRPH¶DFWXDO·DQGZKLFKVRPHWLPHwill be for the first time.  We have in view 
the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards 
LWVHOIµ 
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the eleventh book of the Confessions, the common-VHQVH´RQWLFµGHILQLWLRQRI
time in favor of precisely such a distentio animi.  It is hard to imagine that a 
student of Husserl, who has recommended that anybody interested in time 
ought to read Confessions XI, is unfamiliar with this text, particularly when that 
student not only edited for publication the text in which Husserl made this 
recommendation, but also gave a lecture series on the book immediately 
preceding it!   
Two plausible explanations remain:  that the distentio animi worked its 
ZD\WKURXJK+HLGHJJHU·VVXEFRQVFLRXVWRVXFKDQH[WHQWWKDWKHGLGQRW
recognize his solution to the problems of time as anything other than his 
own, or that he had some reason for eliding and obscuring this influence; 
between these two, it is difficult to choose.  In support of the latter 
explanation, I can try to articulate at least one respect in which Heidegger 
ZRXOGKDYHIRXQG$XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQWGHILFLHQWQDPHO\WKDW$XJXVWLQH·V
distentio animi is surrounded on all sides by Scriptural exegesis and speculation 
regarding creation and eternity, all of which Heidegger brushes aside in a 
IRRWQRWHDV´GHILQHGZLWKDQRULHQWDWLRQWRZDUGVWKHLGHDRI¶FRQVWDQW·
presence-at-hand.µ100 Heidegger leaves open the possibility that some 
DFFRXQWRIHWHUQLW\DUULYHGDW´E\WKHvia negationis et eminentiaeµPLJKW
supplement an ontological account of time and of temporality after this 
ontological account has already been established phenomenologically,101 but 
rejects as not worthy of discussion the suggestion that a revealed or 
                                                          
100 Heidegger, Being and Time, 499 n. 13. 
101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 499 n. 13. 
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philosophically determined eternity can found and initiate, even in the mode 
of aporia, such a phenoPHQRORJ\WKLVLVRIFRXUVH$XJXVWLQH·VPHWKRG7R
be clear:  it would be unrealistic to demand that Heidegger accept 
Augustinian revelation as a basis for a phenomenologically determined 
RQWRORJ\%XW+HLGHJJHUFRXOGKDYHDOORZHGWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQt is 
certainly not as naïve as that ontic account which both Heidegger and 
Augustine describe and reject; only a prejudice against the conceptualization 
of eternity which automatically imagines that such a conceptualization is an 
inauthentic act of fleeing death precludes him from seeing that Confessions XI 
mirrors his own definition in much of its content, if not its tone. 
 More is at stake here than bibliography.  That Augustine is 
unacknowledged as a source of some of the more influential philosophy of 
the twentieth century can certainly rankle me, or the Augustinian guild, but 
hardly anybody else ought to be upset by merely this plagiarism.  More 
generally upsetting is the result of this omission, that by it Heidegger escapes 
the need to argue for the conclusions he reaches, and more particularly for 
the departures he makes from Augustine.   Heidegger and Augustine agree 
on a certain uncanny and destabilizing definition of temporality as an ecstatic 
force which centrally determines both human being and (created) Being in 
general; this definition leads both of them to an anthropology (and perhaps 
an ethics) of temptation and of profligacy, and especially of ecstatic being-
towards-something DVWKHPHDQVRIXQLILFDWLRQRIWKHVHOI·VSRVVLELOLWLHV%XWLW
leads Heidegger to give this something the name of death, and Augustine to 
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give it the name of God;102 it leads Heidegger to analysis of fear and anxiety, 
DQG$XJXVWLQHWR´EXUQLQJORYHµWRKRSHDQGWRSUD\HU)RUERWKRIWKHP
time gives the human being its shape and its fundamental orientation to the 
world, and for both of them time does not exist except that it tends toward 
non-being.103  But for Augustine, this time tends toward non-being not due 
to an inscrutably arbitrary and tragic caprice, but due instead to a 
transcendent Ratio which makes itself manifest also as Verbum and Principium, 
Virtus and Sapientia.104  I have no wish to over-state my case; there are almost 
FHUWDLQO\UHDVRQVLQWHUQDOWR+HLGHJJHU·VV\VWHPWRLJQRUHWKHDVSHFWVRI
$XJXVWLQH·VDQDO\VLVRIWLPHZKLFKGLIIHUIURPKLVRZQ+HLGHJJHU·V
forgetfulness or refusal to acknowledge his debt renders any discussion of 
these reasons speculative at best.   But even if he had, as I wish, brought 
these debts out into the light, and even if he had entered into a good-faith 
argument with Augustine, it seems unlikely that he would have avoiding the 
trap which Husserl fell into:  ignoring context.  Confessions ;,LVDV0DULRQ·V
analysis in particular is willing to acknowledge, not a discrete philosophical 
unit, however sophisticated and compelling (or not) it might be; it is instead a 
FOHDULQJRIWKHWKURDWDSUHDPEOHWR$XJXVWLQH·VDSSURDFKWR*HQHVLV7KLV
is not merely proper Christian piety.  It also demarcates the boundaries of 
                                                          
102 $XJXVWLQH·VVLPLODUGLVFXVVLRQGRHVLQFOXGHGHDWKEXWRQO\DVSDUWRIDUK\PLQJ
G\QDPLF´$WKLQJGLHVDQGFRPHV into being [moritur et oritur] inasmuch as it is not 
ZKDWLWZDVDQGEHFRPHVZKDWLWZDVQRWµConf. XI.7.9. 
103 Augustine, Conf. XI.14.17. 
104 Augustine, Conf. XI.8.10-9.11. 
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Augustinian phenomenRORJ\´nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura; without 
creation, there can be no time.µ105  
 
By ignoring theology, Husserl and Heidegger misconstrue the self  
 Formally, both Husserl and Heidegger are guilty of falsely 
distinguishing between Augustine the philosopher and Augustine the 
theologian; the Augustine who claims Christianity as vera philosophia will not 
permit one to select portions of his work as philosophically interesting or 
coherent without a much more rigorous discussion of the principles of such 
a selection.  This formal error leads, at least indirectly, to the conclusions that 
their more theologically minded heirs will most concern themselves with 
disputing.  The Husserlian epoché and Heideggerean phenomenology tout 
court, not unlike the Cartesian meditatio before them, are in some sense 
spiritual exercises ² but to what end?  For Husserl, the self is apparent to 
itself, so long as it practices this epoché, restricted to the epistemic realm, 
which it can of its own devices do.  For Heidegger, the self is opaque to itself 
² or at least, the practices needed for the self to access itself are not theorized 
² and it cannot of its own devices or otherwise do anything to remediate the 
situation of finitude and time, construed as tragically insurmountable.  For 
Augustine (and for Marion and Chrétien), the self is always opaque to itself, 
though this opacity can have both troublesome aspects (which can be 
PLWLJDWHGDQGSRVLWLYHDVSHFWVRQWKHZKROHWKHVHOI·VILQLWXGHDQGLWV
                                                          
105 Augustine, Conf. XI.30.40. 
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temporality are not construed as insurmountable obstacles, but as themselves 
gifts.  The philosophy and practice of Augustine thus differs fundamentally 
in aim from the philosophical practices of Husserl and of Heidegger, which 
DSSHDUWHQHEURXVO\LQ$XJXVWLQH·VZDNH:HVKDOOsee that the more closely 
RQHDWWHQGVWR$XJXVWLQHDQGWKHOHVVRQHDOORZVRQH·VUHDGLQJWREHSUH-
determined by (for example) Heideggerean commitments, the more these 
practices and exercises emerge as tools to better appreciate and celebrate the 
finitude of the self, and to enjoy all other created things as also gifts.  Indeed 
the final chapter of the present work will suggest some ways in which a fuller 
reading of Augustine, which attends especially to the dimensions of 
Augustinian proto-phenomenology which are concerned with the Trinity and 
with the account in Genesis of the becoming of all things can better account 
for some of the bizarre locutions of Conf. X-XI on Augustinian grounds, but 
also can salvage a more deeply restless ground for the concerns of 
phenomenology itself, viz. a Trinitarian transcendence and an account of the 
co-constitution of subjects and objects in the imagination.  Before that, the 
two intervening chapters will describe and begin to assess the efforts of 
Marion and Chrétien to resituate Augustine in precisely this way.   
  
 
 
73 
 
III.  Marion and Augustine  
 
Abstract 
This chapter contains a sustained engagement with Jean-/XF0DULRQ·V
important 2008 monograph on Augustine.  Much like Heidegger provided a 
more compelling and more detailed e[SRVLWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VUHOHYDQFHWR
phenomenology than Husserl did, Marion provides an account of the 
question which is similarly more compelling, more creative, and more 
attentive to linguistic and conceptual details.  For this reason my approach to 
Marion is largely expository.  But much like Heidegger remained 
IXQGDPHQWDOO\LQOLQHZLWKPDQ\RI+XVVHUO·VPRVWGHFLVLYHHUURUVVRWRR
0DULRQ·VUHDGLQJLQLWVDYHUVLRQHVSHFLDOO\WRPHWDSK\VLFVFDOOVIRUVHULRXV
FULWLFLVP,QIDFW0DULRQ·VUHOLDQFHRQan impoverished and dark 
Heideggerean ontology is apparent in his treatment of nearly every major 
Augustinian topos which he entertains:  the confessio, memoria, veritas, the distentio 
animi, and the relationship between ego and mundus via love and praise.  In 
HDFKRIWKHVHDUHDV,SRLQWWRDSDWWHUQZKHUHLQ0DULRQ·VEROGDQGLQWHUQDOO\
consistent insights into the Augustinian text is less averse to theology than 
that of his forerunners, but equally averse to metaphysics, and so while it 
brings many small illuminations to the corners of the Augustinian world, it 
fails to offer a compelling synthesis of these insights, and so calls forth 
FRQWUDU\WR0DULRQ·VLQWHQWLRQVEXWIRUUHDVRQVSXUHO\LQWHUQDOWRWKH
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phenomenological project) a wider-ranging reading RI$XJXVWLQH·VRQWRORJ\
and his relationship to Platonic philosophy. 
 
Au Lieu De Soi LVDQLPSRUWDQWWH[WLQWKHWUDMHFWRU\RI0DULRQ·V
thought, and in the history of phenomenology 
Jean-Luc Marion acknowledges that his recent book on Augustine106 
was to be expected:  the trajectory of his historical project and that of his 
phenomenological project, not easily separated one from the other, both 
point back to a radicality which precedes Descartes.  Au Lieu De Soi will very 
likely become an important text for VLWXDWLQJ0DULRQ·VSODFHLQWKH
phenomenological tradition, and indeed asks for a newly conceived account 
of the role of Augustine in determining that tradition ² a role which pierces 
through Derrida, Ricoeur, Heidegger and Husserl, with each to some extent 
claiming Augustine as their own, such that the phenomenological tradition, 
OLNHWKH5HIRUPDWLRQPLJKWZHOOEHEHVWQDUUDWHGDVD¶KLVWRU\RIFRPSHWLQJ
$XJXVWLQLDQLVPV·1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHPRVWXUJHQWTXHVWLRQZKLFKAu Lieu De 
Soi raises is best put from DWKHRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHLV0DULRQ·VODWHVWWXUQRU
rather return,107 to Augustine, particularly on the heels of The Erotic 
                                                          
106 $X/LHX'H6RL/·DSSURFKHGH6DLQW$XJXVWLQ.  Paris:  PUF, 2008,  9.  All 
translations from this text are my own:  I will only provide the French when my 
translation fails to capture important nuance. 
107 0DULRQ·VILUVWDUWLFOHVZHUHH[SRVLWLRQVRI6W$XJXVWLQHVHH´/DVDLVLHWULQLWDLUH
VHORQO·(VSULWGH6DLQW$XJXVWLQµRésurrection 28 (1968):  66-DQG´'LVWDQFHHW
EpDWLWXGHVXUOHPRWFDSDFLWDVFKH]6DLQW$XJXVWLQµRésurrection 29 (1968):  58-80.  
The young Marion is to be commended for understanding that the most important 
thing a Frenchman could be doing in 1968 is reading Augustine carefully. 
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Phenomenon,108 most accurately interpreted as a phenomenological claiming of 
Augustine, or as an Augustinian re-configuring of phenomenology?  In the 
IRUPHUFDVH0DULRQ·VWUDQVODWLRQVRI$XJXVWLQLDQIRUPXODVconfessio as 
¶UHGXFWLRQ·veritas DV¶WKHVDWXUDWHGSKHQRPHQRQ·ego DV¶WKHJLIWHGRQH·HWF
would be read as imperialistic or even narcissistic impositions which would 
tell us much about Marion and little about Augustine; in the latter, as 
DGPLVVLRQVWKDW0DULRQ·VSURMHFWKDVDOODORQJEHHQPRUH$XJXVWLQLDQDQG
thus more deeply theological, than even he (let alone we) have known, which 
would, whatever insights it might bring to our understanding of Augustine, 
GHIDPLOLDUL]HWKHWHUUDLQRI0DULRQ·VRZQWKRXJKWULGGLQJXVRI
misinterpretations, both Cartesian and Heideggerean.  If nothing else, Au 
Lieu De Soi proves Marion as a very careful and imaginative reader of 
Augustine, and one whose arguments and translations deserve similarly 
careful attention:  my approach will then be largely exegetical, tracing out the 
skeletal framework of Au Lieu De Soi, with brief critical comments salted in 
liberally. 
 
The genre and the structure of the Confessions already gestures 
WRZDUGVDSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO´HURWLFUHGXFWLRQµ 
As a methodological statement, Marion launches his first chapter, La 
confessio ou la réduction, by arguing that the novelty of the Confessions emerges 
not at the level of content, but primarily at the level of form:  whether they 
                                                          
108 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon. Trans. Stephen E. Lewis. Chicago and 
London:  The University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
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speak of the self, the will, memory, time, Scripture, creation or God (as they 
GRLQURXJKO\WKLVRUGHUWKH\¶LQVFULEH·WKHVHWRSLFVLQDILUVW-person 
narrative.  The observation might seem banal, but Marion shows the 
RULJLQDOLW\RIWKLVDSSURDFKE\TXHVWLRQLQJLWUDGLFDOO\¶:KRVSHDNVZKDW
DERXWZKDWSUHFLVHO\DQGWRZKRP"·109   Au Lieu De Soi is thus to be 
conceived of as an attack not only on the interpretation of the Confessions as 
the first autobiography, but on the very concept of autos which this genre 
presupposes and reinforces:  the Confessions are indeed a writing of a life, but 
specifically and intentionally not DOLIHRIWKHVHOIEXWRQH¶LQOLHXRIWKHVHOI·
In placing such high importance (a move which is in obvious continuity with 
Heidegger) on the first-person singular narration of the Confessions, Marion 
GRHVQRWZLVKWRQHJOHFW$XJXVWLQH·VRWKHUZRUNVLQIDFWKHYLHZVWKH
imperative to take seriously De trinitate and De civitate dei, as well as more 
FHQWUDOO\$XJXVWLQH·VFRPPHQWDULHVRQ6FULSWXUHDVRQHLPSRVHGE\WKH
nature and the trajectory of the Confessions themselves, and the failure to obey 
WKLVLPSHUDWLYHDVDQHVVHQWLDOV\PSWRPRILQDSSURSULDWHO\¶SKLORVRSKLFDO·
readings of Augustine.110  Instead, this first-person narration is correctly 
YLHZHGDV¶SHUIHFWO\DSRUHWLF·LQRWKHUZRUGVDVSUREOHPDWL]LQJDQ\H[WHUQDO
definitions of the genre of the Confessions as theological, philosophical, literary 
or autobiographical, in the speculative senses of each of these genres.  Such a 
SUREOHPDWL]DWLRQLQVLVWVRQDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZKLFKWDNHVLWV¶DLP·DQGLWV
¶SRLQWRIGHSDUWXUH·IURPWHUPVSXUHO\LQWHUQDOWRWKHWH[WQDPHO\DQ
                                                          
109 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 30. 
110 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 21. 
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interpretation of the Confessions as confessio, understood in its double sense as 
confession of sin and of praise.111  In generic terms, then, the Confessions both 
presuppose and aim at what they inaugurate in their first six words:  magnus es 
Domine, et laudabilis valde  is here understood as a confession of praise, which 
intends through the confession of sin to confess praise more adequately.  
Showing the clear influence of Jean-Louis Chrétien,112 0DULRQFODLPVWKDW¶WR
SUDLVHGRHVQRWGHVLJQDWHRQHDFWRIVSHHFKDPRQJRWKHUV«>EXW@WKHRQO\
voice worthy oIDFFHVV·WR*RG.113  Marion lingers long on these first six 
words, noting in them precisely the problematic which he will apply to the 
whole of the praise instantiated and described in the Confessions:  Who speaks 
these words, and to whom?  Noting that they are first of all a quotation of 
Scripture, a conflation of Psalms, and secondly framed in terms of the desire 
WRSUDLVHZKLFKKXPDQLW\RUPRUHSUHFLVHO\KXPDQLW\DV¶DVPDOOSDUWRI
FUHDWLRQ·SRVVHVVHVDQGDVSLUHVWR0DULRQEHJLQVWRGHYHORSWKHconfessio of 
the Confessions as at once the voice of Scripture, Aurelius Augustinus, the 
reader, the Church and finally the whole of creation: 114  ¶7KHILUVWSKUDVHRI
the Confessions is therefore articulated from the beginning in a demand (God 
                                                          
111 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 31. 
112 Cf. Jean-Louis Chretien, Saint Augustin et les actes de parole.  Paris: PUF, 2002. 
113 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 32. 
114 Although reading all of this from Conf. 1.1.1 is an impressive exegetical act, none 
RILWLVQHZWR0DULRQ·VSURMHFWVDYHDUJXDEO\the move to incorporate creation in 
WKLVUHGXFWLRQ2QWKLVPRYHZKLFKILQGV0DULRQZDYHULQJEHWZHHQFDOOLQJLW¶WKH
FRVPLFOLWXUJ\·DQGDVVHUWLQJWKDWLWKDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHNRVPRVDQGWKH
specifically theurgic dimension of which Marion rather ahistorically leaves out, cf. 
Ch. 5 below. 
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is given to be praised), then in a response (in fact, humanity does praise him, 
as does the whole of creation).·115   
,QRUGHUWRJHWIURPWKLVSRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHWRWKLVFKDSWHU·VXOWLPDWH
and titular claim that this confessio functions as an erotic reduction, Marion 
argues that this confessio and this praise is neither conceptual nor speculative, 
because, faced with the incommensurability of finite praise and the infinitely 
praised, the confessio ¶VSHDNVLQDVSHHFKZKLFKSUHGLFDWHVQRWKLQJ·of God, but 
speaks to God and leads the speaker to God, converting him from a locuteur to 
an interloqué.116  Thus the reader of Augustine must first recognize himself as 
an interlocutor with Augustine, and more primarily as interlocuted by God 
alongside Augustine:  the distinctive nature of the Confessions DV¶DWH[Wpar 
excellence, to-God [á-Dieu@·IRUPV¶DQH[WUDRUGLQDU\UXSWXUHZLWKWKH
meWDSK\VLFDOPRGHRIVSHHFK·117 when this latter is understood as predicating 
(in the etymological sense) something of God, inscribing God under an 
allegedly pre -existent concept or category.  In this way, when Marion argues 
that there is a fundamental difference between speaking to God and speaking 
RI*RGVXFKWKDW¶WRVSHDNof God signifies, in the end, speaking of him, but 
without, even against KLP·,118 this prepositional playing is not simply a tired 
reiteration of the speculative difference between theo-logy and theo-logy, but a 
reorientation of this formulation in the opening terms of the Confessions, with 
the result that the reader is allowed to interpret the enigmatic ministerium 
                                                          
115 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 32-3. 
116 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 36-7. 
117 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 39. 
118 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 38. 
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praedicatoris in a similarly etymological fashion:  neither as referring to 
$PEURVHQRUWRDP\VWLFDO¶LQZDUG·&KULVWDVLQ&RXUFHOOH119), but to a 
phenomenological structuring of creation as such, which is nevertheless 
tenaciously Christological, the ministry of that which is spoken before (prae-
dicere) us. 
Marion thus construes the confessio as a phenomenological structure 
which comes from a strictly theological claim; the remainder of the first 
chapter describes how this strXFWXUH¶DURXVHVRUJDQL]HVDQGXQLILHV·WKH
Confessions.120  7KH¶DURXVDO·ZKLFKWKLVVWUXFWXUHHIIHFWVRQWKHConfessions 
refers, in the first instance, to the prominent and determining role that the 
quotation of Scripture plays in its pages.  This has long been noted and is a 
commonplace within Augustinian studies, but Marion is to my knowledge 
the only phenomenological reader of Augustine to point it out.  Further, his 
analysis is, rather remarkably for a phenomenologist, quick to tie the 
observation of this fact to the Augustinian teaching of verbal creation:  that 
$XJXVWLQHVRIUHTXHQWO\TXRWHVWKH%LEOHLQGLFDWHVWKDW¶LWLVQRWDPDWWHURI
words said by St. Augustine, but first said to St. Augustine by the very one to 
whom the confession now repeats them -- words said right away by God who 
has said the word first, or rather who has said the first word, as he has 
FUHDWHGWKHZRUOGE\LW·.121  Praise therefore structures not only language, but 
                                                          
119 Pierre Courcelle: Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin.  Paris: de Boccard, 
1950.  
 
120 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 70. 
121 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 42. 
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the creation of the world via this language; to praise is to pay attention, and 
to pay attention to praise is to learn that to which praise responds.  In this 
sense, for Marion, again showing the clear influence of Chrétien, 
phenomenology takes on a decidedly antiphonal character:   
That which I say and that which I wish to say (my 
intentionality) are up to me, but that I say them and how I say 
them (my syntax and my performance) come to me from 
DQRWKHU«7KHconfessio has no function but to apprehend, 
little by little, that from which speech has come, without 
knowing, as a response.122  
 
 In other words, the practice of the confessio, as a perpetual response, formally 
PLUURUVWKH¶ODWHKDYH,ORYHG\RX·ZKLFK$XJXVWLQHZLOOODWHURIIHUWRDEHDXW\
ZKLFKLV¶DVDQFLHQWDVLWLVQHZ·DOWKRXJKKHKDVQRW\HWHVWDEOLVKHGWKDW 
pulchritudo as a plausible content to fill this form; for the moment, and 
primarily, as Marion contends, this form arises out of the logic of quoting 
Scripture ² despite or because of the fact that, as Augustine tells, one cannot 
quote Scripture without lHDUQLQJDQ¶DSRVWROLFKHUPHQHXWLF·DQGRQHZKLFK
moreover participates in the missions of the Trinity.123  In applying the logic 
of Confessions ;´,GRQRWVD\DQ\WKLQJULJKWWRPHQZKLFK\RXKDYHQRW
previously heard from me, nor do You hear anything from me which you have 
not previously said to meµ124 WR$XJXVWLQH·VVSHHFKDVDZKROH0DULRQ
FRQYLQFLQJO\DUJXHVWKDWWKLVORJLFSUHFHGHV¶WKHVHOI·DQGUHQGHUVLWSRVVLEOH
                                                          
122 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 43. 
123 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 44. 
124 For the remainder of this chapter, any English quotations of Augustine are my 
RZQWUDQVODWLRQVRI0DULRQ·V)UHQFKWUDQVODWLRQV, although I have taken efforts to 
FKHFNWKHVHDJDLQVWERWKWKH/DWLQYHUVLRQHGLWHGE\2·'RQQHOODQGZKDWHYHU
English translations I had at hand ² in the case of the Confessions, Chadwick; in the 
case of the City of God, Dyson; On the Trinity, Hill.  I have taken care, though it 
SDLQVPHW\SRJUDSKLFDOO\DQGDHVWKHWLFDOO\WRUHSURGXFH0DULRQ·VZLOGLWDOLFL]LQJV 
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Further, he makes no effort to conceal the language of being Augustine uses 
in tKHSDVVDJHPRVWUHOHYDQWWRWKLVDQWLSKRQDOYRLFH´<RXFDPHbefore me 
before I called to you.  With mounting frequency, by voices of many kinds, 
you put pressure on me, so that from far off I heard and was converted and 
called upon you as you were callinJWRPH«LQDQ\JRRGDFWLRQVRIPLQHyou 
were before me «Before I was, you were, and I had no being to which you could 
grant existence.  Nevertheless here I am as a result of your goodness, which 
precedes all that you made me to me, and all out of which you made me.µ125 
(XIII.1.1).  This passage, which Marion reads as supporting in advance his 
doctrine of the gifted (O·DGRQQp), nevertheless shifts the radicality of this 
doctrine from that of the subject (which /·eWDQW'RQQpGHVSLWH0DULRQ·V
objections to the contrary, indeed tends towards) into that of an economy of 
FUHDWLRQ¶$VWKHJLIWHG,PXVWDOOWKHVDPHUHFHLYHP\VHOILQWKHVDPHWLPH
that I give what I receive, because I do not precede them, but come, exactly 
like them, from an immemorial instance.·126  He illustrates this reception and 
donation of the self with reference to the Milan conversion narrative, in that 
Augustine does not have at his disposal, at the moment of conversion, a self, 
let alone words to express that self, but only the words of the psalms.127  To 
quote Scripture, as the anterior call of the triune God mediated through 
HFFOHVLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVWKH¶PRVWLQWLPDWHUHVSRQVH·P\FRQIHVVLRQFDQ
make.128   In this way the structure of the confessio, particularly construed as 
                                                          
125 Augustine, Conf. XIII.1.1. 
126 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 47. 
127 Augustine, Conf. VIII.12.28.  
128 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 49. 
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that which listens carefully to the language of the Bible and appropriates it as 
its own most appropriate and most personal, indeed as that which 
underwrites its being, initiates the text of the Confessions, which already begins 
to emerge as more dialogue than text. 
 
Marion correctly but insufficiently recognizes the ontological weight of 
confessio 
0DULRQ·VDUJXPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHConfessions by the 
principle of the confessio similarly problematizes any facile distinction between 
the linguistic and the ontological, as well as any simply disjunctive reading of 
the confessio laudis and the confessio peccati.  After an impressive survey of the 
texts (largely from the Ennarrationes in psalmos) in which Augustine discusses 
the act of confession, Marion arJXHVWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VWUHDWPHQWRI
confession marks an important departure from his predecessors, whether 
Christian (Tertullian) or pagan (Cicero, Ps.-Quintilian), for all of whom 
confession (exomologesis) is primarily (in the case of Tertullian) or exclusively 
(in the case of Cicero and Ps.-4XLQWLOLDQRIIDXOWDQGWKXV¶DJDLQVWWKHVHOI·
For Augustine, on the contrary, confession of praise is equal to confession of 
ILQLWXGHZKLFKLVVLPLODUEXWSULRUWRFRQIHVVLRQRIVLQ¶,FDQRQO\SUDLVH
God as God, if I name him as such, but I can only name him as such, if I 
deny myself this same name.·129  Further still, as Marion glosses on 
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$XJXVWLQH·VVXJJHVWLYHO\RQWRORJLFDOSKUDVHsine confessione tamen non simus:130   
¶)RU,GRQRWVD\P\FRQIHVVLRQ,DPP\FRnfession; I do not say it because 
I am it; and I am not really, unless I confess.·131  So radical to the Confessions is 
this logic that, as Marion displays with a note of tedium, nearly every book 
begins or ends with an explicit confession, and, as he goes on to argue, there 
is a discernible arc of these confessions from the individual to the communal 
or ecclesial,132 to (finally, at the end of Book XIII) the universal confession of 
¶DOO\RXU>*RG·V@ZRUNV.·133  In so defending the structural integrity of the 
Confessions against unnamed literary critics on the one hand, and on the other 
DJDLQVWWKH¶WKHRORJLDQVSKLORVRSKHUVDQGKLVWRULDQV·ZKRPLQHWKHPIRU
XWLOL]DEOHIUDJPHQWVEXWLJQRUHWKHFRQIHVVLRQVRISUDLVHDV¶DOLWHUDU\
ornament or a pious convention,·134 Marion contends quite rightly that they 
take not only their name, but also their logic and trajectory, opening from the 
personal onto the Scriptural, liturgical and universal (we could add, as Marion 
does not, ontological) structure of the confessio.  Since it sets the scene for 
much of the exegesis of the Confessions which Au Lieu De Soi comprises, it is 
worthwhile to linger briefly over the way in which these structures overlap: it 
is not in the institution of a soi, even liturgically, even in the cosmic liturgy, 
but in the decentering [décentrement@RIWKHVHOI¶DOZD\VSDUWLDODQGWKXValways 
to be taken up again.·135  The unity which arises between Augustine as a 
                                                          
130 Augustine, Ennarrationes in Psalmos 29.4. 
131 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 54. 
132 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 60. 
133 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 63. 
134 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 64. 
135 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 75. 
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subject (Conf. I-IX), his readers as a hermeneutic and ecclesial community 
(X), and all creation insofar as it is temporal (XI-XIII) is thus not exactly that 
of concentric circles, but the unity of spheres decentered in their perpetual 
and constitutive response to God, who, as interior intimo meo (which will 
become in its repetition, an increasingly emphasized phrase throughout Au 
Lieu De Soi, rivaled only perhaps by the quaestio mihi), is read as the center 
which establishes, delimits and structures them.  In this way Marion argues 
for not only the first nine books, but the entirety of the Confessions, as 
SUHFLVHO\QRWDXWRELRJUDSK\EXW¶hetero -ELRJUDSK\·WKHVHOIVDLGE\*RGZKR
alone knows it.  God, closer to me than my interior, but also closer to other 
SHRSOHWKDQWKHLULQWHULRUVWKHUHIRUHPDUNV¶WKHWKLUG·DQHVVHQWLDO¶GHWRXU·
DQG¶PHGLDWLRQ· between me and them.136  7KDW0DULRQ·VH[DPSOHWKDW
0RQLFD·VSUD\HUVWR*RGRQ$XJXVWLQH·VEHKDOIDUHHIILFDFLRXVZKHUHKHU
¶GLUHFW·LQWHUYHQWLRQVDUHQRWPDUJLQDOL]HVWKHPHGLDWLRQRI$PEURVHDQG
thus neglects the reciprocality of this principle (that others, and particularly 
bishops, serve likewise as a mediation for the self to God, even if this 
mediation is a response to the more primary mediation) need not distract 
IURP0DULRQ·VEURDGHUSRLQWWKDW¶6W$XJXVWLQHDQWLFLSDWHVWKH
phenomenological doctrine of the third person, from then on allowed, but 
only in order to inverse it immediately·:137 this is the first instance wherein Marion 
establishes Augustine as an ultimate, if distant and perhaps indirect, founder 
of phenomenology, but rather than submitting Augustine to a straitjacket of 
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phenomenological dogmatics, allows Augustine to unseat and supplant this 
dogmatics theologically.  Thus, in an exceptionally important footnote, 
Marion compares this transcendent (not transcendental!) third, as a 
¶JXDUDQWHHRILQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\·WRWKH¶PXQGDQH·WKLUGVRI+XVVHUOWKHZRUOG
Sartre (the groupe en fusion), Merleau-Ponty (the flesh), Henry (life), and even 
/HYLQDVIRUZKRPWKHWKLUGUHPDLQVDOZD\V¶DQRQ\PRXVDQGZLWKRXW
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ·.138   The resulting paradox, that the most interior to the ego is 
also the most alter to the ego, gestures towards a phenomenology radicalized 
in Augustinian fashion, which Marion appears to be willing, at this early 
moment in the book, to permit to challenge 20th century phenomenological 
orthodoxies.  And if he does not entirely follow through on this impulse, in 
ways which I will suggest later, still this opening methodological chapter at 
OHDVWJHVWXUHVLQDYDOXDEOHGLUHFWLRQ7KLVFKDSWHU·VFORVLQJOLQHZKLFK
equates the model of the confessio WRDQ¶HURWLFUHGXFWLRQ·ZKLFKDOORZVDFFHVV
to love of others and love of God, in lieu of suggesting that Marion is 
interested in Augustine only to shore up the views he has arrived at 
independently of Augustine,139 actually invites an Augustinian critique of 
0DULRQ·VSUHYLRXVZRUNDQGDUHYLVLRQLQJRIWKHHURWLFUHGXFWLRQLQWKHOLJKW
of the Augustinian confession.   
 
 
                                                          
138 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 81 n.2. 
139 Notably, Augustine is absent from The Erotic Phenomenon, save the epigram:  Nemo 
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Marion strikes down the Husserlian self-sufficient subject as 
fundamentally Cartesian, rather than Augustinian  
The drive to decenter the subject theologically, by the structure of the 
confessioLVLQFRQWLQXLW\ZLWK0DULRQ·VSUHYLRXVKLVWRULFDOZRUNRQ'HVFDUWHV
and Augustine,140 which has cast salutary doubt on any assumed 
uninterrupted tradition of a cogito with Augustinian roots, and indeed 
foreshadows the defense of this position which begins the next chapter, /·HJR
RXO·DGRQQp0DULRQ·VPRVWVXVWDLQHGDQGFRQYLQFLQJWH[WXDODQDO\VLVRIWKLV
question to date.  He sets up this discussion by reframing the question of the 
cogito LQWHUPVRI¶DFFHVVRIWKHVHOIWRLWVHOI·DV'HVFDUWHVWKLQNVKHKDV
found such an access in cogitatio, so Augustine is supposed to have found it in 
a quasi-epistemological reading of the imago dei.  Though this simplistic 
conflation might seem to have an air of the straw man about it, Marion 
UHPLQGVXVWKDWVXFKZDVSUHFLVHO\WKHUHVSRQVHRI$UQDXOGLQ'HVFDUWHV·
own time!141  Nevertheless it is easily corrected:  as texts from De civitate dei to 
De trinitate, but especially De beata vita and the Enchiridion VKRZ$XJXVWLQH·V
formulation, though formally similar to the cogitoUHSODFHV¶EHLQJ·ZLWK¶OLIH·
A more insidious danger than a simple and historical conflation might here 
insinuate itself:  namely, to read life in such a formulation as something 
primarily possessed, something at my disposition.  Much like the treatment 
RIODQJXDJHLQWKHILUVWFKDSWHU0DULRQ·VGHIHQVHDJDLQVWVXFKDPLVUHDGLQJ
                                                          
140 See in particular Questions cartésiennes, II, Sur l'ego et sur Dieu (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1997), especially pp. 37ff. 
 
141 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 93. 
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RI$XJXVWLQHDLPVSULPDULO\WRGHFHQWHURU¶GLVDSSURSULDWH·WKHVHOIIURPWKH
VHOI¶1RWhing lives by itself ... Only the Living par excellence lives of 
itself.·142  The conscious echo of Henry, whose phenomenology of life is very 
nearly Barthian, does not preclude Marion from describing something very 
OLNHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶´WROLYHµPHDQV´WROLYHSURYLVLRQDOO\µEHFDXVHPRUH
essentially, by procuration.·143  But with or without an explicit account of the 
participation by which I live, Marion points out that Blondel, Heidegger and 
indeed Descartes himself recognize, to different extents, that the Cartesian 
cogito represents a development, if not an outright betrayal, of the Augustinian 
tradition, both in its execution and indeed in its very aim:  Augustine at no 
SRLQWDWWHPSWV¶WRDVVXUHWKHHJRRILWVH[LVWHQFHQRUWRDVVLJQWRLWcogitatio as 
LWVHVVHQFH·144 
This aggressive strike against cogitatio ought to be uncontroversial by 
now, particularly in phenomenological circles.  More controversial might be 
WKHDWWDFNRQWKHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOVXEMHFWLWVHOI¶6W$XJXVWLQHSHUIHFWO\
allows the argument which links thought to being, he even inaugurates it and 
will impose it on his posterity (including Descartes); but he denies to this 
same argument the ability to produce and consecrate my ego known by itself 
«7KHHJRLVPLVVLQJIURP6W$XJXVWLQHDWOeast in the Cartesian sense of 
´ego ille, quem noviµVLQFHLWGRHVQRWNQRZLWH[FHSWDVDTXHVWLRQDQGD
TXHVWLRQRQDQXQNQRZQHVVHQFH´:KDWDP,DQGRIZKDWVRUWDP,"µ·145 
                                                          
142 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 96. 
143 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 95. 
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Such a questioning, at the root of the self, Marion follows Augustine in 
terming an exile, in biblical terms, or in rhetorical terms a monstrum.  Crucially, 
as Marion points out, both invocations of the self as quaestio mihi arise in 
liturgical contexts:  in the first case,146 in grief at the death of a friend (but 
more radically due to the separation from that friend which occurred in his 
baptism), and in the second case147 in fear that he enjoys liturgical music 
more than its object.  In both cases, it is a matter of the self not having at its 
disposal the greater liturgical life which provokes it to question itself 
radically, or more accurately to recognize that its self has always been in 
question.  The liturgical mysteries (and this word is well-advised) teaches 
against the law of non-FRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶5LJKWDZD\$is not A, I am not me·:148 
and this is a mark not merely of sin or death, but of finitude, since it is 
PDQLIHVWERWKEHIRUH$XJXVWLQH·VFRQYHUVLRQDQGDIWHULQSUD\HU:KLOHWKH
ego exists, and knows that it exists, it knows this precisely as a problem, a 
closure of itself to itself, an inaccessibility. 
 
Marion overstates the dark side of memoria in order to point toward 
desire as the central mode of Augustinian phenomenology 
Whence comes, for Marion, the Augustinian memoria, not as a 
solution to this problem, but as an intensification of it.  Memoria, which more 
than a faculty or a disposition is the very constitution of the ego.149 As such, 
                                                          
146 Augustine, Conf. IV.4.9. 
147 Augustine, Conf. X.33.50. 
148 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 103. 
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UDWKHUWKDQ¶FRPSHQVDWLQJIRUWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIDcogitatio sui in returning an 
DFFHVVIRUWKHHJRWRLWVHOIWRWKHVHOI«>memoria] not only gives the ego no 
access to itself, it renders decisively manifest the impossibility of a principle 
IRUVXFKDFFHVV·150  This is so because memoria is decidedly not relegated, for 
Augustine, to the representation and reproduction of past objects as images 
(although Augustine theorizes this function more clearly and more 
comprehensively than his predecessors or followers), but instead composes 
and organizes these images, theoretical knowledges, and finally the mens itself.  
Augustine subordinates cogitatio to memoria, rather than the other way round, 
VXFKWKDW¶memoria DORQHDVVXUHVWKHXQLW\RI>WKHPLQG·V@ flux by 
temporalizing it.·151  Memoria is self-excessive, and thus paradoxical, the fitting 
¶SODFHRIWKDWZKLFKKDVQRSODFHWKHSODFHRIDOOWKRXghts which are not of 
WKHZRUOG·;152 this paradox, hoc monstrum, is particularly appropriate when it 
comes to the ultimate paradox of memoria of the self, the collecting of the self 
both in memory (as crudely understood, referring to the past) and as 
anticipation or desire.  While avoiding the term anamnesis, Marion clearly 
evokes the concept in his reference to De trinitate ;¶8QOHVVWKHPLQG
sees its best end, that is its own security and beatitude, by a certain hidden 
memory, which is not abandoned wKHQLWLVORVWIURPIDUDZD\·HPSKDVLV
PLQH+HVXPPDUL]HVWKLV¶QHZILJXUH·RIWKHVHOI·Vquaestio to itself in 
H[SOLFLWO\RQWRORJLFDOWHUPV¶WKDWZKLFK,DPLJQRUDQWRI>VFP\H[LVWHQFH@
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my quaedam memoria occulta, at the same time preserves it for me and hides it 
from me.  And, since I am my memoria, I tKXVEHFRPHKLGGHQIURPP\VHOI·153  
Memoria PRUHRYHUGHHSHQVDQGEURDGHQVWKH¶HVVHQWLDODPELYDOHQFH·
RIWKHVHOI·VODFNRIDFFHVVWRLWVHOIE\¶UHQGHULQJDEVHQFHSUHVHQWEXWDlso 
keeping absence abVHQW·;154 it both serves to call past things to mind, but also 
to call to mind the very fact of recalling:  which is nowhere as clear as in 
$XJXVWLQH·VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHSDUDGR[RIUHPHPEHULQJWKDWRQHKDVIRUJRWWHQ
something, but cannot remember what that something is.155 This is a paradox 
far from a simple illogicality or a banal thought experiment:  it discloses the 
VHOIWRLWVHOILQLWVYHU\LQDFFHVVLELOLW\DQGFRQIRXQGVLQDGYDQFHWKH¶SUHVHQFH
RIWKHVHOIWRWKRXJKW·RQZKLFK¶PHWDSK\VLFV·156 relies.  More radically still, 
Augustine considers the case wherein one forgets even that one has 
forgotten, which, perhaps relying too heavily here on the account of Levinas, 
Marion sees as central and as indicating the ultimate presence in the memoria 
of that which, more than even the self and its experience, exceeds memoria:  
QDPHO\WKH¶LPPHPRULDO·,QWKLVHYHQWZKLFK0DULRQZLWKRXWPXFKWH[WXDO
justification takes as constitutive of the memoriaWKHDFWLRQ¶QRORQJHU
concerns that which was present to my mind in the past and could become 
so again in the future -- in the literal sense, the representable as re-presentable -
- but that which in me remains inaccessLEOHWRPHDQGXQFRQWUROODEOH·157  It 
                                                          
153 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 114. 
154 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 115. 
155 Augustine, Conf. X.16.24ff. 
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LVQRWQHFHVVDU\LQRUGHUWRDJUHHZLWK0DULRQ·VDUJXPHQWWKDWmemoria 
¶UHSHDWVDQGFXOPLQDWHV·WKHDSRULDZKLFKWKHVHOILVWRLWVHOIWRVKDUHLQWKLV
bizarre privileging of what is for Augustine merely a black hole for inquiry, 
and what is certainly a dead end in the quest for the vita beata which he will 
rightly emphasize next as the most proper aim for these aporias of 
anamnesis.   Though he here veers precariously towards letting 20th century 
SKHQRPHQRORJ\VHW$XJXVWLQH·VDJHQGDKHTXLFNO\UHPLQGVKLPVHOIWKDW
memoria, even if it has a cognitive function which is most sharply displayed in 
the purely formal forgetting of forgetting, nevertheless is more primarily 
determined by the will, by the self-transcendence of memoria by its function of 
desiring, rather than its self-negation, as in the vision at Ostia.158  This desire, 
PDQLIHVWHGILUVWDQGXOWLPDWHO\IRUWKHKDSS\OLIHZKLOVW¶ZLWKRXWREMHFW
worldlesVDQGXWRSLDQ·159  nevertheless can be given more content than its 
purely formal counterpoints:  specifically, he is constrained by the 
Augustinian text to give it at least as much content as gaudium in veritate¶MR\
DQGHQMR\PHQW·DVWKH¶VHQVLEOHLQGH[RIWKHWUXWKEHFDXVHKHUHWKHWUXWKQR
longer offers only information to know, but is opened as a territory to be 
HQWHUHGLQWR«WKHWUXWKKHUHLQTXHVWLRQLVJLYHQto be known, but above all 
to be inhabited «>DV@WKHJURXQGRIOLIH.·160  Marion does not, as Heidegger 
does, reject veritas LQWKLVIRUPXODWLRQDV¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·,QIDFWLWUHWDLQVD
fundamentally personal, though not Christological character: the radical 
HXGDLPRQLVPLPSOLHGLQWKHXQLYHUVDOGHVLUHIRU¶MR\LQWKHWUXWK·
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SDUDGR[LFDOO\¶LQGLYLGXDOL]HV·DQG¶LGHQWLILHV·PHDVPH.161  The particular 
mode or way in which the desire for the vita beata shows itself in me simply is 
me.  But this is only true so lonJDV,WUDYHODORQJWKLVZD\WKLV¶GLVWDQFHRI
the self in place of the self.·162  How?  Marion leaves the answer to this question 
more or less indeterminate, but he does vitally resolve that such a traveling 
ZLOOEHILUVWRIDOOWULQLWDULDQ¶RQO\*RGPDNes one with the truth, but this 
WUXWKLVUHFLSURFDWHGZLWKFKDULW\DQGHWHUQLW\´2HWHUQDOWUXWKDQGWUXH
EHDXW\DQGFKDULWDEOHHWHUQLW\µ·163 As is to be expected, Marion ignores the 
Platonic and entirely metaphysical context of this exclamation. 
 
Marion pushes his conception of desire towards universality, while 
stopping short of ascribing it to being itself 
Although Marion allows (and this is a departure, however 
begrudging) this traveling to have a theoretical element, this remains only a 
¶TXDVL-knoZOHGJH·RIWKHGHVLUHIRUWKHvita beata which is a knowledge 
¶ZLWKRXWFRPSUHKHQVLRQDQGZLWKRXWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQOLWHUDOO\MXVWHQRXJKIRU
desiring it.·164  Both in the knowledge and in the desire, as unconditioned, 
Marion argues that there is an intrinsic logic to the (happy) life that supplants 
and outstrips the cogito in advance:   
Life (just because I do not possess it, but receive it from 
elsewhere) is given only on the condition that I receive it at 
HDFKLQVWDQW«%HLQJJLYHVQRWKLQJEXWEHLQJEHFDXVHit 
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does not in fact give it), while life gives nothing but life, thus 
gives the happy life (because it cannot but give itself).  When 
life is substituted for being, it is thus already a matter of 
beatitude, intrinsic to desire and thus ignored by being, which 
neither desires nor can be desired.165  
  
While Marion cannot justify this outright equivocity between life and being 
on Augustinian grounds, with his polemic against Descartes (or at least 
against a caricature of Descartes) he hits on the central point of Augustinian 
desire:  that desire is itself received.  Such a stance draws on one of 
$XJXVWLQH·VPRVWFLWHGELEOLFDOWH[WV¶:KDWGR\RXKDYHWKDW\RXGLGQRW
UHFHLYH"·&RUDQGPXVWFRORURXULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHORJLFRIGHVLUH
generally, and SDUWLFXODUO\WKHGHVLUHIRUMR\LQWKHWUXWK6LQFH,DP¶QR
longer essentially who I am, but what I love,·166 a voluntary ontology which 
accords well with the anthropology of the interior intimo meo, any Cartesian or 
Husserlian reading of desire and of interiority is to be eschewed:  not only is 
¶WKHEHWWHUWKHPRUHLQWHULRU·167  EXW¶WKHPRUHLQWHULRULVFKDULW\·ZKLFKLV
already oriented to actually existing others.168 The journey into the self is 
simultaneously a reception of that self, and more fundamentally an entering 
LQWRDQHFRQRP\RIFKDULW\ZKLFKLVDWRQFHSDUWLFLSDWRU\¶E\SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
God is it [sc., the soul] made happy·169) ² although Marion neither 
emphasizes (as one should) nor qualifies (as one might expect) the key 
metaphysical word participatione ² DQGXQLYHUVDO¶KHLVPRUHLQWHULRUWR
everything, because all things are in him, and more exterior to everything, 
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168 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 142-3, citing Augustine, In epistolam ioannis 8.9. 
169 Augustine, In epistolam ioannis 23.5. 
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because he is over them all·170 ).In this last dimension, by invoking the 
Christological seminales rationes of De genesi ad litteram, the seeds by which God 
is present as the most interior place of all things, Marion gestures towards the 
next chapter, in which he submits his motif (until now allegedly pure in its 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOULJRURIWKHVDWXUDWHGSKHQRPHQRQWKDWZKLFKLV¶PRVW 
VHFUHWDQGPRVWSUHVHQW·secretissimus et praesentissimus)171 to a cosmic and 
ultimately theological reconfiguration, after which O·DGRQQpappears ² in its 
original giftedness and in its ultimate desire for the vita beata, both of which 
surpass and include memoria (as memory, as sensation or as self-
consciousness) ² as fundamentally a lover, participating in a cosmic 
exchange.  
 
In elaborating a personal and subjectivized account of veritas, Marion 
offers a Platonic ontology which he yet refuses to recognize as such 
Having explained the connection between the vita beata and love, 
Marion next considers love (or enjoyment, or desire to enjoy) specifically as a 
mode of relating to the truth, in the third chapter, La vérité ou le phénomène 
saturé.  Or perhaps more accurately, he outlines an account of truth which is 
made possible by such a privileging of love:  if the desire for the happy life is 
the desire to enjoy God, it must be simultaneously the desire to enjoy the 
true God, thus the desire to enjoy truth itself (a rather analytically retiring 
way of arriving at the Augustinian formulation of gaudium in veritate):  but 
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what sort of truth presupposes gaudium as its mode of access?  He begins his 
consideration with a predictable objection raised by Heidegger:  ¶LIWKHWUXWK
JRYHUQVWKHGHVLUHIRUWKHKDSS\OLIH«KRZFDQZHDYRLGWKHUHVXOWWKDW
desire passes under the control of theory, which would then control even 
HWKLFVDQGWKHZLOO"·172 .  In other words, so long as eternal life remains 
characterized primarily by knowledge of the truth (cognitia veritatis), Augustine 
remains unable to think the truth (as Heidegger supposes he wishes to do) 
beyond the Greek impulse of a cold and neutral theoria.  Marion perhaps 
follows Heidegger too closely in assuming that such an impulse ever existed 
among the Greeks:  nevertheless, his attempt to defend Augustine from the 
charge of an inability to search radically for the phenomenalization of truth 
finds him ready to qualify or indeed reject the caricature of Augustine 
presented by Heidegger, if not more thoroughly to qualify or reject the 
caricature of the Greeks which it presupposes.  His tactic is to show that, 
despite the undeniable existence of texts which show knowledge as a mode 
of relating to the truth, truth gives itself more radically and more exhaustively 
¶WREHGHVLUHGWKDQWREHNQRZQ·² in fact, desire is infinitely more appropriate 
than (theoretical) knowledge as a mode of relating to the truth.173  This 
account rests heavily upon the insistence, from 'LHXVDQVO·rtre  onward, that 
*RGLVQRW¶RQHEHLQJDPRQJRWKHUV·7KRXJKE\QRPHDQVLVWKLVDQRYHO
SRLQWIURP0DULRQ·VSHQQHYHUWKHOHVVKLVUHVROYHWKDWLWEHUHODWHGWRDQ
anamnetic desire which must in some sense precede knowledge of what it 
                                                          
172 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 150. 
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desires clarifies this point, and renders it more obviously Augustinian, and 
also, incidentally (and contrary perhaps to his avowed intention), more deeply 
Platonic.  He quite rightly notes that this principle of a love which precedes 
and engenders knowledge is, incipiently in the Confessions and explicitly in De 
trinitateD¶UHFLSURFDOLPPDQHQFH·ZKLFKLV¶QRWKLQJOHVVWKDQDQLPDJHRIWKH
Trinity itself.·174   
The truth that both bears, and is borne out of, such a reciprocality is 
REYLRXVO\¶QRQ-WKHRUHWLFDO·DWOHDVWLQWKH cold neutrality which both 
Heidegger and Marion assign to theoria0DULRQ·VSURMHFWLQWKLVFKDSWHULVWR
delineate a phenomenology of such a truth not as a Heideggerean refusal of 
the theoretical, but as supra-theoretical, an excess of truth over what noetic 
FRQWHPSODWLRQFDQEHDUWRVXIIHU+LVHPSKDVLVLVWKXVODUJHO\RQWKH¶FKRLFH·
ZKLFKWKHWUXWK¶LPSRVHV·RQWKHRQHZKRXQGHUJRHVLWQRWDFKRLFHRI
judgment, of determining whether something is true or false, but a choice of 
accepting or rejecting the truth which is given, or, when translated into the 
more provocative Augustinian lexicon, of loving or hating the truth.  Heavy 
DFFHQWLVJLYHQLQ0DULRQ·VDFFRXQWWRWKHUDWKHUPDUJLQDOGLVWLQFWLRQ
between two modes of the truth in Conf. X.23.34:  the (loved) truth that 
illuminates (veritas lucens) and the (hated, at least at first) truth that accuses 
(veritas redarguens).  Of these two modes of truth ² and Marion is unrelentingly 
resolute in maintaining that lucens and redarguens are but two modes of the 
same and divine truth ²  in keeping with the Augustinian doctrine of the 
truth as illuminatio, the lucens LVSULPDU\VXFKWKDWWUXWK¶HPEUDFHVHYHU\WKLQJ
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imSHULDOO\DQGLUUHVLVWDEO\·175 DQGHYHQWKH¶DFFXVLQJ·WUXWKLVXQGHUVWRRGLQDQ
optical ratheUWKDQDQHWKLFDOPHWDSKRU¶ZKHUHWKHOLJKW´DFFXVHVµWKHUHOLHI
and the traits of that which it strikes:  the divine light neither persecutes nor 
blames, but is confined to being given off.·176  7KLV¶JLYLQJRII·>/DWLQfulgere, 
French se répandre : more daringly rendered emanation], as Heidegger already 
VDZ¶VHWVLQTXHVWLRQP\RZQIDFWLFLW\DQGH[LVWHQFH·177 and renders evident 
DOOP\WUDLWVLQGHHGP\VHOIKHUHDVDVLQQHUZKLFKLVZK\0DULRQ·VDQDO\VLV
IROORZLQJ$XJXVWLQH·VEHJLQVZLWKKDWUHGRIWKLVlight, out of a misplaced 
love of the self.  The Augustinian nexus of truth and love emerges, 
chronologically and phenomenologically, first of all out of this hatred, which 
is nevertheless ontologically subordinate to love, such that even this hatred 
of the truth arises from love of the self, and eventually can lead to the greater 
ORYHRIWUXWK¶,QEULHILQRUGHUQRWWRKDWHWKHOLJKWRQHPXVWORYHLWPRUH
WKDQRQH·VVHOIDWOHDVWPRUHWKDQWKHVHOIZKRVHWUDLWVWKHOLJKWDFFXVHV.·178 
Part of what Marion PHDQVE\¶QRQ-WKHRUHWLFDO·HPHUJHVLQKLVUHMHFWLRQRID
rather more banal understanding of hatred of the truth, that ¶WKHWUXWK
engenders hatred·179 which in context is merely the observation that since 
some truths are difficult to hear, the messenger who bears such a truth does 
prudently to distance himself from that message.  This formulation falls short 
RIWKHUDGLFDOLW\RI$XJXVWLQH·VVLQFH$XJXVWLQHGUDZVPRUHGLUHFWO\RQWKH
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Johannine formulation in which the truth which is hated (and eventually 
kilOHGVXVWDLQVQRGLIIHUHQFHZLWKLWVPHVVHQJHU¶+DWUHG«RIWKHWUXWKFDQ
only be addressed to him who claims to incarnate the truth:  this thus proves 
to be epistemologically Christological, thus theological:  for he alone can 
inform me and himself constitute the informing, verify and say what 
YHULILHV·180  The following phenomenology of hatred of the truth, of the 
WUXWK·VXQEHDUDEOHH[FHVVRIREYLRXVQHVVWKHKDWHU·VLQLWLDOUHIXVDOWREHDULW
his pleasure in retreating to his habitual sin and ignorance, and finally his 
arrival at a choice to remain what he is or to undergo the process of 
confessing, turning toward the truth and becoming converted in love to a 
love of that truth, adamantly casts these familiar terms in phenomenological 
rather than moralizing terms, but this phenomenological re-casting of 
Augustine more radically submits the process of phenomenology to an 
Augustinian, a Johannine and ultimately a Christian account of the truth as 
ORYHGZKLFKIDUIURPEHLQJVHQWLPHQWDOL]HGLVWKH¶RUGHDO «RI
´SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHKLJKHVWOLJKWµ.·181 Indeed it is this ordeal of participation, 
in other words the pain of imitating, growing into and becoming the truth 
which one loves, in which even the hater of the truth participates, albeit in a 
perverse mode¶>+DWUHG@QRORQJHUKHUHFRQFHUQVWKHZLOOWRLPLWDWH*RGLW
is always a matter of becoming as God) but of the mode of this imitation:  
whether because God gives it to me, or because I have acquired it by and for 
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myself.·182  Such a purported acquisition is, at its root, the desire to remain as 
one is, or in other words to acquire and possess the self:  it is a denial of God 
and of reciprocality as the interior intimo meoHYHQDVLW¶ZLWQHVVHVDJDLQDQG
UDGLFDOO\WRDQLQYHUVHORYHRIWKHWUXWK·ZKLFKPRre fundamentally underlies 
it.183  The exchange (at root Trinitarian) which underlies this anthropology, 
that of caritasWKHUHIRUHKDVDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOIXQFWLRQZKHQFH$XJXVWLQH·V
reflections on Scripture and the rigorous rule of charity in Conf. XII.  The 
phenomenology of hatred and thus of love for the truth (Conf. X) leads 
Augustine to an account of truth which essentially participates in and 
accomplishes an exchange ² universal and communal ² ZKLFK¶JDWKHUVLQ
mutual love those who commune in the same love of the truth -- always 
theirs, although or because each does QRWFODLPWRSRVVHVVKLVRZQ·184 
 
Marion argues that an Augustinian account of the gift outstrips both 
Husserlian and Heideggerean subjectivity 
To demonstrate the implications of this truth as loved and 
exchanged, Marion here takes an historical detour, considering its surpassing 
of two schools of its heirs:  herein is one of Au Lieu De Soi·VPRVWH[SOLFLW
repositionings of phenomenology in Augustinian terms.  The first of these, 
which begins with the Thomist conception of truth as adequaetio rei et intellectu 
and is repeated in different terms by Descartes, Kant and Husserl, Marion 
GLDJQRVHVDVDUHYHUVDORI$XJXVWLQH¶7KHWUXWKGRHVQRWOHDGVRPXFKWR
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the thing itself as much as it leads to the knowing mind, which has the power 
to make it by saying it.  More than an aporia, it is here a matter of a 
transcendental condition:  I make the truth, by making possible the 
adequation between the conception and the thing, that is to say by judging; 
and thus, since I judge it, I make the truth by instituting myself at a distance 
from it.·185  To this is opposed Heidegger, who reverses the reversal:  instead 
RIDQHSLVWHPLFRUQRHWLFDGHTXDWLRQWUXWKLVSKHQRPHQDOL]DWLRQ¶ZLWKRXW
coming from a syntheVLVRUDFRQVWLWXWLRQXQLTXHO\IURPLWVHOI·:186 but even 
+HLGHJJHU¶SUHVXSSRVHVPHDV'DVHLQ·WRGHFLGHLW7KLVFULWLTXHLVZHOO
known, and appears in Marion as early as Réduction et donation:187  but here, in 
advancing a specifically Augustinian account of truth as gift, which, in a 
precise opposite to the models of adequation and phenomenalization,188 
makes me and decides me, judges my adequation and adequacy, Marion both 
makes a more convincing case than he has previously made for the 
inadequacy of the 20th century phenomenological models, and very correctly 
UHVLWXDWHV$XJXVWLQHZLWKLQDFRPSOH[SRUWUDLWRIWKHWUXWKWKDWKDV¶WRRKLJK
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186 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 185. 
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Phenomenology, trans. Thomas A. Carlson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1998. 
188 From an Augustinian perspective, it is not terribly important that these models 
be accurate portrayals of their respective figures (particularly the critiques of 
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DWHQVLRQ·IRUFUHDWHGILQLWXGHDQG¶UHYHUEHUDWHV·ZLWKVXFKDVWUHQJWKWKDW
only love can sustain it.189 
 
Marion artificiall\VHSDUDWHV´%HLQJµIURPSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
G\QDPLVPZKLFKREVFXUHV$XJXVWLQH·VFRQWLQXLW\ZLWKQHR-Platonism 
$OORIWKHIRUHJRLQJKRZHYHULVPHUHSUHOXGHWR0DULRQ·VQH[W
move:  just as the final step of the first chapter is to translate confessio DV¶OD 
UpGXFWLRQ·DQGWKDWRIWKHVHFRQGFKDSWHUWRWUDQVODWHego DV¶O·DGRQQp·VRLQ
this third chapter veritas, transposed into pulchritudoLVILQDOO\WUDQVODWHGDV¶OH
SKpQRPqQHVDWXUp·2IWKHWKUHHWKLVWUDQVODWLRQLVWKHPRVWGDULQJDQG
risks the most hubristic misreading, due both to the originality and the 
SHFXOLDULW\RIWKH)UHQFKWHUPWR0DULRQ·VRZQWKRXJKWDQGWRWKHLQLWLDO
shift in even the Latin.  For Marion has admirably shown that veritas is, as 
loved, pulcher:  but is it, for all that, pulchritudo itself?  To answer this, he 
DSSHDOVWRWZRLPSRUWDQWSDVVDJHVIRUDQ\WUHDWPHQWRI¶DQ$XJXVWLQLDQ
SKLORVRSK\·--  the first, from Confessions´,VKRXOGKDYHtransgressed the 
philosophers, even when they spoke truly, in favor of your love, my supremely 
good Father, beauty of all beauties.  2WUXWKWUXWK«µ;190 the second, from 
Contra academicos:   
                                                          
189 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 188.  Although Marion for obvious reasons wants to 
affirm some degree of uniqueness to AugustLQH·VDFFRXQWKHDFNQRZOHGJHVRWKHUV
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,WLVFRPPRQO\FDOOHG¶Philocalia·'RQRWFRQWHPQWKLVQDPH
from its common usage, for philocalia and philosophy are 
nearly named the same thing, and it is as if they seem to be of 
the same family - and they are.  For what is philosophy?  The 
love of wisdom.  What is philocalia?  The love of beauty.  Ask 
the Greeks.  What, therefore, is wisdom?  Is it not, in truth, 
beauty?  The two are sisters, engendered of one parent.191 
 
In both of these, the essential convertibility of wisdom and beauty is 
confirmed precisely by love, or at least friendship, which must be more 
original than either, both as a phenomenon and as a proper name for God.  
In a final confirmation of this model by the original model of the confessio, 
0DULRQFODLPVWKDWWRFRQIHVVVLQLVDOVRLQHYLWDEO\EXWQRWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\¶WR
FRQIHVVEHDXW\·DQGWKDWWKHGHOD\EHWZHHQWKHVHFRQIHVVLRQVLVWKDWUHIHUUHG
WRLQ$XJXVWLQH·VIDPRXVH[FODPDWLRQ¶Late KDYH,ORYHG\RX·KHUHDGVWKLV
apostrophe to pulchritudo DVD¶VHGXFWLRQLQWKHVWULFWHVWDQGPRVWGLUHFW
VHQVH·LQZKLFK¶EHDXW\PDNHVDVWHSWRZDUGVPHZKLFK,FDQQRWPDNH
WRZDUGLW·,WLVRIWKHXWPRVWLPSRUWDQFHIRU0DULRQWRUHDGWKLV¶VHGXFWLRQ·
DJDLQVWDQ\WUDGLWLRQZKLFKZRXOGUHDGLWDVDQ¶DOOHJRU\·RULQGHHGHYHQ
HPSOR\WKHPLVOHDGLQJWHUP¶VSLULWXDOVHQVHV·¶,WLVLQGHHGDPDWWHURIWKH
five physical senses, not a spiritual allegory, because the sensible senses 
exercise right away a spiritual function.·192  It is difficult to imagine such a 
reading without the influence of Merleau-Ponty and Henry, yet the passage 
LWVHOILVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHRORJLFDODQGDVVXFKLVPRUHUDGLFDOWKDQWKH¶DXWR·-
affection of the flesh:  it is, infelicitously but inevitably, a theo-affection, which 
is for all that no less well and truly of the flesh.  Correspondingly, philocalia 
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VXSSODQWVDSKLORVRSK\ZKLFKZRXOGWUHDW¶DHVWKHWLFV·DVDVXE-discipline:  
¶EHDXW\WKXVGRHVQRWGHILQHDSDUWLFXODUGRPDLQRISKLORVRSK\«LWUDWKHU
assures the world in its totality and thus first of all its erotic reduction, where 
the truth can be known insofar as it is loved.·193  Marion supplies an 
unnecessary and misleading correlative to these claims when he adds that 
¶%HDXW\Goes not play the role of a simple transcendental, which one could 
GHULYHIURP%HLQJ«EHFDXVHLWGRHVQRWFRQFHUQWKHKRUL]RQRI%HLQJEXW
the question of love.·194 One might have hoped for a more inclusive and 
imaginative treatment of being, since it is noWDWDOOFOHDUWKDW$XJXVWLQH·V
language regarding being195 proscribe the sort of dynamism and reciprocality 
which Marion rightly finds in his language regarding beauty and wisdom.  A 
scholastic or Aristotelian enumeration of different kinds of being is simply 
QRWRQHRI$XJXVWLQH·VPDMRUFRQFHUQVLQHLWKHUDSRVLWLYHRUDQHJDWLYH
IDVKLRQVR0DULRQ·VHLVHJHVLVKHUHLVDVGLVDSSRLQWLQJDVDQ\SXUSRUWHG¶QHR-
6FKRODVWLF·GHVLUHRQWKHSDUWRI*LOVRQIRUH[DPSOHWR¶ILQG·VXFKDQ
enumeration in Augustine.  In any event, the logic of this dynamism is 
certainly more easily perceived in the case of love than in the others:  since in 
love, one necessarily enters into an economy which is at once compromise 
DQGIXOILOPHQW¶,QZKDWZD\ZLOOZHEHFRPHEHDXWLIXO"By loving him who is 
always beautiful.  As much as love increases in you, so much does beauty 
increase, because love itself is the beauty of the soul.µ196 In this economy, the 
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GLIILFXOW\RIHQWHULQJLQWRZKLFKIRUPVWKHQH[WFKDSWHU·VPHGLWDWLRQ
something very like a theological Platonism (again, contrary to his avowed 
LQWHQWLRQVHPHUJHV¶7KLQJVRQO\DSSHDUEHDXWLIXOLQWKHDEVROXWHEHDXW\DV
WKH\DUHVKRZQWRE\WUXHRQO\LQWKHDEVROXWHWUXWK·197 ² a dynamic of the 
SKHQRPHQRQVDWXUDWHGE\¶WKHDEVROXWH·which nonetheless is rigorously 
6FULSWXUDODV0DULRQ·VDOOXVLRQWR*HQHVLV¶YHU\JRRG·FRQILUPV
gesturing towards his culminating chapter on creation). 
 
0DULRQ·VFHQWUDOFULWLTXHRI+HLGHJJHULVH[SUHVVHGLQ&KULVWRORJLFDO
terms, but resists commitment to a fully theological ontology 
Between beauty and the self, as finite and as fallen, love must 
mediate, and it must do so in a particular approach:  namely that of conversio.  
)RUWKLVUHDVRQDOWKRXJK0DULRQ·VILUVWWKUHHFKDSWHUVKDYHEHHQGHGLFDWHG 
to establishing the aims of confessio, the ego, truth and beauty, all of these are 
underwritten by the dynamic of conversion, whose description in the next 
chapter, /DIDLEOHVVHGHODYRORQWpRXODSXLVVDQFHGHO·DPRXU therefore forms 
precisely a fulcrum for the entirety of Au Lieu De Soi, its structural and logical 
center.  In this respect it is intended to parallel Book X of the Confessions, as 
WKHERRNLQZKLFK¶WKHHJRWRSSOHVRYHU>bascule] into Scripture, and the 
VLQJXODULQWRWKHSOXUDO·198   To these two progressions we may perhaps add a 
third, implicit, even reticent, but no less strongly felt:  phenomenology itself 
topples over into ontology, with a discernible, and increasingly critical, 
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GLDORJXHZLWK+HLGHJJHUVHWWLQJPXFKRI0DULRQ·VDJHQGDThis is in at least 
RQHUHVSHFWLQHYLWDEOHDVLGHIURP0DULRQ·VORQJ-standing debt to Heidegger, 
which was never without reservation but is appearing to be more and more 
SUREOHPDWLFLQ0DULRQ·VRZQH\HVLWZRXOGEHXQWKLQNDEOHWRHQJDJHDWDQ\
length with the Augustinian conversion, and its attending tentatio, without 
IDFLQJ+HLGHJJHU·VUHDGLQJWKHUHRI0DULRQWDNHVMXVWDVVHULRXVO\DV
Heidegger does the refrain of Confessions X, taken from Job ² ¶,VQRWKXPDQ
OLIHRQHDUWKDWHPSWDWLRQ"·199 ² as an indication that temptation, far from 
being an accident, even a result of the fall, is constitutive of life as such, as 
¶SHUPDQHQW·DQG¶XQLYHUVDO·DVLV the desire for the happy life.200  In this it is 
FOHDUWKDW¶WHPSWDWLRQ·KDVDGLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJWKDQWKDWRIWhe quotidian 
understanding as basically identical with sin:  another indication of this 
strangeness is that Augustine treats most substantially of this question after 
what is commonly seen as his conversion, after even his baptism.   For 
Heidegger, this is to be read as a privileging of possibility over actuality:  
$XJXVWLQH·VFRQFHUQLVIRUWKHSXUHO\SRVVLEOHWHPSWDWLRQZKLFK¶ZLWKRXW
KDYLQJDQ\QHHGWRSDVVLQWRWKHHIIHFWLYLW\RIDQHYLODFW«DVNVQRWKLQJ
more than this possibility to be exercised,·201 such that temptation occurs on 
D¶SXUHO\LQWHULRU·VLWH$VVXFKDQGDJDLQZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR-REWHPSWDWLRQ
RFFXUV¶QRWRQO\DVWKHSDUDGR[LFDORFFDVLRQRIDWHVWRIIDLWKEXWDOVRDWHVW
RIWKHVHOI·D¶GLVSRVLWLRQ·DQGD¶KDELWXV·PRUHWKDQDFKRLce.  In its universal 
testing, Marion points out, temptation is a mode of phenomenalization, 
                                                          
199 Job 7.1, cited in Conf. X 28.39 and 32.48. 
200 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 209. 
201 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 206. 
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ZKHUHLQ¶DPDQLVPDGHWRVHHWKDWZKLFKZRXOGUHPDLQZLWKRXWLWLQYLVLEOH
to him:  his thoughts, his force, his own self, that which is in him, but not 
shown to KLP·LQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHKLGGHQWRKLVNQRZOHGJHRIDFWXDOLWLHVEXW
shown only in his desire for possibilities.202  Temptation regards zuhandenheit, 
not vorhandenheit, and indeed discloses the phenomenological priority of such 
to us. 
 To this point, Marion follows Heidegger ² indeed it would be 
difficult not to do so, and their common reading of temptation as the 
experience of the self, particularly in resisting conversion by insistently 
UHPDLQLQJZKDWRQH·VVHOILVQRZLQWKHSUHVHQWGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHSLvotal 
role of time in Augustinian thought, even without having cited a word of 
Confessions XI.  Whether one terms it facticity or, more faithful to Augustine, 
mutability,203 the fundamental and absolutely definitive mode of the vita 
humana for Augustine is without doubt radical possibility.  Where Marion 
begins his departure from Heidegger, however, is at first purely philological:  
where Heidegger reads the onus mihi which Augustine announces he has 
become as exactly this radical possibility,204 and eventually, in Being and Time, 
as the burden of Dasein itself, Marion insists that we read this central phrase 
in its theological and thus, for Augustine, biblical context:  without this 
FULWLFDOPRYH¶DOORI$XJXVWLQH·VLQTXLU\>LQWRWKHvita humana, truth and thus 
ultimately God] disappears, reduced to a simple instrument for taking up 
                                                          
202 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 210. 
203 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 211. 
204 +HLGHJJHU´$XJXVWLQHDQG1HR-3ODWRQLVPµ 
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again the question of Being.·205  The context of this biblical correction of 
+HLGHJJHU·VSDUWLDOUHDGLQJLVWKHSDUDGR[RI0DWWKHZ¶P\EXUGHQLV
OLJKW·$XJXVWLQH·VDOOXVLRQ however, need not be caught in order simply to 
read the full idea in which he uses the phrase onus mihi sum (a signal that 
+HLGHJJHU·VPLVUHDGLQJLVDIWHUDOOPRUHZLOIXOWKDQDFFLGHQWDOWKHSDUDGR[
WKDW¶as I am not filled with you, I am a burden to m\VHOI·)RU0DULRQWKHULGGOH
raised by this formulation ² ¶ZK\WKHIXOOQHVVRI*RGPDNHVRQHOLJKWZKLOH
WKHIXOOQHVVRIVHOILQIDFWWKHHPSWLQHVVRI*RGWKXVDYRLGFUXVKHV·² is 
solved with reference to love.  He notes that Augustine, whose 
interpretations of Matthew 11 are neither hard to find nor difficult to 
interpret,206 consistently emphasizes the ease and the lightness with which the 
lover RI*RGIXOILOVWKHGLYLQHFRPPDQGPHQWDQGRSSRVHVWKLVWR¶WKHZHLJKW
of the self reduced to itself aloQH·ZLWKRXWDQ\H[WHUQDOUHIHUHQFHRIORYH
from which to suspend such a weight.207  Common to both situations is the 
occasion of deciding the manner in which one bears temptation.  In place of 
Dasein and its decision to inquire after Being, Marion substitutes the 
Augustinian definition of humanity as pertinens ad Christum, which decides 
what it will love and how it will love, with a crucial difference:  where 
+HLGHJJHU·VH[LVWHQWLDODQDO\WLFLVLQWKHHQGGHSHQGHQWRQNQRZOHGJHDWOHDVW
the knowledge of wheWKHUDQGKRZLWH[LVWV$XJXVWLQH·VDQDO\WLFLILWFDQEH
so called) of love depends on a receptivity which is at once unknowing and 
SDVVLYH,QRWKHUZRUGV0DULRQ·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQHRQUHVLVWDQFHWR
                                                          
205 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 213. 
206 Citing Enn. in psalmos 7.10 and 67.18. 
207 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 216. 
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WHPSWDWLRQWDNHVDVH[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQWDQGDV¶frontally opposed to 
+HLGHJJHU·WKHIDPRXVIRUPXODWLRQ¶Da quod iubes, give ZKDW\RXFRPPDQG·
¶7HPSWDWLRQEHFRPHVWKHRUGHDORIWKHVHOIZKHUHWKHVHOIOHDUQVZKHWKHULW
loves what it has received as a gift, and whether it loves this gift more than 
any other thing.·208  Recognition and love of the divine command (and thus 
of conversion) as a gift is for Marion both originary and ultimate, depending 
on the desire ² and Marion concedes too much to Heidegger by allowing that 
this desire is unconditioned and immediate ² for the vita beata, a desire which 
is itself a gift; temptation arises not as an excessive but as a deficient 
manifestation of this desire.  In this light Marion rehearses briefly the 
distinction between uti and frui, played on the stage of 1 JoKQ·VWULDGRI
concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes (or curiositas) and the 
desire for praise (the ambitio saeculi):  temptation faces me, in each of these 
WKUHHFDVHVZLWKWKHGHFLVLRQ¶EHWZHHQORYLQJLWIRULWVHOIRUWUDYHUVLQJLW 
loving who gives it, in being decided between loving the given gift or him 
who renders it possible.·209  0DULRQ·VQRYHOLQVLJKWWRWKLVIDPLOLDUWULDGLVWKDW
Augustine experiences all three of these cases as surprising disclosures of 
himself to himself:  iQWKHILUVWFDVHWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VHURWLF
dreams, he experiences himself as unable to deny the pleasure in the unreality 
of the dream which he is able to deny in the reality of waking life; in the 
second, his fascination with theoretical knowledges (whether mathematical or 
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theatrical) precisely insofar as they do not concern him;210 in the third, the 
most egregious and the most painful, his confusion between the praise of 
God on account of himself and the praise of himself on his own account, 
whiFKHVWDEOLVKHVWKHORJLFRIWHPSWDWLRQPRVWUDGLFDOO\¶,QWKLV,DPWR
myself less known than you.·211 In three concentric spheres (the interior, the 
exterior, the intersubjective) Augustine finds himself to know God, the least 
knowable, more than he knows even himself. 
 Marion intensifies this Augustinian critique of Heidegger to the same 
degree to which he intensifies his own development of tentatio as leading to a 
¶VWULFWO\HURWLFKRUL]RQ·WKHSeinsfrage is nothing but an account of cura (here 
translated as Sorge or le soin) ¶QHXWUDOL]HG·DQGSXUJHGRILWVDVVRFLDWLRQZLWK
delectatio and, more radically, amor .212  Following an intuitive, but no less 
exegetically rigorous, connection between the will and what delights it, he 
UHDGV$XJXVWLQH·VIRUPXODWLRQ in the Soliloquies OLWHUDOO\¶,KDYHQRWKLQJRWKHU
WKDQDZLOO·ZKLFKGLVFORVHVWRPH¶ZKDW,DPDQGZKR,DP:·213  even if this 
will appears as perverse, in its perversity it does not obscure but in fact 
reveals my perversity.  The radicality of this formulation is seen more clearly 
in the contrary case:  in order to rejoice in the truth, it would suffice that I 
desire so to do.  But the corollary to this doctrine is that it is severely 
difficult, aporetic even, to desire this.  Marion discerns here a proto-
                                                          
210 Although Marion does not note it, this phenomenal description comes from 
$XJXVWLQH·VRZQILUVWSHUVRQH[SHULHQFHUHODWHGLQConf. I.13.21, of weeping over 
Dido but not taking this weeping as an occasion to discover his own loss of the love 
of God. 
211 Augustine, Conf. X.37.62. 
212 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 222. 
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Nietzschean strand of thought (albeit according to an admittedly 
LGLRV\QFUDWLFUHDGLQJRI1LHW]VFKHWKDW¶PRUHRULJLQDOWRWKHWUXWKWKDQLWVHOI
proves to be the will for the truth in it,·214 DZLOOZKLFKOHDGVWRD¶SUDFWLFLQJ
of the truth, a practice which is finally seriously theoretical.·215  Aside from 
WKHVXUSULVLQJFRQFHVVLRQWKDWWKHUHLVRUFRXOGEHD¶WKHRU\·ZKLFK
WUDQVFHQGVWKHFUXGHXQLYRFDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQRI¶WKHWKHRUHWLFDO·ZKLFK
Marion has often deployed, this passage is notable for its incipient critique of 
Heidegger (using Nietzsche as much as Augustine):  where Heidegger 
VXSSODQWVDFWXDOLW\ZLWKSRVVLELOLW\$XJXVWLQH·VORFDWLQJRIWKHWUXWKDVactually 
in desire (even if neither this desire nor its truth is readily accessible to me) 
demands more rigorously that I decide, between my current possibilities, to 
GHVLUHDQDFWXDOLW\$QGDWWKLVSRLQW+HLGHJJHU·VJXLGLQJDVVXPSWLRQVXIIHUV
DIURQWDODWWDFNIURP0DULRQDJDLQFLWLQJ+HLGHJJHU·V$XJXVWLQHDJDLQVWKLP
no fewer than three times LQ%RRN;$XJXVWLQHFDOOVXSRQ¶hoc monstrum·
ILUVWGHVFULEHGLQ%RRN9,,,WKDW¶WKHVRXOFRPPDQGVWKHERG\DQGLV
obeyed immediately; the soul commands itself [to desire the truth, for 
instance] and is resisted.·216 Heidegger posits, or rather assumes, exactly that 
E\ZKLFK$XJXVWLQHLV¶VWXSHILHG·² that Dasein can definitionally decide on its 
own possibility, and will itself to want whatever it wants to will.   
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0DULRQ·VFRPPLWPHQWWRDUDGLFDOYROXQWDULVPIRUFHVKLPWRPLVUHDG
the ontology of creation which he increasingly recognizes as central to 
the Confessions 
$WWKLVSRLQW0DULRQDSSOLHVWKHORJLFRI¶WKLVPRQVWURVLW\·RU
¶SDUDGR[·DV0DULRQUDWKHUODPHO\WUDQVODWHVLWDVHODERUDWHGLQ%RRN;WR
the more personal and more famous account of AuguVWLQH·VLQ-)decision in 
the Milanese garden (the historical or literary character of which we are 
mercifully allowed, from a phenomenological or a theological perspective, to 
LJQRUH,QWKHDFFRXQWIURP$XJXVWLQH·VRZQOLIHDQDFFRXQWZKLFK0DULRQ
deemV¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·LVVWUHQXRXVO\GLVSXWHGQDPHO\WKDWWKHZLOOLV
subordinated to the understanding, such that what I know to be the good is 
easily, or even automatically, by virtue of this knowledge, willed.  In the case 
RI0LODQ$XJXVWLQH·VWHDUVFRPHfrom his inability to submit to this account:  
he knows very well the truth, and understands its superiority to his present 
life, and despite (or, as Marion suggests without much explanation, even 
because of) this knowledge, he cannot will himself to will it, thus cannot will it.  
7KLVLVRIFRXUVHDNLQWRWKH¶KDWUHGRIWKHWUXWK·GLVFXVVHGDERYH¶7KXVLWLV
that they hate the truth, on account of that thing, which they love in place of 
the truth.·217 Rather than reading this in its intuitive senses ² that $XJXVWLQH·V
obstinate refusal, or more accurately his delay, to convert even to that which 
he knows is superior and will assure him the happier life which he desires 
and knows himself to desire, is due to a simple weakness of the will, or out of 
a fear that he has misled himself and thus risks losing what he has due to a 
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faulty understanding of what he desires ² Marion will go on to impute a 
VWURQJHUDQGVWUDQJHUPRWLYHWR$XJXVWLQHQDPHO\WKDWKH¶KDWHVWKHWUXWK·
and not only his conception of this trXWKEXWWKHWUXWK¶DVVXFK.·218  Here he 
overstates his case, but does so with few negative consequences for his 
reading of Augustine (although it does lead him down a questionable path 
ZKHQHYDOXDWLQJWKHKLVWRULFDOUHFHSWLRQRIWKH$XJXVWLQH·VWHDFKLQJIor 
example finding Kant a more faithful Augustinian than Aquinas!), and largely 
for an admirable reason.  Marion labors under the misconception that for 
Augustine, in order to love, or to will, the good, one must be equally capable 
of loving or willing the evil, but only because he has correctly perceived the 
(positive) force of the love for the good, and the (equally strong) force of the 
love of evil;  all he has missed in this evaluation is the negative or better 
privative nature of this latter force.  Ultimately it is an ontological misreading 
RI$XJXVWLQHDQGDIDLOXUHWRXQGHUVWDQGIXOO\WKHZHLJKWZKLFKWKH¶YHU\
JRRG·RI*HQHVLVH[HUFLVHGRQKLVWKRXJKWZKLFKKHUHOHDGV0DULRQ
astray, and keeps him from making the decisive break with Heidegger:  for 
while he heads in the right direction to deny the (phenomenological or 
HPSLULFDOYDOLGLW\RIWKH¶UDGLFDOVHOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ·RI+HLGHJJHU·V
¶DXWKHQWLF·ZLOO0DULRQUHWDLQVDQHOHPHQWRIWKLVGHWHUPLQLVPLQKLV
LQVLVWHQFHWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VVFDWWHUHG UHPDUNVRQ¶ZLOOLQJDOLH·219 mean that 
one must normatively pass through a phase of actively hating the truth in 
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order to reach a state of loving it. 220  From such an insistence (in which, it 
must be acknowledged, Marion maintains that this sort of hatred is ultimately 
only directed tRZDUGV¶WKHFORVHVW·RUP\VHOI221), Marion can only introduce 
JUDFHDJDLQXQGHUWKHWLWOHRIWKH¶da quod iubes·SUD\HUDVVRPHWKLQJRIDQ
artifice, a surprise exit, through which possibility and indeed actuality sneak 
into the impotence and the impossibility which so definitively characterized 
the vita humana only a few pages before.222 Such an operation is undoubtedly 
an imposition on Augustine, whose account of the perverse (and never evil) 
will as willing only lesser goods ² even to the point of willing nothing, or the 
nothing ² is more rigorous and more natural in its connection to grace.  
,QGHHG0DULRQUHFRJQL]HVVRPHWKLQJRIWKLVORJLFHJ¶7KHEDGZLOOLQWKH
ODVWLQVWDQFHZLOOVQRWKLQJHYLO«EXWLWZLOOVQRWKLQJLW does not will, it fails 
itself·223EXWLVOHGDVWUD\E\$XJXVWLQH·VSHUKDSVRYHUO\HDJHUODQJXDJHLQ
narrating his (pre-conversion, pre-baptism) experience of the theft of the 
SHDUVLQZKLFKKHLQWHUSUHWVKLV\RXWKLQWKLVRYHUO\YROXQWDULVWLFWHUPV¶«,
did not even will to enjoy the thing which I hungered to steal, but the theft 
DQGWKHVLQLWVHOI«,WZDVVKDPHIXODQG,loved it; I loved to die, I loved my fall, 
I did not love what this fall aimed at, but I loved the fall itselfµ224 into asserting 
that this is the normative condition of temptation, at all moments of their 
conversion.  Further, as we shall see below, it is important to note, as Marion 
                                                          
220 This is obviously an anti-Socratic, anti-Greek stance on the will:  or at least stands 
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221 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 234 and 241. 
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does not, that what Augustine loved was the fall itself, the defectum, in other 
words the motion towards (or, with more etymological rigor, the unmaking of) 
what he loved. 
The account that emerges, ex machinaIURP0DULRQ·VRYHUO\LQFOXVLYH
but rightly intentioned characterization of humanity by their delights, is 
however very deeply Augustinian, particularly in the brilliant diagnosis of 
$XJXVWLQH·V3HODJLDQFRQWURYHUVLHVWKDWWKH3HODJLDQVIDLO
phenomenologically at the precise moment that they fail theologically, by 
ignoring or denying that grace is in continuity with the free will, in fact 
authorizing and creating it.  The false distinction between the human desire 
for the truth and the desire which is a gift from God, thus between a will and 
DJRRGZLOOZKLFKWKUHDWHQHGWRHPHUJHIURP0DULRQ·VLQVLVWHQFHRQWKH
possibility of desiring the evil qua evil, here disappears, as both desires are at 
URRWDUHVSRQVHWKHIXOOQHVVRIGHVLULQJLQZKLFK¶,ZLOOZKDWLVJLYHQWRPH
WRORYH·225   7KXV$XJXVWLQH·VILQDOGHILQLWLRQRIFRQYHUVLRQDV¶QRWZLOOLQJ
what I will and willing what you will·226 rightly understood, denies the very 
possibility of willing ² permanently, vehemently, ex toto ² anything other than 
what God wills that I would will.  Whether and how the object of such a 
willing stands in being, even with respect to the nothingness which Marion is 
happy enough to describe, remains somewhat mystical; in spite of his 
habitual shrugging off of the question, this consideration of the will is bound 
by the Augustinian turn to Genesis to at least speak of the will as 
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IXQGDPHQWDOO\DGLVSRVLWLRQWRZDUGV¶WKHKHDYHQ DQGWKHHDUWK·,QGHHG
0DULRQ·VXOWLPDWHPRYHLQAu Lieu De Soi will be to connect this conversion, 
as the hinge on which truth, language and the self rotate, up with creation, as 
that which precedes it and makes it possible, or even as that which is 
simultaneous with it.   
 
6LPLODUO\0DULRQ·VDFFRXQWRIWHPSRUDOLW\JHVWXUHVWRZDUGVDFRVPLF
liturgy, but does not consummate this move with either a theoretical 
reflection or an exegesis of Conf. XII-XIII 
Before he makes this move, however, he is bound in at least two 
ways to make a detour between the will and creation into an explanation of 
time:  on the one hand, the very structure of the Confessions, which have Book 
;,RQWLPHLQWHUYHQLQJEHIRUH$XJXVWLQH·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRUEHWWHU
meditations) on creation and Genesis, and on the other, his Heideggerean 
commitments, however loose they have become at this point in his career, 
dictate such a move.  In spite of both of these easily predictable 
FRPPLWPHQWVKRZHYHUWKHILIWKFKDSWHU¶/HWHPSVRXO·DYqQHPHQt·LVSHUKDSV
the most surprising of Au Lieu De Soi:  at the moment where his 
Heideggereanism could easily have taken at least a last gasp in the form of a 
simple exposition of how the distentio animi anticipates and indeed structures 
the central insights of Sein und Zeit, Marion here attempts to conserve for 
phenomenology a more radically Augustinian (and thus more radically 
biblical, as will emerge in the last chapter of this essay) account of time than 
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Heidegger achieved.   In so doing he delineates two improper readings of the 
role of Book XI in the structure of the Confessions more generally:  the first, 
that (by now we might hope passé) whereby Book XI is artificially isolated 
from the rest of the Confessions DQGWUHDWHGDV¶DSKLORVRSKLFDOWUHDWLVHRn 
WLPH·ZKLFKLVWKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUVLPLODUWUHDWPHQWV¶QRGGLQJPRUH
or lesVZLOOLQJO\WRKLVFUHDWLYLW\·;227 the second, that by which Book XI is seen 
LQ¶*UHHN·RU¶SKLORVRSKLFDO·IDVKLRQDVWKDWE\ZKLFK$XJXVWLQHVKLIWVKLV
gaze from time and the self (I-X) to eternity and heaven (XII-XIII), with 
these realms understood as simplistically and dualistically as is possible.  The 
misreading common to both is a failing to read them in the light of the 
confessio ZKLFKRSHQVWKHERRN¶&DQLWEH/RUG, that, since eternity is yours, 
\RXDUHLJQRUDQWRIZKDW,VD\WR\RX"«%XW,H[FLWHWR\RXP\DIIHFWDQG
WKDWRIWKRVHZKRUHDGWKLVWKDWZHPLJKWDOOVD\´*UHDWLVWKH/RUGDQG
highly worthy of praise.µ·228 In the first misreading this passage stating 
AXJXVWLQH·VLQWHQWLRQVPXVWVLPSO\EHLJQRUHGVLQFHLWVREYLRXVUH-citation 
of Psalm 47.1 (which also opens Book I) makes clear that there is a logical 
connection between the confessio of Book XI and the confessiones accomplished 
throughout the Confessions; in the second misreading, the particular nature of 
this connection is ignored -- namely that of mediating between the duality of 
$XJXVWLQH·Vego DQG*RG·Vte ² is missed because the misreading falsely 
imports the duality of time and eternity onto it, the very duality which 
Augustine questions and disputes:  if there can be no mediation between time 
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and eternity, then why make a confessio at all?  In fact, as Marion pithily puts it, 
LWLVQRWILUVWRIDOODPDWWHURI¶WKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHRULJLQRIWLPH·EXW¶WKH
question of the origin of the question RIWLPH·229  ² why would Augustine even 
ask God about the origin of time, were there no chance of mediation 
between an eternal God and a temporal ego, wherein I could accomplish 
anything by my confessiones?  Adding to this difficulty is the transition made 
KHUHIURPDFRQIHVVLRQPDGHLQRUGHUWRVWLUXS$XJXVWLQH·VRZQORYHLQWR
that which is made to stir up love for God in the community of readers, since 
at that moment the confession, until now potentially mystical, a-cosmic and 
purely internal, must also mediate through the world.  What is needed is a 
GHVFULSWLRQQRWRIWLPHEXWRIHWHUQLW\DQGPRUHSUHFLVHO\RQH¶ZLWhout 
FRQIXVLRQQRUVHSDUDWLRQ·230 with time.  Despite the jestingly  Chalcedonian 
language, such an account arises (as we shall see) for Augustine not at the 
PRPHQWRIWKH,QFDUQDWLRQEXWZLWKFUHDWLRQLWVHOIWKH¶QRQ-Greek concept 
SDUH[FHOOHQFH·KHVWDWHVDJDLQDQGSXWDWLYHO\ZLWKRXWGLVSOD\LQJIRUD
moment a Greek thinker who falls into such a trap231):  the confession of 
FUHDWLRQRUPRUHSUHFLVHO\WKH¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIEHLQJVDVFUHDWHG·D¶SODFH
(lieu·LVHVWDEOLVKHGZKHUHLQ¶WKHconfession is made possible no longer only for 
RQHEXWIRUWKHFRVPLFFRPPXQLW\«Dconfessio by the whole creation, in 
some PDQQHUFRVPLFRIWKHFUHDWRU·232  0DULRQ·VLPSXOVHKHUHWRILQGD
cosmic liturgy of a kind in Augustine, in fact as the culminating trend of the 
                                                          
229 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 261. 
230 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 263. 
231 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 263. 
232 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 264. 
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Confessions, is undeniably correct, even if the articulation of the relationship 
between the individual and ecclesial confessiones and the cosmic confessio is left 
vague and indetermined:  in what manner is this cosmic confession manifest?  
,VLWDIWHUDOOPHUHO\KHUPHQHXWLFWKH¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·RIEHLQJVDVFUHDWHG
and if so, is this an individual or an ecclesial hermeneutic? Is it, like the 
individual confessio, doubly of sin and of praise ² and what does this look like?  
These questions mist away as quickly as they are raised, and are not treated 
substantially even in the last chapter which treats of Books XII and XIII. 
 
0DULRQ·VXOWLPDWHGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHdistentio animi rightly privileges 
the two poles of creation and conversion, but again under-theorizes the 
biblical and ritual elements of these poles 
For now, nonetheless, all that matters for Marion is to establish the 
FRVPLFOLWXUJ\$XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQWQRWRQO\RIEHDXW\EXWPRUHFUXFLDOO\RI
time$JDLQVWDQ\¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·RSSRVLWLRQWRHWHUQLW\DVDJDLQVWDQ\¶QHXWUDO
SV\FKRORJLFDOGHVFULSWLRQ·WKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWLPHDVLQHVFDSDEO\Iixed to 
(divine and eternal) creation reconfigures time as an essentially liturgical 
function.233  In strict parallel to his arguments regarding the logic of the 
interior intimo meo as applied to life, beauty, as the constant mutability and 
variation of all things qua created, emerges as a logic of non-non-
FRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶ZKHQRQHLQWHUURJDWHVWKHP234 on the beauty which renders 
                                                          
233 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 266. 
234 6F¶DOOWKHVHWKLQJVZKLFKDUHDURXQGWKHRXWVLGHRIP\IOHVK·omnibus his quae 
circumstant fores carnis meae: it is surprising that Marion does not even cite, let alone 
emphasize, this rather obviously proto-phenomenological formulation. 
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WKHPGLYLQHWKHWKLQJVFRQIHVVWKDWWKH\DUHQRWWKLVEHDXW\´$QGZKDWLV
WKLV",LQWHUURJDWHGHDUWKDQGLWVDLG¶LWLVQRWPH·and all that is within in 
confessed the same thing.µ·235 Time, here nearly controvertible with beauty, is 
that which fundamentally shows a being as neither identical to nor divorced 
from God, and so impossible to understand at all without theological 
reference, which in turn renders it impossible to understand exhaustively.  In 
this very proper sense, we might refer to time as divine, albeit only by 
participating in the eternal act of creation.  As a corollary, from a 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOVWDQGSRLQWWLPH¶RQO\Kas sense in and for the world, and, 
even for this, it is not inscribed there as a mundane-being, but is disclosed as 
the mundane itself. Time comes with the world, it worldizes and makes ZRUOG·
(il mondanise et fait monde);236 this latter proposal is to be seen as the strict 
FRQVHTXHQFHRI$XJXVWLQH·VLQVLVWHQFHDJDLQVWD0DQLFKDHDQFRPSODLQWWKDW
*RGGRHVQRWSUHFHGHWKHZRUOGWHPSRUDOO\$VWKH¶PXQGDQHLWVHOI·FR-
equal in creation with the world, time assumes its properly central place in 
0DULRQ·VDFFount, as a theological reconfiguration of differance,237 the temporal 
delay that the self (paradigmatically the human self) suffers, in its inability to 
seize on, define, or realize itself exhaustively at any given moment.   In favor 
of the view that such a temporal delay and incongruity is the condition of 
humanity, qua created, for Augustine, Marion cites his previously explained 
examples of the repetition of Scripture that opens the Confessions (the self 
                                                          
235 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 265, citing Augustine, Conf. X.6.9. 
236 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 270. 
237 ,QGHHGWKHUHZRXOGEHQRUHDVRQWRXVH'HUULGD·VE\QRZUDWKHUGDWHGQHRORJLVP
in his account unless in order to reframe it, and show how it was always at root 
Augustinian and thus susceptible to theological critique. 
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cannot express itself without borrowing on the language of Scripture), the 
logic of memoria DVUHO\LQJRQDQHWHUQDO¶LPPHPRULDO·WKHVHOIFDQQRW
remember itself without reference to God ² ¶WKHPHPRU\RI\RXZDVZLWK
PH«EXWnot yet ZDV,·238), and ultimately desire, that which most 
fundamentally defines the self, as itself (and not merely its object) escaping 
WKHSUHVHQWPRPHQW¶Late have I loved you·239).  To this he adds a fourth, 
which in fact recapitulates them all under a personal key, and proves the 
irreducibly theological character of time:  that of FRQYHUVLRQ¶,VDLGWR
myself:  Behold, now is the moment, now -- and with this word now I was 
going towards what I had decided, I had nearly done now, and I was not 
doing it; but I was not falling back to the same point as before, I was holding 
myself nearly there, I was taking up the effort again, a little again, again a little 
away, and now, now I was arriving, I was holding it; and no, I was not there, I 
did not arrive there, I did not hold it, remaining between the death of the 
dead and the life of thHOLYLQJ«DQGWKHsame point of time I was held in 
suspense.µ240 Due to this insistent and nearly existential crisis of nows fading 
LQWRHDFKRWKHUVOLSSLQJRXWRI$XJXVWLQH·VUHDFK0DULRQFRPPHQWV¶7KXV
if there proves to be a philosophical aporia of time, it will be necessary to 
know it and read it as also, and even first of all, the symptom of a theological 
FULVLV·241  If it is theological, it is no less ontological:  rather than meditating at 
OHQJWKRQWKHIDPRXVDSRULDKHUHULJKWO\GLVPLVVHGDV¶EDQDO·EHFDXVHLWLVDV
                                                          
238 Augustine, Conf. XII.17.23. 
239 Augustine, Conf. X.27.38. 
240 Augustine, Conf. VIII.11.25. 
241 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 275-6. 
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easily found on the pages of Husserl or Plotinus as those of Augustine, with 
which Augustine begins his pursuit of time ² QDPHO\WKDW¶,IQRERG\DVNVPH
I know, but if I wish to explain it to someone who asks, I do not know·242 ² 
Marion points out merely that this aporia reflects on and intensifies the 
already primary monstrum WKDW,DPWRP\VHOIVLPSO\LQP\EHLQJ¶SUHFLVHO\
the question of time bears on my manner of being.·243  Being and time, in the 
Augustinian formulation, have a taut yet disjunctive relationship:  since time 
only is LQWKHSUHVHQW´«ZHGRQRWLQWUXWKVD\WKDWWLPHLVH[FHSWWKDWLW
WHQGVQRWWREHµ;244 but since this time, so limited, still constitutes the world 
as such, the question of time invites a questioning of the present, and thus 
that which is presented, presence.  Predictably, this questioning takes the 
IRUPRIDSUREOHPDWL]DWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDQH[SODQDWLRQLQD¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·
account, the present would be guaranteed a stable dominance over the other 
dimensions of time (and of being), and would in turn guarantee a sort of 
stability to that which it dominates, finally resulting in the guarantee of our 
being able to comprehend (and thus desire, remember, anticipate etc.) all 
times and all beings through the window of the present.  In its theological 
resituation, however, even the first guarantee is questioned:  the present is 
not, or at least is only relatively, which in turn topples the stability of the 
past, the future and all beings, up to the point of (especially) toppling the 
stability of our access to them.  It is for this reason, Marion holds, and only 
secondarily distaste for the astrologers, that Augustine holds such a revulsion 
                                                          
242 Augustine, Conf. XI.14.17. 
243 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 278. 
244 Augustine, Conf. XI.14.17. 
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for the definition of time as the movement of bodies:245 the presumed 
stability in such a model denies the possibility of a time which itself requires 
conversion:  beyond their common inaccessibility to knowledge, time and 
conversion are seen to share a fundamental instability, which gives rise to the 
epistemic inaccessibility, but in the same stroke delivers a different sort of 
knowledge.  This latter, which Marion strictly opposes to the sterile and 
QHXWUDONQRZOHGJHRI¶SKLORVRSK\·$XJXVWLQHFDOOVWKHarcana praesensio 
futurorumWKH¶KLGGHQSUHVHQFLQJ246 RIIXWXUHWKLQJV·;247 for Marion the 
etymology is important, as it discloses the pre -sensing, the sensation-
beforehand, which derives from memoria but is more akin to a sort of 
anticipation of time as it comes to us in the unstable shift from now to now 
to now, etc.  Since time is not only a de-centering, a displacement, but is itself 
de-centered and displaced, it does not merely measure the movement of 
ERGLHVEXW¶EXWSURYRNHVLWE\SURGXFLQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIWKHWKLQJWRZDUGV
itself, its passage into another than what it was, its surpassing, its distancing 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRLWVHOI·248  Due to this traversal of all things towards 
themselves through the theological excess that, in creation, constitutes them, 
the Augustinian intentio, which alone secures some relative degree of 
consLVWHQF\LQWKH¶IOX[·RIWLPH249 must be rid of any Husserlian overtones 
for our ears:  instead of gathering things together into a stable, if finite, view, 
                                                          
245 Augustine, Conf. XI.22.29. 
246,Q0DULRQ·V)UHQFKpré-sentir:  Chadwick renders the Latin into English as 
¶SUHVHQWLPHQW· 
247 Augustine, Conf. XI.17.24. 
248 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 288. 
249 Augustine, Conf. XI.27.36. 
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the intentio LQLWVRULJLQDODQGWKHRORJLFDOFDVWLQJ¶RQO\UHPDLQVSUHVHQWWR
render possible the dissolution of the present itself, and to permit the 
passage, the dissipation and the differentiation of every thing.·250  Marion in 
effect agrees with the famous Augustinian identification of time as a ¶GLVWHQWLR·
(or différance), but pauses to ask:  a distentio of what? 
 7RDQVZHUWKLVTXHVWLRQ0DULRQWXUQVWR$XJXVWLQH·V
SKHQRPHQRORJ\RI6W$PEURVH·VK\PQDeus creator omnium, in which memoria 
returns to play a decisive role in the determination and the measuring of 
WLPHEHIRUH,VLQJDV\OODEOH,KDYH¶SUHPHGLWDWHG·WKHOHQJWKRIWKDWV\OODEOH
IURPP\PHPRU\RIZKDWWKHVRQJGLFWDWHV¶FRQILGHG·LWWRP\PHPRU\DQG
then sing it until it passes to my memory according to the pre-sensed 
determination of its length.251 The attention I pay to the sound while I emit it 
and the expectation with which I await its completion (and begin to plan the 
next syllable) are both subordinate to memoria, with a subordination that I 
cannot exhaustively understand any more than I can understand the power of 
memory itself, with the result that both the ego and its temporality fall under 
WKHVDPH¶VKDGRZRIXQNQRZOHGJH·:252  not indeed unknowable with the 
LQDFFHVVLELOLW\RIWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQWEXW¶LQWKH´«penetrale amplum et 
infinitumµRIP\PHPRULDWKDWZKLFKZLWKRXWXQGHUVWDQding it, nevertheless 
,DPIRU´WKHVRXOLVLWVHOIPHPRU\.µ·253 The difference here is vital:  the 
continuity, however indirectly assured through memoria or intentio, is neither 
                                                          
250 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 289. 
251 Augustine, Conf. XI.27.36ff. 
252 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 291. 
253 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 292, citing Augustine, Conf. X.8.14 and 14.21. 
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one of absolute presence nor absolute absence, but a sort of definitively 
contiQJHQWSUHVHQFH¶WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHSDVVDJHLWVHOI·254 wherein the 
SDVVDJHLV¶SURFODLPHG·DQG¶UHFODLPHG·LQWKHVDPHPRWLRQ7KXVWKHDQVZHU
WRWKHTXHVWLRQLVRIFRXUVHWKDWWLPH·Vdistentio is a distentio animi, so long as 
this genitive is understood in both the subjective and the objective sense:  
¶7KHSDVVLQJVRXOPHDVXUHVQRSDVVDJHRWKHUWKDQLWVRZQ7LPHDUULYHVDV
what distends the soul, even as what is distended by the soul·VXFKWKDW¶«WLPHRQO\
temporalizes the world by being temporalized first by and in my soul.255 In 
RWKHUZRUGVDQGPRUHVXFFLQFWO\¶,DPQRWRQO\in or with time, I am time 
LWVHOI·256  This identification of time as a distentio that is both the action of the 
mind, and the action on the mind, Marion understands as a decisive break 
with the Greeks, who here receive some very welcome specification (namely 
Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus),257 who assign temporality to physical 
substrates, not the human mind, and thus posit a neutral and objective 
measurement of the duration of the present moment which Augustine denies 
LQIDYRURI¶DQRULJLQDOVHQVLQJ·RIWKHLQGLYLGXDOVRXO,QWKLV
understanding, we might question the ease with which Marion dispenses of 
the Plotinian world-soul in favor of the Augustinian animus meus, since even 
HOVHZKHUHLQ0DULRQ·VDFFRXQW$XJXVWLQHFDQWKHRUL]HQRanimus that is not 
at least synchronous with the creation of the world, if not in a sense 
                                                          
254 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 294. 
255 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 295-6, emphasis mine. 
256 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 297. 
257 3ODWR·VLQFOXVLRQRQWKLVOLVWLVFRQIXVLQJVLQFHDWQRSRLQWLQWKLVGLVFXVVLRQGoes 
Marion cite, let alone discuss, any Platonic texts; his discussion of Aristotle and 
Plotinus draws on Physics 4.10 and Enneads 3.7 and 3.13, respectively. 
  
 
 
125 
 
dependent on it:  nevertheless, he is aware that such a deeply individualizing 
account of time must be sharply guarded against veering in a Kantian 
¶UDGLFDOO\VXEMHFWLYLVW·GLUHFWLRQE\LQVLVWLQJWKDWWKHanimus is only distended 
and distending because it is created.258  In fact such is the distinctive stigma 
RIWKHKXPDQPLQG¶2IDOOFUHDWXUHVWKHmens of man bears most 
profoundly the mark of its creation and, for this, is offered, more fragile and 
more pliable than any other, to the distentio of a temporalization.·259   
7KLV¶RIIHULQJ·UHYHDOVWKHWUXHDJHQGDRI0DULRQ·VDQGLQGHHG
$XJXVWLQH·VLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI time:  they share in a pursuit of time as a gift 
which mediates between two seemingly diachronic events, namely the (past) 
FUHDWLRQRI¶WKHKHDYHQDQGWKHHDUWK·DQGWKHIXWXUHFRQYHUVLRQLWVHOIDOVR
a creation) of the self.  Between these two events arrives, as the site of both, 
the event of the world: or better, since this arrival is only understood as 
arriving towards a mind, the advent of the world, which is recognizable DV¶WKH
advent of time itself,·260 the arrival of the passage of the present in the soul.  
This advent marks the distentio animi DVWKH¶VDWXUDWHGSKHQRPHQRQSDU
H[FHOOHQFH·VLQFHLQLWLVJLYHQERWK¶WKHFORVHVWEHLQJ-given (my self in 
relation to others) and the being-JLYHQLQWRWDOLW\WKHZRUOG·LQRWKHUZRUGV
communal and phenomenological conversion and creation, both of which 
are necessary to underwrite any temporalized facticity.261 But before Marion 
makes this move from time forward to creation, he performs a familiar two-
                                                          
258 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 300. 
259 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 301. 
260 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 304. 
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step, a step from Augustine forward to Heidegger and a step from Augustine 
EDFNWRWKH%LEOH)LUVWWR+HLGHJJHU0DULRQGHIHQGV$XJXVWLQH·V¶IDOOLQWR
WLPHV·DJDLQVWDFUXGHPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI+HLGHJJHU·VFRPSODLQWWKDWVXFK
an account suggests time as accidental to Dasein, rather than its most proper 
charDFWHUL]DWLRQDV¶IDFWLFDOH[LVWHQFH.·262   To correct this misunderstanding, 
which alleges that Augustine has failed to distinguish between the time which 
marks proper existential temporality and that which marks a decay (Verfallen) 
² or in more familiarly theological terminology, temporality insofar as 
humanity is created, and temporality insofar as humanity is fallen ² Marion 
takes recourse to the well-noted263 philological nexus of ¶WHQWLRQHV·which 
surround and structure the distentio.  By inviting attention to these (especially 
intentio and extentio) as specific modalities of time, Marion rightly claims, 
$XJXVWLQH·VVHHPLQJO\IDWDOLVWGHILQLWLRQRIWLPHDVdistentio as only one 
modality, however inevitable, of temporalization, and moreover one which is, 
desSLWH+HLGHJJHU·VVHOHFWLYHUHDGLQJQRWSDUWLFXODUO\FHQWUDOWRConf. XI.264  
In order to understand the relationship between these three modalities, 
Marion downplays the extent to which the Augustinian distentio relies on the 
Plotinian diastasis, and emphasizes on the contrary its biblical source, in 
Philippians 3.13-DFRPPHQWDU\RQZKLFKIRUPVWKHHQGRI$XJXVWLQH·V
formal reflections on time:  
                                                          
262 Heidegger, Being and Time, 82. 
263 &I-04XLQQ´)RXUIDFHVRIWLPHLQ6W$XJXVWLQHµRecherches augustiniennes 36 
(1992). 
264 Marion acknowledges his indebtedness to Chrétien for this reading:  cf. La joie 
spateuse (Paris, 2007), p. 46. 
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%XW´VLQFH\RXUPHUF\LVEHWWHUWKDQDOOOLYHVµEHKROGP\OLIH
is a distentioDQG´\RXUULJKWKDQGKDVWDNHQPHµLQP\/RUG
the Son of Man, mediator between you [who are] One and us 
>ZKRDUH@PDQ\LQPDQ\E\PDQ\VRWKDWE\KLP´,NQRZ
KLPLQZKRP,DPNQRZQµDQGOHDYLQJEHKLQGROGGD\V,
IROORZWKH8QLTXH´IRUJHWWLQJWKHWKLQJVWKDWSDVVµQRW
distended, but extended, not towards the things which will come 
DQGZKLFKSDVVEXW´WRZDUGVWKRVHZKLFKDUHEHIRUHµ´,
SXUVXHµIROORZLQJno distentio but a tension [intentio], thH´SDOP
RIWKHFDOOLQJRQKLJKµ265  
 
+HUH0DULRQ·VWUDQVODWLRQIDUPRUHSDLQVWDNLQJO\ literal than conventional 
WUDQVODWLRQVGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZD\LQZKLFK$XJXVWLQH·VPRUH
VSHFXODWLYHWKRXJKWRFFXUVEHWZHHQELEOLFDOPDUJLQVWKH¶diastasis of Plotinus 
is repealed and located in the emprosthen epekteinomenos of St. Paul, and thus the 
distentio is opposed to and leans on another disposition, here called extentio.·266   
Marion perhaps overreaches in his rejection of Plotinus, but the essential 
PRYHKHUHLVWKHGHILDQWUHMHFWLRQRIWKH¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·267 opposition of the 
distentio to an (in IDFWLPSRVVLEOH¶LPLWDWLRQRIHWHUQLW\·EXWLQWKHextentio, an 
LQVLVWHQWO\KXPDQDQGILQLWHPRGHRIWHPSRUDOLW\ZKLFK¶H[WUDFWVPHIURP
the dispersion [distentio] by stretching me outside myself.·268  Noting that 
Philippians 3 arises (in fact for the first time in the Confessions) in the account 
RIWKH¶YLVLRQDW2VWLD·0DULRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHFRQYHUVLRQIURPdistentio to 
extentio takes place in a communal vision, indeed in an intentio that comes 
from faith and above all love.269 The Pauline logic is the hermeneutic key to 
                                                          
265 Augustine, Conf. XI.29.39, citing Ps. 32.4, 62.9, and Phil. 3.12-14. 
266 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 307-8. 
267 Here putatively neo-Platonist, but in fact more Stoic. 
268 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 309. 
269 Augustine, Conf. IX.10.23. 
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WKH¶TXHVWLRQRIWKHRULJLQRIWLPH·WKH¶DWWUDFWLRQ>intentio@·270 by which 
¶GLVWUDFWLRQ>distentio@·LVFRQYHUWHGWR¶H[WUDFWLRQ>extentio@·SUHFLVHO\GRHVQRW
FRQVLVWLQ¶WHQGLQJWRZDUGVWKLQJVZKLFKZLOOFRPHfutura  «EXWWKRVHZKich 
remain and will remain in front, ea quae ante sunt ·:271  the things which are 
DKHDGQRWEHFDXVHWKH\OLHLQWKHIXWXUHLQD¶QDWXUDO·DQGSUH-eschatological 
DWWLWXGHEXWEHFDXVHWKH\DUHLQIURQWRIXVLQWKH¶DGYDQFHRIGLVHTXLOLEULXP·
the positive and essential characterization of time as impermanent, unstable, 
and thus more to be desired than to be known theoretically.   After the 
¶FRQYHUVLRQRIWLPH·SKHQRPHQRORJ\DSSHDUVDVLQIDFWHVFKDWRORJ\EXWLI
such is the case, it is not clear how one could avoid the conclusion that it is 
therefore equally ecclesial, cosmic, and in some sense metaphysical. 
 
When he finally arrives at the exposition of Genesis, Marion points the 
way towards a thoroughly Christianized Platonism, and 
unintentionally shows tKHYDFXRXVQHVVRIWKH´%HLQJµKHUHMHFWV 
The next and final chapter, La création du soi, however, finds Marion 
KDVWHQLQJWRFODULI\KLVFRPPHQWDU\RQ$XJXVWLQH·VFRPPHQWDU\RQ*HQHVLV
EHJLQVE\LQVLVWLQJWKDWWKHUHLVQRWKLQJRIWKH¶*UHHN·LPSXOVHWRH[plain the 
¶ZRUOG·KHQRWHVZU\O\WKDW$XJXVWLQHZURWHQRWUHDWLVHHQWLWOHGperi tou 
kosmouKHUHXQGHUVWRRGDVWKH¶FORVHGZRUOG·RI¶SK\VLFDl beings or beings in 
                                                          
270 This translation, wKLFKDWWHPSWVWRFRQWHQGDJDLQVWWKH¶H[FOXVLYHO\HSLVWHPLF·
understanding which Husserl has given intention, is certainly clever, even if it might 
have been more winsome to have engaged Husserl head-on.  
271 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 311. 
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JHQHUDO·272  In his insistence that the exposition of Genesis 1.1-2 does not 
IRUP$XJXVWLQH·VUHVSRQVHWRWKH¶TXHVWLRQRIWKHZRUOG·VWLOOOHVVD
SURJUHVVLRQODEHOHG¶7KRPLVW&DUWHVLDQRU.DQWLDQ·IURP¶DUDWLRQDO
doctrine of the mens DQGRI*RG·LQConf. I-;,WR¶DUDWLRQDOFRVPRORJ\·KH
notes that Augustine rarely speaks of the mundus at all, and when he does, he 
UHVWULFWVKLVPHDQLQJWRWKH-RKDQQLQHVHQVHRI¶WKHWRWDOLW\RQWLFLIRQH
likes) of what I love, of being insofar as I love it.·273  $VDUHVXOWWKH¶FUHDWLRQ
RIKHDYHQDQGHDUWK·LVD¶SHUIHFWO\DSRUHWLF·IRUPXODWLRQVRORQJDs it is 
XQGHUVWRRGDVDUHVSRQVHWRD¶PHWDSK\VLFDOTXHVWLRQ·LQSDUWLFXODUWKH
Heideggerean274 RUDWURRW/HLEQL]LDQTXHVWLRQRI¶ZK\LVWKHUHLQJHQHUDO
VRPHWKLQJUDWKHUWKDQQRWKLQJ"·)RUVRORQJDVLWLVVRXQGHUVWRRGLWLVDQ
apparently and obviously inept response, both on phenomenological grounds 
(because the distinction between ens increatum and ens creatum LV¶GHSULYHGRI
DQ\SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOMXVWLILFDWLRQ·DQGELEOLFDOJURXQGVWKHFUHDWLRQ
narrative in Genesis, and to this we could add that of Job 38-41 or the 
account of the creation of Wisdom in Proverbs 8, refuses to be submitted to 
DQ\TXHVWLRQVRI¶ZK\·2QWKHFRQWUDU\0DULRQVXJJHVWV$XJXVWLQH·V
interpretation of the first verses of Genesis is to be understood as in the first 
place a critique in advance of such a question:  where Heidegger, in even 
asking this question, assumes the insufficiency of the theological response to 
the question, Marion reads Augustine as challenging precisely the 
arbitrariness of the question itself.  In his attempt to restore a sort of 
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phenomenological justification for the question of creation, Marion opens 
the door for a conversion of phenomenology, in two senses:  a conversion 
which phenomenology performs upon its practitioner, and a conversion 
which phenomenology undergoes, from Heideggerean fundamental ontology 
to Augustinian biblical exegesis; in the former case, as obviously in the latter, 
the pivotal locus for this conversion is that of creation:   
We no longer ask [as does Heidegger] if creation responds to 
the question of why for the world, but, inversely, we ask to 
ZKDWTXHVWLRQFUHDWLRQEULQJVDUHVSRQVH«,WFRXOGEHWKDW
creation brings no response other than the response itself -- 
in the sense that everything, in heaven and on earth, only 
arises in the creation precisely for this, to respond.275   
  
Marion therefore takes very seriously the fact that Augustine prays, at the 
beginning of Book XI (and not, as we might have expected, at that of Book 
XII) for understanding of how God created heaven aQGHDUWKWKH¶WDNLQJXS
DQGUHDGLQJ·RI*HQHVLVSDUDOOHOVLQWKHHFFOHVLDOVSKHUHWKDWZKLFK$XJXVWLQH
performed in the individual sphere at Cassiciacum, repeats it and expands the 
H[KRUWDWLRQRI5RPDQV¶3XWRQWKH/RUG-HVXV&KULVW·WRWKHFRVPLFVSKHre, 
WRWKHSRLQWWKDW¶WKHZKROH´RUGHUSHUIHFWO\JRRGRIJRRGWKLQJVµZKLFK
concludes the whole of the Confessions, accomplishes precisely the initial 
praise of God laudabilis valde.·276 The response which precedes, supports and 
IRUPV$XJXVWLQH·Vconfessio is exactly parallel to the goodness and the beauty 
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that all things have insofar as they appear.277  Mediating between these two 
responses is DQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶FRPPXQLWDULDQDQGOLWXUJLFDO·ZKLFKZLWKWKH
first (in support of this, Marion notes that in XI.1.1 Augustine announces 
WKDWKLVLQWHQWLRQLV¶WKDWwe PLJKWDOOVD\·WKHH[DFWconfessio which opens the 
Confessions¶*UHDWDUH\RX/RUGDQGJUHDWO\ZRUWK\RISUDLVH·OLWHUDOO\FR-
responds to the second, and allows its beauty and its goodness to shine forth 
as praise:  the communal confessio ¶DORQHSHUPLWVWKLV>VFSHUPLWVWKHFUHDWHG
order to praise God]:  the things themselves cannot be given to see 
themselves as created by God -- in other words, as given by God -- if nobody 
interprets them as such, as witnesses to the glory of God.·278  There is 
something of a return of totality here, from a different and putatively non-
PHWDSK\VLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHQDPHO\WKDWRID¶XQLYHUVDO·SUDLVHRI*RGE\
SUDLVLQJ¶WKHSOXUDOLW\RIWKLQJV·DVFUHDWHGE\*RG¶7his can only be by a 
universalized confessio of God, by all believers, in relation to all things, as 
gifts.·279   And despite his intentions to the contrary, something very like a 
Proclean theurgical ontology arises out of this universal, liturgical, 
phenomenological interpretation:   
It results that the hermeneutic of creation consists precisely in 
not defining things as beings (still less as beings subsisting in 
an uninterrogated presence) but in recognizing them as gifts 
received under the title of creation and rendered under the 
title of praise, the presence of which is only maintained in this 
exchange.  In fact, creation and praise reciprocate each other 
DQGUHQGHUHDFKRWKHUPXWXDOO\SRVVLEOH´$OOWKHVHWKLQJV
                                                          
277 Marion here is again clearly invoking a very literal understanding of X.6.9, 
Interrogatio mea intentio mea, et responsio eorum species eorum¶P\TXHVWLRQZDVP\
LQWHQWLRDQGWKHLUUHVSRQVHZDVWKHLUEHDXW\· 
278 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 322. 
279 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 323. 
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praise you [as] creator RIDOOµ,QRWKHU words, the formula 
´\RXUZRUNVSUDLVH\RXµPXVWEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDSOHRQDVP
or rather as an equivalence.280   
 
Regarding this exchange and mutual reciprocation, Marion invites an 
important qualification of his oeuvre DVDZKROH¶´&UHDWLRQµGRHVQRWDSSHDr 
in the lexicon of being, nor of Being, but in the liturgical vocabulary, as 
confessio and as praise, which moreover alone recognizes and establishes LW·281  
7KHUHLVWKHQQRZD\WRXQGHUVWDQG¶%HLQJ·LQ0DULRQ·VSHUHQQLDODOOHUJ\WR
LWH[FHSWDV¶WKDW ZKLFKLVQRWOLWXUJLFDOO\GHWHUPLQHG·DVRUWRIQDWXUH
without grace, which moreover on Augustinian grounds, as Marion will soon 
QRWHLVDQLPSRVVLELOLW\RUHYHQDQRQVHQVH¶JUDFH«HQJOREHVthe whole 
KRUL]RQ·RIFUHDWLRQ.282  The extent to which Marion and his post-God without 
Being FULWLFVKDYHWDONHGSDVWHDFKRWKHUFDQEHHDVLO\VHHQ´%HLQJµLVHPSW\
and purely formal for Marion, to the point where one wonders why he is at 
such pains to avoid it. 
All the same, most of the import of this statement is the 
FRXQWHULQWXLWLYHFODLPWKDWSUDLVH¶DORQH·UHFRJQL]HVDQGHVWDEOLVKHVFUHDWLRQ
IRUWKHILUVWWLPHWKHIXOOIRUFHRI0DULRQ·V¶QRQ-PHWDSK\LFDO·
FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIFUHDWLRQDSSHDUV¶&UHDWLRQGRHVQRWUHQGHUWKHconfessio 
possible, as the ontic place of its exercise, but it itself only becomes possible 
from the confessio, its liturgical precondition.·283  We have, in other words, 
EHHQWDNHQIDUDILHOGIURPWKH¶EUDFNHWLQJRIWKHJLYHU·RI/·(WDQWGRQQp:  
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¶7KHUHLVQRSRVVLELOLW\RIVHHLQJWKHZRUOGDVheaven and earth created by 
God, if one has not first consented to praise God as God,·284 so that if there 
is anything like a cosmology, an ontology or a phenomenology, it must come 
rather directly from, and respond to, the liturgical.285   In support of this, 
Marion considers the paradoxes of place which open Confessions ,¶,GRQRW
have another place in me than what God has made; therefore God cannot 
come into me, without my first coming into him or discovering myself 
immediately already in him:  I am not a place for God, rather I have a place 
in him.·286  +HFRQWUDSRVHVWKHFRPIRUWLQJQDWXUHRIWKH¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·RU
better univocalUHDGLQJRIFUHDWLRQDV¶DVWKHSURGXFWLRQRIDZRUOGRIEHLQJV
E\WKHH[HUFLVHRIDQHIILFLHQWFDXVDOLW\·WRWZRDSRULDVZKLFKresult from 
WKHVHSDUDGR[HVRISODFHRQHWKHRORJLFDOWKDWVLQFH*RGLV¶´HQWLUHO\
HYHU\ZKHUHZLWKRXWDQ\WKLQJFRQWDLQLQJ\RXµ«KHLVUHYHDOHGDOOWKHPRUH
DV´secretissimus et praesentissimus, at the same time the most secret and the most 
SUHVHQWµ·;287 tKHRWKHUDQWKURSRORJLFDODQGE\QRZIDPLOLDUWKDW¶«LQILQGLQJ
myself in heaven and earth which come from him and are in him, I above all 
H[SHULHQFHZKDWDGLVWDQFHVHSDUDWHVPHIURPKLP«WKHFUHDWLRQRIKHDYHQ
and earth leaves me without place for praise, because, more essentially, I do 
not know the place (ubi) of myself, allowing anything whatsoever, let alone 
                                                          
284 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 324. 
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myself, to inhabit me·288  7KLV¶XWRSLDRIWKHVHOI·VWXPEOHVXSRQWKH
theological aporia of the secretissimus et praesentissimus at every turn, each time 
WKDW¶WKDW,QRORQJHUOLVWHQWRPHEXWWRKHDYHQDQGHDUWKinsofar as created·;289 
in recognizing the quaestio of its created and thus non-self-identical quality of 
heaven and earth, and in fact by proclaiming it and precisely confessing it, 
heavenHDUWKDQGWKHVHOIHDFK¶RYHUFRPH·WKDWquaestio, in a conversion of 
place, from the utopic here to the divine there, which Marion claims is the 
SURSHUO\$XJXVWLQLDQGHILQLWLRQRISUDLVH¶$QG,VD\Where are you, my 
God?  Behold, there you are.  I catch my breath a little bit in you, when I 
stretch my soul over me in a voice of exultation and confession.·290 A place, 
ultimately the only place, is given in God, by virtue and by means of the 
confessioVXFKLVWKHUHDGLQJRI*HQHVLVWKDW0DULRQ·V$XJXVWine performs, in 
three movements:  an ontological meditation on the phrase invisibilis et 
incomposita, a gloss on caelum as caelum caeli,291 and the exercise of finding the 
Trinity in Genesis 1.1-2, or better locating genesis within the Trinity. 
The first of WKHVHWKHGLPHQVLRQRIWKHHDUWKDV¶LQYLVLEOHDQG
XQIRUPHG·GHWHUPLQHVWKHHDUWKUHIHUUHGWRLQ*HQHVLVDVnot simultaneous or 
V\QRQ\PRXVZLWKWKHHDUWKDVZHH[SHULHQFHLWDOZD\V¶VHHQDQGWRXFKHG·
through forms,292 but instead as indicative that, in MDULRQ·VZRUGV¶PRUH
originally and although the biblical text does not explicitly mention it, matter 
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has been also created, in the same stroke.·293  Here Marion claims that 
Augustine breaks with the Greek heritage, and in a welcome change, names 
QDPHV¶IURP3ODWRWR3ORWLQXV·PDWWHUKDVWKHVWDWXVRIprinciple, as a given, 
before a demiurgic creation, and thus erotically irreducible (an ambiguity on 
which the Manichaeans seized, since then matter could be the source of evil), 
ZKHUHDV$XJXVWLQH·VPRUHUDGLFal narrative of creation as taking place within 
the confessio GLVSRVHVLWIURPWKLVVWDWXV¶7KXVWKHHDUWKSUHVXSSRVHVPDWWHU
but matter itself presupposes creation.  Then matter offers no place, neither 
to the earth nor to the confessio, but it is receLYHGDVDOORWKHUWKLQJV«LWVHOIWR
be worked by the confession.·294 :KHQFH0DULRQ·VJORVVRQWKHSKUDVHde nihilo:  
since matter is itself a gift and an exercise of praise, in the creation of matter 
*RGKDV¶´PDGHVRPHWKLQJHYHQRIQRWKLQJIURPDQGwith nRWKLQJQHVVµ«
for God not only created from (ex) nothing, in order to exit from it and 
substitute for it a being (after nothing comes Being):  he has above all created 
with (de) nothingness, in order to make being with, in the guise of material, 
nothingness itself.·295  7KLVWKH¶XWRSLF·ORJLFRIQRQ-identity, imagines 
FUHDWLRQQRWDV*RG·VFRPEDWDJDLQVWWKHnihil, but his redemption thereof:  
¶*RGE\FUHDWLQJWKHFUHDWHGGRHVQRWWKHUHE\DEROLVKQRWKLQJQHVVEXW
assigns this nothingness itself to the created by assuming it as created by 
him,·296 WKXVRSHQLQJD¶VLWH·IRUWKHconfessio from the earth.  The second 
PRYHPHQWHFKRHVWKLVVLWHIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI¶WKHKHDYHQRIKHDYHQ·
                                                          
293 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 333. 
294 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 333-4. 
295 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 334, citing Augustine, Conf. XII.7.7. 
296 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 335. 
  
 
 
136 
 
the caelum intelligibile, which, although characterized by Augustine as that of 
the mens pura, is still to be distinguished from the Plotinian nous in that it 
UHPDLQVDFUHDWXUH¶WKHFRQWHPSODWLRQHYHQSXUHO\LQWHOOHFWXDORI*RG
remains marked by the distance from the created in its possibility to praise:  
thus, the confessio alone unites to God, not simple knowledge, which remains 
nothing more than a means and DPRGH·297 Marion here acknowledges that it 
is not the case that knowledge, even theoretical knowledge, has no role in the 
Confessions, provided that such knowledge does not pretend to escape its 
nature as created and temporally conditioned; similarly, Marion does not 
object to a formulation of hierarchy of capacitas between humanity and angels, 
or even amongst humanity, which might be imposed by this knowledge, so 
long as these hierarchies are flattened insofar as they all take place in the 
same place of the confessio, even if to different degrees or modes, of the 
LQWHOOLJLEOHE\LQWHOOLJHQWFUHDWXUHV7KH¶KHDYHQRIKHDYHQ·UHPDLQVFUHDWHG
and temporal, but corresponds to the extentioIUHHGIURP¶GLVWUDFWHG·
temporality not by an atemporal knowledge (lest Augustine be viewed as a 
Gnostic) or an atemporal immateriality (lest he be viewed as never quite 
escaping his Manichaeism) but by love, the adherence to God which can 
ILQDOO\XQGHUZULWH¶DVE\H[FHVV·DQDGKHUHQFHWRWKHVHOI;298 the creation of 
the self that takes place within the confessio is, if one likes, a return to paradise, 
UDWKHUWKDQDQHVFDSHWRHWHUQLW\7KHWKLUGDQGILQDOPRYHPHQWRI0DULRQ·V
commentary on the Augustinian Genesis does not, as the first two, take its 
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cue from a single word or phrase of Genesis 1, but from the tripartite 
WHPSRUDOVWUXFWXULQJRIWKHERRNVZKLFKGLVFXVVLW%RRN;,DVWKH¶SUHVHQW
RIWKLQJVSDVW·LQmemoria, Book XII as the ¶LQDXJXUDOnow of the creation of 
KHDYHQDQGHDUWK·DQG%RRN;,,,DVWKH¶HVFKDWRORJLFDOexpectatio «RIWKH
orLJLQZDWFKLQJRYHURXUIXWXUH·299  0DULRQSRLQWVRXWWKHREYLRXV¶,QIDFW
these places prove to be, in the last instance, Trinitarian:  it only becomes 
possible to praise God as God if God gives the time and the place for it.  
And where DUHWKHVHIRXQGHOVHZKHUHWKDQLQ*RGKLPVHOI"· 
 7KRXJKKHLQWHQGVWKLVDV¶XQLYHUVDOUXOH·DSSOLFDEOHWRWKHZKROH
created order, Marion extrapolates somewhat outside of the boundaries of 
the Confessions LQRUGHUWRH[SOLFDWHWKH¶RSHQLQJRIWKHconfessio·IXUWKHUZLWK
SDUWLFXODUUHIHUHQFHWRKXPDQLW\PDGH¶WRWKHLPDJHDQGOLNHQHVVRI*RG·
The importance of this phrase in establishing humanity as paradigmatic of 
creation resides precisely in its difference from the rest of creation, made 
secundum suam similitudinem, according to its own likeness:  Genesis 1.26 claims 
WKDWKXPDQLW\LVQRWRQO\PDGHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHOLNHQHVVRI¶DQRWKHU·EXWRI
¶DQRWKHURI DPD[LPDODOWHULW\·QDPHO\*RGVRWKDWKXPDQLW\ZLWKLWV
sharpest degree of difference to itself, testifies most sharply to God.  It is 
WKXVWKHFDVHWKDW¶KXPDQLW\LVGHILQHGE\WKLVYHU\WKLQJZKLch remains 
without definition.·300  There is more:  the importance of the word imaginem in 
this formulation is not lost on Marion, the theorizer of the idol and the icon.  
Much to his credit, Marion allows the breadth of the Augustinian doctrine of 
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imago to revise his earlier and far too disjunctive account, according to which 
the defining effectivity of the icon is limited to its eyes; all of humanity, and 
not just its capacity for gazing and for eye-contact, points its intentionality 
toward something transcendent, however ill-defined that something might 
remaiQ+XPDQLW\LV¶WRWKHLPDJHRI*RG·ZKRP¶QRQDPHQRLPDJHDQG
no concHSWFDQSUHWHQGWRFRPSUHKHQG·301 and thus is imaged precisely by 
the lack of (exhaustive) imaging.  Here enters the familiar language of the 
gaze, or more precisely of motion (ad) traversing humanity as image or icon:  
WKHLPDJH¶RQO\DSSHDUVDVWKLVPRYHPHQWtowards, and only this intentio ad 
NHHSVDUHVHPEODQFHIRULW·302  Thus emerges something like an 
anthropological and existential YLDQHJDWLYD¶humanity carries the image of 
God in the same measure in which it leaves its resemblance to itself (ad suum 
genus, ad suam similitudinemDQGLVULVNHGWRUHVHPEOHQRWKLQJ«E\UHVHPEOLQJ
no image, especially not a pretended imago of God, but by carrying the 
resemblance of the style of God.·303  Though this intriguing suggestion is left 
LQFKRDWHVRPHWKLQJRILWVORJLFDSSHDUVLQ0DULRQ·VTXLWHFRUUHFWLQVLVWHQFH
that the various images of the Trinity entertained in De trinitate IX-XI ² 
foremost among them the triad of memory, intellect and will ² ¶GRQRWRIIHU
[an image of the Trinity] in themselves as their stable content, but only in the 
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measure which they refer this content to God himself,·304 that is, not as a 
brute imposition of the categories of human capacitas onto the persons of the 
Trinity, but exactly as the reception of these capacities via participation in, 
and their attentive and desiring return to, the Trinity.  Thus surfaces the 
¶LQGHILQLWLRQ·RIKXPDQLW\LWVDSRSKDWLFUHIXVDOWRVXEPLWWRWKH
comprehension of formal categories, wheWKHUWKRVHDUHRI¶WKHUDWLRQDO
animal, the ego cogitans, the transcendental I, the absolute self-consciousness, 
WKH´DQLPDOHYDOXDWLQJLQLWVHOIµ1LHW]VFKHQRUHYHQDVWKH´OLHXWHQDQWRI
1RWKLQJµVWLOOOHVVDVWKH´VKHSKHUGRI%HLQJµ+HLGHJJHU.·305   But no 
VRRQHUGRHVWKLV¶LQGHILQLWLRQ·HPHUJHDVDquaestio and a dis-placement than it 
is its own theological solution, witnessing to its place in the similarly 
LQGHILQLWH*RGZKLFKPRWLYDWHVWKHIRUPXODWLRQSHUKDSV$XJXVWLQH·V
most famous, of humanity as inquietum¶UHVWOHVV·RUDV0DULRQUHQGHUVLW¶LQD
GLVHTXLOLEULXP·ZKLFKFKDUDFWHUL]HVLWDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQ-characterizable, 
H[DFWO\EHFDXVHKXPDQLW\LVPDGH¶WR·*RGfecisti nos ad te.306 This raises a 
fundamental question to the Heideggerean account, which Marion hesitates 
to answer:  does this inquietum itself rest as an answer, albeit an apophatic 
answer, within time and with no reference to eternal praise, or is it, on quite 
the other hand, entirely and inexhaustibly an ontological question? 
 $VLVZHOONQRZQ$XJXVWLQH·Vinquietum cor is neither individual nor 
LQWHUPLQDEOHWKLVRSHQLQJSDUDJUDSKVSHDNVRI¶RXU·KHDUWDVEHLQJLQ
GLVHTXLOLEULXP¶XQWLO·LWUHVWVRUUHDFKHVHTXLOLEULXP¶LQ\RX·6RWRR
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0DULRQ·VGHVFULSWLRQLQLWVYHU\DSRShaticism, points to a sort of definition 
found in the rest of God on the seventh day.  Importantly he connects this 
UHVWZKLFKLVLUUHGXFLEO\WKHRORJLFDOEHFDXVH¶RQO\*RGJLYHVUHVWEHFDXVH
only God has it, and only God KDVLWEHFDXVHRQO\*RGLVLW·307) with 
$XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQWRIPRWLRQDVZHLJKWVWHQGLQJWRWKHLUSURSHUSODFHKH
notes that this depends on a strictly physical understanding, comparable to 
$ULVWRWOH·VRIWKHORFDOPRYHPHQWRIHOHPHQWVOLQNHGXSZLWKWKHSK\VLFDO
claim of Wisdom 11.21¶<RXKDYHRUGHUHGDOOWKLQJVLQPHDVXUHQXPEHUDQG
ZHLJKW·1RQHWKHOHVVDQGFUXFLDOO\$XJXVWLQHPDNHVDVKLIWWRWKLVDFFRXQW
on which he relies, by asserting (and again, the fame of this passage tends to 
REVFXUHLWVVLJQLILFDQFH¶0\ZHLJKWLVP\love:  wherever I am carried, it is 
my love that carries me.·308 It is love, for Augustine as for Marion, that 
explains and governs both creation and eschatology, running the motion of 
the unquiet manifestation of phenomena and their eventual return to resting 
in their proper place in God ² for Augustine, weight need not be a 
gravitational pull downward; indeed, as Marion notes, it is originally and 
paradigmatically a force of ascent.309 For this reason, it is difficult to avoid 
UHIHUULQJWR¶P\ZHLJKWLVP\ORYH·DVDYHU\VWULFWO\PHWD-physical 
determination, indeed as the root and end of any claim of any metaphysics 
worth the name ² and thus we are bound by charity in the end to interpret 
0DULRQ·VKDELWXDOUHMHFWLRQRI¶PHWDSK\VLFV·WRUHMHFWRQO\DQ\WKLQJWKat is not 
love.  
                                                          
307 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 354. 
308 Augustine, Conf. XIII.8.9. 
309 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 364. 
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0DULRQ·VILQDOHPSKDVLVRQORYHLVQRWQHDUO\DVFRQWUDU\WRWKH
analogia entis as he believes; this disjunct is more polemical than 
substantial 
 For this reason, forsaking the hardly initiated attention to Genesis, 
Marion turns to an elucidation of Augustine on love, in the last and longest 
section of Au Lieu De SoiSURYRFDWLYHO\WLWOHG´7KH8QLYRFLW\RI/RYHµ
This could be understood in two very different ways:  the denial of (absolute) 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ*RG·VORYHIRUFUHDWLRQDQGFUHDWLRQ·VORYHIRU*RGRU
the denial of (absolute) difference between different modes of created love.  
At the end of The Erotic Phenomenon, Marion characteristically allows his 
meaning to remain paradoxical, ignoring the latter of these understandings of 
XQLYRFLW\DQGKRYHULQJEHWZHHQDIILUPLQJDQGGHQ\LQJWKHIRUPHU¶*RG
loves in the same way as we do.  Except for an infinite difference.  When 
God loves (and indeed he never ceases to love), he simply loves infinitely 
EHWWHUWKDQGRZH«+HORYHs like no one else.·310  In its simple structure of 
DVVHUWLRQDQGWKHQGHQLDOWKLVLVQRWDYHU\VDWLVI\LQJDFFRXQWRI¶XQLYRFLW\·
nor is it entirely clear, in its allegedly pure phenomenological description, 
why anybody would be interested in developing or defending such an 
account.  Here, however, at the end of Au Lieu De Soi, Marion intends to 
accomplish at once an Augustinian basis for the former meaning, and a 
clarification of the latter:  in both cases it emerges that Marion is interested in 
                                                          
310 Marion, Erotic Phenomenon, 222. 
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GHIHQGLQJKLV¶XQLYRFLW\·DJDLQVWDQ¶HTXLYRFLW\·RIORYHZLWKRXWHQJDJLQJWKH
YRFDEXODU\RI¶DQDORJ\·ZKLFKLQDQ\FDVHVHHPVDPRUHDFFXUDWHQDPHIRUKLV
GHVFULSWLRQ,QWKHILUVWFDVHZKDW0DULRQPHDQVE\WKH¶XQLYRFLW\RIORYH·
comes to light as a facticity, indeed the most radical facticity in the 
$XJXVWLQLDQDQWKURSRORJ\ORYHLV¶WKHXOWLPDWHFRQGLWLRQRISRVVLELOLW\IRU
WKHVHOI·VXFKWKDWLQPRUHIDPLOLDUO\$XJXVWLQLDQWHUPV¶´>W@KHUHLVQRERG\
who does not love.  ...  We are not asked to love, but to choose what we 
love.µ·311  The (theological) relationship between this facticity and its 
founding love (divine love as the creation, the facere in fecisti nos ad te, which 
XQGHUZULWHVLWLVLPSOLHGFOHDUO\HQRXJKEXWUHPDLQVLPSOLFLW0DULRQ·V
primary interest iVLQWKHVHFRQGFDVHWKDWRIHVWDEOLVKLQJD¶XQLYRFLW\·RI
human loves (of God, neighbor, self and things) which nevertheless enfolds 
WKHVHORYHVDVGLVWLQFWPRGHV2QWKHILUVWSRLQW0DULRQ·VWDUJHWLVQRWIRU
example) Aquinas or other theoreticians of analogical love, but the once 
influential account of Anders Nygren, the equivocal argument of whose Eros 
and Agape312 is skillfully dismantled on textual grounds.313  In this dismantling 
Marion points to several places in the Augustinian corpus where Augustine 
not only in practice, but even in theory, equates dilectio and caritas, and both of 
these with amor, which is also capable (at times) of referring to cupiditas or 
                                                          
311 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 366-7, citing Augustine, Sermo 34.1. 
312 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982. 
313 It is surprising that, from the vast literature on Augustine and love, Marion 
restricts his focus to Nygren and a brief mention of Arendt, paying no heed to even 
%XUQDE\·VVHPLQDOAmor Dei.   
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even concupiscentia:314 though it is more difficult than Marion supposes to 
generalize about $XJXVWLQH·VXVDJHRIGLIIHUHQWZRUGVIRUamor, he is right to 
FDOOWKLV¶XQLYRFDO·DQGHYHQ¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDO·LQVRIDUDVDWYDULRXVSRLQWV
Augustine (or indeed the Vulgate) uses them all in similar ways.  The 
distinctions which can arise from this initial XQLYRFLW\WKH¶PRGHVLQWULJXHV
DQGZLOOV·E\ZKLFKORYHHYHQWXDOO\FDQDQGPXVWEHGHFOLQHGDUHLQIDFWDOO
theological, such that any love, even illicit, ill-executed or poorly placed, is 
rendered possible by love of God alone.315  Two results follow:  one, illicit 
loves are defined exclusively as the attempt to love something created and 
FRQWLQJHQWDVWKRXJKLWZHUH*RGDQGWZRUHFLSURFDOO\¶WRHQMR\*RG-- in 
fact, the only possible enjoyment -- renders in the same stroke possible, by 
extension and in reference to him (propter Deum) to enjoy all the rest, since 
this rest constitutes precisely a gift of God.  Whence the possibility and even 
the promise that, if I only enjoy God for himself, all the rest will become 
lovable, no longer by cupiditas, but well and truly by caritas.·316  Love of 
creation and love of the Creator are not univocal in the sense that either 
could logically or chronologically precede the other, even substitute for the 
other, but only in the radical sense that, in the light of the latter, even the 
former is transfigured into, eventually, love of God. 317  The distinction 
                                                          
314 See above all De civitate dei 14.7, where Augustine cites multiple biblical texts as 
justification for this assimilation. 
315 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 374. 
316 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 372. 
317 Marion ignores the famous, and the more obviously analogical, account 
determined by the distinction between use and enjoyment in the first book of De 
doctrina christiana:  if he had taken it into account, this would have balanced (but 
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EHWZHHQ0DULRQ·VDFFRXQWKHUHDQGWKDWRID7KRPLVWDQDORJLFDOFRQFHSWLRQ
of love is in the end only one of emphasis:  both of them rely on and 
authorize a development of an ordo amoris, where the love of a thing is parallel 
to and relies on the love of the self, which is parallel to and relies on the love 
of the neighbor, which is parallel to and relies on the love of God, but in 
0DULRQ·VDFFRXQWWKHHPSKDVLVOLHVRQWhe similarity between these loves, 
since they are all in the end not merely parallel (though they might certainly 
also be parallel), but in a rich and deep sense identical, while the more 
WUDGLWLRQDODQDORJLFDOYLHZZRXOGHPSKDVL]HWKH¶LQILQLWHGLIIHUHQFH·² but one 
merely of degree ² between them.  In both cases, enjoyment of a thing can 
only be in Deo and propter Deum, and can thus only be truly enjoyment if it is 
¶FRQYHUWHG·IURPcupiditas to caritas or dilectio, these now being understood not 
as univocal by their recognizable exercise, still less (as for Nygren) by their 
REMHFWEXWLQWKHHQGRQO\LQHIIDEO\E\WKHLUVW\OH¶,WLVQHYHUDPDWWHURI
not loving, nor of loving anything but God, but of knowing to love all 
according to the appropriate mode, God and the gifts of God.·318  Here 
enters, subtly, as through the back door, a form of knowledge (or at least 
prudentia):  to discern between the gifts of God and God himself is no doubt 
beyond any pretended neutral practice of reason, but comes to light here as a 
higher and more spiritual practice.  This reasoning introduces the principle 
KHUHFDOOHG¶SDUDGR[LFDO·RILQGLUHFWORYH¶LQRUGHUWRUHDFKORYLQJWKHVHOI
it is better to love him by whom one lives, than to directly love the self, by 
                                                                                                                                                
certainly not contradicted fundamentally) the account which appears in Au Lieu De 
Soi. 
318 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 374. 
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whom onHNQRZVWKDWRQHFDQQRWOLYH·;319 in other words, loving the self (or 
the neighbor, or indeed any created thing, even the totality of the heaven and 
the earth) must pass through the love of the most distant and most present 
intermediary, God.  But even this paradox cannot dispute an equivocity of 
ORYHDVZHOODV$XJXVWLQH·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI-RKQ-18, in which Christ 
interrogates St. Peter about his loves:  in the end, instead of asking, as he had 
done twice before, diliges me?, he asks, amas me?  From this, Augustine 
FRQFOXGHV´«WKH6FULSWXUHVRIRXUUHOLJLRQGRQRWVD\WKDWamor is one thing, 
dilectio or caritas another.µ320 Not content to rest here, Marion points out 
beyond Augustine that this account challenges and even overturns habitual 
conceptions oIGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQORYHVDVNLQJ¶0XVWRQHQRWHYHQ
conclude that, when it is a matter of definitively committing to Christ and 
assuming the mission of the shepherd of his Church, amare fits better than 
diligere, contrarily to the current usage, which accords to dilectio a gratuity and 
disinterest which one refuses to amor"·321  ,IWKHUHH[LVWVD¶XQLYRFLW\RIORYH·
it emerges here in its highest and finest form precisely as reciprocality, 
exchange, and precisely not disinterested gratuity:  such is the lesson not only 
RI&KULVW·VZRUGVEXWHYHQKLVSDWWHUQRIFKRRVLQJWKRVHZRUGVLQILQDOO\
FRQGHVFHQGLQJWR6W3HWHU·VKDELWXDOXVDJHRIamare.  The biblical and 
Augustinian re-examination of love leaves not even such a familiar concept 
DV¶XQLYRFLW\·Ln its domesticated place. 
                                                          
319 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 375. 
320 Augustine, De civ. Dei 14.7. 
321 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 378-9. 
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In the very last pages322 of Au Lieu De Soi Marion makes the degree to 
which he intends this exegesis of Augustine to function as a critique of the 
SKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWLRQ·VDVVXPSWLRQRI¶WKHVXEMHFW· 
The ego thus is not itself itself: neither by the apprehension 
of the self in the knowledge of the self (Descartes, at least 
according to the common interpretation) nor by a 
performative (Descartes in a less common interpretation) nor 
by apperception (Kant) nor even by auto-affectation (Henry) 
or anticipatory decision (Heidegger).  The ego does not even 
accede to itself for another (Levinas) or as another (Ricoeur) ² 
but it only becomes itself by another.  In other words, as a 
gift, for all comes, without any exception, by and as a giIW«323 
 
$VDGHVWDELOL]LQJJLIWWKHGRXEOHPHDQLQJRIWKH¶SODFHRIWKHVHOI·ZKLFK
UHQGHUVWKHWLWOHRIWKLVZRUNKDUGWRWUDQVODWHERWK¶,QOLHXRIWKHVHOI·
SURFODLPLQJWKHGLVSODFHPHQWRIWKHVHOIDVWKHVXEMHFWRI0DULRQ·V
LQYHVWLJDWLRQDQG¶,QWKHSODFHRIWKHVHOI·DVVHUWLQJDQHZO\ILJXUHGDQG
literally re-SODFHGVHOIILQDOO\HPHUJHVDVSDUDOOHOWRWKHGRXEOHFRQYHUVLRQ¶RI·
(in its subjective and objective genitives) phenomenology.   After this 
¶FRQYHUVLRQ·SKHQRPHQRORJ\PXVWEHLWVHOIDQG\HW not itself ² retaining all 
its previous characteristics, but somehow trans-figured.  In Au Lieu De Soi we 
are only seeing the first fruits of the new phenomenological engagement with 
love, or with imagination, or with politics:  these have all been treated, or at 
least hinted at, in intriguing manner, but insufficiently.  This intriguing 
insufficiency is perhaps to be expected, given that these things are 
                                                          
322 With the exception of the provocative but for my purposes irrelevant appendix, 
in which Marion argues philologically and convincingly against the translation of the 
divine name (or more accurately, the divinely simple intensive pronoun) ¶,GLSVXP·DV
¶KLPVHOI·7KLVDSSHQGL[LV\HWDQRWKHUFODULILFDWLRQRI0DULRQ·VVWDQFHRQ$TXLQDV
and an important further point of conversation between Marion and those critics of 
Marion who still bristle at the most central concepts of 'LHXVDQV/·ÈWUH. 
323 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 383-4. 
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LQH[KDXVWLEOHQHYHUWKHOHVVZLWKRXWTXHVWLRQ0DULRQ·VUHIXVDOWRHQJDJHZLWK
Augustine on ontological grounds, seen at once in his antipathy for ancient 
thought and his seeming ignorance of the very concept of analogical being, 
shuts this door to him further than it needed to be shut.  In the next chapter, 
I will entertain the work of Chrétien, whose ad hoc and essayistic forays into 
$XJXVWLQH·VSURWR-phenomenology are not nearly as eccentrically and 
narcissistically tied to his own system, hoping to reflect and clarify the 
insights that Au Lieu De Soi has begun to invite. 
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IV. Chrétien and Augustine 
 
Abstract 
As we have seen, Jean-/XF0DULRQ·VUHFHQW¶DSSURDFK·WR6W
Augustine, while certainly possessing much by way of charm and of value, is 
ultimately not convincing as a theological appropriation, still less as an 
historical evaluation.  This is due to at least two reasons:  on the one hand, 
Marion is committed to a decisive philosophical and historical break between 
Platonism and Christian or biblical theology, and on the other hand, his 
phenomenological burden is in the last instance to describe, critique and 
refine a concept (or non-concept) of the self, to the exclusion of the 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQUHMHFWHGDV¶PHWDSK\VLFDO·RIH[LVWHQFHDFWXDOLW\DQG
transcendence.  This commitment and this burden are jointly manifest in Au 
Lieu De Soi, and in spite his strident and subtle readings, neither the 
Augustine of the Confessions nor the broader Augustinian corpus can support 
them.324  ,QFRQWUDVW0DULRQ·VIULHQGDQGFROOHDJXH-HDQ-Louis Chrétien has, 
over the course of his entire career, reflected on and argued alongside 
Augustine in a less dogmatically anti-metaphysical manner.  In so doing, 
Chrétien has allowed the fertile interchange of the Platonic tradition and 
ULJRURXVDWWHQWLRQWR6FULSWXUHZKLFKGHILQHV$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWWREHWLOOHG
and cultivated.  It is the burden of this chapter to make known some of the 
                                                          
324 Further, if Joeri Schrivjers is to be believed they do not get us very far 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOO\HLWKHU6HHKLV´,QWKH3ODFHRIWKH6HOI$&ULWLFDO6WXG\RI
Jean-/XF0DULRQ·V¶Au Lieu De Soi/·$SSURFKHGH6DLQW$XJXVWLQµ0RGHUQ
Theology 25:4, October 2009, 661-686. 
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fruits of these cultivations, with special but not exclusive reference to his 
explicit interaction with Augustine, and to allow them to ripen further.  Most 
RIWKHFKDSWHU·VDUJXPHQWZLOOKHHG&KUpWLHQ·s 2002 monograph on 
Augustine, as yet ignored in the Anglophone world, Saint Augustin et les actes de 
parole,325 EXWEHIRUHDSSURDFKLQJWKLVLQWULJXLQJZRUN,·OOH[DPLQHDIHZ
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHHVVD\VIURPHDUOLHUZRUNVZKLFKHQJDJH$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW
This H[DPLQDWLRQZLOOGLVSOD\WKHEUHDGWKRI&KUpWLHQ·VNQRZOHGJHDERXWDQG
interest in Augustine, both as a theologian and as a precursor (if not outright 
SUDFWLWLRQHURISKHQRPHQRORJ\,KRSHWKHUHLQWRSURYHWKDW&KUpWLHQ·VOHVV
polemical commitment to the phenomenological tradition in fact yields a 
more profitable engagement with Augustine, even when viewed from 
SKHQRPHQRORJ\·VRZQJRDOVDQGVWDQGDUGVEURDGO\FRQVWUXHG0DQ\RIWKH
themes which Marion (and for that matter Heidegger) considers with respect 
to the Confessions (time, the self and the world, language) have the definite 
VWDPSRI&KUpWLHQ·VHDUOLHUHQJDJHPHQWVWKXVP\SUHVHQWDWLRQRI&KUpWLHQ·V
oeuvre, insofar as these themes are inarguably central to the 
phenomenological tradition, will have HHLGHJJHU·VDQG0DULRQ·VWUHDWPHQWV
in view.  But such will be for the most part the case only obliquely, implicitly 
and partially, as I will attempt to let Chrétien speak for himself, much like 
Chrétien himself allows Augustine to speak for himself.  Methodologically 
speaking, then, this chapter will take a tone more driven by argument, in 
RUGHUWRSURYLGHDQDUFKLWHFWXUHLQZKLFK&KUpWLHQ·VPRUHPHGLWDWLYH
approach can shine forth in all its rigor.  In so doing, I hope to provide a 
                                                          
325 Jean-Louis Chrétien, Saint Augustin et les actes de parole.  Paris: PUF, 2002. 
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SRUWUDLWRI&KUpWLHQ·V$ugustine as, in a complex relationship of roles, 
Platonic philosopher, biblical exegete, and proto-phenomenologist, tracing 
WKHVHUROHVLQWKHWUDMHFWRU\RI&KUpWLHQ·VZRUNRYHUWKHODVWWZHQW\-five years, 
as this appears in three representative monographs:  /·LQRXEOLDEOHHWO·,QHVSpUp,326 
/¶$SSHOHWOD5pSRQVH,327 and Saint Augustin et les Actes de Parole,328 with a 
concomitant attention to how these roles shift when applied to the loosely 
similar themes of the latter three works.  
 
Chrétien insists that epistemology, when viewed from his central 
theme of excess, has an ontological dimension; this shows the fruit of 
a serious engagement with Greek philosophy 
The primary burden of The Unforgettable and the Unhoped for is to take 
up, in a new key, but one which draws deeply from the Platonic tradition, a 
Levinasian critique of Husserl on time and forgetting.  In this portion of the 
essay, I will pay close attention to the terms of the discussion which Chrétien 
sets up in the first chapter of the work, as the double context (both Platonic 
and phenomenological) for an examination of how Augustine figures in 
&KUpWLHQ·VDFFRXQWRIWLPHIRUJHWWLQJDQGWKHPHPRU\ZKLFKSUHFHGHVWKH
self, dislocating any idealist entitlement predicated on the self-sufficient 
                                                          
326   Paris:  Desclée de Brouwer, 2000, translated by Jeffrey Bloechl as The 
Unforgettable and The Unhoped For (New York:  Fordham University Press, 2002).  
References are to the translation. 
327   Paris: Eds. De Minuit, 1992, translated by Anne A. Davenport as The Call and the 
Response (New York:  Fordham University Press, 2004).  References are to the 
translation. 
328   My translation of this work is forthcoming as St Augustine and the Acts of Speech, 
SCM Press, 2014; the page numbers from all citations of this work will refer to the 
French text. 
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presence of the self to itself.  He begins this account by giving a brief reading 
of the Meno3ODWR·VVXVWDLQHGDFFRXQWRINQRZOHGJHDQGPHPRU\DQGWKDW
which has born the brunt of commentary with regard to the Augustinian 
account of these).  In a refreshing change from any glib treatments of the 
¶0HQRSUREOHPDWLF·&KUpWLHQVKRZVE\PHDQVRIDFORVHDQGFDUHIXOUHDGLQJ
of the Meno, that this short dialogue is too rich to be summarized by the 
simple claim (which, if it matters, Socrates himself rejects as intellectually 
lazy) that one cannot seek something without knowing what it is one seeks, 
and thus in some sense possessing it already.  In the preface to the work, 
Chrétien reverses the negative determination of forgetting that such a 
summarization of the Meno presuSSRVHVVKRZLQJWKDWD´ILUVWIRUJHWWLQJµLV
the nucleus of the Platonic teachings on anamnesisZKLFK´RSHQVDSURSHUO\
KXPDQWHPSRUDOLW\ZKLFKLVWKDWRIWKHVHDUFKIRUWKHWUXWKDQGIRURQHVHOIµ
a destitute temporality which alone permits us to recognize that we are not 
RXURZQRULJLQVXFKWKDWZHFDQ´WUXO\EHFRPHRXUVHOYHVµE\UHFRJQL]LQJ
this constitutive difference.329  If, he shows, forgetting is a privative loss, 
ontologically and logically dependent on memory or knowledge, such as is 
taught by Leibniz or Hegel, then memory is a tool of reason, or more 
accurately, of an a priori self-consciousness.  If, on the other hand, and in 
keeping with the Christian theological and mystical tradition of creatio ex 
nihiloIRUJHWWLQJRFFXUVLQD´IODVKRIGLYLne Nothingness -- the pure 
LOOXPLQDWLRQRIWKHDE\VVRIDOOEHLQJVDQGWKHDEVROXWHRULJLQµWKHQWKH
                                                          
329   Chrétien, Unforgettable, xix-xx. In a manner crucial to setting Chrétien off from 
the earlier Marion, Heidegger is given credit not for inventing but only for reprising 
the initially Platonic project of a positive thought of forgetting (32). 
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KRUL]RQRIKXPDQH[LVWHQFHHPHUJHVDVDSDVWZKLFK´HVVHQWLDOO\µZLWKGUDZV
from all future memory.330  In evoking Plato against Leibniz, Chrétien 
critiques WKHODWWHU·VDWWHPSWWRGHP\WKRORJL]HDQDPQHVLVZKLOHKHDQG
various neo-Kantian readers of Plato whom Chrétien reads attentively) would 
find in the mythical pre-human being of the soul by which Plato expresses 
his doctrine a meaningless shell for, or a distraction from, a rational kernel 
expressing an a priori self-consciousness, Chrétien insists that so to suppress 
WKHP\WKLFDOLVWR´ORVHZKDWLVPRVWSUHFLRXVLQ3ODWRµ-- namely, the 
rigorous thought of the past, of forgetting, of loss itself, which Chrétien is 
HDJHUWRHODERUDWHDQGHPSKDVL]HDVRQHRI3ODWR·VFRUHFRQFHSWVDQGDVWKH
VFHQHRQWRZKLFKKLVRWKHUGRFWULQHVPD\HPHUJH$WVWDNHLQ&KUpWLHQ·V
GHIHQVHRIP\WKLQJHQHUDOZKLFK´VKDWWHUVWKHIDOVHHYLGHQFHVSUHYDLOLQJ
RYHUWKHVHOIµDQd of this particular myth, is the question:  is there room in 
SKLORVRSK\IRUWLPHRUIRUWKH´XQUHSUHVHQWDEOHLPPHPRULDOµ"331  Put 
another way, if there is a knowledge (or theoria) which is prior in me even to 
P\EHLQJKXPDQGXHWRP\´KDYLQJVHHQWUXHEHLQJµLQDSUH-human soul, 
can either philosophy or my self afford to forget that I have initially and 
originally forgotten this knowledge?  And could it be that it is not Platonic 
recollection, even in its mythical trappings, but a thoroughly modern and 
anti-3ODWRQLVWFKHDS´PHPRU\µRIRXUVHOYHVDQGZKDWZHEHOLHYHRXUVHOYHV
to have learned, which prevents us from practicing a true relation to wisdom?  
$IWHUDOODV&KUpWLHQLVKDSS\WRUHPLQGXV3ODWR·V0HQRIRQGRIUHFLWLQJ
                                                          
330 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 1-2. 
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WKH´GRFWULQHVDQGFLWDWLRQVµ he has learnt from the sophists, learns nothing 
from his encounter with Socrates (himself a paragon of forgetfulness and 
absent-mindedness), while the young servant in the same dialogue, 
unencumbered with such self-deception and unashamed of his ignorance, 
learns (or recollects) the rules which govern the proportions of square 
QXPEHUV5HFROOHFWLRQWKXVEHJLQVZLWKDYRZHGLJQRUDQFHDQGWKXV´WKH
GHVLUHIRUNQRZOHGJHDQGWKHWHQVLRQRIWKHVHDUFKIRULWµZKLFKtherefore 
opens onto the future.332 
 From this oft-discussed, but under-read, episode, Chrétien 
generalizes:   
The other past, the absolute past, will remain forever an 
absolute past; it will not be recaptured or rediscovered, or re-
presented, rendered present again.  It does not come back as 
what may be repeated or reproduced.  However, it does come 
back to us from the future:  what in the past made us comes 
back to us, it befalls to us, in and as the task of being.333 
 
He illuminates this with a contrast between empirical, ontic forgetting, and 
this originary, ontological forgetting -- the first attempts to overcome 
forgetting by way of remembering what we have forgotten, and thus to 
recollect our pre-natal self, while the second only seeks to recollect that we 
have forgotten, and to seek by (and only by) our very existence to live 
towards truth, being and thus (from a human perspective) towards the future. 
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333 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 14. 
  
 
 
154 
 
 ,QDQLPSOLFLWUHFROOHFWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VWURXEOHVUHFDOOLQJKLVRZQ
childhood,334 &KUpWLHQVD\V´1RUHELUWKUHSHDWVELUWK0\RZQLPPHPRULDO
remains forever forgotten and lost.µ335  But the baptismal language here bears 
emphasizing.  It reminds us that, for Augustine, I simply do not care to 
remember my birth; the literary trajectory of the Confessions is also heavy with 
the phenomenological theme that my infancy is banal in comparison to my 
rebirth, and in comparison with that which gives me both birth and rebirth.  
Representation and this crude order of knowledge is static and self-sufficient 
-- WKH3ODWRQLFUHFROOHFWLRQRIWKHDEVROXWHSDVWZKLFK´escapes every 
UHSHWLWLRQDQGHYHU\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQµLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DZLOGDQGWHQVLYH
´H[FHVVµZKLFK´IRXQGVPHVHQGVPHDQGGHVWLQHVPHDQGLVNQRZQWRPH
only obliquely, in the excess of being.µ336  Chrétien intends this language of 
being to be understood both in the quotidian sense, as the mere and brute 
fact of existing, and in the entire philosophical context of the Platonic ousia 
(which he reminds us is the explicit initium RI3ODWR·VODVWH[SORUDWLRQRI
anamnesis or of time, in the Phaedo) -- both of these he combines in the 
3KDHGUXV· ´HURWLFUHFROOHFWLRQµZKHUHDVRXOUHFRJQL]HVLWVHOIQRWLQWKHIDFH
of a romantic fated lover, but in a communal and nearly choral 
´UHGLVFRYHULQJDQGUHFROOHFWLQJWKHEHDXWLIXOµZKLFKLVH[WHUQDOWRERWK
lovers, as one encounters the illumined only in encountering, however 
obliquely, and even without expressing mentioning or even recognizing it, 
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light.337  But lest this foray into love and the erotic strike the strict 
philosopher as rhapsodic, Chrétien reminds him WKDW3ODWRPXFKWR.DQW·V
judgmental chagrin) shares a precisely parallel admiration (thauma) in the 
UHDOPRIJHRPHWU\´DQRYHUDEXQGDQFHDQH[FHVVRIPHDQLQJLQWKH
properties of representations; the encounter, in what is necessary, with an 
unexpected meaning and fecundity that seem rather to have expected us, to 
have been in expectation of RXUWKRXJKWµ ZKLFK3ODWRDVVLJQVWR´RXU
intellectual affinity with the origin of all beings.µ338  Chrétien takes Plato 
seriously:  this destabilizing thauma does not deny some stability, or the 
existence of an immutable nature, nor indeed the human quest (call it 
metaphysical) to relate to the immutable in some way, but in fact predicates 
WKHHQWLUHKXPDQ´YRFDWLRQµXSRQWKLVLPPXWDEOHQDWXUHDQGWUXWK 
I am always already in the truth, which is itself always and 
IRUHYHU%XWIRUKXPDQEHLQJVWKLV¶DOZD\VDOUHDG\·LVWKDWRI
forgetting:  the immemorial consecrates it to the future, it 
comes from the future itself, though without ceasing to be 
immemorial and without us being able to return to the origin 
of our being or coincide with it.339 
 
In this affirmation, however qualified, of a transcendental and 
explicitly metaphysical adumbration of the self, the expression of consecration 
is significant, resurrecting the Augustinian language of excess and fertility as 
blessing and spiritual goodness.340 ,QRWKHUZRUGVZLWKUHODWLRQWR+HLGHJJHU·V
                                                          
337 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 17. 
338   Chrétien, Unforgettable, 19, citing Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, p.363 -- translated in 
English as The Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
339 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 19. 
340 Cf. Augustine, Conf. XIII.12.27. 
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assertion that anamnesis is the proper name for the ontological difference,341 
Chrétien relegates all human life and inquiry to this acknowledgement of 
ZKDWZHFRXOGLQDPRUHWKHRORJLFDOUHJLVWHUWHUP´FUHDWLRQµKH
VXPPDUL]HVZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR3ODWR·VFRUSXVWKDW´WREHDVHOIDPRXQWVWR
QRWEHLQJDEOHWRFRLQFLGHZLWKRQH·VRZQRULJLQµ342  
 %HIRUH&KUpWLHQ·VDUJXPHQWPRYHVIXUWKHULQ the Platonic tradition to 
an analysis of Plotinus, for whom recollection is properly mythical, according 
to his counterintuitive (at least to a post-Freudian age) definition of myth as 
an analytic, and thus temporally dividing and temporally distinguishing, rather 
than a synthetic overarching and a-temporalizing power, it retains and 
LQWHQVLILHVLWVGHIHQVLYHO\SKLORVRSKLFDOSURYHQDQFH´:KDWHYHUWKHRULJLQ
and nature of the religious traditions of which Plato makes use in this myth, 
he has without any doubt detoured and re-routed them toward philosophy, 
for the very object of recollection is not of the order of religion, but is the 
truth of being toward which science and philosophy struggleµ343  
Nevertheless there is nothing in the Platonic tradition, as Chrétien himself 
recognizes, which forms the grounds on which to erect such a strict 
GLVFLSOLQDU\ZDOOLQGHHGWRSUHGHWHUPLQHWKHDYHQXHVRQZKLFKWKH´WUXWKRI
EHLQJµPD\DUULYHWRXVZRXOGFRQWUDGLFWLQWKHRU\DQGLQSUDFWLFHWKHYHU\
tension between tUDGLWLRQDQGQRYHOW\LQWRZKLFK&KUpWLHQ·VDQDO\VLVRI3ODWR
LQWHQGVWRLQWHUYHQH(YHQ´RXUNQRZOHGJHRI>DQRULJLQDOIRUJHWWLQJ@FDQ
remain the same only through acts that are always new, through a constant 
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renewal of our acts of understanding.  To retain a memory through time is to 
always exeUFLVHQHZDFWVRIUHPHPEHULQJµ344   The novelty so evoked is 
SDUDOOHOWRWKHSHUSHWXDO´UHMXYHQDWLRQµZKLFKZHXQGHUJRMXVWWRUHPDLQRXU
FXUUHQWDJHRUWKH´SHULOµRIIRUJHWWLQJWRZKLFKZHVXEPLWRXUVHOYHVZKHQ
we expose ourselves to the risk of being, or again, in a Platonic lexicon, but 
RQHQROHVVIDPLOLDUWRWKHELEOLFDOO\WUDLQHGHDUWKH´H[RGXVµZKLFK
forgetting performs upon knowledge.  These three terms -- rejuvenation, 
peril, exodus -- are all synonymous WHUPVIRUDKXPDQEHLQJ·VUHODWLRQWR
EHLQJRUWRWUXWKLQ&KUpWLHQ·VUHWULHYDORIWKH3ODWRQLFWUDGLWLRQEXWDV
3ORWLQXV·UHIOHFWLRQVRQDQDPQHVLVDUHVRKRVWLOHWRDFUXGHO\WHPSRUDOOLWHUDO
reading of the Platonic myth that the majority of commentators ignore or 
GRZQSOD\WKHLUUROHLQKLVWKRXJKW&KUpWLHQ·VUHWULHYDOIDFHVDGHFLVLYHFKRLFH
-- will he emphasize, as the neo-Kantian readers who wish to claim Plato as 
their own proto-idealist, the Plotinian preoccupation345 with the forgetting of 
the self?346  Or will he refuse this phenomenological (in the narrow sense) 
impulse in favor of a mystical and mythical reading of Plato, with a poetic 
´UHIOHFWLRQRQWKHDEVROXWHSDVWµ?347  In fact, Chrétien complicates this simple 
duo by veering his analysis in a surprising direction:  he brings in a critique of 
3ORWLQXVIURPWKHODWHU´WKHXUJLFDOµ3ODWRQLVW3URFOXVDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK
3ORWLQXV·FUXFLDODQGGHWHUPLQDWLYHHUURUis WRGHQ\WKDW´WKHVRXOLV«
                                                          
344 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 21. 
345 Which, moreover, is not entirely foreign to the phenomenological tradition.  Cf. 
Marion, Au Lieu De Soi passim.  
346    Cf. Plotinus, Enn. III.7, IV.3. 
347 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 23. 
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completely descendent into the sensible.µ348  Due to this choiFH3ORWLQXV·
only partially descended soul is to the same extent immune to an initial 
forgetting, such that a portion of the soul, and so a portion of the self, is 
never exposed to forgetting at all.  For this reason, Plotinian recollection is a 
´UHWXUQVFRIWKHVHOI«WRWKHRULJLQDQGDQRULJLQWKDWRQHKDVQHYHU
properly left -- rather than a gathering, without return, of the truth given and 
ZLWKGUDZQLQIRUJHWWLQJµ349  Chrétien is careful to affirm that Plotinus is not 
nearly so culpable in this regard as are the neo-Kantians350 -- indeed, Kant 
KLPVHOILVPRUHVXEWOHWKDQDUHWKH.DQWLDQVLQ&KUpWLHQ·VHVWLPDWLRQ-- for 
the direct recollection of the beautiful self which Plotinus prescribes for the 
self who would be philosophical is still a task, a vocation, and thus difficult 
work, rather than an a priori given.  Nonetheless, the accent which Plotinus, 
due to the doctrine of the undescended soul, places on the self as not only 
the locus but also the object of the process of recollection is indeed a 
´WUDQVIRUPDWLRQµRI3ODWR·VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHVDPHZLWKLWVHPSKDVLVRQ
specifically external beauty.   
 
&KUpWLHQ·VUHDGLQJRIWKH3ODWRQLFWUDGLWLRQLQFOXGHVWKHXUJLFDO
Platonists, and this inclusion allows him to argue for a more 
sophisticated relationship between philosophy and theology 
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 More to the point for the present study, although Chrétien will wait 
until the following chapters to introduce the Augustinian thought of loss, the 
self, and beauty351 into this history of the Platonic tradition, when he does so, 
Augustine appears, alongside Plato, to emphasize the constitutive impotence 
of the self to, on its own terms or by its own powers, recollect itself, or 
recollect any other thing, except (in the guise of the interior intimo meo and the 
superior summo meo -- that is, divine inwardness and divine excess) God, the 
overwhelming and wounding voice of beauty which is at once most at home 
in the human soul, and most foreign to it.352  And we can add to this that in 
so doing, Augustine is not only in keeping with the Platonic tradition, but is 
also more apparently phenomenological than Plotinus, in the sense that 
though he does not neglect to theorize the self as the locus of recollection, 
the self is not (as it is for Plotinus) the only or primary object of recollection:  
by setting his aim to that which is interior and superior to the self, Augustine 
believes himself to have found not only his own self, but also, in the indirect 
approach of the creation to the creator, the appearance of all other things 
whicKWKHFUHDWRUKDVFUHDWHG,QPXFKWKHVDPHYHLQ&KUpWLHQ·VUHDGLQJRI
WKH3ODWRQLFWUDGLWLRQDFFHQWVWKHIDPRXVSKUDVHDNLQWR/HYLQDV·Otherwise 
than Being, according to which the Good is beyond being, Epékeina tés ousias.  
With a heavy stress on the temporal dimension of this beyond, Chrétien claims 
(rightly) that the Platonic dialogues, and to some extent the tradition they 
form, are contrary to and already in excess of the crude sense of metaphysics 
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352 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 89-90. 
  
 
 
160 
 
that Levinas et alii allege them to found and authorize ² but exactly this 
excess is what saves them from being anti-metaphysical in just such a crude 
way.353  And the elaboration of this critique of Levinas clarifies the odd 
distinction between religion and philosophy which Chrétien has above 
asserted:  LeYLQDV·FKHULVKHG´GLYLQHFRPPDQGPHQWVGRQRWLQIDFWVKDUHLQ
the immemorial and a past other than all memory:  they come under a sacred 
KLVWRU\«ZKLFK must always be remembered.µ354  7KXV&KUpWLHQ·V
demarcation of his present project as belonging more to philosophy than to 
religion is not to be understood as a denigration of the theological -- indeed, 
such would send a perplexing message to Janicaud and other critics who 
allege that Chrétien is in any event more a theologian than anything else -- 
but instead precisely as a universal, even an imperialist, claim that the 
immemorial has over all realms of thought and life, a refusal to be cordoned 
off to the accidents of any particular religious tradition (in which Chrétien 
perceives but does not describe concrete practices of anamnesis, such as cult 
or prayer). 
 Unsurprisingly in this context, Proclus, the pagan Platonist who 
above all (save perhaps Plato himself) has thought through the philosophical 
import of ritual and prayer, sits more closely at the feet RI3ODWR·VP\WKVDQG
images than does Plotinus.  For example, he makes of the river Lethe a 
symbol of the forgetting not, as for Plotinus, only of the human body,355 but 
                                                          
353 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 30. 
354 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 31. 
355 Plotinus, Enn. IV.3. 
  
 
 
161 
 
RIWKH´ZKROHRIWKHVHQVLEOHZRUOG.µ356 &KUpWLHQ·VWUHDWPHQWRI3URFOXVPRUH
generally iVYHU\SRVLWLYHDQGLWLVLQGHHGLQ3URFOXV·FRPPHQWDULHVRQWKH
Platonic dialogues that he finds the thematization of the whole of his 
concept of a positive construal of forgetting:  the logoi ´SUHVHQWLQXV
DFFRUGLQJWREHLQJµE\ZKLFKZHUHFRJQL]HRXUinitial forgetting,357 forgetting 
DV´FRPSOHWHO\FRQWUDU\WRYDFDQF\µZKLFKZHLJKVXVGRZQZLWKWKHFDUH
and the desire which the recognition of our forgetting arouses, in short, 
´)RUJHWWLQJ>DV@DWRQFHGLVWUHVVDQGWKHZD\RXWRIGLVWUHVV«5HFROOHFWLRQ
[as] the passage from an understanding of the inarticulate to articulation.µ358  
In this passage, and as if to serve as a final brick in the wall which divides 
both Platonism and phenomenology from any sort of idealism, Chrétien 
reminds us that the recollected ideas (or forms) evoked by Plato are in 
NLQVKLSZLWKWKHVRXOEXW´E\QRPHDQVLQDQLGHQWLW\µ359  The richness of 
the Platonic metaphors of kinship and generation are fertile ground for 
&KUpWLHQ·VZRUGSOD\RIH[FHVVWKHLGHDVIDUIURPEHLQJDQ\a priori 
FDWHJRULHVRUNQRZOHGJHVDUHDWEHVW´SUHJQDQWµZLWKWKHIXWXUHRI
anticipation, such that the Good is perpetually and by definition in an excess 
to us which is measured by nothing other than forgetting, than our forgetting 
of it and the forgetting of it which constitutes us most originally.360 
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358 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 36. 
359 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 37. 
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%H\RQG0DULRQ·VVLPSOLVWLFIHWLVKL]LQJRIIRUJHWWLQJ&KUpWLHQYLHZV
forgetting as a creative and participatory act 
 The second essay of the collection begins to invoke Augustine more 
frequently, beginning with a UHIOHFWLRQRQWKH$XJXVWLQLDQ´YDVWVSDFHVDQG
DPSOHSDODFHµRIPHPRU\,361 which aims to ask whether forgetfulness is a 
loss which is destructive of memory, or simply a different and negative 
modality of memory, or even a special faculty thereof.  Chrétien answers in 
support of the latter possibilities, and in fact strengthens them:  forgetting is 
WKH´IRXQGDWLRQDQGFRQGLWLRQµRIPHPRU\ZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHVD´PDNLQJµ
UDWKHUWKDQDGHVWUXFWLRQ7KLVPDNHVSRVVLEOHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQRID´SRHWLFVRI
forgetting,µDVWKHDUWRIGHVFULELQJZKDWLV´PRVWYLWDOLQ>PHPRU\·V@
SRZHUµ362  This counter-intuitive claim comes, for Chrétien as for Augustine, 
from the accumulative power of time, and the limits of intentionality in the 
PHUHSUHVHQWPRPHQWZKHQIDFHGE\WLPH·Vimmense and overwhelming 
flux:   
It is self-evident that under the normal conditions of 
consciousness, it is impossible for me to remember in a same 
present moment everything that has ever occurred to me, and 
above all if I conserve it down to the finest detail.  The 
integral presence of the past is thus identical to its latency, its 
indestructibility is simultaneously its being held in reserve, 
DQGLWLVSUHVHUYHGLQEHLQJUHVHUYHG«,QRUGHUIRUWKH
memory as such to be able to appear, it is necessary that 
certain aspects of the past be erased and disappear.363 
 
                                                          
361 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 42, citing Augustine, Conf. X.8.12. 
362 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 42. 
363 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 47. 
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Even more can be claimed:  this limit is an essential definition of humanity -- 
DV3ORWLQXVGHQLHVWKHQDPHRI¶PHPRU\·WRWKHLQILQLWHVHOI-consciousness of 
an astral body,364 ZKLFKFDQ´JUDVSLWVHOIin a single and unique intuition 
without lack, loss, interval or distance,µ365 so too Augustine, while speculating 
RQVXFKDQ´LQVWDQWDQHRXVLQWXLWLRQ>RID@WRWDOO\UHDVVHPEOHGSDVWµ
QRQHWKHOHVVDWWULEXWHVWKLVSRZHULILWH[LVWVRQO\WR´DNLQGRIGLYLQe power 
ZKLFKZLOOHQVXUHWKDWDOOWKHDFWLRQV«RIHYHU\LQGLYLGXDOZLOOEHUHFDOOHGWR
PLQGDQGSUHVHQWHGWRWKHPLQG·VYLHZZLWKPLUDFXORXVVSHHG.µ366   He 
incorporates biblical language into this philosophical insight (or does the 
causality run the other way round?), finding this to be the meaning of 
5HYHODWLRQWKDW*RGDORQHPD\KDQGXVWKH´ERRNµZKLFKIXOO\DQG
exhaustively captures our selves:  our selves not only as written, but, in 
FRQWLQXLW\ZLWK0DULRQ·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQHVHOYHVZKLFKDre as far away 
as possible from self-LGHQWLW\UHO\LQJDVWKH\GRRQ´DQRWKHURIDPD[LPDO
DOWHULW\µ&KUpWLHQ·VIROORZLQJPHGLWDWLRQVDUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\UHVWOHVVDQG
wide-ranging, drawing as deeply from Proust and Peguy as from Plotinus.  
But the esVD\·VILQDOTXRWDWLRQDQGLWVUHVWLQJSODFH-- that of St John of the 
&URVVUHIHUULQJWRWKHHPSWLQHVVRIPHPRU\DVD´\HDUQLQJDQGDPHOWLQJ
away of the sRXOIRUWKHSRVVHVVLRQRI*RGµ367 could just as easily have come 
from the opening chapter of the ConfeVVLRQVRUIURP$XJXVWLQH·VLQDELOLW\368 
to find God in his memory.  And yet this is not a yearning without hope for 
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367 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 77. 
368 Augustine, Conf. X.17.26. 
  
 
 
164 
 
UHQHZDO´$VZHEHDULWµ&KUpWLHQFRQFOXGHV´LWGRHVQRWJLYHLWVHOIDJDLQ
but gives itself as the very excess of its presence that no memory can 
contain.µ369 
 Anticipating the concerns of The Ark of Speech and of Saint Augustine 
and the Acts of Speech, the third essay of The Unforgettable and the Unhoped for370 
begins by opposing the Greek alastos (unforgettable), from the tragic register 
which gives it linguistic and conceptual birth, to the first gift of Mnemosune 
in mythology:  namely, forgetting, and its primary vehicle:   
Speech [parole], song, music, the guardian powers of the 
senses.  To the ecstasis of suffering is opposed the ecstasis of 
WKHZRUG«6SHHFKFRPHVIURPDGLYLQH0HPRU\WKDWQHYHU
becomes ours, even if it does dispense its favors and gifts on 
us in offering another unforgettable, that of our misfortunes 
[alastoi].  Yet neither of them is a secret kept jealously within 
us.371  
 
In the shadow of an Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, wherein the 
unforgettable is primarily the non-repeatable, non-representable habitual 
practice of virtue, Chrétien posits an Augustinian-Heideggerean thought 
wherein the unforgettable is, no more repeatable and certainly no more 
UHSUHVHQWDEOH´ZKDWKDVEHLQJDQGKDVEHHQLQEHLQJ.µ372 This ontological 
                                                          
369 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 77. 
370   $QGWKHILQDOHVVD\ZKLFKKHUHFRQFHUQVXVDOWKRXJKWKHFROOHFWLRQ·VILQDO
essay, on the unhoped for as a different modality of the unceasing, has much -- 
IURPDPHGLWDWLRQRQ(XULSLGHV·Alcestis to a stunning comparison and 
rapprochement of Philo on Genesis on the one hand, and Heraclitus on the other -- 
WRUHFRPPHQGLWDVDQH[DPSOHRI&KUpWLHQ·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRWKLQNVLPXOWDQHRXVO\LQ
both biblical and classical vocabularies, with results that are as surprising as they are 
compelling, Augustine is absent from it, and so these considerations are too 
tangentially related to our project to be entertained. 
371 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 80-1. 
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functioning of the gift in memory, parallel but irreducible to even the richest 
ethical account, depends on a conception of the memory which is not limited 
to the past -- for this would render it representable, and thus at best aesthetic 
rather than ethical or ontological -- but can operate as the memory of the 
present and also of the future.  Chrétien rightly and explicitly recognizes such 
WREHORQJILUPO\´WRWKH$XJXVWLQLDQWUDGLWLRQµEHJLQQLQJZLWKConfessions X 
but also present in Bonaventure and Guillaume of Saint-Thierry.373  Further, 
such an ontological functioning of memory does not leave behind a certain 
sort of ethical eudaimonism:  in a brief but illumining discussion of De 
Trinitate ;,9RQWKH´memoria DeiµWKHKXPDQPHPRU\ZKLFKIRUPV
our relation to God, Chrétien makes clear the extent to which this memory 
depends on the assurance (by faith and by Scripture, not as an a priori) of a 
past and future beatitude.374 On this basis, he evokes the thoroughly 
Augustinian account given by Guillaume of Saint-Thierry of the creation of 
humanity according to the imago dei as Trinitarian, comprising intellect, will 
and (most centrally here) memory,375 a creaWLRQZKLFKLV´XQFHDVLQJµDQG
RFFXUVXQGHUWKHUXEULFRIDFRQVWDQWUHQHZDOIURPZLWKRXW´*RGFRPHVWR
memory in order to strike it with a wound of love that eternity itself could 
QRWFORVHDJDLQ«7RFDOO*RGXQIRUJHWWDEOHLVWRVD\WKDWZHDUHIRUHYHU at 
the most inward part of ourselves, transpierced by his light, and not that we 
would always suffer it in the same wayµ376  Chrétien goes on, as thought this 
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374 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 87. 
375   On Augustine and the imago dei, cf. Ch 5 below. 
376 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 89. 
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were necessary, to invoke explicitly the interior intimo meo as the Augustinian 
thought which renders the phenomenology of memory possible, again, and 
crucially, in the key of the imago dei´)RUWKHLPDJHLQVRIDUDVWKHLPDJHRI
the infinite, always manifests the excessive, which we must love and respect, 
but which LVQRWDWDOODWRXUGLVSRVDOµ377 
 Of this important and impressive essay, one equally important 
criticism may be levelled in relation to a remark made offhand, at its end:  
´)RU6W$XJXVWLQHWKHmemoria Dei, unforgettable and inexhaustible presence 
of alterity, is necessarily at work in all the spiritual exercises that we might 
possibly commit, but it does not reduce to a determinate practice and does 
not designate a specific spiritualityµ378  In one sense this is true:  Augustine is 
not concerned, either in the Confessions or the De Trinitate, with prescribing 
certain prayers or rituals, such as we usually describe with the phrase 
´VSLULWXDOH[HUFLVHVµ%XWDVWKHVSHFLILFDOO\LQWHOOHFWXDOSUD\HUVVFDWWHUHG
throughout both works cry out, the very practice of philosophy embodied by 
these works is the discrete and particular spiritual exercise to which 
Augustine calls any who would experience, deepen and enrich their sense of 
a memoria Dei -- indeed, it is for him the exercise par excellence of the 
spiritus.379  &KUpWLHQ·VIDLOXUHWR perceive the nature of philosophy as a spiritual 
exercise for Augustine is merely an inability to think far enough in the right 
direction on which he has embarked, and towards which his reflections on 
                                                          
377 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 90. 
378 Chrétien, Unforgettable, 95. 
379   On this notion of philosophy as spiritual exercise, specifically as the ground of 
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Augustine gesture, in spite of the passage quoted above:  in the training, 
discipline and working of the spirit can be found not only the Augustinian 
reflection on phenomena, but also the culmination of the relationship of 
theology and the love of wisdom in his thought. 
 
The relationship between self and world emerges in a creative and 
vocal response to beauty, viz. praise 
 ´,DPWHOOLQJWKHVDPHVWRU\RYHUDQGRYHUZKLFKLVP\VHOIDQGWKH
ZRUOGµVD\V:LOOLDP)DXONQHU380  Chrétien takes this rather poetic claim up 
in a specifically vocal sphere in The Call and the Response.  He introduces this 
work by asserting that every performance of the voice, no matter how 
TXRWLGLDQKDV´DWLWVFRUHµWKHFRPELQHGYRLFHVRI´DOOWKDWLWDQVZHUVµWKH
YRLFHVDQGVLOHQFHVZKLFKSUHFHGHLWDQG´FDOOµLWIRUWK´7KHUHLVQRILUVW
voiFHµE\ZKLFKZHFRXOGHVFDSHWKLVFKRUDODQGVRQRURXVFRQWH[WRIDOO
speech, which is simultaneous and synoQ\PRXVZLWK´WKHZRUOGµ381  This 
assertion itself calls forth, necessarily, questions:  what thought or thoughts 
can express the appearance of our voiFHWKURXJKZKLFK´ERWKFDOODQG
UHVSRQVHEHFRPHLQFDUQDWHµDQGKRZGRHVWKHLQFDUQDWLRQZKLFKWKXVWDNHV
place in our voice manifest itself in all of our bodily senses?  These questions, 
SHUKDSVPRUHWKDQDQ\RWKHUVLQYLWHLQ&KUpWLHQ·VHVWLPDWLRQDUHIlection on 
the traditions of thought from which they draw their momentum, since they 
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are in part asking how our voice and our thought themselves rely on the 
voices of our forebears, not in this case exclusive of rational metaphysics or 
biblical theology.382  Chrétien is thus not at all tempted to be defensive of his 
proclivity to have wide-ranging bibliographies -- asking questions about our 
voice in relation to other voices, our body in relation to other bodies, and the 
like demands not only an interdisciplinary approach (for on what grounds 
would we reject relevant thoughts from any given discipline?) but also a 
meditation on this very interdisciplinary approach.  All of this Chrétien 
presumes and argues is necessary to maintain a meticulous 
´SKHQRPHQRORJLFDl perspectiveµ383  As above, the present analysis will 
DWWHPSWWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQ$XJXVWLQH·VUROHLQWKHVWXG\EXWHVSHFLDOO\
because Augustine too refuses to disclose whether, at any given moment, he 
considers himself to be operating as exegete, bishop or metaphysician, such 
an alchemic process will at times seem too artificial to maintain with any 
degree of rigidity. 
 The first chapter of this work is equal parts critique of the 
+HLGHJJHUHDQWKRXJKWRIYRLFHDV´FRUUHVSRQGHQFHµWRDFDOODQGPHGLWDWLRQ
on the Greek alignment of the beautiful (to kalon) and the call (to kalein).  In 
both instances, the argument is one of origin:  Chrétien does not hesitate to 
credit Heidegger as the origin of the 20th century thought according to which 
the voice is always a UHVSRQVHLQWKHILUVWFDVHDQGLQWKHVHFRQG&KUpWLHQ·V
radical etymological approach affirms this thought to be inherent in the 
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RULJLQDOODQJXDJHRISKLORVRSK\,IEHDXW\LV´FDOOYRFDWLRQDQG
SURYRFDWLRQµLWLVWKRVHZKRVHWKRXJKWDQGYRLFHZHUHIormed by the Greek 
language (and these range, significantly, from Plato to Paul and beyond) who 
can help us give voice to it in French or English.  And although Heidegger 
has heard, and can help us also to hear, beauty as the call which is the origin 
of our voice, careful and inclusive attention to these Greek thinkers denies 
what Heidegger affirms:  that our response to it can also correspond to it, in 
some measure be commensurate with it, while for Plato, Paul and Chrétien 
(and we can add, as Chrétien does not, Augustine), such a claim is an 
KXEULVWLFLPSRVVLELOLW\7KHFHQWUDOLW\RIWKH*UHHNODQJXDJHLQ&KUpWLHQ·V
argument here precludes much consideration of Augustine, whose grasp of 
Greek is notoriously spotty.  So it is that the pegs on which his critique of 
Heidegger hangs are primarily Plato and direct commentaries on Plato by 
Proclus, Hermeias of Alexandria, Marcilio Ficino and others,384 and even his 
theological sources (predominantly Denys) are hellenophones -- the medieval 
thinkers he cites (Aquinas, Eriugena and the like) he argues, rightly, to be 
VXPPRQHGLQGLUHFWO\LQWRWKLV3ODWRQLFWUDGLWLRQE\YLUWXHRI'HQ\V·
influence on them.385  One might have expected, at the intersection of 
Heidegger, Platonism as mediated through the Western Middle Ages, and the 
Pauline theology of the call in creation, no better summation of this train of 
thought than the mystical protophenomenological experience of Augustine 
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LQ&RQIHVVLRQV;%XW$XJXVWLQH·VHQWU\RQWRWKHVFHQHRIThe Call and 
the Response is deferred until the opening of the next chapter.  For this reason, 
DOWKRXJK&KUpWLHQ·VFDUHIXOFRPPHQWDU\RQWKHFDUHIXOFRPPHQWDULHVRQ
Plato or on Denys) deserves careful commentary, both for its intrinsic 
elegance and for its value to our consideration of interdisciplinarity and the 
voice, our analysis will entertain the argument of the second chapter in 
greater detail. 
 7KHEXUGHQRIWKLVFKDSWHU´7KHYLVLEOHYRLFHµLVWKHHODERUDWLRQ
and the defense of a certain porosity between sight and hearing, such that 
voice and image are not easily separated, much less pitted one against the 
other (as they are in for example Reformation-era polemics).  In it, Chrétien 
argues that, in the thought of a voice which sees or (citing a title of Paul 
Claudel) an eye which OLVWHQVWKHUHLVQRWKLQJRIWKH´HPSW\SDUDGR[µDQG
HYHU\WKLQJRID´ULJRURXVO\SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOSURSHUW\µRISHUFHSWLRQDQG
expression.  Asking whether this thought is expressed and explored in the 
history of philosophy, Chrétien gestures briefly to Merleau-Ponty, but quickly 
PRYHVZHOOEHKLQGKLPWR$XJXVWLQH·VConfessions, and more particularly to 
WKHSDVVDJHFLWHGDERYHZKHUHLQ$XJXVWLQHDVFULEHVWR*RG´DFHUWDLQOLJKW
and a certain voice, a certain perfXPHDQGQRXULVKPHQWDQGHPEUDFHµ386  On 
the spiritual senses by which God, in these sensory modalities, is to some 
GHJUHHDSSUHKHQGHGZKLFKDUH´EH\RQGWKHVHQVLEOHEXWQRWEH\RQGWKH
VHQVRULDOµ&KUpWLHQUHPDUNV´2XUVHQVHVVWLOOPDNHVHQVHDIWHUZHKDYH
turned to what is purely spiritual.  After evoking a light, a voice, a fragrance, 
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6DLQW$XJXVWLQHFRQFOXGHV¶,WLVWKLVWKDW,ORYHZKHQ,ORYHP\*RG·7KH
TXHVWLRQKRZHYHUERXQFHVULJKWEDFN¶$QGZKDWLVthis"·7KHSUHFLVH
nature of the sensoriality involved remains obscure.µ387 The answer to the 
IDPRXVTXHVWLRQ´:KDWGR,ORYHZKHQ,ORYHP\*RG"µRSHQVRQWRDQRWKHU
questioning, of an increased rigor and intensity, this time not posed to 
$XJXVWLQH·VVHOIRUWR*RGEXWWRWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGLQWKHNH\RIDWWHQWLRQ
(intentio´0\TXHVWLRQ was my attention, and their answer was their beauty 
(interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum).µ388 In the Latin of 
this passage, Chrétien appropriately reads the lack of verbs (even esse, which 
Chrétien is happy enough to read as simply an auxiliary and tautological verb) 
to imply the strictest possibility identity between the two terms.  Beauty is a 
response, and so a voice, and furthermore, one which only emerges in a 
dialogue.  This has decisive implications for any thought of sight or what is 
VHHQ´0RUHLQWLPDWHWRWKHJD]H>UHJDUG@WKDQVLJKWLVWKHIDFWWKDWLWOLVWHQV
,WLVQRWHQRXJKWRRSHQRQH·VH\HVWRVHHWKHVDPHH\HVPXVWTXHVWLRQDQG
make themselves the soothsayers of the word that each thing bears within 
itself but also ripens into song at its surface.µ389  This illumination of the 
voice of beauty, particularly as a response, is in continuity with the Platonic 
tradition according to which beauty is and emits a call, and shows the deep 
affinity of call and response:   
Things of themselves call us and invite us to interrogate 
them.  Their beauty calls by responding and responds by 
calling.  To be in need of a word, to suffer from a lack of 
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word, is already to belong to the word, to be preempted by it 
in the very motion through which it finds itself anticipated. 390 
 
7KLV´PRWLRQµFDQQHYHUEHJLQRQLWVRZQWHUPVQRUGRHVLWSRVVHVVLWVRZQ
future -- WKHGLDORJXHEHWZHHQWKHVHOIDQGWKHZRUOGWDNHVLWV´EUHDWKµIURP
´WKHLQYLVLEOHµVXFKWKDWWKHDQVZHUZKLFKWKHVHOIRUWKe world provides to 
LWVRULJLQDU\FDOOLVDOZD\V´LQDGHTXDWHµWRLWDOZD\V´IDOOVVKRUWµLQEULHILV
perpetually breathless when faced by the breath of excess.  The disparate 
HOHPHQWVRIWKHZRUOG´DQVZHUE\GLVSRVVHVVLQJXVRIDQ\SRVVLELOLW\RIEHLQJ
sDWLVILHGZLWKWKHPDQGVWRSSLQJDWWKHP«(YHU\YRLFHVD\VLWVLQDGHTXDF\
and therefore [says] what exceeds itµ391  Likewise every visible thing testifies 
to an excess of imaging; these finitudes which bear the weight of infinity are, 
if not interchangeableWKHQDWOHDVWFURVVDEOH´interlaceableµ392 -- a thought 
which is not unique in the Judeo-Christian tradition to Augustine, but also 
present in Aquinas, Luther, and Philo, whose commentary on Exodus 20.18 
´WKHSHRSOHDOOVDZYRLFHVµDQWLFLSDWHVWKH/XNDQ theology of Pentecost:  
WKHYLVLEOHYRLFHV´JDYHULVHLQHDFKVRXOWRDQHZVHQVHRIKHDULQJIDU
superior to that which is mediated by the ear.µ393 Chrétien drives this inter-
mediability of sight and sound home, along with the inter-dependence of 
external matter and perception, with regard to our own spiritual and physical 
VHQVHV´>%HDXW\@DVVXPHVRQRXUSDUWQRVSHFLDORUJDQUHDG\WRUHFHLYHLW
rather it creates in us the conditions of its receptionµ394  But, at the other end 
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of the spectrum, for this dialogue in which the visible voice of beauty speaks 
to occur, our own voice is also necessary; Chrétien closes this chapter with a 
JQRPLFEXWFHUWDLQO\GHHSO\$XJXVWLQLDQWKRXJKWWKDW´)RUWKHYLVLEOHWR
lose its voice, our own would have to become blind and perish, ceasing to 
answer it and to question itµ395  2XUYRLFHRQO\UHVSRQGVWREHDXW\·VFDOO
But this response is no small thing, for without it, and without the intentio 
ZKLFKLWLPSOLHVEHDXW\·VFDOOZRXOGUHPDLQVLOHQW´2WKHUZLVHKHDYHQDQG
earWKZRXOGEHXWWHULQJ>*RG¶V@SUDLVHVWRWKHGHDIµ396 
 
Manifestation is always mediation, which implies a participatory 
metaphysics that Chrétien hesitates to thematize as such 
 From this affirmation, Chrétien moves his attention to a 
philosophical tradition inverse to this Augustinian meditation on the visible 
YRLFHWKDWRIDQ´LQQHUµYRLFHSUHVHQWDOWKRXJKVLOHQWZLWKLQWKHVHOI,Q
KLVUHIOHFWLRQVRQWKLV´RWKHUYRLFHµWZRSRLQWVHVSHFLDOO\JHUPDQHWRWKH
present study emerge:  in the first instance, the dialogue between Augustine 
and Reason (conceived as a voice at once internal to Augustine and 
sufficiently foreign to him that a true dialogue may occur) is compared to 
that between Socrates and his daimon; in the second, anticipating the 
concerns of one especially enlightening essay in Saint Augustin et les Actes de 
Parole&KUpWLHQDUJXHVIRUDQGHODERUDWHVDQDFFRXQWRIWKH´WUDQVODWLRQµ
which we must perform in order to hear this prior and originating call, and 
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equally in order to respond to it.  In both cases, the insight, central to the 
entire argument of The Call and the Response, that the phenomenological 
VWUXFWXUHRIODQJXDJHDQGRIH[LVWHQFHDFFRUGLQJWR´WKHFDOOWKDW«VHQGVXV
LQWRWKHZRUOGµLV´RQO\SHUFHLYHGµLQRXUUHVSRQVHWRLWEXWWKat the call sets 
IRUWKWKHWHUPVRIRXUUHVSRQVHDQGVR´DOWHUVµLWWDNHVWKHLQLWLDOIRUPRID
meditation on the psalmic thought, dear to Augustine, of the sacrificium laudis, 
WKH´VDFULILFHµRISUDLVHZKLFKLVDWRQFHWKH´JLIWµRISUDLVHDQGLWV
immedLDWHDQGGHILQLWLYH´LQMXU\DQGORVVµ,QWKLVUHJDUGWKHWKRXJKWRI
SUDLVHGLVFORVHVDQHVVHQWLDOGLPHQVLRQRIODQJXDJHDQGWKHYRLFH´LWLV
intimately our own insofar as it reveals something to us about our own 
utterance and its meaning; but it does not belong to us since we are not the 
source of its light.µ397  This invites, in a striking invocation of the entire 
Western philosophical parade, from Socrates to Malebranche to Kant, Fichte, 
Rousseau, Heidegger, in spite of acknowledged differences, a reflection on 
the inner voice as the site of irreducible alterity within the self in each of their 
thoughts.398  For all its near omnipresence in the philosophical tradition, this 
inner voice raises a phenomenological problem for Chrétien.  Given that this 
phenomenon is persistently identified as a voice, and not for example as an 
illumination or a simple sensation, the mode according to which it is given 
must in some way be analogous (even by means of a conceptually difficult 
analogy) to the voices which we hear on a daily and familiar basis, and so 
PXVWFRPHIURP´DEHLQJRWKHUWKDQRXUVHOYHVµQHYHUWKHOHVVWKLVYRLFH
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VWXEERUQO\DSSHDUVLQWKHWUDGLWLRQDV´immediateµLQXV%XWDVWKH
KHUPHQHXWLFSKHQRPHQRORJLVWVZLOOTXLFNO\REMHFWDQGIROORZLQJ5LFRHXU·V 
commitments, as they will even invoke Augustine so to do), voices only 
speak in words, and thus in complex and particular formal mediations.  This 
being the case, can the inner voice truly be transcendent, universal, and so 
subject to phenomenological investigation, or is it a simply local, particular 
and in the end even idiosyncratic manifestation? 
 To begin to respond to these admittedly thorny questions, Chrétien 
QRWHVWKDWVRPHRIWKH´PRVWIUHTXHQWDQGPRVWSUHFLVHTXHVWLRQVµLQDORQJ
debate amongst commentators devoted to the Platonic dialogues attempt to 
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU6RFUDWHV·daimon ´FRXOGSURSHUO\EHVDLGWRKDYHD
¶YRLFH·µRUZDVDVLPSOHDQGUDWKHUFUXGHPHWDSKRUIRU something like a 
´FRQVFLHQFH.µ399  But to set up these questions more programmatically, it is to 
Augustine that Chrétien turns, and most centrally to his Soliloquies, an early 
work, even the neologistic title of which, as he notes, raises the question of 
such an at once immanent and transcendent dialogue:  is ever it truly possibly 
that cum solis nobis loquimurFDQ,LQDQ\GHIHQVLEOHVHQVH´WDONRQO\ZLWK
P\VHOIµPDQWRPDQ?400 And, in a passage which also intrigues Marion,401 
Augustine begins this literary dialogue with a prayer that leaves the specific 
natures of the answer to thLVTXHVWLRQLQGHWHUPLQDWH´Ait mihi subito, sive ego 
ipse, sive alius quis extrinsecus, sive intrinsecus, nescio ¶VXGGHQO\VRPHRQHVSHDNVWR
me; whether this is I myself, or another exterior to me, or another interior to 
                                                          
399 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 47. 
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PH,GRQRWNQRZ·.µ402 This, well before the Confessions will formulate more 
famously the magna quaestio mihi, already raises and leaves unanswered the 
problem of the self and its particular form of existence or manifestation:   
To wonder whether it is myself or another who calls me, to 
wonder whether the implied alterity is external or internal, is 
basically to wonder who I am by asking myself how it is 
possible for me to be thus reached, and therefore to answer 
the call that is intimately addressed to me.  The call that is 
sent to me makes me problematic to myself, uncertain of my 
boundaries and of my power.  The question and the call are 
one, since the perplexity that regards its source is a perplexity 
that regards me.403 
 
(YHQVR&KUpWLHQILQGVIDXOWLQ$XJXVWLQH·VHDUO\GLDORJXHIRULWVQDWXUHDV´D
VLOHQWDQGPXWHGLDORJXHµZKLFKGRHVQRW´HQWHULQWRWKHSX]]OHVRIDQLQQHU
YRLFHµFRQWHQWDVLWLVWROHDYH5HDVRQYRLFHOHVVRUDWOHDVWWRUHIUDLQIURP
explicitly thematizing Reason as being or having a vox.  This is not to ascribe 
a naïve experientialism to Augustine on this front:  Chrétien rightly notes that 
$XJXVWLQHDQGPRUHGLUHFWO\$XJXVWLQH·VKHLUVVXFKDV+XJKRI6W9LFWRU
does elsewhere reflect, albeit critically, on the attribution to a post-lapsarian 
KXPDQLW\RID´UHJLPHof immediacy in which God would speak directly to 
WKHVRXOLQDSXUHLQZDUGQHVVµ7KRXJKWKLVPLJKW$XJXVWLQHVSHFXODWHV
have been available in Eden, such a disincarnate account of revelation via a 
purely inner voice is in fundamental discontinuity with the biblical tradition:  
Chrétien paraphrases an argument contra Manicheos, saying,  
Even if the call leads us back to our own spiritual intimacy, 
the world is where it must resonate for sinful humankind.  
No genuinely Christian thought could ever privilege an inner 
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403 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 48. 
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YRLFHRYHUWKHFKRUXVRI*RG·VZLWQHVVHVWKLVZRXOGDPRXQW
WRVXEVWLWXWLQJDSULYDWHDQGVROLWDU\¶UHYHODWLRQ·WRWKH
Revelation that founds the Church.404  
 
 But here, as elsewhere, Chrétien is concerned to dismantle any easy 
distinctions betwHHQWKHELEOLFDODQGWKH3ODWRQLFWUDGLWLRQ6RFUDWHV·
daimon, too, resists the esoteric and the private, as Plutarch and Proclus 
affirm,405 preferring to be manifest by resonating only in the public agora of 
philosophy.  Such is indicative for Chrétien that, for the Platonic tradition, 
philosophy is not only essentially incarnate and public, but in fact calls into 
question at the most radical level the static account of the self on which any 
esotericism necessarily relies:  for the Platonists, he summarizes´WKHUHLVQR
inner voice except through some intimate alteration, which constitutes 
genuine interiority.  To listen is to be opened to the other and transformed 
by the other at our most intimate core.  Intimacy, in these ways of thinking, 
is neither escaSHQRUVKHOWHUEXWUDWKHUWKHSODFHRIEURDGHUH[SRVXUHµ 
 In order to establish that Augustine shares in this tradition, both of 
WKHYRLFHDVDOWHUDWLRQDQGRIWKH´SXULILFDWLRQµZKLFKPXVWRFFXUSULRUWR
and through this voice, Chrétien certainly might well have appealed to 
numerous passages of the Confessions, or perhaps more easily he could have 
turned to the De magistro.  But, perhaps in order to insist, however subtly, that 
his participation in the Platonic tradition does not facilely represent any kind 
of corruption of Christian theology, he turns his analysis to the very core of 
Christian theology -- not only to the Bible, but to the first Christian 
                                                          
404 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 50. 
405    Cf. Plato, Apology 33B; Plutarch, De genio socratis 588C-D; Proclus, Alcibiades I, 
trans. :LOOLDP2·1HLOO7KH+DJXH01LMKRII 
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WKHRORJLDQ-RKQWKH%DSWLVWDQGWR$XJXVWLQH·VVHUPRQVDQGPHGLWDWLRQVRQ
this figure who testifies only to Christ, and to himself only indirectly, as ego 
vox´,DPDYRLFHµFU\LQJRXWLQWKHZLOGHUQHVV406  The philosophical theme 
of voice is thus central to the Augustinian thought on John, and with it, the 
relationship of my voice to all preceding voices, including the Eternal voice:   
The immutable Word sent these voices, and after so many 
voices preceding it, the same Word descended into its own 
chariot, in its very own voice, in its flesh.  Collect therefore 
into one voice as it were all of the voices that preceded the 
Word, and attribute them to the person of John.  It is as 
though he carried in himself the symbol of all these voices:  in 
and of himself, he was the sacred and mystical personification 
of these voices; and if he properly named himself the Voice, 
this is because he was the sign and representation of all the 
others.407   
 
This invites a rapprochement of the themes of The Call and the Response with 
those of The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, showing that these reflections 
are to some extent inseparable:   
Even having come, the Word needs still and needs always to 
EHDQQRXQFHGE\QHZYRLFHV«>7KHKXPDQYRLFH@LVWUXO\
itself and accomplished as voice only by being both defeated 
and exceeded.  Defeated and exceeded by the immemorial 
past, the immemorial past of the Word that it announces and 
whose fullness it bears, defeated all over again by the 
imminent future, but also by the eschatological future that 
ULSVLWDVXQGHUDQGPDNHVLWFU\RXWµLQWKHZLOGHUQHVV408  
 
                                                          
406    That even this self-identification is drawn from the voice of another, that of 
Isaiah, is an intriguing and significant fact which is not lost on Chrétien; cf. 
Chrétien, The Call and the Response,  63. 
407 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 64, citing Augustine, Sermo 288. 
408 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 65. 
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This perpetual annunciation, which Chrétien compares fruitfully to the task 
of the translator,409 is obstinately incarnate:  it is inseparable from a 
transcendent Logos, but only manifests itself to my self in the voice which 
resonates in my ear and in my larynx.  To be seized E\WKLVFDOOLV´WKH
condition of my humanity and therefore of my human corporeity, of the 
possibility in me of bearing spirit throughout my whole body by bearing my 
YRLFH7KHPRVW¶HPSLULFDO·DVSHFWRIWKHFDOOLVDlso its most 
¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDO·µ;410 this structure, at root that of the Incarnation, is a primary 
of human experience.  But to see it as simply reducible to human existence, 
V\QRQ\PRXVZLWKLWRUVLPXOWDQHRXVWRLWLVWRORVHLWHQWLUHO\´:HFRQWLQXH
to hear [the call] in our own voice, as everyone does, by taking up speech, 
without ever believing that we are VSHHFKOHVWLQGHHGLWEHORVWµ$QGWR
recognize the call in our response, which it initially makes possible and 
continually alters at the most fundamental level, is to see it as formally 
indistinguishable from a gift, or from beauty, either of which, as Augustine 
affirms and expounds, we can only love by affirming its alterity to our 
(interior or embodied) selves.  We love them, if we love them at all, only late:  
´7HVWLQJDQGH[SHULHQFing itself, my voice already has a past, is already late 
relative to the word, which is why, when it finally speaks, it will never be 
through with speechµ411   
 The final essay of The Call and the Response, an exposition of Aristotle 
on touch as the sense wKLFKIRUPV´WKHILUVWKHDULQJµRIWKHFDOOWKH
                                                          
409 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 77-82. 
410 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 81. 
411 Chrétien, The Call and the Response, 82. 
  
 
 
180 
 
founding of all the other corporeal senses, drives all of the foregoing 
UHIOHFWLRQVGHHSO\LQWRWKHWH[WXUHRIWKHIOHVKLWVHOI$XJXVWLQH·VDEVROXWH
absence from these pages renders a sensitive rendering of &KUpWLHQ·V
phenomenological reading of the De Anima only questionably relevant to the 
present argument.  But if we may be permitted just one remark, we can 
quickly note that, ever the orator, Augustine orders his lists carefully, 
retaining as last those senses which he holds to be most important:  in the list 
of the spiritual senses evoked above, after light, voice, fragrance and food 
comes the embrace of touch,412 and in the famous passage which begins 
´/DWHKDYH,ORYHG\RXµWKHSDUWLFXODUPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIWKH´HYHUDQFLHQW
HYHUQHZµpulchritudo which Augustine eulogizes culminate in that of touch:  
´<RXWRXFKHGPHDQG,DPVHWRQILUHWRDWWDLQWKHSHDFHZKLFKLV\RXUVµ413.  
This suggests, admittedly without fully generating, a potentially fertile ground 
for dialogue between Augustine and the Aristotelian tradition.414 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
412 Augustine, Conf. X.6.8. 
413 Augustine, Conf. X.27.38. 
414   Insofar as Aquinas takes up the arguments of the De Anima, this dialogue can 
point squarely in the direction of Eucharistic tasting as a primary form of touch:  on 
this, cf. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (London:  
Routledge, 2000).  Such an account is moreover not absent from Confessions X, with 
the subtle but unmissable Eucharistic diPHQVLRQRIWKH´VSLULWXDOVHQVHVµ 
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&KUpWLHQ·VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$XJXVWLQHLVPDUNHGSULPDULO\E\DORYH
of his words and by attention to his voice 
As noted above, my approach to St Augustine and the Acts of Speech415 
will differ somewhat from my approach to the two earlier works.  On the 
one hand, since its subject matter is more locally focused, centering on a very 
particular theme (that of speech) and one particular figure (Augustine) where 
the previous works drew more broadly on both philosophical and theological 
sources, this portion of the present chapter will necessarily be more attentive 
to Chrétien specifically as philologist, in the rich etymological sense of this 
term, as one who loves and attends to the very words of Augustine, letting 
them shape his argument even more directly than they have in The 
Unforgettable and the Unhoped for and The Call and the Response.  On the other 
KDQGWKHSUR[LPLW\LQWLPHDQGVXEMHFWPDWWHUWR0DULRQ·VAu Lieu De Soi 
will permit a more strictly comparative argumentative strategy, although again 
this will remain for the most part implicit.  To achieve both of these goals, 
my methodology will be more deliberately architectonic; rather than picking 
several representative chapters, and trying to convey a sense of the argument 
of the whole of the work through them (or worse, attempting to cherry-pick 
                                                          
415   The arguments of this monograph have significant overlap with those of The 
Ark of Speech, from whose pages, moreover, Augustine is far from absent.  For 
reasons of economy, I here abstain from any significant discussion of that book, 
which retains its charm and its rigor, only noting that in its five essays, which (very 
characteristically, as we are beginning to see) skip with little explanation from 
DQDO\VLVRI*HQHVLVWRWKDWRI$ULVWRWOHRU3URFOXV)RUZKDWLW·VZorth in terms of 
WKHGLVFXVVLRQRI&KUpWLHQ·VEUHDGWKRI$XJXVWLQLDQUHDGLQJWKHJUHDWPDMRULW\RI
Augustinian citations in The Ark of Speech draw from the enarrationes in Psalmos, with 
more occasional and brief yet worthwhile discussions of De civitate dei, Confessions, De 
trinitate and several more minor texts. 
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the highlights of each chapter), I will present some of the key questions 
regarding speech (which are often quite similar to those asked by Marion a 
SURSRVRIWKHVHOIWKDWPRWLYDWH&KUpWLHQ·VDUJXPHQWDQGDWWHPSWWRVKRZ
the manner in which he answers these questions (and not attend too directly 
to the answers themselves).  It is an approach Chrétien himself would like -- 
his aesthetic works (cf. Corps á corps or /¶$QWLSKRQDLUHGHODQXLW416) practice the 
altogether phenomenological art of focusing on but one corner of a mosaic, 
or on a single square inch of a landscape, to see what a few organizing details 
will reveal of the logic and form of the entire work. 
 :KDWLVLQLWLDOO\WKHPRVWVWULNLQJGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ0DULRQ·VDQG
&KUpWLHQ·VPRQRJUDSKVRQ$XJXVWLQHHPHUJHVLQWKHYHU\IRUPRIWKH
chapter titles:  in Au Lieu De Soi0DULRQ·VWLWOHVWDNHWKHIRUPRIGLVMXQFWLYHV
between an Augustinian theme (in Latin) and a proposed translation thereof 
LQWRSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOFDWHJRULHV´Veritas RUWKHVDWXUDWHGSKHQRPHQRQµ
IRUH[DPSOHRU´Confessio RUWKHUHGXFWLRQµZKHUHLQActes de Parole, Chrétien 
has chosen simple infinitives describing this or that act of the voice (so one 
ILQGVFKDSWHUVRQVXFKSUHGLFWDEOHWRSLFVDV´7HDFKLQJµDQG´%DSWL]LQJµEXW
DOVRWKHPRUHVXUSULVLQJ´(DWLQJDQG'ULQNLQJµDQG´%HOFKLQJµ2QHFRXOG
HDVLO\UHDGWRRPXFKLQWR0DULRQ·VUKHWRULFDODQGSKLORVRSKLFDOGHFLVLRQLWLs 
not the case that his disjunctives imply a contrast between veritas and the 
saturated phenomenon, nor even (as we have seen in Chapter 3 above) that 
0DULRQSUHIHUVKLVWHUPLQRORJ\WRWKDWRI$XJXVWLQH+RZHYHU&KUpWLHQ·V
less flexible chapter titling in fact gives him greater freedom to attend to 
                                                          
416 Paris: Eds. De Minuit, 1997 and Eds. 'H/·+HUQHUHVSHFWLYHO\ 
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many different aspects (the role of each infinitive within the canon of 
$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDVZHOODVWKHEURDGHUZD\LQZKLFK$XJXVWLQH·V
reflections on each can inform our own).  What comes to the surface of 
&KUpWLHQ·VERRNJLYHQWKHVHQVLWLYLW\RIKLVSUHVHQWDWLRQRI´D
SKHQRPHQRORJ\RIVSHHFKIROORZLQJWKHFRQQHFWLQJWKUHDGRILWVDFWVµLVD
portrait of Augustine, which attends to Augustine not only as a resource for 
philosophical reflection and argumentation, but also as a preacher, a bishop, 
an exegete and (above all) one who speaks in forums both public and 
familiar.417  $QGVRDOWKRXJK&KUpWLHQ·V$XJXVWLQHLVDGPLWWHGO\VWLOOUHDG
through sometimes Lutheran eyes (particularly, and unsurprisingly, 
Kierkegaardian eyes), he still surfaces as a richer and a fuller Augustine than 
the figure that Heidegger and Marion treat, a living character in a tradition 
which is equally full of life. 
 
Chrétien makes a clear and careful analysis of the extent to which 
Augustine anticipates phenomenological concerns 
 This tradition works, as it does for Marion, in two directions:  
looking forward from the Augustinian vantage point, Chrétien gestures 
WRZDUGV$XJXVWLQH·VUROHLQWKHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOWUDGLWLRQDQGORRNLQJ
backward, he considers the relationship of the hellenic and the biblical 
SKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWLRQVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDQGOLIH:HKHUHILUVW
consider the relatively few explicit movements towards phenomenology 
                                                          
417 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 8. 
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proper.  In the first of these, the Heideggerean description of questioning as 
¶WKHSLHW\RIWKRXJKW·418 LVIRU&KUpWLHQHPEOHPDWLFRI$XJXVWLQH·VULJRU
LQYRNHGUDWKHUFDVXDOO\ZLWKUHJDUGWR$XJXVWLQH·VGLVLQWHUHVWLQPDNLQJOLJKW
RIWKHTXHVWLRQDVWRZKDW*RGZDVGRLQJ¶EHIRUH·KHFUHDWHGWKHKHDYHQand 
the earth.419 Although the invocation appears to be offhand, it is well placed; 
&KUpWLHQGRHVQRWIDLOWRPHQWLRQWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VDSSURDFKLVQRWIROORZHG
by the entire Christian tradition, with Luther, for example, citing favorably 
the joke which Augustine only mentions in order to reject.  The implication 
is subtle but clear:  Luther, whom Heidegger holds, at various points in his 
career, in high esteem, fails in this questioning piety exactly where Augustine 
VXFFHHGV$XJXVWLQH·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDGPLW ignorance in the face of difficult 
TXHVWLRQVPDNHVSRVVLEOHD´EULOOLDQWPHGLWDWLRQµRQWLPHZKHUHWRGLVPLVV
WKHTXHVWLRQDVULGLFXORXVDV´SURXGRUYLROHQWµDPRXQWVWRD´VOLSSLQJDZD\
from the responsibility of speechµ420  In a similar manner, Chrétien claims an 
Augustinian heritage for the Heideggerean thought of listening as active, as 
´DQHYHQWµ+HLGHJJHUVD\V´$VORQJDVZHOLVWHQRQO\WRZRUGVDVWKH
expression of someone who speaks, we do not yet listen, we do not listen 
absolutely.  Never will we arrive in this way at truly having heard someone.  
When, then, have we heard?  We have heard when we make a part of what is 
said to us (wenn wir den Zugesprochenen gehörenµ421  This active and nearly 
                                                          
418    0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU´/DTXHVWLRQGHODWHFKQLTXHµLQEssais et conferences, trad. 
Preau (Paris, 1958), p. 48; collected in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), as The Question Concerning Technology, 321ff. 
419 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 19, citing Augustine, Conf. XI.12.14. 
420 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 19-20. 
421  +HLGHJJHU´4XHVWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWHFKQRORJ\µ-60. 
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agonic dimension of listening, in which every act of listening on my part, far 
from being a mere sensory perception or the imprinting of words or 
thoughts on my otherwise passive mind, is only taken up by my re-
articulating that to which I listen, and is indeed only taken up in order that I 
might respond to it, is of course a structure familiar to readers of The Call and 
the Response; the citation of Heidegger in this chapter of Actes de parole, 
sandwiched as it is between meditations on De doctrina christiana and on lines 
IURP$XJXVWLQH·VVHUPRQVVHUYHVto underline the vivid resonance of that 
work with the Augustinian corpus.  The same can be said for the very similar 
TXRWDWLRQIURP´:KDWLVDWKLQJ"µLQActes de Parole·VFKDSWHURQWHDFKLQJ 
7KHVWXGHQW¶GRHVQRWEHJLQWROHDUQH[FHSWZKHQKH
experiences what he takes as that which is already properly 
his.  There alone is the true learning, where one takes what 
one already has, that is, is given to oneself, and where this is 
experienced as such.  Teaching thus will say nothing other 
than letting others learn, that is, mutually standing to learn.  
Learning is more difficult than teaching, for only he who can 
truly learn ² and only so long as he can do this ² he alone is 
capable of teaching.422   
 
This thought, perhaps more easily linked to the Platonic thought of 
anamnesis, is for Chrétien most obviously relevant in a discussion of the 
Augustinian doctrine of Christ as the Truth, and thus as the true and only 
teacher in every student.  Finally, lest these attributions appear arbitrary, 
Chrétien makes a brieIDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI+HLGHJJHU·VRZQOHFWXUHVRI
Augustine,423 noting the centrality of the confessio as an integral and essential 
                                                          
422  Chrétien, Actes de Parole, FLWLQJ+HLGHJJHU´4X·HVW-FHTX·XQHFKRVH"µWUDQV
Reboul-Tasmania (Paris, 1971), p. 85; English translation in What is a thing? 
Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1968). 
423    Discussed above, Ch. 2. 
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part of the process of becoming a quaestio WRRQHVHOILQ+HLGHJJHU·VUHDGLQJ
For Heidegger and for Chrétien, the indispensable point, worth much 
DUJXPHQWZLWKWKHQHDUO\DOZD\VXQQDPHG´FRPPHQWDWRUVµLVWKDWWKH
quaestio mihi is not a natural or an inevitable stance:  even if one could imagine 
other ways in which a person could problematize herself, it remains that the 
double confession of sin and of praise is the mechanism by which Augustine 
arrives at this decisive formulation.424  &KUpWLHQ·VRYHUDOODVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOWUDGLWLRQ·VUHODWLRQVKLSLVWKXVDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\
Heideggerean in its scope, and largely positive in its determination.  He 
departs from both this scope and this determination only once, in reflecting 
RQ+XVVHUO·VVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWWUDFLQJRIWKH$XJXVWLQLDQLPSXOVHWR
thematize time by means of the song.425  The difference here is slight, in that 
Husserl, who, as we have seen, opens The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness ZLWKDQ´KRPDJHµWR$XJXVWLQHLQGLVSXWDEO\EHDUVWKHODWWHU·V
influence, not only in reflecting on the temporality of melodies, but in 
making of music in general a paradigm of the structure of temporality.  But 
the difference, or really the betrayal, of Augustine, remains important in 
&KUpWLHQ·VH\HVWRQRWHIRU+XVVHUOLWLVHQRXJKWRKHDUDVRQJLQRUGHUWR
experience and to meditate on the flux of temporality within the 
consciousness, whereas for Augustine, in line with the previous reflections 
on listening and learning, we must not only be gripped by the song, but 
actively grip it back and respond to it -- it is not only a matter of hearing the 
                                                          
424 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 131-2. 
425 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 150ff. 
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song of time, but more centrally of joining our voice in the choral song 
(which, moreover, is an image by which Chrétien will frequently signify his 
conception of philosophy).426 
 
&KUpWLHQ·VDFFRXQWRI3ODWRQLVPLQActes de Parole does not live up to 
the hermeneutical principles he has outlined, nor to his more generous 
and attentive approaches in his earlier books and essays 
 We may perhaps best illustrate this claim by turning now to the 
choral relationship which Augustine bears to both Hellenic and biblical 
figures of philosRSK\LQ&KUpWLHQ·VHVWLPDWLRQ:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHILUVW
&KUpWLHQUHVLVWVWKHLPSXOVHWRFRQVWUXFWDW\SRORJLFDODFFRXQWRI$XJXVWLQH·V
3ODWRQLVPRU6WRLFLVPRU3\WKDJRUHDQLVP«1HYHUWKHOHVVLWUHPDLQV
possible to generalize that for Chrétien, Augustine is generally aligned with 
the thought of (unsurprisingly) Plato and (more surprisingly) Heraclitus, and 
generally, if more subtly, distant from that of Plotinus.  Both Plato and 
Heraclitus figure in Actes de Parole in a way analogous to what we have just 
seen regarding Heidegger:  for the most part, their role is that of the casual 
citation, the broad thematic comparison, or the textual or accidental 
HQFRXQWHU)RUH[DPSOHLQ&KUpWLHQ·VWUHDWPHQWRIVSHHFKDVHGLEOHDQGDV
nourishing, he does not neglect to mention that there is some Platonic 
precedent in the discussion in the Phaedrus of the truth as nourishment;427 
much like this is his evocation of Laches DQG6RFUDWHV·GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHLGHDO
                                                          
426    Cf. e.g. The Call and the Response 29-32. 
427 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 38. 
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PXVLFLDQDVWKHRQHZKRLV´LVQRWFRQWHQWWRVHWWKHPRVWbeautiful harmony 
on his lyre or on some frivolous instrument, but who, in the reality of his life, 
VHWVLQDJUHHPHQWKLVVSHHFKHVDQGKLVDFWVµLQRUGHUWRGHPRQVWUDWH
SKLORVRSKLFDOSUHFHGHQWIRU$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRIH[LVWHQFHDQGSDUWLFXODU 
ethical existence, as musical.428  Heraclitus is often evoked in a similar 
manner, 429 and it is not clear how often Chrétien intends these evocations to 
be merely a demonstration of similarity for the benefit of the intellectually 
curious, and how often there is a more defensive apparatus at play, designed 
to protect Augustine from the charge of anti-intellectualism, or simply to 
define him as a philosopher worthy of philosophical attention.  In either 
event, the comparisons of Augustine to Plotinus are in the mode of a sharp 
contrast.  While Chrétien does not unequivocally deny a relationship, and 
even one of similarity and influence, between the two, and indeed he need 
not, as his meditations elsewhere430 on Plotinus are more careful and more 
generous than are some of the frightened caricatures thereof which permeate 
the philosophical and theological world, but his emphasis is nonetheless 
unflaggingly on the ruptures which Augustine makes with Plotinus.  These 
ruptures include the rejection of a brute Plotinian apophaticism as 
´SXVLOODQLPRXVµWKHWKRXJKWRIWKHinterior intimo meo as a dialectical 
progression, and thus to some extent a rejection, of Plotinian anthropology, 
the rejection of a Plotinian instrumental account of the body, and, most 
interestingly for our purpoVHVWKH´SHUIHFWDQGLUUHYHUVLEOHVHSDUDWLRQµRIWKH
                                                          
428 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 154. 
429  Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 28 and 193. 
430    )RUH[DPSOH´La beauté dit-elle adieu"µLQ/·$UFKHGH3DUROH, 105-149. 
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biblical metaphysics of creation from the thought of form and matter 
purportedly present in Plotinus.431  This last, occurring in the chapter on 
´5HFDOOLQJµGLVFORVHVPRUHWKDQWKHRWKHUVWKHRYHU-argument, disappointing 
from such a thinker who so often presents shrewd and convincing readings, 
rather than exaggerated cartoons, of the Platonic tradition:  the biblical 
DFFRXQWRIYHUEDOFUHDWLRQDQGHVSHFLDOO\$XJXVWLQH·VUHIOHFWLRQVRQLWIURP
the Confessions to De genesi ad litteram, has seemed to many (both supporters 
and detractors RIDORRVHO\GHILQHG¶3ODWRQLVP·) to support, to include, or to 
UHIRUPD3ORWLQLDQPHWDSK\VLFVDQG&KUpWLHQ·VIDLOXUHRUUHIXVDOWRGHVFULEH
what facet or passage of the Enneads is allegedly displaced or subverted by 
this account is a failure of argument, and a failure of hospitality.   
 
,QVWHDG&KUpWLHQ·VHPSKDVLVRQELEOLFDOUDWKHUWKDQ3ODWRQLFVRXUFHV
underscores his understanding of Augustine as a resolutely scriptural 
philosopher 
 But where Chrétien has failed, in this instance, in practice is precisely 
where he has succeeded in principle:  the elaboration of a structure in which 
philosophy, understood here metonymically as the Greek language, can be 
welcomed into Christian revelation is a commitment which Chrétien rightly 
espouses (the reader need hardly be reminded of the instructive contrast here 
ZLWK0DULRQDQGKLVIODWUHIXVDORIDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKLV´Saint Augustin ne parle 
SDVOHODQJXH¶JUHF·µ,QZKDWIROORZs, I will present the ways in which 
                                                          
431 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 96, 220, 266, 213ff., respectively. 
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&KUpWLHQ·V$XJXVWLQHKDVXVHGELEOLFDOILJXUHVWRHODERUDWHDTXDVL-
phenomenology of speech, this being made possible at the theoretical level 
E\&KUpWLHQ·VLQFLVLYHWKRXJKWRIWUDQVODWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKDQ\VSHHFK
(including philosophical speech) is necessarily translated from one 
idiosyncratic language of thought into another, both in the passing of 
WKRXJKWLQWRVSHHFKDQGLQWKDWRIVSHHFKLQWRWKHOLVWHQHU·VODQJXDJH,QD
rather sanguine rhetorical flourish, Chrétien closes the chapter devoted to 
expanding this thesis by reminding the Christian tradition that it, less than 
any other, needs to be afraid of such linguistic, conceptual or existential 
translation, being founded as it is on the teachings of one who immediately 
and permanently expresses himself in a foreign language:  they  
«RQO\NQRZWKHVSHHFKHVRI&KULVWLQ*UHHNWKDWLVLQD
translation, and in a translation of which God did not want us 
WRKDYHWKHRULJLQDO«$WWKH$VFHQVLRQLWLVQRWRQO\KLV 
glorious body which has disappeared from our eyes, it is also 
the intonation of his voice, as well as the flesh of his 
speeches, in the language which he spoke.  This is 
irreversible.  His speeches come back to life in Greek, in a 
translation which, for the faithful, is forever the original of 
the Spirit.432   
 
That the New Testament (and, for Augustine, the most authoritative 
translation of the Hebrew Scriptures) were written and preserved only and 
originally in the language of philosophy bears further thought.  But such is 
QRW&KUpWLHQ·VSURMHFWDWOHDVWQRWLQActes de Parole,433 which restricts itself to 
VHYHUDOH[HJHVHVLQVSLUHGE\$XJXVWLQH·VRZQRISDUWLFXODUELEOLFDOSDVVDJHV
or figurae: to these we now briefly turn. 
                                                          
432 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 74. 
433    He does gesture further in this direction in the collection of essays, Sous le regard 
de la Bible (Paris:  Bayard, 2008). 
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 &KUpWLHQ·VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH$XJXstinian reading of the Bible is 
sometimes difficult to disentangle from his own treatment of the Bible; both 
are marked by a remarkable ingenuity and a flexibility of approach.  This is 
GXHDWOHDVWLQSDUWWR&KUpWLHQ·VWKRXJKWIXOVHQVLWLYLW\WR$XJXVWLQH·V
continual reflection on the concrete practice of reading.  It is perhaps no 
accident that, of the few English books on Augustine which he cites, Brian 
6WRFN·VAugustine the Reader,434 which has not received the attention it is due in 
the Anglophone world, JHWV&KUpWLHQ·VFDUHIXODWWHQWLRQDQGDSSUREDWLRQLQ
it, Chrétien has found a meticulous deliberation of the various modes of 
reading (of Scripture, but also of the world and even of God) which 
Augustine both authorizes and practices.  Chrétien is particularly receptive to 
the Augustinian insight of the Bible as a hospitable text, worthy of the trust 
that the most difficult passages can, with the attention the time that they 
invite, emerge to be seen as the most rewarding for thought.435  Indeed this is 
of a piece with the insight, acknowledged but hardly elaborated by Chrétien, 
that a text may, without recourse to deliberate allegorical reading, bear 
PXOWLSOH´OLWHUDOµVLJQLILFDWLRQV:436  this, which as we will see more deeply in 
the final chapter of the present essay, is for Augustine one of the most 
LPSRUWDQWVKDGHVRIPHDQLQJSUHVHQWLQWKHDFFRXQWLQ*HQHVLVRIFUHDWLRQ·V
fertility.437  But the difficulties which the interpreter encounters, faced with 
                                                          
434    Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998). 
435 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 56. 
436 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 178. 
437    Cf. Conf. XII in its entirety, and of course De genesi ad litteram, whose very title 
displays the at times surprising elasticity with which Augustine applies the latter 
term. 
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such a rapidly multiplying fecundity of meaning, are not to be conceived as a 
´YHLOµRUHOVHDVDFKDOOHQJHH[WHUQDOWRWKHUHDGHUDV&KUpWLHQUHPDUNVZLWK
regard to the Apostle John, here functioning as a paradigm of all biblical 
philosophy, to speak forth an interpretation of the text is only possible for 
him who rests most comfortably on the bosom of the Word.438  The 
difficulty of reading, even of reading the Bible, is not separable from the 
quaestio mihi, the interrogation of the self, although due to his insistent focus 
on the linguistic interpermeability of self and world, this inseparability is not 
for Chrétien nearly as interesting as it may have been in the more exclusively 
subjective hands of Husserl or Marion.  With this in mind, we can here 
H[DPLQH&KUpWLHQ·VLQWHUURJDWLRQVRIELEOLFDOILJXUHVEHJLnning with those 
which he uses most locally, in order to demonstrate or illustrate particular 
facets of particular acts of speech, and progressing to those which he 
considers, in their most general aspects, as the most disclosive of a proper 
phenomenology of speech.  Lest the former, more local class be seen as 
UHODWLYHO\XQLPSRUWDQWZLWKLQ&KUpWLHQ·VWKRXJKWOHWLWEHUHPHPEHUHGKRZ
deeply certain biblical phrases (most evidently, those taken from the psalms) 
impact the shape and flow of the text of the Confessions:  though direct and 
explicit exegetical interaction with the psalms, in a mode similar to that 
applied to Genesis in the final two books, is absent from the Confessions, we 
QHHGQ·WORRNDVIDUDVWKHEnarrationes or the Sermones for serious reflection on 
the psalms.  In actuality, in a different modality, the burden of the Confessions 
LVODUJHO\WRH[SRVLWWKHSVDOPVWKURXJK$XJXVWLQH·VOLIHLIQRWWKURXJKKLV
                                                          
438 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 61-2 
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considerable exegetical talent.  Such ought to remind us that, amongst 
various modes oIUHDGLQJ6FULSWXUHWKH´OLWHUDOµRUVFLHQWLILFLVQRWIRU
Augustine or for Chrétien, necessarily the most revealing or satisfying, and 
the brief and offhand invocation of a scriptural figure or story can, in its very 
familiarity and peripheral ease, be well worth our attention.  Such is the case, 
for example, with the figure of Adam as an exemplification of the 
H[KRUWDWLRQWR¶H[XOWZLWKWUHPEOLQJ·439  WKLVSKUDVH·VDSSHDUDQFHLQWKH
psalms, and especially its application440 to the pre-lapsarian Adam, suggests 
for Chrétien that this description, of a fearful and unstable joy in the 
presence of God, divulges an essential dimension of humanity.  Similarly, 
Chrétien notes that the Johannine description of John the Baptist as 
´UHMRLFLQJZLWKMR\gaudio gaudetµ441 is not to be taken in isolation from its 
context, in which case it would be a rather precious rhetorical flourish at 
EHVWLWLVUDWKHUWREHXQGHUVWDQGDVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHVWDWXVRI´VWDQGLQJ
DQGOLVWHQLQJµZKLFKSUHFHGHVLWLQWKHJRVSHO-- to rejoice with joy is in a 
UHODWLRQRIDSSRVLWLRQWR´VWDQGLQJDQGOLVWHQLQJµDQGVWDQGLQJOLWHUDOO\DQG
physically, is itself for Chrétien dependent on a prior phenomenological 
stance of listening.442  This sort of reading, rather casual in its tone, even if we 
musWDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWDJUDPPDWLFDODSSURDFKVWLOOOHVVDQ´KLVWRULFDOµ
approach, as this is generally known) neither supports nor negates it, 
                                                          
439    Ps 2.11, discussed briefly in Actes de Parole 130-1, and with a more sustained 
attention in /HUHJDUGGHO·DPRXU(Paris:  Desclée de Brouwer, 2000), 55 ff. 
440    Augustine, De genesi ad litteram XI.17.24. 
441    John 3.29. 
442    Tractates on the Gospel of John XIII.12.  This reflection opens, and is sustained 
throughout, Ch. 2 of Actes de Parole  (pp. 25-35). 
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inarguably illustrates the Augustinian thought of joy, and without question is 
LQVSLUHGE\$XJXVWLQH·VRZQUHDGLQJV of Scripture.  Similar points could be 
PDGHRI&KUpWLHQ·VUHPDUNVRQ-REDVDfigure of ontological humility,443 on 
Lazarus as an illustration of confession DVD´UHVXUUHFWLRQµRIVSHHFK,444 on 
the Lukan parables of request as a moral and a phenomenological 
exhortation towards persistence in attention,445 and perhaps the most sharply, 
because it is one of the more entertainingly unpredictable moments in Actes 
de Parole, on the Levitical dietary proscription of eating non-chewing animals 
as a positive assessment of ´FKHZLQJµDVDQDFWRIVSHHFK.446  He will make 
similar remarks, with little shift in tone, regarding Christ as a character on 
this phenomenological stage -- for example, in his silence in the manger or 
on the cross, as an example (indeed the founding paradigm) of silence as a 
particularly plentiful act of speech.447 
 None of this is meant to imply that Chrétien is insensitive or 
LQDWWHQWLYHWR$XJXVWLQH·VPRUHSURORQJHGDQGV\VWHPDWLFUHDGLQJVRI
Scripture, as for example when he draws attention to the Augustinian 
account of Mary and Martha as figurae of the active and contemplative lives.448  
&KUpWLHQQRWHVWKDWLQOLHXRIWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOUHQGHULQJRI&KULVW·V
ZRUGVWR0DUWKDDVIDYRULQJWKHFRQWHPSODWLYHOLIHKHUHILJXUHGLQWKH´RQH
WKLQJQHHGIXOµWRWKHDFWLYH$XJXVWLQH·VDSSURDFKUHMHFWVWKHSDWKRI
                                                          
443 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 175. 
444 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 124. 
445 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 188-9. 
446 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 51. 
447 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 101ff. 
448 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 31ff. 
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UHDGLQJWKHWZRVLVWHUVDV´WZRSRVVLELOLWLHVRIH[LVWHQFHRUIDLWKEHWZHHQ
ZKLFKZHPXVWKHUHDQGQRZGHFLGHµSRVLWLQJ0DU\DVDILJXUHRIHWHUQDO
life, a contemplation in which we can participate only to the extent that we, 
like Martha, are actively hospitable to the images of Christ which we 
encounter in our temporal life.  Even here, then, in a more historically based 
UHDGLQJ&KUpWLHQ·VDWWHQWLRQWRWKH$XJXVWLQLDQVFULSWXUHKDVLQLWVSHULSKHUDl 
vision the more properly existential dimension of the characters of the 
gospel, and of their words.  This is even more the case in two references 
PDGHWR3HWHU,QWKHILUVW$XJXVWLQHLQWHUSUHWV&KULVW·VUHEXNHRI3HWHUMXVW
on the heels of his confession of Christ as the Messiah, as signifying that 
3HWHU·VZRUGVFDQDVHDVLO\FRPHIURP*RGDVWKH\FDQFRPHIURPKLPVHOI
LQHLWKHUFDVHKDYLQJH[LVWHQWLDOLPSRUW´,WLVUHDOO\DPDWWHURIOLIHDQGGHDWK
As soon as he speaks from himself, Peter immediDWHO\IDOOVµ449  In the 
second, Augustine contrasts the Petrine denial of Christ during the Passion 
with the aforementioned confession of faith:  the former makes evident that 
3HWHU·VRZQZRUGVFRPHIURPOLHVDQGIURPFRZDUGLFHEXWWKHODWWHUGLVSOD\V
the wholly spiritual power of speech to testify to the truth, and to transform 
Peter, in his entire person, into this testimony.450  Chrétien remarks the 
compatibility of this reading with the Pauline interrogation, dear to Marion:  
´:KDWGR\RXKDYHWKDW\RXKDYHQRWUHFHLYHG"µ&RU
Correspondingly, in a very different passage of Scripture, Augustine finds an 
apt metaphor for and illustration of speech in the figure of Jacob (in 
                                                          
449 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 117. 
450 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 145. 
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$XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJIsrael, which he translates (following Jerome) as videns 
deum.  Unsurprisingly, for the author of La parole blessée SHUKDSV&KUpWLHQ·V
most widely read piece, at least in the English-speaking world, due to its 
inclusion in the Janicaud collection)451$XJXVWLQH·VH[SRVLWLRQRI-DFREDV
blessed to the precise extent that he is wounded in wrestling with the 
stranger warrants at least a brief meditation.  This he accomplishes, following 
Augustine closely, by comparing it with the other blessing which Jacob 
obtains violently:  that of Isaac, blessing his son:  in both cases, Augustine 
GHFOLQHVWRHYDOXDWH-DFRE·VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHEOHVVLQJVRQDPRUDOUHJLVWHU
(in the first instance, by means of violence; in the second, by means of 
deceit), opting instead to listen to what these stories reveal about the blessing 
prRSHULWIDOOVWR,VDDF´QRWWREOHVVKLVVRQVE\UHFRJQL]LQJWKHPEXWWR
UHFRJQL]HWKHPE\EOHVVLQJWKHPµ452  The act of speech under consideration 
here, namely blessing, founds and sets the conditions of the secondary act of 
recognition; this biblical philosophy of speech likewise only reveals itself to 
the reader who is prepared to receive the story as a blessing first. 
 The above examples have shown the degree to which Chrétien 
appreciates the phenomenological weight of the words and figures of 
Scripture.  But one more class of biblical texts remains for our discussion, 
that in which speech is itself the subject of the action.  Of these, in the 
beginning it is necessary to address the theme of speech in creation, evoked 
above with respect to the fertility of creation and the multiplicity of 
                                                          
451 3KHQRPHQRORJ\DQGWKH´7KHRORJLFDO7XUQ7KH)UHQFK'HEDWH (New York:  Fordham 
University Press, 2000), 147-175. 
452    Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 178, citing Augustine, Conf. X.34.52. 
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meanings.  Chrétien deals with this under the type of paradox, or of 
circularity:  in speech, since its first biblical manifestation appears in a 
FUHDWLYHPRGH´WKHUHLVWKXVDPXOWLSOLFLW\RIVLJQVSRVVLEOHIRURQHsame 
sense, and a multiplicity of sense possible for the same signs.µ453  Strictly 
VSHDNLQJ&KUpWLHQ·VJORVVKHUHRQConfessions XIII.24.36 applies first in the 
intellectual sphere, since it is a matter of meanings; however, Chrétien never 
LQYRNHV¶VHQVH·Zithout a purpose, and the immediate context (a discussion 
of fertility and sexual generativity) makes it clear that this intellectual and 
linguistic multiplication is a metaphor for a more primary corporeal 
generation:  signs and senses alike are productive and reproductive.  A similar 
circularity between the intellectual and the sensory is at play in the 
Augustinian Eden:  the first page of Actes de Parole, and indeed the first 
FLWDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQHPDGHWKHUHLQLQYRNHV$GDP·VPDQXDOODERXUDVD
´TXHVWLRQLQJµRIWKHSRWHQWLDOLW\RIWKHURRWVVKUXEVDQGSODQWVSUHVHQWHGWR
him in Eden.  Chrétien here allows his earlier focus, in /¶$UFKHGH3DUROH,454 on 
$GDP·VZRUNDVSULPDULO\naming the animals to be supplemented by the 
more acutely Augustinian description of Adamic reason as manual and 
interrogative:455  but in both books, he incisively displays an insight that 
SKLORVRSKLFDOHODERUDWLRQRQ*HQHVLV·ZRUGVDERXW$GDPDUHDSULPDU\
locus, and a rich starting point, for Christian anthropology.  But it is not 
enough:  neither Chrétien nor Augustine are content with an Adamic 
anthropology, nor an Adamic account of speech, and this is not simply due 
                                                          
453 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 180. 
454    Chrétien, /·$UFKH, 2-9, and passim. 
455    Cf. Augustine, De genesi ad litteram VIII.8.16, and below, Chap. 5. 
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WRVRPHUHDORULPDJLQHGSHVVLPLVPZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHIDOO&KUpWLHQ·V
reflections on Babel, and on the transformation from one language to diverse 
ODQJXDJHVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKLVZHOODOWKRXJKLQKLVFKDSWHURQ´7UDQVODWLQJµ
he draws chiefly on De civitate dei to meditate on the diversity of speech as a 
punishment, Chrétien does not rest with an undemanding binary between the 
goodness of simplicity in Edenic speech on the one hand, and on the other 
the evil of plurality in Babelic speech.  Rather, he exhibits the catholicity of 
VSHHFKSUHVHQWHGE\$XJXVWLQH·VWUHDWPHQt of the narrative of Pentecost:456  
this inventive comSDULVRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VWUHDWPHQWRI%DEHOZLWKWKDWRI
Pentecost makes of Babel an original glossolalia, a sort of felix culpa of 
VSHHFK´7KDWDOOKXPDQODQJXDJHVFDQWUDQVODWHWKHVSHHFKRI*RGDQG
produce it by the human efforts of translation:  this multiplies the blessing 
instead of fragmenting itµ457 
 The link which entangles Adam with the church of Pentecost is, of 
course, Christ, and no Christian philosophy of parole could hesitate to invoke 
Christ as logos.  Chrétien does not fail in this regard:  one has the 
considerations one would expect, on for example the paradoxical or 
oxymoronic aspects of the Word being silent or silenced,458 or on the Word 
inviting us to pray his words and make them our own.459  But here, too, 
Chrétien is on guard against making of Augustine an excessively 
&KULVWRFHQWULFWKLQNHUDWWHQWLRQWR&KULVWDQGSDUWLFXODUO\WR&KULVW·VOLIH
                                                          
456 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 66ff. 
457 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 71. 
458 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 101. 
459 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 185. 
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GHVFULEHGDVD´FU\µ460 directs attention away from Christ.  The structure of 
WKHFU\RSHUDWHVLQDQHDUO\GLDOHFWLFPDQQHU´<HVKHKDVOHIWDnd look, he 
LVKHUHµ461  7KH¶FU\·ZKLFK&KULVW·VOLIHSUHVHQWVLVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VH\HVILUVWD
FU\HQFRXUDJLQJWKHUHFLSLHQWRIWKHFU\WR´UHWXUQWRRXUKHDUWut redeamus ad 
corµEXWLQNHHSLQJZLWK&KUpWLHQ·VLQVLVWHQFHVKDUHGZLWK0DULRQWKDWWKH
interior intimo meo always be read with its accompanying superior summo meo) this 
´UHWXUQµKDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKDEHQLJQLQWURVSHFWLRQ,QVWHDGWKHFU\
which occasions it breaks any quiet solitude which could facilitate 
introspection to begin with.  When the cry overlaps perfectly with God, as it 
GRHVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VLPDJLQDWLYHUHDGLQJRIWKHOLIHRI&KULVWIURPFRQFHSWLRQ
to ascension, the divine cry need not come from one of the predictable 
sources, whether it be mystical experience or biblical text:  ´LQWKHOLIHRIWKH
Word, all is word, all speaks, all bursts in a radically new sense.µ462 
 
Chrétien makes a counter-intuitive connection between silence and 
communal being 
 ,QWKHIRUHJRLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSLQ&KUpWLHQ·V
handling of AugusWLQH·VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQRUIRUHVKDGRZLQJRIWKH
phenomenological, Platonist and biblical traditions, I have run the risk of 
tending to the artificially abstract.  This has been necessary, but the contours 
of Actes de Parole render it equally necessary to correct this tendency, taking as 
                                                          
460    In Conf. IV.11.16, a passage which Chrétien invokes no fewer than twice in 
Actes de Parole DV´DVWRQLVKLQJµ-1). 
461      Conf. IV.12.19, cited in Actes de Parole 221. 
462 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 163. 
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they do both their methodological starting questions (what is the voice of a 
particular human being capable of?) and their subject matter (when 
FRPSDUHGWR+HLGHJJHUDQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQW0DULRQ&KUpWLHQ·VDQDO\VLV
draws much more frequently from the various sermones and enarrationes which 
Augustine delivered in voce sua) from Augustine considered not as a 
representative of doctrines, whether these be philosophical or theological, 
but as a discrete, particular, locally and temporally bound man:  in short, not 
an Augustine of Augustinianisms as much as an Aurelius Augustinus.  
Chrétien approaches this with a considerable amount of care, wisely skeptical 
RIDQ\´SV\FKRORJL]LQJµLPSXOVH463 WRWU\WRH[SODLQDQ\RI$XJXVWLQH·V
preaching or thought exclusively and exhaustively in terms of, for example, 
his relationship to Monica.  The moral or psychological approach to 
Augustine, which is still de rigueur in much of the Anglo-American world, in 
fact for Chrétien obscures a real and really embodied portrait of Augustine, 
to whom such an approach would undoubtedly have been foreign, tending or 
pretending to portray only his inner life with little regard for his public 
existence.  The whole of Actes de Parole of course aims to portray a sort of 
meta-$XJXVWLQLDQWKRXJKWRIVSHHFKUHO\LQJDVLWGRHVRQ$XJXVWLQH·V
VSHHFKHVDERXWVSHHFKHVRQO\QRZDQGWKHQGRHV&KUpWLHQ·VDQDO\VLVGURS
down from this reflexive level to make comments on the context and tone of 
                                                          
463    Such a skepticism appears to Chrétien to be especially applicable when we 
FRQVLGHUWKRVH$XJXVWLQLDQWHDFKLQJVZKLFKRQWKHVXUIDFHVHHPWREH¶PRUDO¶
doctrines but which upon further thought bear phenomenological or existential 
LPSRUW6XFKLVWKHFDVHIRUH[DPSOHZLWK$XJXVWLQH·VFDUHHU-long preoccupation 
with lying as not simply an act but a mode and attitude of being:  cf. Chrétien, Actes 
de Parole, 113-120, and similar warnings on 16, 52, 69, 81, 95, 130, 138, 147n.3.  
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these speeches themselves, and on what these can communicate of 
$XJXVWLQH·VKLVWRULFDOVHOI2IWKHVHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIRU&KUpWLHQDQG
that to which he returns most frequently464 is the wistful or regretful tonality 
with which Augustine will insist that he wishes he could more frequently be 
silent.  Chrétien , whose thought especially in The Call and the Response and The 
Ark of Speech has persistently identified and emphasized silence, listening and 
reading as not only paradoxically forms of speech, but as the forms of speech 
which render possible the speeches which more naturally occur to us, is 
keenly aware of this seeming irony:  that Augustine, one of the most prolific 
ZULWHUVDQGVSHDNHUVRIWKHDQFLHQWZRUOGZKRVH´RUDORHXYUHµ&KUpWLHQ·V
term for the even-today growing nuPEHURIWUDQVFULSWLRQVRI$XJXVWLQH·V
speeches and sermons, which also often record the responses of his 
audiences) surpasses that of any other, will frequently lament that his post as 
bishop forces him to speak more often than he can listen, and to write more 
often than he can read.  This irony has, however, a nearly dialectical 
UHVROXWLRQDQGRQHZKLFKOLHVFORVHWRWKHFRUHRI&KUpWLHQ·VSKHQRPHQRORJ\
of speech:  the more Augustine speaks, the more he is aware of the limits of 
his speech, and thus the less authority he presumes.  This dimension of 
speech, as the famous exhortation of De doctrina christiana puts it, will make a 
speaker (dictor) only from a listener and a prayer (orator),465 and with regard to 
the divine speech, has an egalitarianizing impact on the relationship between 
WKHVSHDNHUDQGKLVDXGLHQFH&KUpWLHQLQYRNHVLQWKLVUHJDUG$XJXVWLQH·V
                                                          
464 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 27, 54, and 91-2. 
465    Augustine, De doctrina christiana IV.25, 27. 
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memorable description of himself and his audience as condiscipuli.466 The 
participatory element here could be easily missed -- HYHQ$XJXVWLQH·VSK\VLFDO
VWDQGLQJLQWKHSXOSLWGHSHQGVRQERWKKLVDQGKLVDXGLHQFH·VVWDQGLQJLQWKH
truth, and participating, by listening and responding, in Christ as the Word:  
WKXV&KUpWLHQTXRWHVDVHUPRQVD\LQJWKDW´LI&KULVWZHUHQRZVLOHQW
Scripture would not speak.  The reader goes up to the tribune, and he is not 
silent.  The preacher speaks, if he speaks in truth, it is Christ who speaks.  If 
Christ were silent, I myself would not be able to say this to you.  And he has 
not put silence in your mouth:  for when you sing all the time, it is he who 
speaks.µ467 This reflection on a speaking silence (and the desire for it) as the 
paradigmatic way of imagining the historical Augustine reaches its 
FXOPLQDWLRQLQ&KUpWLHQ·VDFFRXQWLQWKH2VWLDQDUUDWLYH.468 Chrétien rather 
dismissively eschews the numerous attempts to place the visio which 
Augustine and Monica share in the context of mystic visions or Platonic 
ascents, calling our sole attention to the prayer to silence which begins the 
DFFRXQW´,IDQ\RQHFDQVLOHQFHsileat) the tumult of the flesh, silence the 
images of the earth and the waters and the air, silence even the heavens, and 
if the soul also in the self were silenced, and surpassed by not thinking any 
more of itself, silenced the songs and the visions of the imagiQDWLRQ«µ$QG
in keeping with the persistent contention that silence need not itself be silent, 
&KUpWLHQDUJXHV´)RU$XJXVWLQHWKLVVLOHQFHEHFRPHVWKHLUVLOHQFHLQXVDQG
our silences also, an empty welcoming which is the space of resonance for a 
                                                          
466 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 28 and 108ff. 
467 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 34, citing Augustine, Sermo 17.8. 
468 Augustine, Conf. IX.10.24. 
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higher speech.µ469  Instead of or in spite of the more common intellectual 
DFFHQWVRQ2VWLD·VDVFHQW&KUpWLHQ·VUH-telling of the ascent is one which 
SDVVHVWKURXJKVLOHQFHWRWKLVKLJKHUVSHHFKZKLFK´ZHPXVWZLWKRXWHQGWU\
to say, though it cannot be altogeWKHUVDLGµ470  Such a restless silence is, as 
intimated above, present only in bodies -- both in the individual bodies 
ZKLFKZHFRPSULVHDQGLQWKHVRFLDODQGHFFOHVLDOERG\RI&KULVW&KUpWLHQ·V
Augustine is thus a theoretician as much of the speaking body as of the silent 
mind, and his account of the real voice and sonority which is present in the 
ERG\DQGLQERGLHVJLYHVDQHZLILQGLUHFWUHQGHULQJRI$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW
of the role which corporeality plays in speech.   
This arises first, and most strikingly, in a series of brief chapters (3-5) 
in which Chrétien explicates and meditates on the Augustinian usage of 
eating and drinking, chewing and belching as acts of speech.  Although 
Chrétien claims to be reading Augustine as speaking of them literally and 
physically, it is sufficient to read them as particularly acute metaphors for the 
ingestion, rumination and re-issuing of speech, so long as one does not 
dismiss them as purely psychological due to an embarrassment of their 
supposed crudity;471 even their use as metaphors would be enough to 
VDIHJXDUGWKHFRUSRUHDOLW\RI$XJXVWLQH·VVSHHFK2IWKHVHWKHILUVWHDWLQJ
and drinking) is principally for Chrétien the occasion to deliberate the 
Augustinian contours of hunger and thirst, and thus most primarily of desire, 
as modalities by which we relate to speech; that we hunger and thirst for 
                                                          
469 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 99. 
470 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 104. 
471 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 52. 
  
 
 
204 
 
speech, and for the nourishment of words in general and the Word in 
SDUWLFXODUWKDWLVWKH¶EUHDGRIWKHDQJHOV·LVDFRQVWDQWWKHPHIRU$XJXVWLQH
because it is first a constant Pauline topos.  Chrétien similarly reads 
$XJXVWLQH·VIDPRXVGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH(XFKDULVWLQ&KULVW·VLPDJLQHGZRUGV
´$QG\RXZLOOQRWFKDQJHPHLQWR\RXUVHOIDV\RXGRZLWKWKHIRRGRIWKH
flesh, but it is you who will be changed into meµ472) as equally true of speech 
LQLWVEURDGHVWGHILQLWLRQ´ZHPDNH>VSHHFK@HQWHULQWRXVLQVXFKDZD\WKDW
it becomes a part and a component of ourselves; inversely, we are assimilated 
WRLWDVIDUDVSRVVLEOH«µ.473  Speech, especially when regarded with a view to 
the bodily dimensions thereof, is thus a matter both of growth and of 
unification:  this is developed under the rubric of ruminatio, of the chewing of 
speech.   In the final movement of this trilogy in miniature, that of the 
¶EHOFKLQJ·RIVSHHFK-- Chrétien does not apologize for the rudeness of this:  
it is as biblical as it is Augustinian, and he notes that the great majority of 
Augustinian evocations of eructatio UHIHUWRWKHSURORJXHWR-RKQ·V*RVSHO
perhaps the loftiest and most philosophical passage of Scripture, which 
Augustine will frequently claim to be belched forth from the mouth of the 
GLVFLSOHZKRUHVWLQJRQ&KULVW·VERVRPGUDQNWKHUHIURPWKHVRXUFH--474 the 
speech which has, in being assimilated to the body and the soul in the 
process of rumination actively becomes the preaching of that soul and that 
body.  The main phenomenological point made here, which stands to be 
                                                          
472 Augustine, Conf. VII.10.16. 
473 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 45. 
474    Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John ´«ZKDWKHKDVGUXQNLQ
secret, he belched forth in broad daylight (quod in secreto bibit, in manifesto erucativitµ 
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missed either due to our discomfort with the impolite image or to its very 
obviousness, is one very familiar from The Call and the Response:  just as one 
cannot drink a fizzy beverage without a constitutive esophagal response, one 
cannot hear or listen to speech without also speaking forth, and any body 
which is not speaking has not truly heard.  This necessary progression from 
internal to external, from in secreto to in manifesto, is like the rumination of 
speech chiefly framed in terms of unification and sharing, but it crucially 
GRHVQRWOHDYHWKHUHDOPRILQWHULRULW\EHKLQGVXFKLV&KUpWLHQ·V
interpretation of the Augustinian heart, an important concept which as both 
corporeal and internal complicates any bifurcation between the exterior and 
bodily on the one hand and the interior and spiritual on the other.475  
 
Such a communal being is at heart ecclesial and liturgical, for Chrétien 
as for Augustine 
 This complication is of a piece with the complicated relationship, 
often evoked by Chrétien as an entrelacement, between the immanent and the 
transcendent.  While a fuller exposition of this central theme will be delayed 
for the moment, we can note on the related note of the fleshly heart that, 
although Augustine does often distinguish between the heart and the flesh 
(as for example in the distinction between the petitiones carnis and the petitiones 
cordis476), these are opposed not in any essential modality but only in the 
object of their request -- the requesting for gifts of God in the former case, 
                                                          
475 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 86.  This is also why my body is able, even while I sleep, 
to bless:  Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 174. 
476 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 188ff. 
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and of God himself in the latter.  And, as Chrétien will go on to argue, 
$XJXVWLQH·VGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHUHTXHVWLQJRI*RGZKLOHWKis extends down 
to the deepest desire of the flesh (a thought he takes from Psalm 63), only 
takes its impulse and its fulfilment from an intra-Trinitarian request,477 in 
which all of our requests -- IRU*RGRUIRU*RG·VJLIWV-- must participate 
even to exist.  Perhaps the clearest examples of this logic emerge in liturgical 
formats:  for example the resurrection of the body which occurs in the 
confession of sin as a participation in the incarnation of Christ,478 or the 
amalgamation of the physical and the spiritual which emerges from 
$XJXVWLQH·VPHGLWDWLRQVRQWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ&KULVWZKLFKEDSWLVPIRUPV
In this latter, Chrétien notes, Augustine will not permit a dualistic opposition 
between water and speech as respectively a material and a spiritual element, 
primarily because the water of baptism is also spiritual, and (most relevantly 
here) speech is also and equally bodily, and secondarily because both are 
temporal.  Temporality is in the end the heart of this liturgical dimension of 
speech, just as it will surface as the heart of the phenomenological tradition.  
So it is that Chrétien returns, in the exposition of the songs of the church, to 
the Husserlian invocation of the song as the essential example of time.479  In 
a passage regarding the song, as memorable as it is worthy of citing at length, 
he brings out the force and concentration of the Augustinian intermingling 
of the sensory and the spiritual in music: 
                                                          
477 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 190. 
478 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 215ff. 
479 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 150ff. 
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Singing is making what we most intimately are, and what we 
most secretly experience, rise from the chest and the throat 
and resonate in space and in the world.  The joy or the 
sadness of a song is heard in the first instant, and is imposed 
ZLWKDQREYLRXVQHVVZKLFKLVPXVLF·VRZQ7KHYRLFHVHHPV
to be forgotten in its own song, and as to be lost, it which 
leaves no trace, in its own manifestation.  This manifestation 
is at the same time intensely spiritual and intensely sensible.  
Spiritual, for, like dance, it does nothing but pass, it fades as it 
is manifest, and can only be manifest:  it opens onto nothing, 
it has nothing to do with changing any aspect of the world 
when its resonances fades out.  Sensible, even sensual, for 
what is more nude and more carnal than song?480   
 
And it is also with regard to the musical, in particular with regard to the last 
passage of the Enarrationes in psalmos in which Augustine describes and 
H[KRUWVWKHSUDLVHRIWKHWUXPSHWWKHKDUSWKHO\UHDQGWKHUHVWRI'DYLG·V
primitive symphony, that Chrétien closes Actes de Parole with a meditation on 
rejoicing.  For Chrétien, the two Augustinian approaches to the symphony 
evoked in Psalm 150 easily shift from one into the other.  On the one hand, 
Augustine sometimes reads the instruments as images of the individual body 
(for example, the cymbals are a presentation of the lips, because both species 
require a duality in order to make a sound).  On the other, they are 
sometimes for him an image of the whole of humanity in the ecclesial body.  
In both interpretations, the central meaning of the image of a symphony is 
that of harmony and reciprocality, and the near perfect overlapping of these 
interpretations, shows the extent to which Chrétien appreciates the hardy 
literality with which Augustine takes the metaphor of the church as the body 
of Christ.  This emerges in Actes de Parole with a degree of frequency far 
                                                          
480 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 151, citing Augustine, Conf. X.33.50. 
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outstripping the need to document it completely; we can note in passing its 
most striking examples -- WKDWRI$XJXVWLQH·VLQIRUPLQJKLVFRQJUHJDWLRQ
that, due to their participation in the universal ecclesial body, they each 
individually have a share in the perfectly polyglot nature of Pentecost,481 and, 
LQRUGHUWREULQJRXWWKHLQWHQVHO\FRUSRUHDOQDWXUHRI$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRI
the body of Christ, even trans-historically speaking, the occasional reference 
to the reading RI6FULSWXUHDVWKHFKXUFK·V´UHVSLUDWLRQµ482   
 
&KUpWLHQ·VXOWLPDWHDFFRXQWRIWKHVHOILVPRUHFORVHO\WLHGWRWKH
Augustinian texts, and less determined by anti-metaphysical ideology, 
than that of Marion 
 In such instances, the reciprocal and mutually implicating relationship 
between materiality and spirituality in both the individual and the ecclesial 
ERG\LQYLWHIXUWKHUUHIOHFWLRQQRWRQO\RQ$XJXVWLQH·VWKLQNLQJRIKLPVHOI
but on his thought of selves in general. Much of the ground covered here is 
anDORJRXVZLWK0DULRQ·VDQDO\VLVWKHLQIOXHQFHRI&KUpWLHQRQZKLFKLV
partially acknowledged.483 Its prominent place in the opening chapter of Actes 
de ParoleWKDWRQ´4XHVWLRQLQJµLVVRPHZKDWRIDUHGKHUULQJH[SOLFLW
recognition and reflection of the Augustinian thought of le soi is for the most 
SDUWPHUHO\DEDFNJURXQGPRWLYDWLRQIRU&KUpWLHQ·VZRUNDQGLWZRXOGEHDOO
to easy to overstate, in our comparison with Marion, the centrality of the 
following remarks to his overall project.  In sum, the Augustinian self for 
                                                          
481   Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 71,  citing Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 32.7. 
482    Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 85, citing Augustine, De doctrina christiana II.7.9ff. 
483 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 13, 302. 
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Chrétien is marked first by a thorough porosity, a constitutive openness to 
God, other people and objects throughout world around it.  This emerges in 
several roughly synonymous formulations:  -- the self is inherently 
translatable,484 dialogical and textual.485  Many of these formulations depend 
on the specific expression of points Augustine makes about universal human 
experience, and a defense of them as, in spite of their unanimous recognition, 
stretching outside the realm of the obvious.  Such is the case with the 
observation that the human dependence on testimony, for example in order 
to believe in a foreign land which I have not seen firsthand, is rooted in a 
prior formal dependence on their testimony about those things which are 
most proper to me:  I rely on the testimony of others in order to know my 
own birth and parentage, which is one of the founding aporias of the first 
book of the Confessions.486  From this and similar observations, Chrétien 
generalizes that the self, when it questions itself,  
                                                          
484     ´7RWUDQVODWHLVDOZD\VWREHWUDQVODWHGWREHRQHVHOIFDUULHGLQWKHVDPHWLPH
as of the sense, and in order that the sense traverses and crosses from one language 
WRWKHRWKHU:KHWKHURQHGRHVLWIURPRQH·VRZQWRDQRWher, or from another to 
RQH·VRZQZKHWKHURQHLVH[LOHGRURQHZHOFRPHVLWLVDOZD\VDPDWWHURI
KRVSLWDOLW\ZKHWKHUJLYHQRUUHFHLYHGµ 
485     ´7KHSV\FKRORJ\RIUHDGLQJWKXVSDVVHVQHDUWKHHVVHQWLDO%XWWRVD\WKDW
writing and reading are not less than dialogue, this is also to affirm that they have 
the same powers that dialogue has to awaken our attention and make us discover in 
ourselves buried, latent, unnoticed truths, which we thought we did not know.  It is 
this that St Augustine calls commemoratioWKDWZKLFKKDVDSODFHLQGLDORJXH´WKLV
also is made by writings, where are found the deposits of things in which the reader, 
under the conduit of reason, discovers the truth:  not a truth that he believes on the 
testimony of the writer, as he comes by it in a story, but a truth that he also 
discovers (etiam ipse invenit), whether in himself, or in this truth which is the light of 
WKHVRXOµ7KLVLVWKDWLQZKLFKWKHFROORTXLXPRIWKHUHDGHUIDUIURPOHDGLQJWR
errancy or to dispersion, can bring us back to ourselves and in ourselves, can reveal 
in us what we did not know was there.  The return to the self can pass by reading 
WKHERRNVRIRWKHUVµ 
486 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 139. 
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«FDOOVIRULWVRZQH[FHHGLQJDQGLWVRZQRYHUWDNLQJ«7KH
brightness towards which it makes its way cannot only be that 
which it is given, that which it is susceptible of giving to itself.  
Left to itself, questioning discovers that it cannot, in 
principle, altogether discover me, that I am circumvented by 
my own obscurity.487  
 
 Along this particular register, that of questioning, an illumining example of 
&KUpWLHQ·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQJDJH$XJXVWLQHDVERWKD*UHHNDQGDELEOLFDO
thinker arises. He noWHVWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRIWKHTXHVWLRQLQJRIWKH
self takes as an example Christ, cross-examining those asking whether taxes 
ought to be paid to Caesar,488 here construed as a particularly Socratic 
dialectician.  In this episode we are taught  
«that the truth of listening is questioning.  In what sense?  If I 
cannot recognize the truth of anything at all except by 
consulting the light of the Word, every subject which has 
been held to me by others must be transformed by me in 
questioning in the face of this light.  All must become 
question in the face of the Master, whence alone can come 
the possibility of a response.  To listen in truth is to allow the 
RWKHU·VDIILUPDWLRQVEHFRPHTXHVWLRQVLQPH489  
 
 This process of assimilating questions in the depth of the self is born, 
necessarily, out of encounters with other people as well as God -- in a 
passage which bears especial influence on Marion, Chrétien notes that the 
Augustinian nexus of confession coram Deo and coram multis testibus (which 
Marion reads explicitly as an early formulation of facticity490) is, against any 
introspection which takes itself as terminal, the precondition of any auto-
PDQLIHVWDWLRQDQGWKH´QXGLW\µZKLFKRIIHUVLWVHOIWRWKHOLJKWRf 
                                                          
487 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 17-8. 
488    Matthew 22.15ff. 
489 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 20-1. 
490 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi 213ff. 
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interpretation and reception.491  He will make an analogous point about 
FRQYHUVLRQDVD´UHWXUQµWRWKHVHOILQKLVUHIOHFWLRQRQ´5HFDOOLQJµWDNLQJDV
his starting point the paradoxical rendering of the Ascension in Confessions IV 
´+HKDVOHIWIDUIURPRXUH\HVVRWKDWZHZHPLJKWUHWXUQWRRXUKHDUW and 
find him there, ut redeamus ad cor et invenimus eum.µ492 he notes that any 
discussion of self-NQRZOHGJHPXVWSDUDOOHO&KULVW·VRZQDEVHQWSUHVHQFH-- as 
Christ, absent with regard to his body, can thus also (or only) be found in our 
body, so we, when we look to re-call our self, can also (or only) find Christ 
there.  The confessio, then, is exemplary of the ontological recall, of which it is 
a particularly salient fragment.  It is not a neutral report on the self, but a 
recollection of the self which at least alters, if it does not in fact constitute, 
the self.  And this is as true (as Marion has seen) with the confession of 
praise or of faith as it is with the confession of sin, since to perceive oneself 
and (as Chrétien emphasizes beyond Marion) even more to articulate this 
perception is to be transformed by this very act, the recognition and self-
presentation which is the first step towards progress, moral or otherwise.  
Inversely, to perceive oneself as a passive victim of circumstance is to 
constituWHRQH·VVHOIDVH[DFWO\WKLV.493  Chrétien finds an echo of this in the 
Augustinian elaboration of prayer:  from its physical self-constitution (alike in 
either the lifting of hands or the pressing of the self to the floor) to its verbal 
self-articulation, $XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJRIWKH´VFULSWXUDOLQYRFDWLRQWR
                                                          
491 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 126ff. 
492   Augustine, Confessions IV.12.19. 
493 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 228ff. 
  
 
 
212 
 
SHUSHWXDOSUD\HUµ494 is to take it not exactly as a moral exhortation, but as a 
phenomenological description of the self in which our requests disclose our 
selves, in their depths of the desire which constitute them, to ourselves, both 
elucidating us and inviting us to improve.495  Again, if obliquely, the doctrine 
of the imago dei arises in this regard.  The self, in its desire and in its desire to 
desire more completely, makes a sign or an image, such that for each person, 
´WKHKLJKHVWSRVVLELOLW\RIKLVEHLQJDQGKLVVSHHFKLVWRVKRZLQKLPVHOIKLV
origin, not to obfuscate nor to veil in him the light which comes to him from 
it, in a word to become a living and active testifLHUµRIKLV7ULQLWDULDQ
origin.496 
 ,Q&KUpWLHQ·VQDUUDWLRQRIWKH$XJXVWLQLDQSURJUHVVLRQWKLV
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHKXPDQDQGWKHGLYLQHLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\WKDWRI¶VLJQ·
RURI¶LPDJH·DULVHVILUVWQHLWKHUIURPELEOLFDOH[HJHVLVQRUIURPSKLORVRSKLFDO
consideration (although of course it is irrelevant to neither) -- time and again, 
WKH¶LQWHUODFLQJ·RIKXPDQLW\DQGGLYLQLW\FRPHVIURPDVSHFLILFDOO\OLWXUJLFDOO\
constituted speech.497  The interlacing of the human and the divine, which 
ought irreversibly to complicate any account of humaQ¶DFWLYLW\·RU¶SDVVLYLW\·
with respect to the divine, is colored first of all by its emergence in 
confession,498 but just as strongly in the less obvious examples of forgiveness 
DQGEDSWLVP,QWKHIRUPHUFDVH&KUpWLHQVD\VRIIRUJLYHQHVVWKDWLW´VHWVLn 
PRWLRQµWKHOLQNEHWZHHQ*RGDQG*RG·VLPDJHLQKXPDQLW\DQGWKDWLW
                                                          
494 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 171, alluding to 1 Thessalonions 5.17. 
495 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 186. 
496 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 139. 
497   This term arises on 10, 38, 91, 122, 157, and 165. 
498 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 122. 
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GRHVWKLVE\LWVYHUEDODUWLFXODWLRQLQD´FUXFLIRUPµVWUXFWXUHZKLFKLV
supported both by a transcendent relationship between the human and the 
divine, and an intra-human relationship of speech directed from one finite 
image of God to another.499  'XHWRWKHVHOI·VGHSHQGHQFHZLWKUHVSHFWWR
God and to other historically situated selves, its condition is revealed to be 
that of an immediately self-QHJDWLQJSRYHUW\´7RUHTXHVWWRVROLFLt, to beg, 
these reveal our destitution and our in some way beggarly condition, but to 
request from God is already resource and richness, for it is already to be held 
before him, to exist before him and in relation with him, which is the origin 
of every gift, every light and every good.µ500 Such a dialectic is at root that of 
baptism, the speeches of which form the content of one of Actes de Parole·V
longer chapters.501  In baptism, we speak for others (or are spoken for by 
others) in at least two ways:  the baptizer speaks for Christ, and (in the case, 
at least, of infant baptism, or baptism of those who for any reason cannot 
speak their own desire and commitment) the baptized is spoken for by those 
SUHVHQWZKRKDYHFRPPDQGRIVSHHFK+HUHWZRRI&KUpWLHQ·VGLstinctive 
wordplays are apposite:  the first and more directly Augustinian, that of the 
infans as one who cannot speak,502 as a paradigm of all humanity, even if in 
diverse forms and to diverse extents, and the second, which resonates sharply 
with the meditations of Marion in the final essay of Au Lieu De Soi, that of 
RXU¶OLHXWHQDQFH·RUOLWHUDOO\¶SODFH-KROGLQJ·LQVSHHFK7KDWLQEDSWLVPZH
                                                          
499 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 229. 
500 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 183, citing Augustine, Sermo 61.7. 
501 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 233ff. 
502   2QWKLVFIWKHEULHIDQGZLVHDUWLFOHRI-DQHW6RVNLFH´0RQLFD·V7HDUV
$XJXVWLQHRQ:RUGVDQG6SHHFKµ1HZ%ODFNIULDUV-458. 
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speak both for Christ, who is speech, and the infans, who is speechless, and in 
fact identifies the latter with the IRUPHU´LQKLVHQWLUHWHPSRUDOOLIHµIRU
&KUpWLHQGLVFORVHV´RXUIDFWLFLW\µLQDQ´LUUHGXFLEOHµPDQQHU.503  The 
speeches of baptism, then, more than the other acts of speech described in 
Actes de Parole´VHWVDWVWDNHWKHFHQWHURIWKH$XJXVWLQLDQWKRught on identity 
DQGDOWHULW\µ:504  WKHEDSWL]DQG·VKLVWRULFDOSODFHPHQWGHSHQGHQFHRQWKH
traditions of the Church and on ancestral thought and practice, and finally 
her reception and inclusion in the body of Christ (with our without her 
understanding thereof) are not only a symbol or representation of the human 
stance before God.  They all stand to disclose the human stance before 
speech, and thus are at least as phenomenologically revealing as they are 
theologically or ecclesially meaningful.   Whatever its theological merits (and 
WKHUHDUHSOHQW\&KUpWLHQ·VUHIOHFWLRQKHUHRQWKH$XJXVWLQLDQWKRXJKWRI
baptism incontestably lends an intriguing and suggestive interpretation, 
which is hard to imagine except from a sensitive phenomenologically trained 
mind, of the previously familiar (and thus all too easy to domesticate) anti-
'RQDWLVWWKRXJKWDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK´VSHHFKLVVWURQJHUWKDQWKH
speaker.µ505  
 
Chrétien does not bifurcate life from being, as Marion centrally does 
 This emphasis on and elaboration of lieu-tenance as a particularly 
disclosive metaphor for phenomenal reality ought not, nevertheless, to be 
                                                          
503 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 234. 
504 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 245. 
505 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 240, citing Contra cresconium II.21.26. 
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understood as a perfect anticipation, or even an avant le lettre authorization, of 
the whole of Au Lieu De Soi.  2QHWKLQNVIRUH[DPSOHRI0DULRQ·VGHVLUH to 
separate Augustine from Descartes by sundering life and existence, and 
prioritize the former over the latter.506 Directly contrary to this impulse, 
&KUpWLHQ·VXVDJHRIWKHWHUPVDQGFRQFHSWVRIOLIHDQGH[LVWHQFHFDQEHVWEH
characterized as interchangeable, as the following discussion will make clear.  
I will still attempt to treat them disparately, beginning with the Marion-
worrying existence and proceeding to the Marion-approved life, if only in 
order to show the precise degree of interchangeability.  
 When Chrétien cites favorably the thought of Rilke according to 
ZKLFK¶Gesang ist Dasein·WKHVRQJLVH[LVWHQFH,507 it has the effect of rendering 
central the otherwise peripheral assertion, at the beginning of his chapter on 
the granting of requests, that each chapter is a meditation on existence, to the 
exact measure that it is also and more obviously a meditation on speech 
acts.508  This rather offhand claim, which if we are to take it literally, revises 
an easy misunderstanding according to which the acts discussed in each 
chapter of Actes de Parole are discrete, disparate, and therefore separable from 
each other and from us.  On the contrary, the degree to which Chrétien 
assumes a properly existential dimension to speech emerges at several points, 
and fuses each of these chapters together into a whole which is greater than 
the sum of their seemingly unrelated parts:  much like careful attention, as 
$QQH'DYHQSRUWKDVDUJXHGWRWKHIRRWQRWHVRI&KUpWLHQ·VHDUOLHUZRUNV
                                                          
506 Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 95. 
507 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 153. 
508 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 191. 
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DOORZVDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRID´FKRUDOµcomponent of his philosophy,509 the 
footnotes of Actes de Parole, and particularly the persistent intra-textual 
references from one chapter to another, point to a channel of unity under the 
shared ground of each chapter and each act of speech.  This unity is, in brief, 
the theme of speech as transforminJRU´WUDQVILJXULQJµH[LVWHQFH,510 whether 
WKLVWUDQVILJXUDWLRQLVLQGLFDWHGXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJRI´UHVSRQVHµ´SUDLVHµRU
´SUD\HUµWKHWKUHHDFWVRIVSHHFKZKLFK&KUpWLHQDQQRXQFHVLQKLVIRUHZRUG
would accurately capture the common spirit of all the acts he considers, and 
WKXVWKRVHZKLFKDOWKRXJKREYLRXVO\FHQWUDOWR$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWGRQRW
have discrete chapters dedicated to them).  It can arise in three basic gestures, 
figured throughout Actes de Parole in a predictable temporal tripartition.  The 
transfiguration of our past existence occurs in a certain mode of confession, 
ZKLFKLVWKH´ILUVWSRVVLELOLW\RIVSHHFKDQGRIH[LVWHQFHµ;511 that of our ever-
SDVVLQJSUHVHQWH[LVWHQFHKDSSHQVZKHQWKLVLV´KHOGXQGHUµWKHWKRXJKWRI
promiseDVDQRWKHUZD\WREHDGGHGWR´VLJQµDQG´LPDJHµGLVFXVVHGDERYH
of thinking our existentially constitutive distance and difference from our 
origin;512 finally, Chrétien notes that forgiveness, in tying together confession 
anGSURPLVHLVWKHFHQWUDOPRGHRI´RSHQLQJIXWXre possibilities of 
existence.µ513  ,QDOORIWKHVHUHJLVWHUV&KUpWLHQ·VUHJDUGRQH[LVWHQFHLVRID
SLHFHZLWK0DULRQ·VUHJDUGRQWKHVHOILQWKDWLWLVHVVHQWLDOO\UHIerential, 
pointing at its center to that with which it is in relation.  Its most rigorous 
                                                          
509 7UDQVODWRU·VSUHIDFHWRThe Call and the Response, xxvii-xxix. 
510 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 225. 
511 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 122. 
512 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 202. 
513 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 223. 
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identity is alterity, and appears primarily as secondary:  every existence is an 
H[LVWHQFH´secundumµVRPHWKLQJ,514 which can as easily be translated by the 
FRQYHQWLRQDO´DFFRUGLQJWRµDVWKHPRUHULJRURXVO\HW\PRORJLFDO´IROORZLQJµ
of that which it desires, refers to, or belongs to.  Indeed, this dimension of 
belonging is perhaps the most meticulous way of describing the intersection of 
speech and existence.  What Chrétien says with respect to listening -- that it 
´IRUPVDUHODWLRQVKLSRIbelonging, which sets our very being at stake.  This is 
ZK\RQO\LWFDQUHQHZDQGQRXULVKH[LVWHQFHµ-- is equally true of all forms of 
VSHHFK´:HKDYHIRU6W$XJXVWLQHWREecome the residence of speech,µ515 
WKH´SOLQWKµRI our existence which is at once its architectural base and its 
teleological goal.516  7KLVLPDJHWDNHQIURPWKHHQJLQHHU·VYRFDEXODU\LVIRU
Chrétien that which sets aside the Augustinian reflection on the Johannine 
SKUDVHUHJDUGLQJWKHEULGHJURRP·VIULHQG ZKR´VWDQGVDQGOLVWHQVµIURPWKH
ancient commonplace of human upright standing as a philosophically rich 
anthropological or biological truism.  For Augustine, we indeed stand 
XSULJKWEXWFUXFLDOO\QRWRQRXURZQWZRIHHW´2IWKLVXSULJKWVWDQGLQJZH
are not the owners in such a way that it forms as a first condition, purely 
ours, so that we would be able to enter into relation with others and with the 
world.  We are only standing because others, who speak to us, teach us and 
help us to do it.  We have obeyed them.µ517  Our standing, and our existing, 
DV´ZDONLQJH[FODPDWLRQSRLQWVµDUHWKXVWKHKHDUWRIWKHEULGHJURRP·V
                                                          
514 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 115. 
515 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 29. 
516 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 137. 
517 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 25. 
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IULHQG´UHMRLFLQJZLWKMR\µ518 in a never autonomous response to prior 
VSHHFKHVDQGVSHHFK7KLVLVPLUURUHGLQ&KUpWLHQ·VVXEWOHJORVVon the 
structure of the Confessions according to a schema of exitus and reditus:  
´Listening as a new form of existence sets apart because it gathers together, 
and it gathers together because it sets apart:  it is there where God tells me 
that I am the most alone, as one can only be in front of him, but it is this 
VROLWXGHZKLFKPDNHVWKHFKRUXVKDYHQHHGIRUPH«µ519  
 The emphasis on renewal and novelty transfers easily onto the 
register of life: in fact, in the most relevant passage of Actes de Parole to 
MaULRQ·VSURSRVHGVXERUGLQDWLRQRIWKHTXHVWLRQRIH[LVWHQFHWRWKDWRIOLIH
Chrétien speaks of the speeches of baptism transforming, in the same breath, 
our life and our being.520   For him, this is parallel to the Augustinian concern 
to include both body and soul in the action and the reception of baptism:521  
ZHFDQWKXVTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU0DULRQ·VYLWDOLVWLFUHYLVLRQLQJRI'HVFDUWHV
does not in effect, when viewed from a sacramental perspective, cede too 
much to the Cartesian hierarchy he wishes to reverse, by missing the essential 
association between life and existence.  Existence need not, as Chrétien has 
shown in the passages described above, be understood quite so 
minimalistically, as a static assumption or an eternally established stability.  
$QG0DULRQ·Vlaudable (and undoubtedly Augustinian) desire to do justice to 
creation, under the category of the gift, need not exclude a certain 
                                                          
518 John 3.29. 
519 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 35, citing Augustine, Sermo 161.7. 
520 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 234. 
521 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 237. 
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metaphysics, so long as existence is understood to be in some sense 
reciprocal, participatory, beyond any static and merely receptive relation to 
the gift.   
7KLVHPHUJHVTXLWHFOHDUO\LQ&KUpWLHQ·VRYHUWGLVFXVVLRQVRIOLIH)RU
H[DPSOHLQKLVILUVWPHQWLRQRIOLIHLQWKHRSHQLQJFKDSWHURQ´TXHVWLRQLQJµ
KHUHIXWHVDQ´HQWLUHO\SV\FKRORJLFDOµLQZDUGTXHVWLRQLQJUHODWLQJLW instead 
to the activity of the Holy Spirit in the self, as the love which precipitates any 
TXHVWLRQ´,WLVDPDWWHUKHUHRIWKHSURSHUO\FUXFLDOTXHVWLRQLQJDERXWRXU
life and our death, for there is not other true sign of life than to let love be 
spread in the self, and no other true sign of death than to interrupt its 
circulation or make an obstacle to it.µ522  Before any verbal interrogation, 
which is itself the beginning of speech, there is and must be a vital passage of 
love circulating in the self.  This flow does not end with the onset of verbal 
speech, as the trilogy of chapters on speech as nourishment makes patent:  
´7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHQRWLRQRIlife is decisive here:  to obey, this is to 
listen in such a way that one lives, or is revived, of the speech heard ... 
Speech is nourishing insofar as it maintains our life and our powers, gives us 
the capacity to act, restores us in every sense.µ523  Chrétien notes that speech 
considered as life-giving and itself living, and thus as the original stimulation, 
the continuing sustenance, and the terminus of desire is one of the few 
thoughts common to Plato and Nietzsche.524   The essential point is one dear 
to Marion, that speech considered in relation to desire reveals a degree of 
                                                          
522 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 16. 
523 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 31. 
524   Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 38, citing Plato, Phaedrus 247d-248c.  
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dependence on something or somebody other than the self; to consider it as 
Chrétien does further, under the physical heading of hunger, brings out the 
implication that this desire is not D´GLVWUHVVµEXWD´EOHVVLQJ.µ525  But it is a 
dependence which is not without its shadowy side, as our selves are 
characteristically, if not definitively, fooled into finding themselves as the 
authors and sources of the life by which they live.  Such is the gloss Chrétien 
SXWVRQ$XJXVWLQH·VIUHTXHQWTXRWDWLRQIURPWKH3VDOPVDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK
omnis homo mendax, every person is a liar:  he thus interprets life, as he has 
interpreted existence, following the Augustinian rubric of always being 
VHFXQGXP´ 7ROLYH¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHVHOI·LVWROLYHDOLIHZKHUHWKHVHOILV
erased and crumbled in being enshadowed, a life which forbids itself, for it 
has left the light in which and faced by which alone one can become oneself:  
WKDWRIWKH2WKHU«µ.526  Despite, or rather because, of this negative 
estimation of life according to the self, Augustine is able to think death, and 
particularly the speech of the dead, in a positive signification, as is most 
evident in the discussions of Scripture as a sermo mortuorumD´GLVFRXUVHRI
WKHGHDGµ)RU&KUpWLHQ$XJXVWLQH·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHZRUGV
of ScriSWXUHDVDGHDG´VNLQµVWUHWFKHGRYHUWKHKHDYHQVLVIDUUHPRYHGIURP
D´IXQHUHDORUQRVWDOJLFµUHODWLRQWRWKHZRUGVDQGVSHHFKHVRIWKHSURSKHWV
HYDQJHOLVWVRURI&KULVWKLPVHOI´WKLVGHILQLWLYHDEVHQWQHVVRIWKHDXWKRUV«
supports the growing life of the speech of which they are the instruments, of 
LWVSURJUHVVLYHGLIIXVLRQLQWRDOOQDWLRQVµ,QWKLVUHJDUG$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW
                                                          
525 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 38. 
526 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 116. 
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UHSUHVHQWVDJHQXLQHGHSDUWXUHIURP3ODWR·VWKRXJKWRIZULWWHQVSHHFKDVWKH
´RUSKDQHGµGHWULWXVRID´PRXUQHGµDXWKRU-- the detachment of a written 
VSHHFKIURPLWVDXWKRUGRHVQRWNLOORUIUHH]HLWEXW´LVRQWKHFRQWUDU\WKH
FRQGLWLRQRILWVPRVWSURSHUIXWXUHDQGLWVDOZD\VPRUHDPSOHOLIHµLQWKH
interpretation and assimilation of impending generations of readers.527  This 
is true in parallel for the martyrs, whose most enduring speech is neither 
written nor spoken but lived:  in addition to a consideration of speech as the 
VRXUFHRIOLIHDQGDVLWVHOIOLYLQJ$XJXVWLQHGHVFULEHVOLIHDVVSHDNLQJ´:H
can cry with our whoOHOLIHDQG$XJXVWLQHVD\VRIWKH&KULVWLDQ´/HWKLV
voice be in his works (vox eius in factis sit).µ528  The case of the martyrs escapes 
and thus complicates not only the duality of written and oral speech, but also 
that between words and deeds.  Their lesson to posterity, taught by their 
testimony and by their death, is that speech is no more exclusive or hostile to 
works of charity than is death; so Chrétien interprets the Augustinian 
UKHWRULFDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK´WKH\LQGHHGDIILUPKLP>VF&KULVW@HYHQ today, 
and it is today that they preach him; their tongue is silent but their acts 
resound (tacet lingua, sonant facta).µ529 That which binds together speech and 
deed, word and world, and even life and death is therefore, in humble 
deference to Paul, charity.530  What Chrétien thus illuminates with regard to 
the speech of testifying is exactly congruent to the dimension of life as praise,  
                                                          
527 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 77-8. 
528 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 169, citing Augustine, Sermo 88.12. 
529 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 147, citing Augustine, Sermo 286.3. 
530   Cf. 1 Cor. 13.3. 
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as the psalms frequently say,531 and Augustine no less frequently quotes, 
´2QO\WKHGHDGGRQRWSUDLVH«DQGZKRHYHUGoes not praise is already 
GHDGµ532 
Finally, this dynamic portrait of all life, and all existence, as living and 
existing only as love and as praise finds its strongest and most metaphysical 
elucidation in a comment on the Pauline cosmological statement according 
WRZKLFK´WKHZKROHFUHDWLRQ>ktisis@JURDQVµ.533  As Chrétien notes, this verse 
posed an especial problem for Augustine, who battled his entire career 
against being perceived as beholden to Manichean ideologies, and in 
particular to a mythological cosmology in which each discrete physical body 
suffers to the extent that it is embodied.  His explanation of how the ktisis 
groans if it does not suffer is for Chrétien a vital element of human life:  
´(YHU\FUHDWXUHLVUHFNRQHGLQKXPDQLW\QRWEHFDXVHLWHQJOREHs the totality 
of the angels and the transcendence of the Virtues and Powers, or the heaven 
and the earth and the sea with all that is in them, but in this sense, that every 
creature is either spiritual, or animal, or corporeal.µ534 The groaning of the 
whole creation takes place only in human groaning, for only human groaning 
encapsulates body, soul and mind:  in this sense, human speech is not only a 
speech which comes from a source which is other than it, but it is only truly 
human, and only lives, when it speaks by and for the rest of the world. 
 
                                                          
531   Psalm 115.17 and elsewhere. 
532 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 123. 
533 Romans 8.22. 
534 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 256, citing Augustine, De div. quaest. 83 67. 
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There is no artificial separation of phenomenology from ethics or 
SROLWLFVLQ&KUpWLHQ·VUHDGLQJRIWKH$XJXVWLQLDQintentio 
 2QHPRUHGLIIHUHQFHIURP0DULRQ·VWUHDWPHQWRI$XJXVWLQHUXQVWKH
risk of pushing ChrétiHQ·VDQDO\VLVRXWVLGHRIWKHERXQGVRIWKH
phenomenological tradition altogether, to the extent that the tradition has 
always and definitively defended the extent to which it ignores politics and 
ethics, and denies that its analysis of phenomena depend on a prior or 
ongoing cultivation of any particular virtues.535 1HYHUWKHOHVV&KUpWLHQ·V
DQDO\VLVRI$XJXVWLQHGRHVQRWSUHWHQGDVGRHV0DULRQ·VWKDW$XJXVWLQHLV
so intentionally ignorant of or inattentive to the role which particular virtues 
and the practices by which we cultivate them play in speech.  In this respect 
he is inarguably more faithful to Augustine than Marion (and considerably 
PRUHWKDQ+HLGHJJHU%XWLWLVDOVRSRVVLEOHWRVXJJHVWWKDWLQ&KUpWLHQ·V
development of an Augustinian ethics as prolegomenous to or concurrent 
with an Augustinian phenomenology, a critique of precisely this anti-ethical 
impulse emerges.  To whatever extent I have been able to prove so far that 
the tradition and the practice of phenomenology is inescapably, and not just 
peripherally, bound to its interaction with Augustine, to that same extent it 
PXVWEHUHFRJQL]HGWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VRZQWKRXJKWRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRI
phenomenology (or for that matter ontology) with ethics can revise, re-
                                                          
535  This account, necessarily painting with too broad a brush, leaves out certain 
figures -- most notably Levinas -- as being at the least problematic from the strictest 
of phenomenological perspectives, and more importantly as not interacting with 
Augustine in any meaningful way.  So I mean this contextualizing preface to 
&KUpWLHQ·VEULHIDQGRFFDVLRQDOanalysis of Augustinian ethics to be read in a 
suggestive, rather than a definitive, polemical or dogmatic, tone. 
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determine and re-institute an ethical agenda for phenomenology.  For this 
SURMHFW&KUpWLHQ·VDQDO\VLVLQLWVOHVVSROHPLFDODQGPRUHPHGLWDWLYHDQG
KHUPHQHXWLFDOWRQHLVDJRRGVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUKLP$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRI
the appearance, reception and production of phenomena, and particularly 
that of speech,  exists in a circular or reciprocal relationship with the virtues 
of the person who receives, produces and exists in speech.  It is another 
instance, and perhaps the paradigm, of the vox in actis alluded to above:  a 
voice can emerge in virtuous and charitable acts, which further clarify the 
voice understood more strictly as vocal.536  This reciprocal logic is, not 
insignificantly, precisely parallel to the reciprocality of the giving and 
receiving of speech, existence and life which we have seen above.  The 
primarily relevant virtue, as Chrétien rightly notes several times, is that of 
humility, which appears in many guises :  whether this is the humility which is 
requisite for any act of listening,537 the humility which emerges in our 
desire,538 humility aVWKH´FXUHµIRU%DEHO·VSULGH,539 the humility of 
VXEPLWWLQJRQH·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6FULSWXUe to the ecclesial community,540 the 
humility of recognizing the insufficiency of theological images or language,541 
the humility of Job seeking to renounce all the gifts of God in order to 
receive God,542 DQGPRVWLQVLVWHQWO\WKHKXPLOLW\&KULVWWKH´GRFWRUµDQG
´PDVWHUµRIKXPLOLW\H[HPSOLILHVLQWKHLQFDUQDWLRQQDPHO\WKHKXPLOLW\RI
                                                          
536 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 171ff. 
537 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 34. 
538 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 40. 
539 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 69. 
540 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 84. 
541 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 96. 
542 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 175. 
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being or becoming human.543 The heart of all these humilities is for Chrétien 
the recognition that the self is not its own source.  He reads this recognition  
-- and not principally the Incarnation --  as what is absent in the libri 
platonicorum of Confessions VII.9.13,544 and although finding this virtue to be so 
explicLWO\OLQNHGZLWKWKH´PRQVWURXVSULGHµRIWKHPDQZKRLQWURGXFHG
them to Augustine represents a slight eisegesis, the implicit inverse 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKDWPDQ·VSULGHDQGWKHHDUWK\KXPLOLW\RIWKH
incarnation (which is what Augustine expressly describes as missing from the 
3ODWRQLVW·VERRNVEHDUVVRPHRIWKHZHLJKWRIWKHHLVHJHVLV+HUHDERYHDOO
RWKHUSODFHV&KUpWLHQ·VWUHDWPHQWRI$XJXVWLQHRQWKHYLUWXHVDSSHDUVLQLWV
HQRUPRXVGLIIHUHQFHZLWKWKDWRI0DULRQ·VIRU0DULRQZKRSD\VKXPLOLW\
the service of his only extended commentary on any virtue, it emerges first 
and decisively in a negative register, as merely the privative shadow of the 
ambitio saeculi in Conf. X.37.61.  It is part of a bad and inescapable dialectic, 
ZKHUHLQWKHVHOI·VKXPLOity becomes a source of pride, such that the more 
deeply humble the self becomes, the more open it is to a pride which 
parasitically undermines it.545 There is no question that Augustine toys with 
VXFKDQDSRULDEXW0DULRQ·VUHIXVDOWRSODFHLWLQKXPLOLW\·s broader 
LQFDUQDWLRQDOFRQWH[WZLWKLQ$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWDVWKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDOO\
Christian virtue, and that which renders any other possible, pushes Augustine 
farther in a quasi-Lutheran direction than the impulse of the rest of the 
Augustinian corpus will sustain.  Chrétien does not so easily succumb to this 
                                                          
543 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 46, 101, 105ff, 175-6. 
544 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 141. 
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lure.  His treatment of humility, by keeping a Christological centre, allows 
WKDWSDUDGR[LFDOSKUDVH´PDVWHURIKXPLOLW\µDV&KUpWLHQQRWHVWKLVLVD
´FRQVWDQWWKHPHRIWKH$XJXVWLQLDQPHGLWDWLRQµWRVKLQHIRUWKLQDOOLWV
precision.  Against or beyond Marion, the circularity or reciprocity presented 
by humility does not stop with the temptation towards pride in our humility 
(which for all time retains its status exactly as temptation); this temptation leads 
the already partially humble self, in recognizing the temptation, to become 
more humble.  Reason to believe that, for Augustine, this humility bears a 
dimension of the incarnation of God into each self materializes especially in 
&KUpWLHQ·VGLVcussion of the confession of sin, characterized as the process by 
which ZH´SHUPLW*RGWRLQKDELWXVµ546 The humility of repentance, which 
anchors and confers reality upon any confession of praise,547 has a strictly 
poetic character.  Not only does it create the self, as Marion has well shown;548 
it is the primary meaning of the Johannine phrase, dear to Augustine, 
according to which we are able to veritatem facere, to do or to make the truth.  
Confession of sin, and of the distance between the created self and its 
FUHDWRULV´WKHPRVWSUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQµRIWKLVSKUDVH.549  And, noting that 
veritas LVRQHRI$XJXVWLQH·VPRVWIDPLOLDUDQGULFKQDPHVIRU&KULVWWKH
humble confession of sin has the effect of deification:550 ´7RGRWKHWUXWKWR
FRQIHVVRQH·VLQMXVWLFe, this is the incessant work by which we let it be done 
                                                          
546 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 127. 
547 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 134. 
548    Marion, Au Lieu De Soi 56 and passim in the first chapter. 
549 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 128. 
550    Although neither Augustine nor Chrétien uses this language in this respect, it is 
difficult to deny that this is the end of the logic here. 
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LQXVSHQHWUDWHLQWRXVLQVXFKDZD\WKDWLWWUDQVIRUPVXV¶7RGR·LWLVWREH
offered to it iQWKHZD\WKDWLWRSHQVLQXVµ551  Continuing on this creative 
way of humility which confession opens in the self leads to a deeper and 
more lush humility:  it is an ascesis which enriches, and, similar to the dynamic 
according to which prayer is always at its root a prayer for the ability to pray, 
VRWRRLVKXPLOLW\D´SHUSHWXally necessary apprenticeshipµ552  Necessary for 
two reasons:  in itself, because this logic of a radical confession wherein the 
self confesses its inability to confess is extended through all time, and 
H[WHUQDOO\EHFDXVHRI$XJXVWLQH·VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHODQJXDJHRIERWK
illumination and purification as modes of learning.553 Physical, metaphysical 
and ethical learning all occur for Augustine in a proto-phenomenological 
DQG\HWDOVRHWKLFDODQGRQWRORJLFDONH\´E\SXULI\LQJDQGRULHQWLQJRXU
attention.µ554  This is the circularity of the YLUWXHVLQ$XJXVWLQH·VFRQFHSWLRQ
of and practice of philosophy: to purify our attention to the Truth, it is 
sufficient to direct it to the Truth, and so to direct it is so to purify it.  Or as 
Chrétien more lyrically puts it:   
It is not enough that it is day, it is still necessary that we open 
our eyes and keep them open.  And it is not enough to no 
longer see the day, it is still necessary to be seen oneself in the 
FODULW\RIWKHGD\WRSXWIRUZDUGWKHRIIHULQJRIRQH·VRZQ
visibility to the light, to go there in person, body and soul.555  
 
                                                          
551 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 129. 
552 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 185. 
553 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 80-2.  Cf. Augustine, De doctrina christiana Preface 4-5. 
554 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 112. 
555 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 129. 
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The light of the Truth, both as divine and as human, is strong enough to 
strengthen our ability to see it.556  Chrétien is on his guard against this notion 
VHHPLQJWRR´LOOXPLQLVWLFµRUPDNLQJRIWKHKXPDQVHOIDQGLWVspeech only a 
receptive passivity:  confession is impossible without a prior forgiveness, but 
WKLVIRUJLYHQHVVLVDOVRQRWXQLGLUHFWLRQDOEXW´FLUFXODUµFRPLQJIURPWKH
transcendent to the immanent and then, crucially, circulating within the 
immanent, coming not only to me but extended from me to others.557  For if 
confession, forgiveness, and the virtues which each of these presuppose and 
cultivate were exclusively the subject of human reception from a divine and 
therefore eternal source, and not also of human production, how would any 
temporal progression take place?  That this is not the case for Augustine is 
FRQILUPHGLQ&KUpWLHQ·VH\HVQRWRQO\E\$XJXVWLQH·VLQQXPHUDEOHHWKLFDO
exhortations in his sermons and elsewhere, but in the strictly 
phenomenological description, thematically present throughout the 
Augustinian corpus, of life as a peregrination.  The circulation of virtues 
between people, by which those virtues are multiplied and deepened, 
depends on a reciprocal relationship between faith and virtue within the self, 
ZKLFKLV´SXULILHG«WREHOLHYHE\WUDYHOOLQJDQGWRWUDYHOE\EHOLHYLQJµ558  In 
this respect, one of the most beautiful reflections of Actes de Parole entwines 
the question of speech and the self with a meditation on the mystical body of 
&KULVWDVUHSHDWLQJLWVVRQJZLWKLQILQLWHYDULDWLRQ´,WUHSHDWV-- this will be 
the theme, approached many times, of the canticum novum, the new song -- 
                                                          
556 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 144ff. 
557 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 230ff. 
558 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 43, citing Augustine, Sermo 216.7. 
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because it lets, in the grace of God, identities to be interlaced and exchanged.  
I become myself in a song where others sing for me, just as I sing for others, 
DQG&KULVWLQXVDOO7KHTXHVWLRQ¶who VLQJVH[DFWO\"¶LVZRXQGHGEXUQWE\
the lifting up DQGRSHQLQJRIWKHVRQJLWVHOIµ559 
 
&KUpWLHQ·VVFDWWHUHGUHPDUNVRQWHPSRUDOLW\ELQGSKHQRPHQRORJ\ to a 
metaphysics of creation 
 This thought of novelty emerging in repetition allows access, from 
these ethical concerns which might seem more at home in MacIntyre than in 
Marion, to a more familiar terrain for the phenomenological tradition -- 
namely that of temporality.  Chrétien is habitually concerned with this theme, 
but in a fundamentally different manner than Heidegger or Marion is:  rather 
than explicitly thematizing it in a lecture series (as does Heidegger) or in a 
separate chapter (as does Marion), Chrétien typically restricts the question of 
time and eternity to a sort of hiccup at the end of many of his chapters, 
considering to what extent, and in what ways, the act of speech at issue in 
that chapter is characteristic only of temporal life, and in what ways it might 
also enter eternity.  Although this approach means that Chrétien at no point 
gives an extended exposition of Confessions XI, it does have the advantage of 
giving some textual breadth to his deliberation, recognizing that the interplay 
of time and eternity is not so concentrated in Confessions XI as to be missing 
IURP$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWWKURXJKRXWKLVFDUHHULQERWKSHQDQGSXOSLW
                                                          
559 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 156. 
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Chrétien restricts his focus to the acts of speech which he has elaborated:  
careful attention to the question of the body in the resurrection, and thus of 
corporeal and imaginative perception, as well as intellection, will therefore 
rest silent for the moment.560  For the most part, he is concerned to delineate 
and defend the role of speech in human eternity.  Some of the actes de parole 
which fall away with temporality are fairly obvious:  while the confession of 
praise will be eternal, the confession of sin evidently will not be, nor will the 
confession of faith.561  Somewhat more surprisingly, he conceives reading as a 
properly temporal act, not because mediation will disappear when time 
disappears, but the particular form of mediation which we experience in 
ERRNVDQGLQWKH%LEOHLVD´YLDWLFXPDSURYLVLRQDORQJWKHZD\µWRWKHSODFH
in which the world itseOIEHFRPHVRXUPHGLDWLRQ´7KHZRUOGZDVQRWPDGH
in order to end up with a book.µ562   The speeches which persist in eternity 
are also more or less predictable:  that we eat on and are nourished by 
speech,563 that speech will belch forth in vocal praise,564 that song, rather than 
mute contemplation, will be the mode of our praise,565 and that this song is in 
FRQWLQXLW\ZLWKWKH´VRQJRIWKHWUDYHOOHUµHYHQLIthe traveller has reached 
home:566  such are not only repeated Augustinian themes, but also biblical, 
and VR&KUpWLHQ·VIUHTXHQWFXVWRPRIUHPLQGLQJKLVUHDGHUVDWWKHHQGRIKLV
chapters that these forms of speech are eternal as well as temporal need not 
                                                          
560   I will consider these questions in the final chapter of the present essay. 
561 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 134-5. 
562 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 88. 
563 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 49. 
564 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 61. 
565 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 100. 
566 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 153-4. 
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receive a full exposition here.  What is more distinctive about his approach, 
and deserving of mention for what it discloses about the permeability of the 
physical and the metaphysical in his phenomenology, is the insistence that 
WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHVHDFWVRIVSHHFKLQHWHUQLW\HQDFWD´WHQVLRQµRQWKHLU
presence and production in time.  Such is the case, of course, with the acts of 
speech which are by definition rooted in the future, such as the promise.567  
Likewise with baptism, which more than the other acts of speech exists per se 
RQO\LQRQHLQVWDQWRIP\OLIHQHYHUWKHOHVV´SURGXFHVDEHORQJLQJWR&KULVW
which will have QRFHDVHLQWLPHRUHWHUQLW\µ568  In both cases, and indeed in 
WKHYHU\ORJLFRIWHPSRUDODQGHWHUQDOSUDLVHWKLVWHQVLRQLVRQHRI´WKHDUGRU
and the grief of hope,µWKDWZKLFK´IRUPVWKHYHU\Povement of temporal 
existence.µ569  The presence of both terms, the temporal and the eternal, in 
those acts of speech which most centrally define humanity as tensively drawn 
between them, is the sine qua non of the Augustinian thought of novelty.  
What is more, they characterize more than anything else the logic of love:  
                                                          
567   ´,QIDFWWKHSURPLVHGRHVQRWRQO\FRQFHUQWKHIXWXUHQRURQHSDUWLFXODU
region of our existence:  all of our selves are held under its light, and as we are never 
at the origin, there are always already promises held when we ourselves receive for 
WKHILUVWWLPHLQRXUOLIHWKHSURPLVHRI*RG¶7KRVHWRZKRPLWKDVEHHQSURPLVHG
are themselves also promised (etiam ipsi promissi sunt), so that it be the totality of the 
%RG\RI&KULVWZKLFKVD\V¶,WLVE\WKHJUDFHRI*RGWKDW,DPZKDW,DP·µ7KH
promise does not only announce a future joy, it gives a present joy, which is that of 
KRSH¶7KLVYRLFHZKLFKZHKDYHLQVWHDGRIWKHIDWKHUDQGWKHPRWKHUquem habemus 
pro patre et matreZKRPZHKDYHOHIWWKLVYRLFHOLVWHQWRLW«,WLVWKHDOO-powerful 
who has promised, it is the sure who has promised, it is the true who has promLVHGµ
(202, citing enarrationes in psalmos 118.XIII.1, 26.II.23, respectively). 
568 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 237. 
569 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 251-2. 
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´&Karity alone is by essence new,µ570 only present as it is presented now, but 
this only because it has always and eternally been deployed. 
 We can now make explicit the already obvious fact that the actes de 
parole cannot be limited to what Anglophone philosophy has designated as 
´VSHHFKDFWVµDOWKRXJKWKHVHDUHRIFRXUVHDOVRLQFOXGHGLQWKHP$EULHI
examination of the table of contents would make this clear:  although certain 
chapters of Actes de Parole take their starting point with the performative 
aspect of the act of speech under consideration (baptizing, promising, 
blessing, requesting), the great majority are not so restricted.  That this is so 
LVPRVWVWULNLQJDQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWLQWKHILQDOWZRFKDSWHUVRQ´JURDQLQJµ
DQG´UHMRLFLQJµDVWKHZRUGOHVV H[SUHVVLRQRIWKH´XQVD\DEOHµ571  The 
WUDMHFWRU\RI&KUpWLHQ·VDUJXPHQWVRPHWLPHVKDUGWRGLVFHUQGXHWRKLV
intentionally unargumentative tone, carries Augustine from questioning and 
listening (which are in fact one and the same) to groaning and rejoicing, and 
thus proceeds from the temporal and logical centre of speech and existence 
to the temporal and logical peripheries thereof, at the boundaries of the 
phenomenon under consideration.  In the last two chapters, Chrétien argues 
that desire and joy blur even whatever provisional boundaries we could have 
drawn between words and wordlessness.  The same pattern, he has not but 
could well have noted, is discernable in the Confessions, which bring us from 
$XJXVWLQH·VVWDWXVDVDQinfans through a period of rhetoric to a higher and 
inexpressible form of infancy (the Confessions leave us not with an Amen but 
                                                          
570 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 159. 
571 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 249. 
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with an unopened door of speech).572  /LNHWKHILQDO´DµRIWKHZRUG$OOHOXLD
wKLFKLV´YRFDOEXWQRWYHUEDO,µ573 speech and existence are bound together 
in their openness.  And the final phrase of Actes de Parole -- ´7KDWZKLFKLV
higher than we can grasp, our throat and our breath must make it ring out, 
make it sound forth, in order to render testimony to the excessµ574  -- exposes 
excess DVWKH$XJXVWLQLDQFRUHWUDYHUVLQJWKHZKROHRI&KUpWLHQ·VWKRXJKW575  
This excess, pushing our speech to the very boundaries of its potential, is 
nearly always expressed in language related not to words but to images, and 
not to sounds but to light.576  For this reason, since light and images are 
IUHTXHQWO\RQ$XJXVWLQH·VWRQJXHWKHQH[WFKDSWHUZLOOH[DPLQHLPDJHVDQG
the imagination as a phenomenological register, parallel to speech, in which 
Augustine attempts to specify and refine his thought of the manifestation of 
excess. 
                                                          
572   Augustine, Conf. XIII.38.53.  On WKLVVHH&KDUOHV0DWKHZHV´7KH/LEHUDWLRQRI
4XHVWLRQLQJLQ$XJXVWLQH·VConfessionsµJournal of the American Academy of Religion 
70:3, 2002, 539-60. 
573 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 262. 
574 Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 263. 
575   &I&KUpWLHQ·VRZQPHGLWDWLRQRQ the excessive phenomenon as that which 
EULQJVWRJHWKHUDOOWKHYDULRXVVWUDQGVRIWKRXJKWLQKLVFDUHHULQKLV´UHWURVSHFWLRQµ
in the English publication of The Unforgettable and the Unhoped for,.119-129. 
576   Chrétien, Actes de Parole, 10, 14, 21, 26, 48, 76, 80, 86, 111, 116, 124, 128, 130, 
138-144,  162, 170, 181, 202, 213, 223, 240, 248:  this is not an exhaustive list. 
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V. On Genesis 
 
Abstract 
It is no accident that, among the phenomenologists who have read 
Augustine seriously, Chrétien is the most sensitive to the theme of excess, 
particularly with regard to the resurrected body and its sensation.  One 
explanation for this may be found, I have argued, in his methodological 
willingness to consider the role of the Bible and of Greek philosophy in 
$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW%HVLGHVWKLVPHWKRGRORJLFDOSRLQWKRZHYHUWKHUHLVD
deeper continuity between theolRJ\DQGSKLORVRSK\LQ$XJXVWLQH·VZULWLQJV
and his life, which can be seen most clearly in his critical exposition and 
defense of the role of material objects in the Christian life.  Therefore, 
though the close attention paid by Marion and especially Chrétien to 
$XJXVWLQH·VGRFWULQHRIWKHVHOIDQGLWVUHODWLRQWRWKHZRUOGKDVSRLQWHGXVLQ
the salutary direction of examining the centrality of creation, incarnation and 
WKH(XFKDULVWLQ$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWWKLVH[DPLQDWLRQUHPDLQVWREHPRUH
fully performed.  It will be the work of this chapter to supplement the 
SKHQRPHQRORJLVWV·UHDGLQJVRI$XJXVWLQHZLWKDQad hoc ontology derived 
IURP$XJXVWLQH·VWH[WVSULPDULO\WKURXJKDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHLQYHQWLYH
and fertile biblical exegesis of De genesi ad litteram.  However, since the 
phenomenological tradition at its best and most receptive to Augustine on 
KLVRZQWHUPVKDVVWLOOGHSHQGHGRQDVLPSOLVWLFUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQH·V
relationship to the Platonic tradition, my argument will take a brief detour 
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into the dimension of late antique Platonism which would best supplement 
the most robustly anti-interiorist leanings of both Marion and Chrétien, 
namely that of theurgy, whose ritual and communal elements provided a 
framework for the metaphysics of matter and mediation onto which 
Augustine could easily (and at times polemically) hang his exegesis of 
Genesis and his proto-phenomenological account of the self and the world.  
,QRWKHUZRUGV,LQWHQGWKLVWREHDFRQWLQXDWLRQRI&KUpWLHQ·VSURMHFWDQG
thus a critique of the phenomenological antimetaphysical Augustine ² or 
rather, the supposedly antimetaphysical Augustine, inasmuch as the 
Augustine presented by Heidegger and (especially) Marion actually represents 
not a lack of an ontology, nor a true fight against the ontological project, but 
only an impoverished ontology.  I have suggested some ways in which this 
represents a failure to read Augustine seriously on his own terms; in this 
chapter I will suggest some ways in which it also represents a failure 
phenomenologically.   Finally, I will offer some concluding evaluative 
reflections on the relationship between the phenomenological tradition and 
Augustine. 
 
The Augustinian self is teleological, and so even when it attempts to 
account for the present moment, it always points back to an ontology 
of creation and forward to an ontology of resurrection 
The ontological themes which Augustine delineates or seems to assume, 
particularly in his speculations about the resurrected fully human existence, 
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are the framework or even the horizon of the proto-phenomenological self 
as it arises from the Augustinian corpus.  Heidegger and Marion are both far 
WRRZLOOLQJWRDFFHSW$XJXVWLQH·VIDPRXVO\inquietum cor as an easy resolution 
to the aporia of time; for Augustine, this aporia must be resolutely kept as the 
posing of a question which can only be resolved Christologically and in the 
teachings and rituals of the Church.  Chrétien is more willing, alongside 
Augustine, to consider the eighth day not as an embarrassment to philosophy 
but as its culmination.  To carry this prominent example further:  it is easy 
enough to solve the question of time within time if one accepts, as the 
Heideggerean tradition does, an unmediated dualism between time and 
eternity (or more generally between finitude and infinity).  But Augustine 
defers this answer; already in the first chapter of the Confessions, which gives 
the phenomenological tradition of reading Augustine its sloganistic inquietum 
cor, he places this cor in a crucial tension with the rest which it will one day 
enjoy (donec requiescat in te).  Further still, in this paragraph, humanity is 
defined principally not as this restless heart, but as aliqua portio creaturae tuae, a 
participant (however limited) in the act of creation, which, in its desire to 
praise, has a mediatory role to play in the whole of being, rather than the 
rather mopey and narcissistic role which the ínquietum cor taken out of context 
has suggested to the phenomenologists.  Already in the first chapter of 
Confessions, in other words, is latent the last chapter of De civitate dei:577  all of 
the overlapping trinities of participles (seeking, finding, praising; believing, 
invoking, seeking; exciting, delighting, praising) of this theological 
                                                          
577 A chapter which is, tellingly, entirely absent from Au Lieu De Soi.  
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anthropology will eventually be tighteQHGXSWHOHRORJLFDOO\LQWKH´HQGWR
ZKLFKWKHUHLVQRHQGµ$XJXVWLQHSRVLWVpace Marion) a place (ibi) which 
PRVWFHQWUDOO\GHILQHVWKHHVVHQFHRIKXPDQLW\´Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, 
videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus.µ578  
 In the transiWLRQIURP´KXPDQLW\GHVLUHVWRSUDLVH\RXµ579 WR´WKHUH
ZHVKDOOUHVWDQGVHHVHHDQGORYHORYHDQGSUDLVHµDVDQWKURSRORJLFDO
statements, there are two grammatical shifts worth noting:  from the third 
person singular to the first person plural, on the one hand, and from the 
present to the future tense on the other.  Within the context of the 
phenomenological tradition, it is also worthwhile to note a grammatical 
consistency:  both passages remain, contrary to the phenomenological 
preference for the subjunctive mood, which indicates the possible, the 
potential, the hypothetical, firmly in the indicative mood.  There is a place in 
Augustinian ontology, I will suggest, for the subjunctive ² it exists most 
prominently in the repetitive fiats of Genesis 1580 ² but by choosing these two 
WH[WVDVHPEOHPDWLFSROHVRI$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKW,ZLVKWRHPSKDVL]HWKDW
Augustine remains in the Aristotelian tradition of insisting that (indicative) 
actuality is prior to (subjunctive) potentiality.  Husserl wavers, but finishes by 
accepting this Aristotelian tradition; Heidegger overthrows it; Marion has 
spent the better part of his career attempting to reconcile the two and to save 
                                                          
578 Augustine, De civ. Dei 22.30 
579 Augustine, Conf. I.1.1. 
580 Cf. Augustine, Sermo 117 and De vera religione 55.113, where Augustine explicitly 
suggests that the verbum  which most closely approximates Christ is this jussive 
subjunctive fiat. 
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WUDQVFHQGHQFHE\SUHVHUYLQJ*RG´EH\RQGEHLQJµ$OOWKUHHRIWKHPPLVV
the Augustinian genius of ORFDWLQJSRWHQWLDOLW\QHLWKHU´EHORZµQRU´DERYHµ
actuality, but of viewing potentiality as the temporally bound human side of 
actuality.  There is again here a strong teleological current.  As I will argue, 
the closer Augustine gets to imagining God by reflecting on the mediatory 
potential of creation, the more imaginative and the more speculative he 
becomes, and the more confidently he speaks in the future indicative.  Such 
is the narrative of the entire Confessions.  And viewed against this backdrop, 
the intentionally weak and restricted phenomenology of a Heidegger or a 
Marion, which may theoretically treat all things, but only to the extent that 
they rub up against the indicative mood, that is, the existence of the thing 
and the metaphysical conditions according to which it exists, is not wrong-
headed as a prescription to the novice, the heretic, even the pagan; for the 
mature participant in the philosophical life of the Church, however, in trying 
to limit itself to mere propaedeutic to dogma, it falls short not only of its 
proper end, but also of even this more limited role.  Even in referring to 
Christian teaching as vera philosophia Augustine has made it clear that the 
difference between (pagan or supposedly secular) philosophy and the 
Christian life is not one of type but of degree of intensity and veracity.  If 
Chrétien has been, due to his relative lack of ideological pre-commitment to 
the Heideggerean Augustine, more methodologically able to see the extent to 
which Augustine is determinative for the rest of the Heideggerean tradition, 
perhaps his theme of excess may play out even on this ground.  The history 
of phenomenological readings of Augustine tells us at least this much:  
  
 
 
239 
 
Augustine does not bear the bracketing of the speculative, of teleiosis and the 
resurrected body, of the dynamics of creation and of praise.  His very words, 
even when taken out of their context, exceed such an epoche.  If, then, one of 
0DULRQ·VPRUHVDOLHQWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHVWXG\RI$XJXVWLQHKDVEHHQ
providing a theoretical and epistemological grounding for viewing the words 
and works of Augustine as those of a living human, we may be permitted to, 
alongside Chrétien, extrapolate this approach further into its late antique 
context.   
 
When he discusses Platonism with any detail, Augustine is most 
concerned with its communal and ethical aspect on the one hand, and 
its metaphysics of corporeality and temporality on the other 
Outside the field of Augustinian philosophical scholarship, it has 
become commonplace to emphasize the practical and communal dimensions 
of ancient philosophical life.  The methods and catchphrases of Foucault581 
and Hadot,582 even of Wittgenstein,583 ought to dovetail rather nicely with 
some of the directions towards which Marion gestures:  we should regard 
                                                          
581 See Foucault, Michel.  The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1981-1982.  London: Picador, 2005, and The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences.  New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
582  See Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase.  Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995, and What is Ancient Philosophy?,  trans. Michael Chase. Cambridge, 
MA:  Harvard University Press, 2002. 
583 Wittgenstein, Ludwig.  Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.  
Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1963. 
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ancient philosophy not as a series of dogmatic statements, but as the 
sometimes ascetic and sometimes celebratory practice of concrete 
communities.  Augustine is, or should be, a prime test case for such an 
examination; one only needs to reflect on the absurdity of the biographies 
ZKLFKSHUIRUPDVKDUSGHOLQHDWLRQRI´$XJXVWLQHWKHSKLORVRSKHUµRQWKH
RQHKDQGIURP´$XJXVWLQHWKHWKHRORJLDQµRU´$XJXVWLQHWKHELVKRSµRQWKH
RWKHUWRUHDOL]HWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK$XJXVWLQH·VUROHVLQWHUWZLQH0RUHWKDQ
this:  $XJXVWLQH·VHSLVFRSDOGXWLHVVLPSO\are his exegetical and philosophical 
duties; his philosophical mind reaches its broadest challenges in his pastoral 
tasks (examples abound in the Sermones, but the opening paragraphs of De 
trinitate are more dramatic still).  Christian teaching is not, in this regard, 
qualitatively different from pagan philosophy; the Platonic tradition in 
SDUWLFXODULVE\$XJXVWLQH·VWLPHDOLYLQJWUDGLWLRQRIWH[WXDOO\DQGULWXDOO\
formed social communities, which form a horizon against which certain 
SDUWLFXODULWLHVRI$XJXVWLQH·VRZQWKRXJKWWHDFKLQJDQGFRPPXQLW\
organizing may emerge more clearly.  This examination will be brief, and 
QHHGQRWEHH[FHVVLYHO\´REMHFW-KLVWRULFDOµLQWKHVHQVHWRZKLFK+HLGHJJHU
objected ² indeed, by necessity it will emphasize only those parts of the 
tradition with which Augustine himself directly engages in his most explicit 
discussions of the relationship between Christianity and the various pagan 
Platonisms.  The reader will note that, though the phenomenological 
WUDGLWLRQ·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI$XJXVWLQHDUHPRVWVRUHO\ODFNLQJLQWKHLU
DFFRXQWVRI$XJXVWLQH·VRQWRORJ\$XJXVWLQH·VRZQFULWLFLVPVRISDJDQ
Platonism have little to do with those ontological doctrines with which 
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Anglo-American scholarship PRVWFRPPRQO\DVVRFLDWHV$XJXVWLQH·VDOOHJHG
debts to Platonism (e.g. the doctrine of emanation), and much more to do 
with pagan ritual (including the social rituals of the formation of virtue).  I 
will argue for an explicit link between Augustinian ontology and Augustinian 
ritual below; for now, I want only to note that his thought on both owes 
much to the Platonisms with which he interacted, even if this debt does not 
take the usual and usually maligned shape of a crude hierarchical emanation. 
Why, in thHDERYHSDUDJUDSKWKHJUDWLQJLQVLVWHQFHRQ´3ODWRQLVPVµ"
Within studies of late antique philosophy, in reaction to centuries of the 
hegemonic assumption that one can draw a simplistic line from Plato to 
Plotinus (and usually on to Descartes, with or without Augustine 
intervening), there has been in the last twenty years an equal insistence on the 
potential validity of differing disciples of Plato, and the multivocal chorus of 
their doctrines and practices.  In particular, theurgy has increasingly come to 
be viewed as a potentially faithful development of Platonic doctrine (both 
textual and Academic), rather than a risible deviation from Plato.584 There has 
arisen, concomitantly, a questioning of the assumption of Plotinian 
supremacy, for while Plotinus undeniably has some heavily qualified interest 
                                                          
584 This view has been most prominently advocated by Gregory Shaw in his Theurgy 
and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park:  The Pennsylvania State 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVEXWLVDOVRGHYHORSHGLQ$QGUHZ6PLWK´,DPEOLFKXV·9LHZV
on the Relationship of Philosophy to Religion in De MysteriisµLQ+-%OXPHQWKDO
and Gillian Clark, The Divine Iamblichus:  Philosopher and Man of Gods (London:  Bristol 
Classics Press, 1993) and Hans Levy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy:  Mysticism, Magic 
and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1978).  On all 
RIWKHVHTXHVWLRQV5REHUW&URXVHLVDQDEOHDQGKHOSIXOJXLGH6HHKLV´In aenigmate 
trinitas &RQI;,,,7KH&RQYHUVLRQRI3KLORVRSK\LQ6W$XJXVWLQH·V
ConfessionsµDionysius 11 (1987), pp. 53-DQGVHHIXUWKHUKLV´Paucis Mutatis Verbis:  
6W$XJXVWLQH·V3ODWRQLVPµLQ5REHUW'RGDURDQG*HRUJH/DZOHVVAugustine and his 
Critics:  Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner (London:  Routledge, 2000), pp. 37-50. 
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in ritual, this interest is far from central to his ontological or ethical 
systems.585 Viewed from this perspective, the developments of Iamblichus 
and of Proclus towards a more centrally ritualist Platonism bear a striking 
DIILQLW\WR$XJXVWLQH·VRZQFULWLFLVPRIWKH3ODWRQLVPRIKLVGD\:KHQLWLV
UHPHPEHUHGWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VVRPHWLPHVELWLQJZRUGVDERXWWKHplatonici refer 
RQO\WRRQHFXOWXUDOO\OLPLWHGDQGKLJKO\VHOHFWLYHGHYHORSPHQWRI3ODWR·V
thought, and that Augustine has very little criticism of Plato himself, a space 
for dialogue between Augustine and the so-called theurgical Platonists opens 
forth, in which Augustine appears not to reject, but to reform, the Platonic 
tradition.  Therefore I wish to begin to develop the following argument 
regarding Augustine's relationship to Platonism:  (1) that Augustine reforms, 
rather than rejects, the Plotinian Platonism that he inherits,586 (2) that his 
reformation of Platonism is roughly parallel to the theurgical reforms of 
Iamblichus and Proclus, and so Augustine ought to be regarded as mediating 
between Plotinus and the theurgists in a way not yet recognized, at least in 
Anglophone scholarship,587 (3) that Augustine's theurgical Platonism is 
radically Trinitarian, and (4) that this Trinitarian theurgy is at the heart of 
                                                          
585 A good overview may be found in Lloyd, ͓$&´7KH͓Later ͓1HRSODWRQLVWVµ
͓͓In ͓The ͓Cambridge ͓History ͓of ͓Later͓ Greek ͓and Early ͓Medieval ͓Philosophy,͓ ed. 
͓A.H. ͓Armstrong, ͓269̻325.͓ ͓Cambridge:͓ Cambridge͓ University ͓Press, 1967. 
586 For much of this argument, I am indebted to the work of Jason Parnell.  See his 
The Theurgic Turn in Christian Thought:  Iamblichus, Origen, Augustine, and the Eucharist.  
Ann Arbor, MI:  University of Michigan Press, 2009. 
587 &I*LRYDQQL5HDOH´/DUHFH]LRQHGHOSODWRQLVPRQHO´GHRUGLQHµGL$JRVWLQRµ
in Fabrizio Conca; Isabella Gualandri; Giuseppe Lozza, Politica, cultura e religion 
QHOO·LPSHURURPDQRF,9-VI) tra oriente e occidente (1DSOHV0'·$XULD, 1993).  See also 
5HDOH·V Aurelio Agostino:  Natura del Bene (Milan, Vita e pensiero, 1995), and Werner 
Beierwaltes, Agostino e il neoplatonismo Cristiano (Milan:  Vita e pensiero, 1995), cited in 
&URXVH´Paucis Mutatis Verbisµ 
  
 
 
243 
 
Augustinian ontology, primarily in the divine act (the-urgy) of creation, and 
derivatively in the divinizing act of cosmic and human liturgy.  I will argue 
that Augustine's reformation of Platonism parallels Iamblichus' superficially, 
particularly in the former's few scattered remarks on sacraments, which, like 
the latter, emphasize the motif of sacrifice, angelic mediation, and the matter 
used in ritual.  But the bulk of this essay is to show how Augustine radicalizes 
this theurgical tendency, in a Christological and Trinitarian direction 
(Christological, in that he brings together of finite and infinite being, not only 
in the Incarnation, but also in his doctrine of the causales rationes or 'rational 
causes' immanent in all things; Trinitarian in his revision of the Plotinian 
ontology of emanation and light).  This will give rise to a discussion of 
Augustinian ontology, expressed as mediatory on two fronts:  one, the 
properly theurgical, which mediates between transcendence and immanence 
on the plane of being, and two, the imaginatively realist, which mediates 
between faith and reason on the plane of sacramental existentialism.  On 
both of these fronts (the ontological and the existential) Augustine is noticing 
and resolving certain tensions within the Platonic tradition.  
 
Augustine views creation, incarnation and the Eucharist as the 
culmination of Platonic metaphysics 
            It is well known - indeed it is the classic starting point for any 
discussion of Augustine's Platonism - that the young Augustine is enamored 
with the books of Plotinus.  Famously, the only difference he can perceive 
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between these texts and scriptural catholicism is the lack of incarnation - 'But 
that the word was made flesh and dwelt among us, I did not read there.'588 
This is often taken lazily as a lifelong critique of Platonism tout court - and not 
entirely without justification, as Augustine never discovers the radical claim 
of the Incarnation in any Platonist writing.  However, Augustine explicitly 
says he intends to complete Platonism, and not to reject it,589 and to at least 
some extent it is theurgical Platonism which gestures most clearly to 
Christian truth. 
 Seemingly the first and greatest obstacle to such a claim is presented 
by Augustine himself, in Book X of De civitate dei, where he denounces the 
Chaldean project as demonic; some of the harshest rhetoric (for example, 
calling the theurgists demons in human form) in the Augustinian corpus is 
directed toward the theurgists.  But the Church has always been stricter with 
heretic than with heathen:  indeed, the structure of De civitate dei I-X generally 
is a procession of polemics which begins with those polytheists least worthy 
RI$XJXVWLQH·VDWWDFNDQGSURJUHVVHVWRWKHPRUH noble adversaries:  so when 
Augustine admiringly critiques Plato in Book VIII, he naturally progresses to 
Plotinus and Porphyry (of whom he implicitly says, when quoting the Timaeus 
to him, that his greatest failure is that he is not Platonist enough),590 before 
culminating these books contra paganos with a critique precisely of theurgy.  
                                                          
588 Augustine, Conf. VII.9.14. 
589 Augustine, De civ. Dei 8.4-11. 
590 Augustine speculates that if Plato, in his affirmation of embodied being, and 
Porphyry, in his insistence on the undesirability of re-incarnation, had been able to 
discuss these matters face to face, they would have converted each other to 
Christianity (De civitate dei 22.27). 
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The implication of this climactic critique is that theurgy, as a relatively true 
extension of Platonic thought and practice, is perhaps the closest the pagans 
ever got to Christian truth.  The critique itself, interestingly enough, has two 
major foci:  the first ontology, and the second social.  In the first place, 
Augustine argues that pagan theurgy (unlike the Christian doctrine of the 
Incarnation) lacks a means of mediating between the temporal and the 
eternal; in this regard the link to Conf. 7.9.14 hardly needs to be belabored.  
,QWKHVHFRQG$XJXVWLQH·VFRQFHUQLVPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\SDVWRUDOSDJDQ
theurgy intends to complete a lower form of purgation than that offered by 
SDJDQSKLORVRSK\DQGVRLVRQ$XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJDZD\RIVHSDUDWLQJ
between lower and higher parts of the soul, on the one hand, and lower and 
higher classes of society, on the other.  The incarnation and the Eucharist, in 
FRQWUDVWSXULILHV´WKHZKROHµ,WLVKROLVWLFERWKLQGLYLGXDOO\DQGVRFLDOO\
´:HQHHGQRWVHHNRQHSXULILFDWLRQIRUWKHSDUWZKLFK3RUSK\U\FDOOV
intellectual, and another for the part he calls spiritual, and another for the 
body itself; for our most true and mighty Purifier and Saviour took upon 
Himself the whole of human nature.µ591 It is crucial to note, in addition to 
this, that his critique is not against the theurgical mode of being-in-the-world, 
but only against its insufficient end:  sacrifices, invoking the mediating angelic 
forces, and making use of the lowest forms of matter ² this is precisely how 
Augustine describes the sacraments;592 the only thing lacking in pagan 
theurgical practice is a sufficient mediator, i.e. a doctrine of the incarnation.  
                                                          
591 Augustine, De civ. dei 10.42. 
592 Augustine, De trinitate 3.10. 
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Indeed the constructivHFRQWH[WRI$XJXVWLQH·VSROHPLFLQDe civitate dei X is 
his treatment of the True Sacrifice, brought about by God Incarnate, through 
ZKLFK¶WKH&KXUFKEHLQJWKHERG\RIZKLFK+HLVWKH+HDGLVWDXJKWWR
offer herself WKURXJKKLP·,593 a fact which is only obscured when pious 
translators of Augustine render "sacra" as "mysteries" when Augustine is 
talking about pagan ritual worship, and "sacraments" when he is talking 
about the Eucharist or baptism.  Pagan theurgy is simply insufficiently weird 
for Augustine (which itself takes a lot of imagination, as anybody who has 
waded through the fire and entrails of the Chaldean oracles knows); it cannot 
DFFRXQWIRUWKHVHOIIRUKXPDQLW\ZKLFKLV¶DJUHDWHUPLUDFOHWKDQDQ\PLUDFOH
performed by man.·594 Thus if theurgy is a radicalisation of certain elements 
of Platonism ² the social, the textual, the ritual -- then Augustine conceives 
of his preaching and administration as a further radicalisation of these 
elements.595  
           The discussion of the Eucharist in De trinitate makes clear how the 
logic of the Christian sacrifice removes this false distance between offerer 
DQGRIIHUHGDQG0DULRQ·VDQG&KUpWLHQ·VEURDGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHVHOI
                                                          
593 Augustine, De civ. dei 10.20, my italics. 
594 Augustine, De civ. dei 10.12. 
595 Cf. Jason Parnell, The Theurgic Turn in Christian Thought:  ´,Q͓ the͓ end, ͓when͓ 
we͓ scrutinize͓ what͓ is͓ essentially͓ theurgic͓ in͓ the ͓thought͓ of͓ Origen͓ 
and͓ Augustine,͓ we͓ recognize͓ that ͓both ͓thinkers,͓ in͓ surprisingly͓ similar͓ 
ways, construct͓ provisional͓ systems͓ of͓ Christian͓ sacramental ͓mediation,͓ 
informed͓ by͓ a ͓theology͓ of͓ the ͓incarnate͓ Logos,͓ and͓ conceptually 
͓parallel͓ to͓ the͓ pagan͓ and ͓theurgic͓ systems ͓of͓ mediation ͓that ͓their͓ 
rhetorical͓ approach ͓UHMHFWVµ 
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PDNHVUHOHYDQWDIXOOTXRWDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VGHYHORSPHQWRIWKLVXQLILHG
identity of these varying selves: 
What priest then could there be as just and holy as the only 
Son of God, who was not one who needed to purge his own 
sins by sacrifice, whether original sin or ones added in the 
course of human life?  And what could be so suitably taken 
from men to be offered for them as human flesh?  And what 
could be so apt for this immolation as mortal flesh?  And 
what could be so pure for purging the faults of mortal men as 
flesh born in and from a virgin's womb without any infection 
of earthly lust?  And what could be so acceptably offered and 
received as the body of our priest which has been made into 
the flesh of our sacrifice?  Now there are four things to be 
considered in every sacrifice:  whom it is offered to, whom it 
is offered by, what it is that is offered, and whom it is offered 
for.  And this one true mediator, in reconciling us to God by 
his sacrifice of peace, would remain one with him to whom 
he offered it, and make one in himself those for whom he 
offered it, and be himself who offered it one and the same as 
what he offered.596 
 
 In this discussion, four dimensions of theurgical sacrifice ('whom it is 
offered to, whom it is offered by, what it is that is offered, and whom it is 
offered for') are all rigorously Christological, which lends an aesthetically 
fitting simplicity to this 'purifying' [mundandis]597 sacrifice beyond the 
complicated rites of the pagans.  With Christ in the Eucharist as 
simultaneous offerer, offeree and offered, we have the culmination of the 
Christological radicalization of Platonist theurgical practice:  God is in 
matter, and so accomplishes the assimilation of God, humanity, and cosmos.   
 
                                                          
596 Augustine, De trinitate 4.13. 
597 Note the odd (and perhaps neo-logistic ² there is no attestation for this word 
pre-Augustine) use of mundo for 'purify,' instead of the much more common purgo or 
emendo - this is etymologically related to mundus, world.  2QWKH¶ZRUOGHGKHDUW·WKH
commensurability and co-porosity of the self and the world, cf. below. 
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These theological themes and practices show a continuity with 
Platonic doctrines to which the phenomenological tradition, and 
especially Marion, is willfully blind 
           This is also entirely assonant with the turn to the cosmos at the end of 
Confessions - the cosmic liturgy in Augustine is foreshadowed in Iamblichus.598  
Thus if, as Shaw has argued, the pithiest recapitulation of the difference 
between Iamblichus and Plotinus is the difference between homoiosis kosmoi 
[assimilation with the world] and monos pros monon [the flight of the 'alone to 
the alone'], Augustine is very clearly on Iamblichus' side (as is, I would argue, 
Plato), although the Incarnation and the Eucharist allow him to make this 
claim more strongly. 
 On this note there is a remarkable continuity found between the 
relatively late De trinitate and De civitate dei and the pre-episcopal "si enim Plato 
ipse viveret" passage of De vera religione.  De vera religione in fact begins by 
defining "the true religion" not as Christian teaching, but as Christian 
worship.  In this regard Augustine argues that the definitive break 
Christianity makes with pagan life lies in the unification of the private and the 
public, in other words the abolition of the esoteric.  The structure of this 
argument makes possible Augustine's surprising apathy about the specific 
dimensions of the ancient schools; by taking it as given that the ancient 
philosophers "used to maintain rival schools but share common temples,"599 
                                                          
598 'For Iamblichus, the cosmos itself was the paradigmatic theurgy:  the act of the 
gods continually extending themselves into mortal expression' (Shaw, Neoplatonism 
and the Soul, 17). 
599 Augustine, De vera religione 1.1. 
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Augustine is able to disregard whatever differences in dogma separated them, 
due not just to their common pagan liturgies but to their equally common 
separation   between dogma and worship in general.  This is true with only 
one fairly predictable exception:  locating the unique genius of Socrates in his 
inability to divorce his philosophy from his worship, Augustine points to the 
subversive Socratic habit of swearing oaths "by the dog" to illustrate and 
endorse the view that "any works of nature whatsoever, which are brought 
into being [the tellingly Hellenic word gignerentur] under the guiding hand of 
divine providence, are better, and therefore more worthy of divine honors, 
than the things that were worshipped in temples."600 Socrates is, in this early 
work, already upheld, not for his superior metaphysical or ethical dogma, nor 
even for the virtue of his lived philosophy, but as a proto-theurgist in the 
very precise Augustinian sense.  De vera religione still bears considerable 
Plotinian influence, for example in its relative denigration of images and the 
imagination,601 which, as I argue below, dramatically disappears in 
$XJXVWLQH·VODWHUFRPPHQWDULHVRQ*HQHVLV%XWKLVSHFXliar presentation of 
that which in Christianity Augustine thinks would appeal to Plato 
demonstrates in nuce the sort of Platonism to which he aspires, and the most 
definitive foray of his entire philosophical career into intra-Platonist debates: 
If all this has happened; if it is being celebrated in writings and 
monuments; if from one small corner of the earth, in which the 
one God used to be worshiped and where it was fitting to be 
born... and if -- not to go on talking about past events which 
anyone may be free to disbelieve -- if today there is proclaimed 
throughout nations and peoples [several Scriptural quotations 
                                                          
600 Augustine, De vera religione 2.2. 
601 Augustine, De vera religione 3.3. 
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follow, centered on the fostering of virtues]... If these things 
are now being read to ordinary people throughout the world and are 
being listened to with reverence and the greatest pleasure ... if 
throughout cities and towns, camps, villages, hamlets and 
even private estates, the turning away from earthly affairs and 
conversion to the one true God is so openly advertised and 
sought after that every day, throughout the whole world, the 
human race answers with practically a single voice that "we have 
lifted up our hearts to the Lord," why do we still gape open-
mouthed over the dregs of yesterday's drinking bout and 
scrutinize the entrails of dead beasts for divine oracles, while, 
if ever it comes to discussion, we are at greater pains to have 
Plato's name [platonico nominePRUHDFFXUDWHO\¶WKHSODWRQLF
QDPH·@UDWWOLQJDURXQGLQRXUPRXWKVWKDQRXUERVRPVILOOHG
with truth?602  
 
Hill remarks on this last turn of the argument:  "This is a very curious finale 
to such a tremendous bout of rousing rhetoric."  To this we may respond, 
"Only if one comes at it with Plotinian presuppositions!" Indeed, that this 
long encomium to the Christian faith will end with an internal critique ("why 
do we...?") of theurgical practices is practically telegraphed by the particular 
nature of the things Augustine praises about Christianity in the encomium 
itself:  the "cleansing of the soul," the sacraments, ascetic practices, the "daily 
readings" in local church assemblies, and above all the universal celebration 
of these practices, all point toward a view of the Chaldean mysteries as 
neither silly superstition nor anti-Christian demonism, but only an obsolete 
and defunct (because too esoteric, too elitist, too restricted) practice of 
philosophy.  And "defunct" is very nearly exactly Augustine's own comment 
                                                          
602 Augustine, De vera religione 3.3-5. 
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on the practice of divinization via the reading of dregs a few paragraphs later:  
"nimis puerile est."603  
All of this bears re-integration into my foregoing arguments about 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenological appropriation 
RI$XJXVWLQH$V,DUJXHGWZRRIWKHGLVWLQFWLYHWUDLWVRI+HLGHJJHU·V
existential reading of Conf. X are his apt estimation oIKRZ´&KULVWLDQLVHGµ
DQG´RULHQWDOLVHGµWKH3ODWRQLVPRI$XJXVWLQH·VGD\ZDVDQGKLVVXEVHTXHQW
wild underestimation of the extent to which this particular Platonism might 
inform our understanding of Augustine.  This is the historical interpretation 
which will, several years later, lay the groundwork for his central distinction 
between phenomenology and metaphysics in Being and Time:  by forgetting a 
truly Greek phenomenology, western thought had opened the door to 
metaphysical mythology, a door which Christianity had no troubles stepping 
through.  His error here is perpendicular to the much more mainstream 20th 
century error (discussed in the introduction to this thesis), wherein the 
TXHVWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·V3ODWRQLVPLVEHVWDQVZHUHGE\DQDORJ\WRWKH
queVWLRQRI$TXLQDV·$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPLQDQDWWHPSWWRVDYH$XJXVWLQHIURP
the charge that his pagan environment has infected his Christian philosophy, 
one posits a faith which perfects reason.  Whether, then, one suggests that 
the divide between Augustine and the Greeks lies between phenomenology 
and mythology, or between faith and reason, one keeps this divide on the 
order of knowledge, where a more truly Augustinian approach, as I have 
argued, would suggest the divide exists primarily on the order of worship and 
                                                          
603 Augustine, De vera religione 4.7. 
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of love.  Marion is, however, the more decisive figure for the current essay, 
and his attempt and ultimate inability to distinguish between Augustinian and 
Greek worships, and Augustinian and Greek loves, reveals the fault-line 
along which phenomenology either ruptures the Augustinian terrain, or gives 
into it and is itself ruptured. 
 
%H\RQGPHWKRORGRORJLFDOFRQFHUQV0DULRQ·VDYHUVLRQWR3ODWRQLVP
FDXVHVKLPWRPLVUHDG$XJXVWLQH·VUHODWLRQVKLSWR6FULSWXUHDQG
ultimately his situation of the self in a created world 
On the order of love, then, Marion ably dismantles the once-
influential hyper-Protestantism of Anders Nygren,604 but his anti-Hellenic 
temperament betrays his more fundamental inability to leave the early 20th 
century.  On the surface at leDVW0DULRQ·VQHZERRNDSSHDUVWREHKLV
attempt to translate his project into Augustinian Latin (so la reduction becomes 
confessio, O·DGRQQH becomes ego, the saturated phenomenon becomes pulchritudo, 
etc.)   Three possibilities emerge:  is Marion trying, in this translation, to 
bring his own ideas into conformity with Augustine, or is he trying to bring 
$XJXVWLQH·VLGHDVLQWRFRQIRUPLW\ZLWKKLVRZQRUEH\RQGWKHVHWZRLVKH
trying to show that no special effort is required for either project, since their 
LGHDVDUHDOUHDG\PRUHRUOHVVLGHQWLFDO",ILW·VWKHILUVWFRQIRUPLQJKLVLGHDV
WR$XJXVWLQH·VWKHERRNLVREMHFWLRQDEOHIURPDSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
VWDQGSRLQWLIWKHVHFRQGFRQIRUPLQJ$XJXVWLQH·VLGHDVWRKLVRZQLWLV
                                                          
604 Jean-Luc Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 222ff. 
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objectionable from both an historical and a theological standpoint; only the 
WKLUGLVDFFHSWDEOH%XWDV,ZLOODUJXHWKLVWKLUGFODLPWKDW$XJXVWLQH·VDQG
0DULRQ·VSURMHFWVDUHYLUWXDOO\LQGLVWLQJXLVKDEOHFDQRQO\PDNHVHQVHLI
Marion is willing to drop his cherished, and altogether self-imposed, 
distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics.  The answer to this 
question rests in no small part on what it is he means by his opening claim:  
´6W$XJXVWLQHGRHVQRWVSHDNWKH*UHHNODQJXDJHµ 
If we can assume that this claim is not banal, we must, in revisiting it 
in a more evaluative key, read it as enigmatic:  what does it mean to claim 
WKDW´6W$XJXVWLQHGRHVQRWVSHDNWKH*UHHNODQJXDJH"µ3HUKDSVWKHEHVW
ZD\WRH[SOLFDWH0DULRQ·VSURMHFWDQGLWVUHODWLRQWR$XJXVWLQHLVWRDSSroach 
it indirectly, by outlining the misreading which, to my mind, Marion invites.  
Let me be clear:  I think the following explication is a misreading of Marion, 
which I will correct, in fairness to Marion; however, it is a misreading for 
which it is hard to blame those who hold it; I think Marion is ultimately to 
blame for this misreading, particularly due to his allergy to the word 
metaphysics. 
 2QWKLVPLVUHDGLQJ0DULRQ·V¶DSSURDFKWR$XJXVWLQH·WKXVDWWHPSWV
to treat his relationship to the Greek tradition, his metaphysics or lack 
WKHUHRIDQGKLVWUHDWPHQWRIWKH%LEOH,QDOORIWKHVHFDVHV0DULRQ·V
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOOHDQLQJVDUHFOHDULQWKHFDVHRIWKH*UHHNV0DULRQ·V
SUHIHUHQFHLVIRUGHVFULELQJ$XJXVWLQH·VVLPLODULWLHVZLWK$ULVWRWOHUDWKHU than 
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the Platonists;605 in the case of metaphysics, Marion asserts resolutely that 
$XJXVWLQHLV¶QRQ-PHWDSK\VLFDO· 606 in the case of the Bible, Marion argues for 
WKHSKLORVRSKLFDOFHQWUDOLW\RI$XJXVWLQH·VFRPPHQWDULHVRQWKHSVDOPV607 
since the psalms (much like the confessions) refuse the hubristic tendency to 
speak of God in the third person, and thus the allegedly idolatrous reduction 
of God to phenomenon; additionally, the formal logic of both the psalms 
and the Confessions seem to displace or decenter the human subject:  thus 
0DULRQ·VIUHTXHQWFLWDWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VIDPRXV¶,KDYHEHFRPHDJUHDW
TXHVWLRQWRP\VHOI·7KXVDFFRUGLQJWRWKLVPLVUHDGLQJ0DULRQ·VRSHQLQJ
FODLPFDQEHVXSSOHPHQWHG¶$XJXVWLQHGRHVQ·WVSHDNWKH*UHHNODQJXDJH
>VF¶EXWKHGRHVVSHDN+HEUHZ·@··:HFDQQRWHLQSDVVLQJKRZVWUDQJHO\
FROOXVLYH0DULRQ·VSURMHFWLVZLWKFODVVLFDOOLEHUDO3URWHVWDQWLVPLQWKLVUHJDUG 
                                                          
605  ¶,QWKHVDPHVHQVHWKHYHU\ORQJDQGULFKGHEDWHRQWKHVXSSRVHGQHR-Platonism 
RI6W$XJXVWLQH«QRORQJHUVHHPVWRGD\WREHDVGHWHUPLQDQWDVZKHQLWEHJDQQRt 
that the question is without its interest, but it seems less central, if not marginal:  
first, because St Augustine does not use the fundamental concepts of NeoPlatonism, 
or rather, Neo-Platonism (if only because God does not identify with the One, nor 
the Principle, nor even with the Good), second, because an author can influence 
another without explicitly reading him, and finally because  it is advisable to take 
VHULRXVO\KLVMXGJPHQWQHJDWLYHZLWKRXWDQ\DPELJXLW\RQWKHVHGRFWULQHVµ-9). 
606  MarioQ·VSURMHFWLV¶WRWHVWKRZIDUWKHQRQ-metaphysical character of [the 
SKHQRPHQRORJ\RIGRQDWLRQ@JRHV«2QHVKRXOGWKHQUHDGIURPDSRLQWRIYLHZ
identifiable at least negatively:  from a non-metaphysical point of view.  And thus as 
our contemporary utopia, to us who try to think a post-metaphysical point a view.  
+HFDQJXLGHXVLQDGYDQFHDQGZLWKRXWSUHFRQFHLYHGLQWHQWLRQ«7KXVZHPD\
hope for a reciprocal proof:  to test the non-metaphysical status of St Augustine by 
its more intelligible terms of a phenomenology of donation, but also to test how far 
the non-metaphysical character of this phenomenology goes.  To this end, our 
attempt  at reading imposes on itself that which St Augustine imposed on himself, 
or performs spontaneously:  not to employ the lexicon of the categories of O·HWDQW, 
not to impose a fortiori the concepts of modern metaphysics on him, in one or the 
RWKHURILWVVWDWHPHQWVLQVKRUWQRWWRVSHDNWKHODQJXDJHRIPHWDSK\VLFVµ 
607  Cf. Au Lieu De Soi 181. 
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 To this, those critics of Marion who subscribe to this misreading are 
likely to object:  to claim that Augustine does not simply repeat Plotinian 
doctrines does not imply that Augustine does not interact with the Platonic 
tradition, and to claim that Augustine does not make a rigid distinction, in a 
linear and systematic presentation, between ens and esse, does not imply that 
$XJXVWLQHGRHVQRWWUHDWPHWDSK\VLFDOTXHVWLRQV2QHQHHGQ·WEH3ORWLQXVWR
be a Platonist, nor Thomas to be a metaphysician.  The misreader would then 
likely point out the problem with this individualist portrait of Augustine:  for 
Augustine, the self is not only displaced with respect to itself, nor is it only 
displaced with respect to God -- as early as the Confessions, and for the 
remainder of his career, Augustine describes the self as displaced with respect 
to all of the created order, because this created order is itself always 
displaced, de-centered, by the same structures of time which have displaced 
the self.  So, this misreading would conclude, Marion is reading Augustine as 
a theorist of existentialist praise, a thinker of the transcendental subject; this 
LVERUQHWKURXJKPXFKRI0DULRQ·VH[HJHVLVRI$XJXVWLQHDQGSDUWLFXODUO\
evident in his prioritization of the Psalms (with their refusal to speak of God 
LQWKHWKLUGSHUVRQDVWKHELEOLFDOWH[WZKLFKEHVWHQFDSVXODWHV$XJXVWLQH·V 
philosophy:  much like Buber and Levinas, Augustine would appear to be an 
anti-metaphysical phenomenologist, an anti-platonist, even an anti-rationalist.  
Now, I will defend Marion against this misreading, before I conclude this 
section by arguing that, b\GRZQSOD\LQJWKHYHU\UHDO´*UHHNµQDWXUHRI
$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWKHEULQJVLWRQKLPVHOI 
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Marion extends his analysis of the self towards the entire created 
order, but does not appreciate how this subverts his aversion to a 
metaphysics of participation 
Marion makes it very clear that it is not the case that ego is the same as 
le soi (as the central essay of Au Lieu De Soi argues).  Le soi, the self, is always 
called from elsewhere (G·DLOOHXUV), and thus it is perpetually destabilized, or if 
one likes, de-centered, by the response of praise that it offers to the initial call 
of creation.  So far, so good:  but Marion here, as far as I know for the first 
time, acknowledges that it is not only the human self that fits this formal 
structure:  through his reading of Augustine on Genesis, Marion extends this 
de-centered account to all of creation. It is worth quoting at length.   
In fact, creation and praise reciprocate each other, and render 
HDFKRWKHUPXWXDOO\SRVVLEOH´Te laudant haec omnia creatorem 
omnium .µ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHIRUPXOD´Laudant te opera tua µ
must be heard as a pleonasm, or rather as an equivalence.608  
 
We must ask:  is this not closely parallel to theurgy, in its double motion? 
Even linguistically, opera tua would best be rendered in Greek as the-urgia, and 
VRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI*RG·VZRUNLQJDVHTXLYDOHQWZLWKWKHULWXDOGLYLQH
works closely resembles the Iamblichean understanding of the appearance of 
phenomena as simultaneously creation and praise.  In this respect, we should 
note, Marion stops just short of agreeing with my assessment of Augustine as 
a theurgic reformer of the platonic tradition, in parallel with Iamblichus and 
                                                          
608 Jean-Luc Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 324, citing Augustine, Conf. XI.5.7 and 
XIII.33.48. 
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Proclus.  But directly after Marion claims this theurgical cosmology, he 
quickly asserts that it has nothing tRGRZLWKRQWRORJ\KHVD\V¶>7KHZRUG@
´&UHDWLRQµGRHVQRWEHORQJWRWKHOH[LFRQRIEHLQJQRURI%HLQJEXWWRD
liturgical vocabulary, as confessio  and as praise, which alone recognize and 
HVWDEOLVKLW·609  Marion makes, at the very centre of his essay, a persuasive 
case for a decentered or ecstatic self, which no longer has its place ² and he 
even, in being willing to read Augustine seriously on Genesis as the creation of 
heaven and earth, extends this to the world, qua created.  But he argues too 
hard, against Augustine himself, that Augustine divorces liturgy from 
PHWDSK\VLFVLQRWKHUZRUGVWKDW$XJXVWLQHGRHVQ·WWKHQsave WKH´QDWXUDO
DWWLWXGHµRUSRVLWcreation as a specifically ontological category.  Marion here 
had the chance to perceive that when Augustine reads Genesis (as I will 
argue below) as a text of becoming, he attempts a definition of becoming as 
metaphysical without being onto-theological ² that is, he tries to think time 
and being in such a way that creation, and the self, are real, and yet in time.  
To the extent that Marion wants to overcome the Heideggerean idolatry of 
silence, it would seem that an explicit reading of Augustine as both the 
founder of phenomenology and a strictly metaphysical realist would be a 
powerful opportunity7KLVTXHVWLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·VWKHXUJLFDO3ODWRQLVP
WKHQIDUIURPEHLQJDPDWWHURIPHUH¶REMHFW-KLVWRULFDO·LQWHUHVWRXJKWWR
challenge the very foundations of Heideggerean phenomenology, and have a 
rippling effect on all of his heirs, insofar as they have uncritically accepted 
the hypothesis that all metaphysics is ontotheology.  But in his fear of the 
                                                          
609 Jean-Luc Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 324. 
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Greek language, and in spite of his beneficial (albeit too limited) attention to 
the biblical commentaries, Marion misses this opportunity.610  And this is 
where it is finally objectionable for Marion to claim Augustine as an ally on 
his anti-metaphysical team:  Augustine is very clear that Genesis is a 
metaphysical, as well as a cosmological, text.  It is well known that Augustine 
finds the Trinity in the ILUVWWZRYHUVHVRI*HQHVLVZKDW·VSHUKDSVPRUH
interpretively bold is that in Genesis 1.1 alone, Augustine finds the ground of 
being and becoming.611  Every point that the phenomenological tradition may 
make about the self, then, ought to be transferred onto the realm of 
EHFRPLQJDVVXFK6RIRUH[DPSOHZKHQ0DULRQUHDGV$XJXVWLQH·V
description of God as interior intimo meo (closer to me than my centre) as an 
anticipation and critique of the cogito,612 he misses the corollary doctrine of 
the seminal reasons, discussed below, by which Augustine argues that Christ 
LVWKH¶UHDVRQ·RIDQ\WKLQJWKHratio in the center of any entity, so God is also 
interior intimo mundo.  The resultant ontology, in which nothing is simply 
                                                          
610 In the wake of his phenomenological critics, it is understandable that Marion 
wants to abstain from making judgments about the real existence of phenomena-as-
given, or phenomena-as-revealed; this would violate his self-imposed self-definition 
as a phenomenologist-to-the-exclusion-of-theology.  The objectionable point is 
trying to enlist Augustine as performing this same task.  
611  Augustine interprets heDYHQDV¶DVSLULWXDOFUHDWHGZRUNalready formed and perfected·
DQGHDUWKDV¶WKHLPSHUIHFWPDWHULDOVXEVWDQFHIURPZKLFKWHPSRUDOWKLQJV
would be made [or become, fierent @·7KDWLVWRVD\KHDYHQDVWKHHWHUQDO
realm of being, and eaUWKDVWKHWHPSRUDOUHDOPRIEHFRPLQJ6R¶,Q+LP
who is the Beginning, Holy Scripture places the origin of created being [creaturae 
existentis], which exists through Him but still in an imperfect state.  But it shows that 
to Him as the Word belongs the perfecting of created being, which is called back to 
him to be formed [formaretur] by a union with its Creator and by an imitation, in its 
own way, of the Divine Exemplar, who, eternally and unchangeably untied with the 
Father, is of necessity idenWLFDOLQQDWXUHZLWK+LP·7KLVLVDOVRPRUHRUOHVVWKH
logic behind reading principium as Christ.   
612 Jean-Luc Marion, Au Lieu de Soi, 285. 
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tautologous to itself, and nothing is its own centre, but God is the center of 
all, is a circular ontology613 - the Augustinian ordo  is not so much hierarchical 
LQD3ORWLQLDQVHQVHEXWPRUHLQ'HQ\V·VHQVHZKHUH/RYHYL]*RGLV
both at the centre and the circumference of the order of being.  This may be 
ZK\WKH$XJXVWLQH·VPRVWFRPPRQO\XVHGRQWRORJLFDOWHUPVDUHQRW´KLJKHU
DQGORZHUµEXW´LQQHUDQGRXWHUµ+HDUJXHV¶Without any distance or 
measure of space, by His immutable and transcendent power he is interior to 
things because they are all in Him, and exterior to all things because He is above 
them all.·614   Of course this theurgical ontology is exactly parallel to, or even 
FRQJUXHQWZLWKKLVDFFRXQWRIWHPSRUDOLW\´0RUHRYHUZLWKRXWDQ\GLVWDQFH
or unit of time, by His immeasurable eternity He is more ancient than all 
things because he is before them all, and newer than all things because He is 
also after them allµ615  The implication of this theurgical ontology, where 
interior and exterior and tradition and novelty are all convertible and porous, 
for the human self is, however implicitly, the doctrine of deification:  or, the 
entirely teleological doctrine of being made ad imaginem dei.   
 
 
 
                                                          
613  7KLVUXQVSDUDOOHOWR$XJXVWLQH·VWKHRORJLFDOPHWKRGDFFRUGLQJWR*LOVRQ
Following Pascal, Gilson tries tRH[FXVH$XJXVWLQH·VXQV\VWHPDWLFQRQ-linear 
DSSURDFKWRSKLORVRSK\DVIROORZLQJQRWWKH¶SURFHVVRIWKHLQWHOOHFW·DVGRHV
7KRPDVEXW¶DGRFWULQHZKRVHFHQWHULVJUDFHDQGFKDULW\·:KLOH*LOVRQKDVWR
overcome his natural distaste for the non-linear exposition, in doing so he makes a 
YHU\LPSRUWDQWSRLQW¶7KHQDWXUDORUGHURIDQ$XJXVWLQLDQGRFWULQHLVWREUDQFK
RXWDURXQGRQHFHQWHUDQGWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\WKHRUGHURIFKDULW\· 
614 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 8.26. 
615 Ibid. 
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Scripture is, for Augustine, a metaphysical text  
            Although I am here arguing that the groundwork for this ontology is 
laid in Platonic texts, it is worth noting that its more direct source is 
scriptural.  For Augustine, of course, there need be no strict line drawn 
between philosophy and scripture; the Confessions are in large part the claim, 
put in narration, that the Bible is the philosophical text par excellence.    For 
this reason, I here take an exceptionally brief detour into Augustine's general 
practice of reading Scripture; without an understanding of how Augustine 
regards the Bible, only a severely deficient account of how Augustine reads 
being itself can be offered.  Augustine wrote major commentaries on three 
ERRNVRIWKH%LEOHDQGRQH·VFKRLFHRIZKLFKZLOOEHWKHLUSULPDU\VFULSWXUDO
LQWHUORFXWRUWHOOVXVPXFKDERXWRQH·Vreading of Augustine more generally.  
Gilson, for example, focuses on the Tractates RQ-RKQ·V*RVSHOVLQFHKLV
WUHDWPHQWRIWKH,QFDUQDWH:RUGFRQVLGHUHGLQLVRODWLRQIURPWKLV:RUG·V
creative capacity, suggests a proto-Thomist divide between faith and reason.  
Heidegger, in his rare references to Scripture in Augustine, confines his gaze 
to Paul; the very Lutheran Augustine which emerges ought not to surprise, 
though the lack of systematic philosophical exposition of Paul in Augustine 
ought to have slowed Heidegger down on this trajectory.  And as noted 
above, Marion finds the lens of the Psalms most amenable to his fairly 
localized project of defining the self as displaced, particularly with regard to 
language and praise.  In this essay, and as a corrective to these subtle but 
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determinative decisions, I will confine my attention primarily to the book 
Augustine found most fascinating, perplexing, and revelatory.   
Notwithstanding Augustine's comments in Retractiones about, e.g., his 
imperfectus liber, there is a good reason, internal to Augustine's own logic, that 
he returns so frequently in his career to considering Genesis: all of Scripture 
for Augustine is multivocal, as we well know in the wake of de Lubac's 
Medieval Exegesis, but more than this, the Genesis account of creation itself 
provides justification for this doctrine.  He interprets 'be fruitful and 
multiply': 
In all these things [all created matter] we find multitudes and 
abundances and increases. But only in signs given corporeal 
expression and in intellectual concepts [in signis corporaliter editis 
et rebus intellegibiliter excogitates] do we find an increasing and a 
multiplying which illustrate how one thing can be expressed 
in several ways and how one formulation can bear many 
meanings.616  
 
There is a widening hermeneutic circle at play here that runs beyond the 
simple multitude of correct interpretations which de Lubac enumerates 
(literal, allegorical, moral, anagogical) - Augustine finds in the command to be 
fruitful the grounds for his multiple readings of Genesis. Just as both 
'corporeal signs' (paradigmatically, one assumes, the sacraments, but by 
extension all created things) and intellectual concepts, Genesis presents a 
unity which necessarily gives rise to multiple interpretations ² the forms and 
the sacraments, much like scripture, are mediated to all hierarchical levels of 
charitable interpreters in many different ways. This is the precise ecclesial 
                                                          
616 Augustine, Conf. XIII.24.37. 
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sense in which Augustine 'finds himself' on the pages of Genesis, and the 
reason that he comes back at various stages of his life to interpret the self 
that he finds there. 
            Time here is central to the ecclesial multiplication of meanings: as 
time progresses, there are more and more saints of whom any given text is 
true, and (infinitely?) more ways in which that text can be truly understood. 
Time is thus neither a crude Nietzschean recurrence (a paganism which 
Augustine vigorously denies in De civitate dei 12) nor a more refined Hegelian 
dialectical progress, but a widening circularity, in which true interpretations 
of Genesis, as of all revelation, are infinitely multiplied even as they retain 
their unity in the text. The biblical source, in other words, is pregnant with 
these meanings (to the point that Augustine speculates that Moses may have 
been aware of all of these possible meanings). This bears, as we shall see, a 
deep affinity with Augustine's sacramental ontology, such that we would not 
be far amiss to characterize the reading of Scripture as a communal, 
sacramental and creative activity: he says as much in his commentary on "and 
so it was done", claiming that each human understanding of revelation is a 
participation in this divine creative accomplishment.617 For this reason, 
Genesis is dangerous to the project of the anti-metaphysician;618 something 
                                                          
617 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 3.23.35. 
618 Heidegger himself seems to have realized this; the only scriptural citation in Being 
and Time is a critique of the anthropology of the imago dei, Gen. 1:26.  and that it is in 
the same contexWDV¶]RRQHFKRQORJRQ· - - DQGRIFRXUVHWKLVLV+HLGHJJHU·VREMHFWLRQ
WKDW·KDYLQJUHDVRQ·DQGWKH·LPDJHRI*RG·FRQVWUXHGDVWUDQVFHQGHQFHRIWKHVHOILV
precisely what hides our mode of being (namely, ontological, asking the question of 
being) from us  (48).  As I will argue below, this shows a deep misunderstanding of 
the Augustinian doctrines of imago and of ratio. 
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like this claim underlies much of the industry of post-modern hermeneutical 
studies of Augustine, whose ties to the phenomenological tradition are many, 
though largely under-conceptualized.619    
But again Augustine is making a bolder claim on behalf of the words 
of Genesis: it is not only that these words mean something for all, but that 
they actually contain within themselves all things. Scripture is thus 
ontologically pregnant, the 'skin stretched over the heavens,'620 growing 
teleologically forth beyond itself in the Church's practice and understanding: 
There are things of which the knowledge is fixed and 
determined with the generations, such as the lights of wisdom 
and knowledge. But while the truths of these things remain 
the same, their embodiments in the physical realm are both 
many and varied. One thing grows out of another [aliud ex alio 
crescendo], and so, by your blessing [in benedictione tua], God, 
things are multiplied.621 
 
There is an ambiguity in this phrase aliud ex alio - this crescendo of 'one thing 
out of another' (as we are forced to translate the phrase) is more literally of 
'one (other) out of (one) other.'  For Augustine, the book of Genesis, when 
read as a philosophical treatment of becoming, is an text of ontology (in 
VRPHWKLQJYHU\OLNH+HLGHJJHU·VPHDQLQJRIRQWRORJLFDODWH[WRIWKH
SKHQRPHQRORJ\RIJLIWLQVRPHWKLQJYHU\OLNH0DULRQ·VVHQVHDQGDWH[WRI
theurgy, in a meaning of that word that is more or less peculiar to Augustine 
himself:  and it is in this sense that Augustine contributed to the Platonic 
tradition.  I now turn to two of the most prominent ontological doctrines to 
                                                          
619 A full biography of this issue (centering on Ricoeur and to a lesser extent) would 
push the present study well beyond its bounds; BriDQ6WRFN·VAugustine the Reader 
provides a most helpful guide. 
620 Augustine, Conf. XIII.15.16, citing Psalm 104.2. 
621 Augustine, Conf. XIII.24.37. 
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HPHUJHIURP$XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJVRI*HQHVLVEHIRUHVXJJHVWLQJVRPHZD\V
in which an account more sensitive to these dimensions would radically re-
configure the practice of phenomenology itself. 
 
Phenomenology points us to images, but Genesis asserts more 
radically that those images are in their teleological reality able to 
mediate between the immanent and the transcendent 
First, the doctrine of imago.  The Hebrew and Christian tradition of 
holding the tzelem elohim as a central anthropological, spiritual or mystical 
theme has been well-studied, and the specifically teleological dimension 
implied by the Latin translation ad imaginem dei is a pivotal moment of 
0DULRQ·VUHDGLQJRI$XJXVWLQH622  0DULRQ·VGLVFLSOH2OLYLHU%RXOQRLVKDV
ZULWWHQDQ´DUFKDHRORJ\RIWKHYLVXDOLQWKH0LGGOH$JHVµ623 which broadens 
the context of the discussion of what imagines are and can be, and considers 
this question in both historical and ontological context.  What he means by 
WKHWHUP´DUFKDHRORJ\µLVQRWDVLPSOHKLVWRU\RIDUWLVWLFLPDJHVQRUHYHQDQ
historical study of philosophical and theological theories of images, but a 
genealogical account of the fragile relationship between images and reality 
which emerges out of medieval debates on the subject.  For Boulnois, to ask 
about the history of the imagination is thus to ask about the history of the 
truth, and of our access to it:  because especially in the Christian tradition, 
which has tended to be suspicious of any claims to direct and immediate 
                                                          
622 Jean-Luc Marion, Au Lieu De Soi, 419. 
623 Olivier Boulnois,  Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH8QHDUFKpRORJLHGXYLVXHODX0oyen Âge (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 2008). 
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revelation, people can only attain truth by means of some kind of mediation, 
whether verbal or imaginal.  But words and images by definition, and by 
virtue of their finitude, have some degree of difference from the truth, they 
can by definition lead us into falsehood.624  This logical tension runs, as 
WKRXJKDIDXOWOLQHWKURXJKRXW%RXOQRLV·JHQHDORJ\DQGLWLVSDUDOOHOHGE\DQ
historical tension along which he organizes the terms of this discussion, 
namely the tension between Augustine and Denys the Areopagite. 
 ,Q%RXOQRLV·DFFRXQWWKHPHGLHYDOWUDGLWLRQRIWKHLPDJHUXQQLQJ
through Aquinas, Scotus, Eckhart and all the way to the Council of Trent, is 
essentially organized by their commitments to a Dionysian insistence that 
God is essentially formless, lacking even an intelligible form, which means 
WKDWHYHU\LPDJHLVLQWKHHQGD´YLVLRQRIKLVXQOLNHQHVVDILJXUDWLRQRIWKH
XQILJXUDEOHµVXFKWKDWRXUPRGHRILPDginary access to God is by means of 
those images which are most obviously different or deformed from God 
(447), and on the other hand an Augustinian insistence that God, although 
invisible to the senses, is visible in an intelligible form, such that our mode of 
LPDJLQDU\DFFHVVWR*RGLVE\´HQWHULQJLQWRWKHLQYLVLEOHVRXO«>LQ@DQ
LQWHOOHFWXDOLQWXLWLRQZLWKRXWLPDJHVµ,WLVWREHVXUHDQLQWHUHVWLQJ
disjunct which Boulnois has here diagnosed.  But instead of embarking on 
the narration of the debate which ensues, we can question the terms set out 
at the very beginning.  I contend that Boulnois has given, in the opening 
chapter of $X'HODGH/·LPDJH, a rich but not quite rich enough account of 
Augustine on the image.  In what follows, I will present the main points of 
                                                          
624 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH11.  
  
 
 
266 
 
his argument, and then discuss De genesi ad litteram, the central Augustinian 
text (mostly absent from his account) which would have complicated and 
enriched his portrait of Augustine, and thus his account of the entire Middle 
Ages, and, more to the point, ought to complicate and enrich the 
phenomenological portrait of Augustine construed more generally. 
 The first source to which Boulnois turns to elaborate the Augustinian 
account of the image is the rather obscure 83 Questions, in which Augustine 
defines image as distinct from likeness on the one hand and equality on the 
other.  Against likeness, which is the simple property of two things sharing 
some qualities, without implying any causal relationship between them, and 
against equality, which is just a more rigorous form of likeness, the image, for 
Augustine, is essentially marked by a causal or generative relationship to that 
of which it is an image.  The example he takes here (and in multiple other 
locations) is a natural image, that of my reflection in a pond, which depends 
on me in a generative fashion.  And obviously this is even more true in 
DQRWKHUQDWXUDOLPDJHWKDWRIDFKLOG·VUHODWLRQVKLSWRKHUPRWKHUDVEHLQJ
her image.  Augustine notes that the child is not only the image of her 
mother, due to her causal dependence on her and their sharing of qualities, 
but also, were it not for the intervention of time, their ontological 
relationship would be that of equality:  in other words, only their common 
immersion at different points on a temporal spectrum keeps the child and 
her mother from participating in the relationship both of image and of 
equality -- the conceptual overlapping of these two terms, as Boulnois points 
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out,625 is foreign to Plato, but present in, of course, Trinitarian theology.  And 
drawing on the thought, present in both the Platonic and the Aristotelian 
WUDGLWLRQVWKDW¶DUWLPLWDWHVQDWXUH·$XJXVWLQHPDNHVVLPLODUSRLQWVDERXW
artistic images, although these obviously do not necessarily share in the 
relationship of likeness with their originator, except in the case of the self-
portrait:  so the relationship of artist to painting, for example, derives from 
and participates in the relationship of parent to child, which itself derives 
from and participates in the relationship of the first person of the Trinity to 
the second. 
 All well and good.  But, as Boulnois acknowledges,626 Augustine is 
less intrigued and less bothered by these points than he is by the concept of 
´PHQWDOµRU´VSLULWXDOµLPDJHVWKRVHZKLFKDUHinternal to me, depend on 
things outside of me, and are in fact the very mode by which I can perceive 
any thing at all.  To make this point, he turns (rightly but too briefly) to the 
last book of De genesi ad litteram, arguing that here is found a theological 
adaptation of Porphyry, who himself fused the Platonic tradition of tripartite 
anthropology with the Stoic tradition of the phantasma, the dreamlike 
apprehension of intellectual realities (or of deceptive images thereof).  From 
Porphyry, Augustine elaborates a tripartite description of perception, 
corresponding to his tripartite anthropology:  the body senses in its way, 
physically, and the mind senses in its way, intellectually; but mediating 
between these two sensations, just as the spiritus mediates between body and 
                                                          
625 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH18. 
626 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH24. 
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mind, there is imagination, the active and productive sensation of images.  
7KLVLVRIFRXUVHFRPSDUDEOHWR$XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQWRImemoria in Confessions 
X, and Boulnois does in fact nod his head in that direction,627 although 
without any sustained discussion of how memoria relates to imagination.  (It is 
possible to argue that they are synonymous, and that, since the reception and 
production of images is more central to what Augustine is describing in 
Confessions X than is the memory of the SDVW¶LPDJLQDWLRQ·ZRXOGEHDPRUH
IDLWKIXODQGOHVVPLVOHDGLQJWUDQVODWLRQWKDQ¶PHPRU\·IRUWKLVHOOLSWLFDOEXW
central term). 
 In addition to the relationship of natural images to their originals, the 
relationship of artistic images to their originals, the relationship of mental 
images to their originals and the divine relationship of Christ as Image to 
God the Father, Boulnois embarks onto one last part of the Augustinian 
terrain, the discussion of the doctrine according to which people are created 
·WR WKHLPDJHDQGOLNHQHVVRI*RG·628  And it is at this point -- without 
question the central point for any discussion of the Augustinian image -- that 
his account opens itself up to the most severe criticisms, from a philological 
or philosophical perspective.   He specifies four points at which Augustine 
allegedly departs from earlier Greek or Latin patristic thought on the image 
of God:  One, that Augustine conceives of humanity as made to the image of 
the entire trinity, instead of uniquely to Christ.  This is undeniable.  Two, that 
although the current of patristic thought is to make much of the preposition 
                                                          
627 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH30. 
628 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH31-2. 
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¶DG· in the formulation ad imaginem dei, as implying some distance between the 
present state of humanity and the full humanity present in Christ or in 
Paradise, Augustine denies the distinction between being the image of God 
and being to the image of God.  This is, for reasons I will elaborate in a 
moment, problematic (and, as noted above, he does not have Marion on his 
side here).  Three, that Augustine does not, following this same patristic 
current, distinguish between imago¶LPDJH·DVWKDWZKLFKKXPDQLW\LVE\
nature) and similitudo¶OLNHQHVV·DVWKDWWRZDUGVZKLFKKXPDQLW\FDQVWULYHE\
imitating God in virtuous acts or in knowledge).  And four, that the image of 
God resides for Augustine exclusively in the human soul, as distinct from the 
combination of the soul and the body.  This last is perhaps the most 
immediately objectionable, and lays at the root of the earlier claim, the denial 
of the forFHRI¶ad·LQWKHIRUPXODWLRQad imaginem dei.  In support of this 
denial to ascribe the imaginality of God to the body, which Boulnois appears 
to be primarily invested in in order to ward off a crude anthropomorphism in 
our conception of God, he refers -- without explanation -- to De genesi ad 
litteram VI.12.21, which actually makes no mention of any problematic of the 
soul and the body.629  The portion which Boulnois apparently means to 
VXSSRUWWKLVFODLPUHDGVDVIROORZV´7KHSUH-eminence of man consists in 
this, that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellect by 
ZKLFKKHVXUSDVVHVWKHEHDVWVDV,KDYHH[SODLQHGDERYHµ7KHSDVVDJHWR
ZKLFK$XJXVWLQHLVKHUHUHIHUULQJLV,,,LQZKLFKKHFLWHV6W3DXO·VJORVV
                                                          
629 Boulnois, Au-GHOjGHO·LPDJH, 36. 
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on the image of God630 according to which the image of God is a process of 
´UHQHZDOµZKLFKWDNHVSODFHQRWVLPSO\LQWKHPLQGEXWVSHFLILFDOO\spiritu 
mentis, in the spirit of the mind.  While of course the Pauline gloss stops short 
of ascribing this image to the body of humanity, and so Boulnois is partially 
ULJKW$XJXVWLQH·VWUHDWPHQWRI3DXOKHUHDQGHOVHZKHUHLQDe genesi ad litteram 
invites further reflection of the relationship of the spirit, which as Boulnois 
has argued above has as its primary function the imagination, to the mind on 
the one hand and the body on the other.   By taking a look at the role of the 
imagination, and more precisely the Pauline imagination, in De genesi ad 
litteram XII, we will be in a place to call into question the choice Boulnois 
makes to refuse DQ$XJXVWLQLDQWKRXJKWRIWKH´adµLQad imaginem dei. 
 5HFDOOTXLFNO\RQHRI0DULRQ·VPRUHSKLORORJLFDOPRPHQWVZKHUHLQ
he describes the complex relationship of tentiones in Confessions X -- intentio, 
attentio, distentio.  These form the pegs from which $XJXVWLQH·VDFFRXQWRI
temporality and indeed of human existence within this temporality hangs.  
Marion is hardly the first to notice this nexus of concepts; the relationship 
between these modalities of time and perception have been well studied 
within the discipline of Augustinian studies.  Entirely absent from all of these 
discussions, however, is the parallel usage of a different tentio in De genesi ad 
litteram, which, after eleven books of discussion of Genesis, turns to an 
analysis of 2 Corinthians 12.2-4, in which Paul discusses his vision of the 
third heaven.  This analysis follows logically from the end of Book XI, in 
                                                          
630 The text is a conflation of Eph 4.23-¶%HUHQHZHGLQWKHVSLULWRI\RXUPLQGDQG
SXWRQWKHQHZPDQ«·DQG&RO¶«the new man who is being renewed unto 
WKHNQRZOHGJHRI*RGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLPDJHRIKLVFUHDWRU· 
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which Adam and Eve are expelled from Paradise, because Augustine takes 
3DXO·VYLVLRQDVOLWHUDOO\WKHUHWXUQWRSDUDGLVHDQGWKHUHVtoration (even if 
RQO\LQDP\VWLFLQVWDQWRIWKHIXOOUDQJHRI$GDP·VSHUFHSWLYHSRZHUV+H
GHVFULEHVWKLVYLVLRQDVDQ¶ostentio·OLWHUDOO\DVWUHWFKLQJRIWKHH\HDQGQRW
ZLWKRXWUHDVRQ3DXO·VDFFRXQWLVULJRURXVO\DSRSKDWLFDERXWZKHWKHUWKLV
vision is corporeal or spiritual, whether or not, in other words, it makes use 
of the bodily eye.631  And this apophasis is the grounds on which we can 
return to paradise -- or at least we can return a consideration of paradise 
ZKLFKLVODFNLQJLQ%RXOQRLV·DFFount to the question of the history of the 
image.  Because after Augustine acknowledges that he is not certain, his 
GLVFXVVLRQSURFHHGVRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW3DXO·VVRXOGLGQRWOHDYHKLV
body during his ostentio. This is in accordance with his earlier assertion632 that 
the only anima is the anima animans; the soul understood not as noun but as 
SDUWLFLSOHERWK¶VHQVLQJ·RWKHUWKLQJVDQGDZDUHRILWVRZQOLIHDVH[HUFLVLQJ
memory, intellect and will.  The self-consciousness here described, in the 
three coequal registers of will, intellect and memory, is precisely the activity 
of the spirit perceiving life by the body.  In other words, the rational sensing 
and interpretation of both intellectual and corporeal things is dependent on 
the only action in me that iVXQPHGLDWHGQDPHO\¶WKDW,H[LVWDQGWKDW,
NQRZWKLVIDFWDQGWKDW,ORYHLW·WKHLPDJHVRIDOOWKLQJVDUHPHGLDWHGWRPH
                                                          
631 ´:KHWKHULQWKHERG\RURXW RIWKHERG\,GRQRWNQRZ*RGNQRZVµ
$XJXVWLQHFRPPHQWV´«LWLVQRWHYHQFOHDUZKDWWKHWKLUGKHDYHQLVQDPHO\
ZKHWKHULWLVWREHQXPEHUHGDPRQJFRUSRUHDORUVSLULWXDOWKLQJVµAugustine, De 
genesi ad litteram 12.1.2). 
632 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 7.8.11. 
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only through an originary image of the trinity;633 contrary to Marion, the 
return to the Tree of Life must necessarily pass back through the Tree of 
Knowledge. 
 
Augustine is more aware than the phenomenological tradition that the 
imagination can have a philosophical, a theological, and in the end 
even an ontological function 
Imagination can mean many things to the modern ear:  idle ´IDQWDV\µ
in the crude sense, or idealized romantic creativity, or the simple positing of a 
slight contra-factual twist on empirical reality which allows one to describe 
that reality more fully as it actually exists.  For Augustine, imagination has at 
least two meanings:  the first is primarily phenomenological, describing the 
process by which humanity receives phenomena as images, and the second is 
ontological, describing the process by which humanity itself is disclosed as 
imaginary. 
 Imagination-as-perception is the faculty by which humanity may 
sense transcendent Paradise in time; Augustine's description of this faculty is 
found in his discussion of the exemplary case of such sensation, Paul's vision 
of the third heaven.634 This vision is the suspension of corporeal perception 
which is paralleled in everyday experience by the dreams we experience in 
sleep, or, in a stronger sense, when one dies. It differs from (Plotinian) 
intellectual vision in the difference between image and reality, and as such 
                                                          
633   Cf. Augustine, De civitate dei 11.26, 28. 
634 2 Cor. 12, discussed in Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12. 
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introduces a semiotic element to the ostensible visuality of perception and 
faith:  faith gives a concept, imagination produces an image of that concept, 
and reason 'reads' that image.635 Central to this perceptive process is both the 
limit and the reality of the image:  there is no image by which one can 
identify, or in which one can exhaustively contain, an intellectual thing - 
examples include virtues, love, God - whereas I can embrace an image of a 
thing, e.g. my neighbor, or myself, and although my imaginative capacity still 
does not exhaust the thing's plenitude, I have still intended a true analogy of 
its being (and in so doing I have intended God, at a double remove ² the 
image-created-in-my-mind of the image-as-created-by-God of God). 
            In both cases the reality exceeds the image; in the first case by logical 
necessity and in the second case only accidentally, to the extent that my 
imaginative capacity is as yet insufficiently trained. This mediated, indirect 
perception of God is the perception which remains for a world in time, and 
Augustine privileges this indirect or imaginative imagining of God to any 
pretended immediate relation to truth:  since the world as we see it in time is 
the image of the intellectual realm, imagination is the proper mode of 
existential being within the world which, in its reception and its production 
of images, strives towards intellection.636  Eschatologically, Augustine 
                                                          
635 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12.6.15. 
636 ,QIDFWRQHRI$XJXVWLQH·VUDUHH[SOLFLWDIILUPDWLRQVRIDVRUWRIGHLILFDWLRQLQVLVWs 
that deification occurs not on the register of nature, but on that of appearance 
(Sermo 7KHUHKHQRWHVWKDW¶\RXULPDJHLVLQ\RXUVRQLQRQHZD\DQGLQ\RXU
PLUURULQDYHU\GLIIHUHQWZD\·EXWSDUDGR[LFDOO\WKHWUDQVODWLRQRIKXPDQLW\
towards the image of God occurs by that which appears more like me (my image in 
the mirror), and not that which is by nature more like me (my son).   
  
 
 
274 
 
believes,637 the imagination will be able to see, embrace and praise all things 
fully (as do the angels) by beholding the likeness of all things in the Image 
that is the divine creative Word (i.e. intending God at only one remove, if it 
is not impious to posit a gap between God and Word).  
            This dimension of imaginative perception mimetically participates in 
divine creation; as Augustine notes, there is no temporal gap between 
corporeal perception and imaginative perception, rather the object and my 
image of the object occur to me simultaneously, and only the temporality of 
language forces me to describe them sequentially.638   This is an obvious 
parallel to his insistence639 that God creates matter and form simultaneously, 
the temporality of Scripture's language being likewise bound to describe them 
in sequential words. This very fact, present in the quotidian perception of any 
thing, strikes him as more interesting, more mysterious and more 
praiseworthy than the extraordinary visions and dreams which, he says, hold 
the interest of his contemporaries.640 By extension of this observation, 
Augustine argues for a participatory operation of memoria in divine creation:  
memoria not simply as memory of the past, but precisely as the imaginative 
faculty par excellence, produces images 'in shadows and silence'  [in tenebris atque 
silentio],641 a clear echo of Genesis 1.2.  Every instance of imaginative 
reasoning -- that is, a rational perception of an object, a phenomenon, or a 
situation as an image, of God, which respects both the reality and the 
                                                          
637 Augustine, De civ. dei 22.28. 
638 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12.11.22. 
639 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 1.15.29 and elsewhere. 
640 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12.18.39. 
641 Augustine, Conf. X.8.13. 
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limitation of that image -- is a promise of the coming ability of the 
imagination to see, embrace, and praise all things fully, as the angels do, by 
beholding the likeness of all things in the Image that is the divine Word.  Or, 
in other words, as he puts it forcefully and in biblical terms642 in his extensive 
meditation on the perceptive potentials of the resurrected body in the last 
book of De civitate dei, in the return to paradise, our eye -- and here Augustine 
is very insistent that it is specifically a matter of a bodily eye -- will be so 
FOHDQVHGDVWRVHH*RGDV´DOOLQDOOµWKHGLYLQHWRWDOLW\SUHVHQWLQWKH
imaginative perception of each discrete thing and of the harmonious totality 
of all things together.643 
 But what has this to do with the 20th century phenomenological 
tradition?  This very peculiar sort of phenomenological reflection is born out 
of a biblical ontology, something we could term an imaginary realism, where 
there is in a sense nothing but images, but these images are not necessarily 
illusory, nor incorporeal:  they are the necessary way through which humanity 
approaches ad imaginem dei.    This privileging of appearance redoubles, in 
effect, the account of images as sensual, as born out in, for example, the 
reciprocity of Augustinian optics, wherein images, and light, travel out from 
the eye, as well as in to it.644 It emerges that not vision in the modern sense, 
but reciprocity and exchange are at the heart of the Augustinian reflection on 
LPDJHVVXFKWKDWLWZRXOGEHIUXLWIXOWRWUDQVODWHPXFKRI$XJXVWLQH·V
                                                          
642 Cf. 1 Cor. 15.28. 
643 Augustine, De civitate dei 22.30. 
644   See e.g. De trinitate DQG0DUJDUHW0LOHV·KHOSIXOVXPPDU\LQAugustine on 
the Body (Missoula, MT:  Scholars, 1979). 
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emphasis on sight645 to the only sense that in modernity has kept this sense 
of exchange, that of touch (I cannot touch a table unless it is also touching 
me).  Only by thinking of the sense, or better the sensitivity, of touch can we 
understand the imagination as Augustine does -- as tactile, the tactility of the 
eye, and of the soul, here understood as not only always and fully present 
into the body646 (and emphatically not MXVW´GHVFHQGHGµLQWRWKHPLQGEXW
also always and fully extended out to worldly things.     
 In light of this reciprocity, it is possible to suggest that, beyond 
%RXOQRLV·FRPSDULVRQRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQWRWKH3ODWRQLFEXWUHDOO\PRUH
Stoic) phantasmata, a more fruitful conversation might happen on the grounds 
of the more centrally Platonic, and more centrally Biblical, insistence on 
illumination as that which gives temporal reality both its birth and its 
fulfillment. For the present, all that remain are images, and the only way we 
can relate to them is through the imagination, however impure this 
imagination might at present be.  But as for the future, in the at once 
eschatological and teleological paradise towards which we tend, and for 
which all was created, the dimension of becoming is thus not a realm of 
shadow, which will be transcended in favor of a purely intellectual grasp of 
God as an image-less form, but it is a realm of ever-fuller images, always 
tending back towards that which was created first:  imagination, as the return 
to paradise, takes place at every instant of time, even the moment which 
originates time, that of the creation of light.  We could note here, too, against 
                                                          
645   Augustine, De trinitate 11.1.1-2. 
646   ,QGHHG$XJXVWLQHH[SOLFLWO\DUJXHVWKDWKHDULQJDQGLQIDFW¶DOOPRWLRQLQRXU
ERG\·RFFXUVE\PHDQVRIWKHLPDJHDe genesi ad litteram, 12.16.33). 
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a too easily adopted Platonizing apophatic rejection of images, that 
Augustine maintains that images and the imagination will be present in the 
resurrection, just as firmly as he insists that the body will be resurrected.647  
And here emerges the true and radical break that Augustine makes on the 
ontological level with Platonism:  the relevant distinction is not one of the 
(stable, intelligible) realm of being and the (unstable, imaginary or corporeal) 
realm of becoming, or (to put it into the terms of contemporary 
phenomenology) between the actual and the possible, but much more simply 
between present and future:  being, if such a thing exists, is what is unstable 
and incomplete, and completely accessible for all of us, whereas any 
HSLVWHPRORJLFDOSKHQRPHQRORJLFDORURQWRORJLFDOVWDELOLW\LV´SUHVHQWµRQO\
in the future, and so falls within the realm of speculation, mystery and faith.  
Pace Heidegger, the ontological question (and in the end the root of any 
TXHVWLRQZRUWKDVNLQJLVQRW´ZK\is WKHUHVRPHWKLQJUDWKHUWKDQQRWKLQJ"µ
EXW´quid erimus, et qualis erimusµ-- what shall our mode of being be, and how 
shall we exist?648   
 
Augustinian metaphysics has a Trinitarian structure; the relationship 
between self and world is for Augustine one of creation and 
participation in the divine life 
                                                          
647 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12.36.69 -- MXVWDVWKH¶VSLULWXDOERG\·LVRQO\WKH
body of flesh in its uncorrupted fullness (cf. e.g. De civitate dei 22.21), a resurrected 
perception will be different from our current perception not in its restriction to the 
intellectual realm or the corresponding faculty of the intellect, but only in its 
perfected ability to distinguish between bodies, images and intellectual realities, and 
to perceive each with the appropriate mode of vision. 
648 De civitate dei 22.24. 
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So Augustine goes beyond Heidegger on this point: it is not just that 
being only reveals itself to humanity, but that there is a reciprocal move from 
humanity into being:  becoming in time is always becoming towards 
timelessness.   This is why Augustine frequently says that we are still living in 
the 6th day of Genesis 1:  humanity undergoes time to be made towards the 
image of God.  This has a decidedly contemplative side to it, which explains 
ZK\$XJXVWLQH·VWZRJUHDWHVWFRQWHPSODWLRQVWKHYLVLRQDW2VWLDDQGWKHODVW
book of De civitate dei) are not strictly theological:  that is, Augustine does not 
contemplate God, he contemplates the resurrected life of humanity.  This 
teleological aspect of the imagination reflects perfectly the more mundane 
phenomenological sense in which imagination really refers to the unification 
of all of the senses, and the way humanity interprets sensory input into 
sensible intellectuality ² when I remember or imagine the smell of a thing, or 
how it feels, or its sound, I am also able to remember or imagine all of its 
sensory dimensions.  This multi-sensory nature gives an additional shade of 
meaning to the complexity of Augustinian optics, particularly when we 
remember the priority (and subsequent centrality) of light in the Genesis 
QDUUDWLYHRIFUHDWLRQ7KRXJKDWWLPHV$XJXVWLQH·VUHDGLQJRIfiat lux has the 
flavor of Plotinian emanation, more primarily this lux appears as the 
precondition of images, and thus of created being itself.  Augustine's exegesis 
of the creation of light in De civitate dei thus serves as a synecdoche for his 
entire ontological system: 
If, therefore, we ask who made it, the answer is "God". If we 
ask by what means He made it, the answer is that He said 
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"Let it be", and it was. And if we ask why He made it, the 
answer is because [quia]649 "it was good."650  
 
Here we find a stunning revision of Aristotelian physics:651  in fidelity to the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, Augustine omits the material cause, and then 
finds in the remaining three Aristotelian causes (respectively efficient, formal 
and final) the Trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit).  A parallel development 
makes all the more clear this link between light and all that is illumined:   
Every particular thing, or substance, or essence, or nature, or 
whatever else you like to call it, has simultaneously about it 
these three aspects:  that it is one something, and that it is 
distinguished by its own proper look or species from other 
things, and that it does not overstep the order of things.652  
 
He thus gives the material for a Trinitarian ontology ² from scriptural 
account of creation (indeed, from the first three verses of Genesis) it is seen 
that all things, and paradigmatically light, qua created, have within themselves 
a vestigium trinitatis. So it is true to say that all matter, because ex nihilo, is 
nothing, and yet by denying any autonomous material cause to creation, the 
Trinitarian construal of the other three causes somehow, beyond our present 
understanding, imbues matter (as we saw was the case with Scripture) with 
                                                          
649 'Quia' is ambiguous, as Dyson's translation somewhat attests by translating it here 
as 'because' it was good, and on the next pages as 'so that' it might be good (with no 
grammatical difference to support either reading).  This ambiguity is thoroughly 
congruent with Augustine's development of the 'spirit' involving a sense of time, 
motion, and teleiosis:  as the final cause, it both is good and needs to become good.  
See also De genesi ad litteram 3.12.18, 12.14.30.   
650 Augustine, De civ. dei 11.21. 
651         It is all the more stunning that, to my knowledge, no treatment of Augustine 
in the context of ancient philosophy has discussed it as such: Gilson alone mentions 
it (190), but only finds here evidence for the relatively banal statement that, for 
Augustine, creation is good. 
652 Augustine, De vera religione 7.13. 
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divine meaning,653 a meaning which self-multiplies through time from 
pregnant arche to eschatological telos.654   The neo-platonic reditus is in 
Trinitarian fashion radicalized, since the play of Trinitarian light across 
created shadowy trinities show them to be emanating perpetually forth from 
themselves, but always beyond themselves, into the full brilliance of the 
Trinity.  It is for this reason that Augustine has to rein in his tongue lest he 
falsely ascribe conscious knowledge of the Trinity to Plato, whose threefold 
division of philosophy into natural, logical and ethical Augustine finds to 
have a deeply Trinitarian resonance.655  7KXV$XJXVWLQH·VILQGLQJWKHTrinity 
(and the Church) in Genesis is not an hermeneutical anachronism, but is 
rather central to his thought on Trinity, on creation, and on our sacramental 
participation therein.656   Likewise, created light is one of Augustine's first 
attempts at an image of the essential unity,657 because 'the splendor of light' 
simply is that light, with no separation in essence.  Finally, in addition to its 
intrinsic reconciliation of unity and diversity, and its prominence in the 
biblical narrative of creation, light is DOVRDQGKHUHLVDQDUHDZKHUH0DULRQ·V
                                                          
653 This paradox (of all things, at all times, both being and not-being), is well 
described with reference to Augustine's earliest work by Emilie Zum Brunn, in St 
Augustine:  Being and Nothingness, the only book-length treatment of Augustine's 
ontology thus far. 
654 Augustine, De trinitate 3.16 uses explicitly the metaphor of pregnancy:  'For the 
world itself, like mothers heavy with young, is heavy with the causes of things that 
are coming to birth.' 
655 Augustine, De civ. dei 8.5, 11.25. 
656Cf. Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 4.3.7-ZLWK¶PHDVXUHQXPEHUDQGZHLJKW·
(Wisdom 11.20) also construed as a vestigium trinitatis.  In this sense Conf¶P\
ZHLJKWLVP\ORYH·LVSURIRXQGO\VSLULWXDOLQWKHSUHFLVHVHQVHLQZKLFKAugustine 
develops the spiritual in De genesi ad litteram.  
657 Augustine, De trinitate 4.27. 
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account might have on its own terms benefitted from a consideration of light 
and the imagination) light is favored by Augustine as a metaphor for divine 
love:  it is self-giving, and yet never exhausts itself or even depletes its own 
resources in its self-donation. 
            The aforementioned modified Aristotelian account of causes (who, 
how, why) underlies and gives birth to Augustine's many accounts of created 
beings as vestigially Trinitarian:  we could mention here, among others, the 
parallel trinity of wisdom's ordo of all things in 'measure, number and 
weight,'658 and the derivative anthropological trinities of memory, 
understanding and will, and lover, beloved and love.  Of these, the first is of 
primary importance to Augustine; the order of wisdom is a favorite passage 
of Augustine's, treated in texts from De genesi ad litteram659 to De civitate dei660  is 
already implicitly in the famous passage of the Confessions: 'my weight is my 
love'661 is profoundly spiritual in the precise sense of the Spirit as 'final cause,' 
the goodness of all things. Number, as the Christology of all things, deserves 
a longer treatment than I can provide here; the numeri for Augustine are deep 
with the musical resonances of the Pythagoreans, and implicit within his 
                                                          
658 Hill's note on 'in measure, number and weight' is helpful:  
>$XJXVWLQH@«SUHVV>HV@
the preposition "in" to its limits.  If God arranged all things in these three, these 
three must have existed before all things; which is only possible if they are God.  
And so he interprets them as a Trinitarian formulation; God (Father) is measure 
without measure, as that which prescribes modus or limits to everything; God (Son) 
is number without number, as that which provides everything with its species or look 
or beauty or proper nature; God (Holy Spirit) is weight without weight as that which 
draws everything to its own proper rest and stability' (321). 
659 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 4.3.7-8. 
660 Augustine, De civ. dei 11.30. 
661 Augustine, Conf. XIII.9.10. 
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account is a vastly under-explored account of what we may term 'ontology in 
the adverbial,' wherein things are more or less, e.g. angels are more, i.e. are 
more intensely, than humans, or the soul 'is more' than the body.  The 
significance of magus and minus esse for the early Augustine is outlined by 
Emilie Zum Brunn;662 she and I share the opinion that this formulation is 
fairly constant throughout Augustine's career, and this adverbial ontology is 
crucial to understanding Augustine's conception of hierarchy.  Augustine 
replaces the 'chain of being' with something more like a symphony, with 
different ontological intensities vibrating on different wavelengths without, 
for that, being quite 'superior' or 'inferior'.  But to understand the 'number' of 
things in this way would be to have angelic knowledge; the starting point for 
us must instead be imagination ² i.e. understanding the goodness of things, 
their spiritual final cause. 
            But to understand this perception of goodness (which is itself a 
moment of praise, that is, of theurgic return to God) as properly imaginative, 
as I wish to do, we must look briefly at a key moment in the development of 
Augustine's celebrated, and just as often misunderstood, account of the 
anthropological trinity:  most famously, this appears in De trinitate, but it too 
appears as early as the Confessions.  Notably, in the earlier account he posits 
esse and not memoria as the quasi-Father-figure. Latent here, if one believes a 
continuity to Augustine's thought, is an equivalence between memory and 
being, which is only a different way of saying (as Augustine frequently 
iterates) that I am insofar as God knows me:  ontic being is divine 
                                                          
662 Zum Brunn, Being and Nothingness 112ff. 
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anamnesis.  Augustine makes this point most clearly in a discussion of 
memoria and wisdom,663 in which Augustine revisits the argument that 
wisdom, the immutable Trinitarian form, 'spreads itself through all things in 
marvelous patterns of created movement', in the 'conversion of bodies 
[FRQYHUVLRQH«FRUSRUXP]' to itself.664  This conversion of the body, while 
described most vividly in the Confessions regarding Augustine the individual, is 
only applicable to the individual body as a microcosm; the exitus and reditus of 
the prodigal son is merely a participation in the return to God of prodigal 
being.  Further, this return is for Augustine the very definition of time, as the 
'unfolding' [explicando]665 of created measures, numbers and weights.  That all 
of the foregoing is so robustly Trinitarian for Augustine puts the lie to the 
phenomenological false problematic of subjectivity and objectivity; subjects 
and objects have no austere lines drawn between them, and are instead 
constitutively linked by their fundamental vestigia trinitatis.  This 
commensurability between the self and the world, to which the 
phenomenological tradition has aspired in some form as a constant all the 
way back to Husserl, is for Augustine simply a matter of reading Genesis 
carefully. 
 Augustine finds an intriguing linguistic connection in this regard in 
the text of Genesis:  for the creation of each individual component, Genesis 
employs a formulaic trinity of a jussive subjunctive (fiat lux, for example), a 
passively-voiced appearance (et facta est lux), and a benediction (et vidit Deus 
                                                          
663 Augustine, De trinitate 11.17-18. 
664 Augustine, De trinitate 3.7, 3.9. 
665 Augustine, De civitate dei 22.24, De trinitate 3.16 
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lucem quod esset bonum).  The only exceptions to this formulaic pattern are the 
creation of heaven and earth in their entirety, and the creation of humanity, 
both of which exist in the perfect active indicative (In principio creavit Deus 
caelum et terram; et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam).  Created things exist, 
insofar as they exist, hung from the poles of subjunctive potentiality, passive 
becoming, and divine blessing, and only in the eyes of totality and humanity 
FDQWKH\UHDFKIXOOIORZHUDVDFWXDOLW\$XJXVWLQH·s own commentary very 
much emphasizes the fact that directly after this ad imaginem suam comes the 
directive of dominion,666 which might seem to underscore a hierarchical 
difference between the human soul and the soul of the cosmos.  But this 
rests on a fundDPHQWDOWHPSRUDOPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ*RG·VGLUHFWLQGLFDWLYH
and indirect (subjunctive) creative activity is not, as Augustine is at constant 
pains to emphasize, temporally conditioned, but the corresponding human 
participation in the divine creative act is temporally conditioned, and thus 
both the gifted existence of heaven and earth and the co-constitutive 
subjective act of receiving them are equally subject to the limitations of time.  
The existence of the self, then, is the primary theophany; its reflection in self-
knowledge and its refraction by means of the knowledge of self given by 
other subjects and by created objects, as Marion and especially Chrétien have 
developed them, forms both the mirror and the lens which mediate all 
knowledge and all perception. 
 
                                                          
666 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 3.20.30. 
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Since the imagination is central to the Augustinian self, the education 
and purification of the speculative capacity is the primary role of the 
sacraments 
 Mirror and lens:  both apt translations of speculum, the key word in 1 
Corinthians 13.12, which, judging by brute number of citations at least, is 
$XJXVWLQH·VIDYRULWHELEOLFDOYHUVH7KHVSHFXODWLYHGLPHQVLRQRI$XJXVWLQH·V
thought is, then, thoroughly necessary for his phenomenology. Implicit in 
this verse is the progression, or the education,667 of the soul to see God 'in 
substantiam.'  Augustine, as usual, begins this training from the ground up: 
We observe [God in his substance] as both not being far away 
from us and yet being above us, not spacially but in its august 
and marvelous eminence, and in such a way that it also 
seemed to be with or in us by the presence of its light.668   
   
The ontological weight of lux to which this passage attests invites a re-
appraisal of the closely related Augustinian theme of illuminatio;  if light is 
being, then illumination is not simply epistemological, but existential.  It is 
thus not just a matter of saying that faith and reason are compatible, or that 
faith is intensified reason (although these are, of course, true): the divine 
illumination of the cosmos summons forth a response from the entirety of 
the rational soul, mind, and body.   This sort of a liturgical or ritual 
imagination, mediating between faith and reason, is the present-tense 
recognition of the imago dei in all creation, and also the productive cultivation 
                                                          
667  'Exercere' (Augustine, De trinitate 15.1). 
 
668 Augustine, De trinitate 15.10, emphasis mine. 
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of that same imago in the self (which is the limit of the usefulness of the term 
'deification' for Augustine).  Indeed, the historical gap between seeing God as 
he 'appears' in the historical Christ and seeing God in substantiam forms the 
ground for Augustine's development of the existential and epistemological 
category of imagination.  The immediate apparition of God is already lost to 
the post-ascension church, but the mediated, indirect perception of God - as 
the creative source of the world, in the iconic goodness of all things, and 
perhaps most exemplarily in the sacraments - remains available in time, and 
Augustine privileges this indirect or imaginative perception, which can only 
attest in aenigmate to any pretended immediate mystic intellectual revelation:  
since the world as we see it in time is the image of the intellectual realm, 
imagination is the proper mode of being within it which, in its imagining, 
strives towards intellection. 
            Here it is possible to discern a dimension in Augustine's 
reinterpretation of Platonic anamnesis that is theurgical in both the objective 
and the subjective sense:  memoria is the work of God, and the liturgical 
response, particularly in the Eucharist, is the participation of memoria in the 
divine order:  Augustine cannot have missed the cooperative facet of the 
Eucharist implied by the Latin translation of anamnesis in 1 Cor. 11.24-5 as 
com-memoratio ('do this in an act of co-memoria-tion with me').  Here again we 
see the dim outlines of a sacramental dimension, at least eschatological but 
also to a limited extent in our own time, of imagination: in the Eucharistic 
body of Christ, the images of all things are signified (here we remember that 
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a major, if not the primary, meaning of sacramentum for Augustine is 'sign').669 
The development of the imaginative faculty to be able so to see these images 
and to read them, the heightening of the sensus, is at the same time 
transcendent, material, and reflexive. 
 
$XJXVWLQH·VRYHUORRNHGPHWDSK\VLFDOGRFWULQHRIrationes both corrects 
and supplements his other proto-phenomenological texts 
 In all of this, it is important not to be misled by an overly narrow 
reading of the imago dei as a simple mental or intellectual correspondence 
between humanity and God.  It is instructive that, though Aquinas, for 
example, tends to read the imago dei as intellectus or alternatively as mens,670 
$XJXVWLQH·VIDYRUHGZRUGLVratio.  To underline a possible distinction 
between the two ² the first as more susceptible to Bonaventuran or even 
Cartesian isolation from the world, and the second as more universal and 
material, I wish to lift up an admittedly peripheral Augustinian doctrine, that 
of the causales rationes or seminales rationes, the ontological doctrine which, in 
Augustine's own thought, extends his early discovery of God as interior intimo 
meo671 into all the cosmos:  God as more intimate to the world than it is to 
itself.  Iamblichus, much more than Plotinus or indeed Plato himself, lays the 
groundwork for these causales rationes in his discussion of the cosmic spheres 
as principles (archai) which govern the forms of all particulars in the 
                                                          
669 This is not, I concede, his primary meaning in de gen. ad litt. but a survey of 
Augustine's usage of sacramentum throughout his career tends this way. 
670 Cf. Summa Theologica 1.93.6.  Aquinas is in fact deeply Augustinian on this issue; 
his linguistic preference does not fundamentally alter a deep ontological continuity. 
671 Augustine, Conf. III.6.5 
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cosmos.672 To be sure, something very like this is implicit in Plato's forms, 
but to my knowledge Plato never explicitly claims these to be embodied in 
matter - whether, as in Iamblichus, in the cosmic spheres, or, as in Augustine, 
all the way into particular earthly manifestations. 
            As I shall argue below, the incarnational logic of the causales rationes 
allows the entire cosmos to participate in the divine creation of a new world, 
via the creation of images (which for Augustine's imaginative realism, in 
Augustine's linguistic universe, are ontologically superior to any brutely 
material existents).  But this incarnational logic, insofar as it is rigorously 
Trinitarian, avoids both the monism and the pantheism into which Plotinus 
and Iamblichus respectively narrowly escape teetering.  Augustine's rational 
theurgy (cf. Paul's logike latreia, Rom. 12.1) retains positive elements of both 
in a trinit-urgy - in which the moments of creation, incarnation and ecclesial 
ritual all mediate between transcendence and immanence, and so between 
faith and reason.  
            The causales rationes are not exhaustively understood if we take them 
only in their most immediate exposition as an explanation of maggots, as in 
de genesi ad litteram 3.14.23, nor (as Anaxagoras' spermata were) simply an 
explanation of how seemingly new natures could come into existence - these 
causales are meant ontologically, as a doctrine without which nothing could 
be.  Augustine's rational causes are the 'archetypal harmonies of reason 
                                                          
672 Iamblichus, De mysteriis, 184.4. 
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[congruentia rationis] which live immutably in the very wisdom of God,' and yet 
are the proper immanent being of that which they cause: 
«LWLVWKanks to the activity of God continued even down to 
the present time that seeds display themselves and evolve 
from hidden and invisible folds, as it were, into the visible 
forms of beauty which we behold.673   
 
In this doctrine, Augustine asserts transcendence at the very heart of 
immanence.674  As such the rationes are, contrary to the pedestrian 20th-
century readings of the seminales which try to extract from them a proto-
Darwinian Augustine, or to refute such an extraction,675 considerably more 
sophisticated and all-encompassing than the pagan spermata, which assumed 
some stability of things within themselves, so that the paradox to be 
explained was how 'new' natures could come out of existing natures. 
Augustine is working out of a different tradition; creation ex nihilo demands 
an explanation of the existence of all natures at every moment, since no 
stable 'existing natures' can be assumed within the flux of time. Things are 
constantly in excess of themselves, and thus 'other' (aliud) from themselves, 
because of the slipperiness of the present moment - any moment at which a 
thing could be identical with itself is, once named as such a moment, already 
                                                          
673 Augustine, De civ. dei 22.24. 
674 'All things that come to corporeal and visible birth have their hidden seeds lying 
GRUPDQWLQWKHFRUSRUHDOHOHPHQWVRIWKLVZRUOG
«
WKXVLWLVWKHFUHDWRURIDOOWKHVH
invisible seeds who is the creator of all things, since whatever comes into our ken by 
a process of birth receives the beginnings of its course from hidden seeds, and 
derives its due growth and final distinction of shape and parts from what you could 
call the original programming [originalibus regulis] of those seeds' (Augustine, De 
trinitate 3.13, trans. Hill ² who kindly apologizes for the extremely unfortunate 
translational anachronism in the last phrase).      
675 Cf. Canon Dordolot, Darwinism and Catholic Thought (New York: Messenger, 1922) 
and Michael McKeough, OP, The Meaning of the Rationes Seminales in St Augustine 
(Washington, D.C:  Catholic University of America Press, 1926). 
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gone. A thing is more than it was simply because what it was is now a 
memory, and what it is is already striving to become, in conversion to God, 
more (itself) than itself.  (This is an ontological privileging of the present 
[praesens] over the past which, as we shall see, does not denigrate memoria, but 
raises it ecclesiologically; imaginative Eucharistic memoria becomes the vehicle 
of sight for God as ubique praesens [the 'everywhere present']). 
Augustine memorably speaks of the angels as the 'farmers' of 
creation;676 the angelic and the priestly role, to which humanity existentially 
aspires, is to tend being, watering the seminales rationes.  And as they can 
perform miracles by their keen perception of God-in-Himself, God-in-matter 
(the seminales rationes), and God-as-reflected-in-themselves,677 so too must our 
liturgical education pay close and simultaneous attention to all three (which, 
as we have seen, are all signified together in the Eucharistic corpus mysticum).  
In perhaps his most radical affirmation of the imaginative perception of 
matter, Augustine argues in language quite familiar to the Iamblichean ear:   
'To see [God's] substance [in its uncreated immateriality], hearts have to be 
purified [corda mundantur] by all these things which are seen by eyes and heard 
by ears.'678 Corda mundantur: this bizarre formulation is heavy with 
significance; a more etymologically daring translation would dictate that 
hearts must be worlded by the imaginative perception of matter if they would 
                                                          
676 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 9.15.26, De civ. dei 12.25. 
677 Augustine, De trinitate 3.21. 
678 Augustine, De trinitate 3.4. 
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see God in substantiam suam.  In other words, if one has truly received matter, 
one has truly perceived God.679 
            But one can, with Augustine, go further than this:  si bene accepistis, vos 
estis quod accepistis ['If you receive it well, you are yourselves what you 
receive'].680  The fact that he makes this claim in a Eucharistic context (the 
object of reception and becoming being the body of Christ) is not a 
compromise of the claim; on the contrary, it is a radicalization:  if one has 
truly received matter, one has become both matter and God.  Homoiosis kosmoi 
and homoiosis theoi are thus not simply, as they are for Iamblichus, parallel and 
concurrent movements; they are, for Augustine, identical.681  
            Augustine's creational physics, while allowing for a more 
conventionally scriptural diachronic eschatological teleology, insists that this 
teleology must be developed out of the creational synchronic teleology, in 
which things are created in full (germinally and potentially), have at every 
moment in time their formal fullness in eternity in verbo, yet still are at each 
moment striving in praise to divest themselves of what finitude they 
                                                          
679 A sensitive soul will find joy and beauty in the corporeality of 'mere existence' 
(Augustine, De civitate dei XI.27), but 'if a good soul finds joy in the good that is in 
every creature, what is more excellent than that joy which is found [intellectually] in 
the Word of God through whom all things have been made?' (Augustine, De genesi 
ad litteram 12.34.67). 
680 Augustine, Sermo 227.  
681 This too is how he understands the 'very good' benediction of Genesis 1.31, 
which is in some sense parallel to Plotinus' privileging of the beauty of the whole 
over the beauty over any given part (Ennead 1.6) ² as a blessing not specific to 
humanity, but precisely to all creation, and humanity insofar as we are correctly 
placed in Paradise, tending it without ruling over it. Thus the paradigmatic 'man' is 
man-as-priest (Conf. 13.22.32), humanity striving ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum, 
the image which Augustine sees here as primarily 'generating sons by the gospel' by 
means of sacramental perceiving and judging the 'sons' that are from eternity 
seminally present in all humanity and indeed in all created matter (13.23.34).  
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possess. This is somewhat paradoxical - the final end ('there we shall rest and 
see, see and love, love and praise')682 is a moment of self-possession, but only 
by the self-divestiture of praise.  Unsurprisingly, this synchronic teleology is 
Trinitarian for Augustine, who develops what might be termed an 'ontology 
of missions' by defining the being of phenomena as the revelation in time of, 
and so the ever-passing shadows cast by, the eternal Trinitarian processions 
of light.683 The manifestations of these missions in time (most dramatically at 
the Incarnation and Pentecost) appear seminally, as well; the Son and Spirit 
DUHERWKSDUDGR[LFDOO\
VHQWZKHUH>WKH\@DOUHDG\>ZHUH@«DSSHDULQJWRWKH
eyes of men' where they had previously been 'hidden' [secreti].'684  
The final cause - both diachronic and synchronic - of theurgical 
imaginative vision is the last piece of scripture cited in De trinitate: 'We say 
many things and do not attain, and the sum of our words is, he is all things 
[universa est ipse].'685  No text better presents the paradoxes of the theurgical 
imagination, in which the robust ontological difference between creator and 
created is the very principle that unites them in an astonishing est:  the very 
verb esse, rather than the simple vehicle of identity, changes from intransitive 
to transitive, from tautological to teleological.  If the shortcomings of the 
phenomenological tradition have one unifying symbol, it would be this:  a 
failure to recognize the rich elasticity of the verb sum, esse, fui, futurum. 
                                                          
682 Augustine, De civ. dei 22.30. 
683 Augustine, De trinitate 4.1ff. 
684 Augustine, De trinitate 3.3. 
685 Sirach 43.27. 
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It is no surprise then that, in the multifaceted Paradise which can 
signify a place, the third heaven, the moral joy of humanity, and the Church, 
corporeal and imaginative visions are not discarded but perfected.686  The 
liability for error, the lack of clarity, which alone hinders our natural attempt 
to imaginatively perceive a thing and so immediately to imaginatively allow it 
to offer its praise to its Creator, is, in the teleological fullness of Paradise, of 
course eradicated; this, however, without destroying but in fact redeeming 
corporeal and imaginative vision, as well as fulfilling without satiating our 
RQWRORJLFDOGHVLUHIRU*RG,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHIDPRXVSURPLVHWKDW´7KHUH
ZHVKDOOUHVWDQGVHHVHHDQGORYHORYHDQGSUDLVHµVKRZVWKHSUHJQancy of 
rest with (an altogether restless) praise; the promise is not the satiation of 
desire but the replacement of distentio with a pure extentio.  Praise is, as 
Augustine says of the Alleluia, an endless novelty687 RIZKLFK+HLGHJJHU·V
angsty search for novelty in boredom is a cheap parody, and one for which 
rest is a simple precondition: if one likes, rest is the simplicity of being, an 
epoche which brackets out distractions, so that one can see, and love, for the 
first time.   
At the close of De civitate dei$XJXVWLQHFODLPVWKDW¶:HRXUVHOYHV
shall become that seventh day,·688 i.e. the church at rest, the Sabbath that is a 
VLJQ$XJXVWLQH·VFRVPRVLVSURIRXQGO\PXVLFDOSHUKDSVWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJ
of an octave in his eight day theology, wherein the Church, like a suspended 
7th QRWHIRUHYHUUHDFKHVIRUWKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKHRFWDYH¶FRQVHFUDWHGE\WKH
                                                          
686 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 12.36.69. 
687 Augustine, Sermo 362. 
688 Augustine, De civ. dei 22.30. 
  
 
 
294 
 
resurrection of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal rest not only of the Spirit, 
EXWRIWKHERG\DOVR·,WPLJKWVHHPRGGWRUHDGVXFKD*UHJRULDQepektasis 
LQWR$XJXVWLQLDQUHVWEXWDIWHUDOO¶ZKDWRWKHUHQGGRZHVHWIRURXUVHOYHV
WKDQWRUHDFKWKDWNLQJGRPRIZKLFKWKHUHLVQRHQG·" 
 
Conclusion:  What good is phenomenology for Augustine?  What good 
is Augustine for phenomenology?   
It is only by an admittedly circuitous route that the phenomenological 
tradition has brought us to such considerations.  The ritualized education of 
the soul towards a sensitivity to the thoroughly theological ontology which 
VHHPVWRXQGHUOLHPXFKRI$XJXVWLQH·VWKRXJKWRQWLme and the self is under-
conceptualized in even the best of this tradition, represented in this thesis 
primarily by Jean-Louis Chrétien.  And though I have consistently tried to 
show ways in which the accounts of Marion and Chrétien in particular 
gesture towards this theological metaphysics, the burden of this work is in 
the end quite the opposite.  In this final essay, the reader will have noticed 
that the trajectory of the argument tends less towards establishing the 
practice or ideology of phenomenology as necessary for the study of 
Augustine, and more towards establishing the reading of Augustine as a 
necessary corrective practice for phenomenology itself.  To some extent, the 
recent phenomenological interaction with Augustine acknowledges at least 
implicitly that, since its beginnings, phenomenology has claimed the bishop 
of Hippo as an intellectual forefather.  But the more it has let him speak on 
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his own terms, and the more it has respected the differences between him 
DQGWKHWUDGLWLRQ·VPRUHLPPHGLDWH fathers (Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, and 
the great ghost of Descartes who hovers over much of their thought), the 
PRUHKHKDVIRUJHGDGLVFLSOLQDU\UROHLQWKHWUDGLWLRQ·VRZQSUDFWLFHVDQG
thought.  The principle and most obviously germane elements of his thought 
² the self as a quaestio, the destabilizing force of temporality, and especially 
the role that beings can have in illuminating truth to the subject ² rarely 
appear in Augustine divorced from the metaphysical, traditional, historical 
and theological scaffolding which support them in his own thought.  This 
can, and should, make the phenomenologists uncomfortable, and to some 
extent it has. 
I do not wish to deny that the close and careful and inventive 
readings of Marion and Chrétien has been worthwhile, from the perspective 
of Augustinian scholarship.  At the very least, as my opening invocation of 
Isidore of Seville can remind us, the phenomenological guide to Augustine 
points to an interesting confluence of the tradition inaugurated by Husserl 
with theological thought, in a manner that Husserl himself would have been 
surprised to have seen.  Their readings of Augustine shed an eclectic and 
YLJRURXVOLJKWRQVRPHRI$XJXVWLQH·VFHQWUDOWH[WVDQGWKHLULQFUHDVLQJ
openness to including more peripheral texts ² the sermons and the biblical 
commentaries most of all, but also De trinitate ² begin to insist on an 
XQGHUO\LQJFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQDOORI$XJXVWLQH·VZRUNLQYDULRXVJHQUHV7KH
most profound contribution that their forays have made, in my eyes, is the 
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insistence that, in some sense, the relationship between the self and the world 
is a hermeneutical key that can unlock many of the doors in the Augustinian 
worldview.  This insistence is not entirely novel to the phenomenologists, but 
they have held onto it with a rigor that surprises, and it is indeed hard to 
imagine such a rigor existing without the grumpy idiosyncrasies of a 
Heidegger or even a Derrida.  I have argued in this final chapter that their 
experiment, the attempt to read as much of Augustine as is possible through 
this lens, in many ways succeeds, and that though they have not yet tried to 
include many central elements of Augustinian philosophy in this purview, it 
is not difficult to imagine the shape of the argument that they would make, if 
they were more ideologically open to considering them.   
In closing, I would like to assert a hope:  I hope that Marion and 
especially Chrétien continue to wrestle with Augustine for this reason.  
Indeed I expect that the themes I have suggested might fit into their work so 
far ² Platonism, teleology, the imagination, ritual, biblical hermeneutics, the 
Trinity ² would find a more fruitful exposition and exploration at their hands 
than they have at my rather amateurish attempts, especially given that they 
gesture at times to a sincere willingness to let Augustine reconfigure their 
own practice.   If they are willing to continue to let Augustine challenge the 
boundaries between philosophy and theology, between metaphysics and 
Scripture, between thought and life, I suspect that they would have 
considerably more light to shed on Augustine.  More to the point, I suspect 
that Augustine would have much more light to shed on them. 
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